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GENERAL PREFACE
THE following essay is essentially metaphysical: it is an attempt towards providing a corrective for the phenome­
nalism which, in one form or another, directly or inversely, prevails 
in our era. Though I am an Englishman, my belief in metaphysics 
as the source of genuine knowledge of the Real is naked and 
unashamed; but metaphysics must not be conceived as remote 
from the most fundamental interests of the spirit of m an: the circle 
of human knowledge returns upon itself, and its most remote 
point is therefore to be found among our most intimate and deeply- 
felt concerns. Here as elsewhere it is incompleteness that gives the 
sense of distance; and similarly it is incompleteness in the form 
of an overweening phenomenalism that drives the human mind 
to the pictorial, and therefore inadequate, metaphysics of popular 
theology and superstition. T o  the negations of naturalism the 
spirit must oppose affirmations: if possible, adequate affirmations, 
but in any case affirmations. Thus where naturalism would confine 
human existence to the period between birth and death (and rightly, 
taking duration to be the sole meaning of existence), the spirit 
(equally rightly) demands something more. But not rightly if  it 
too accepts the ultimacy of temporal existence, and thence infers 
a life after death (and even before birth) conceived as more of a 
similar kind. But the affirmation is but an illegitimate form of the 
correct refusal to accept a limited period of time as an adequate 
expression of human reality. Nevertheless it is surely clear that no 
one really desires an immortal existence thought of as an infinitely 
extended persistence through time. The dull round of endeavour 
and failure, of trust and deception, of achievement and recurrent 
dissatisfaction, while ‘to-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow, 
creeps in this petty pace from day to day’ , can only be an intolerable 
oppression to the alert imagination. Dusty death itself would be 
better than such immortality. ‘T o  think of life as passing away is 
a sadness, to think of it as past is at least tolerable.’1 Our vaunted 
immortal hopes are but dallyings with eternity; they cannot slake 
‘the undying thirst that purifies our mortal thought’ ; but even that 
thought, so purified, may become ‘a fountain of gardens, a well
1 The Early Life of Thomas Hardy, by F. E. Hardy, p. 275.
of living waters’. Other source of satisfaction for us there is none; 
an immortality of ever-increasing insight and enjoyment may, 
indeed, seem less tantalizing, but that is not the destiny of beings 
cast upon this bank and shoal of time, however it may be in the 
strong level flight of angelic existence. For us, temporal life is 
largely repetitive and accumulative, with but few periods of that 
triumphant consciousness which is our reality and our highest 
good. And what we really desiderate is always more reality, and 
less of the idle repetition that belongs to mere time, and, with 
accumulation, is still the characteristic even of our duration. Our 
good is our eternity.
He who would escape from the dilemma thus presented must 
therefore find a way between its horns by probing deeper and 
into the very springs of finite duration. But he will thus, as 
it seems to me, discover a way better than either mortality or 
immortality: the via aeternitatis. For the threatened night of 
mortality, no less than the nightmare of immortality, is the bogey 
of a fabulist metaphysics using the figures of an all-comprehend­
ing phenomenology; and many of the questions which receive ficti­
tious, or even merely verbal, answers in our popular superstitions 
(whether orthodox or eccentric) are, in an analogous fashion, 
questions which should never have been put, or should have been 
put otherwise. It is my hope that the discussions which follow 
may be useful in making it possible to put some of the great 
problems in a form in which they resolve themselves, or at least 
become capable of resolution as human insight increases, and with­
out resort to imagination or a shoddy mysticism. There are many 
questions, genuine enough, which we can put, but which as yet 
we cannot answer; but questions which are essentially unanswerable 
are not genuine questions at all, and the sooner their fictitious 
character is exposed the better it will be for the progress of the 
human spirit, and its deliverance from the foiled searchings of 
mortality.
The use of the Latin title Aeternitas for an English work is an 
apparent affectation that requires some defence. The justification 
is the more readily here set forth because it gives the opportunity 
thus early for a concise warning against the age-long ambiguity 
of the term ‘eternity’ (and its equivalents), the exposure and 
resolution of which is the main purpose of the book. Latin titles 
have been used for purposes of convenience and brevity (as
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perhaps with Laurie’s Synthetica); or as neutral ground, where a 
work has been published simultaneously in two modern languages 
(as with M r. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus); or 
to distinguish a new discussion of topics already considered by 
the same author under an English title (as with Principia Mathe- 
maticd)\ none of these excuses, however, could apply to the 
present work. But my justification is even more ample: for the 
word ‘eternity’ commonly carries, has long commonly carried, and 
perhaps always will carry, the significance of an unending duration, 
from eternity to eternity. This conception was formally, and very 
definitely, set aside by Spinoza in favour of another, the nature 
of which is fully discussed in the following chapters. One of the 
minor conveniences of the plague of tongues is that we thus have 
several forms of the same word which become available for the 
divergent meanings which important terms are apt to accumulate. 
Thus since Spinoza, not for the first time, but perhaps more 
clearly than any other modern writer, re-defined the term, and 
since he wrote in the Latin, it has seemed an obvious conve­
nience to appropriate the term aeternitas for his peculiar shade 
of meaning. It would have been a real affectation to have per­
sisted in this throughout the book, but its selection as the title 
must be taken as an emphatic reminder that a vital distinction is 
to be drawn between eternity on the one hand, and sempiternity, 
immortality, or aevum on the other.
Further, although I have accepted the Spinozistic distinction 
between time and duration, it would have been an equal affectation 
to refuse to use the term ‘time’ as generally equivalent to duration 
where no special consideration demands their separation. Common 
speech and the practice of important philosophers demand this 
small concession to usage and style.
The description of the essay as A  Spinozistic Study rather 
than as ‘A  Study of Spinoza’ is intended to be significant, and 
is connected with what I have already said about the aim of the 
work. A  Spinozistic study cannot fail also to be in some consider­
able measure a study of Spinoza, while many a study of Spinoza 
has failed simply because it has not been a Spinozistic study. But 
the distinction thus drawn does not imply that it is intended to 
put aside critical exposition in favour of biased defence, or even 
of insistence upon a mere ipse dixit (though no modern philosopher 
has a stronger claim than Spinoza to the dogmatic mantle of
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Aristotle); it means that I prefer philosophy itself to the mere 
history of philosophy, and the creative spirit to the inert letter of 
an unfinished system.
T he purpose of the book is thus not limited to a precise and 
conservative exposition of the views of a philosopher long dead, 
and, it may be thought, superseded, with respect to a set of 
topics far removed from the living thought of our own day. Such 
inquiries would in themselves be respectable and, however mis­
leading when wrongly estimated, even valuable in no mean degree; 
here they are not to my taste, and in this study of the underlying 
principles of the system of Spinoza my aim has rather been to 
discover clues to the solution of some ultimate problems that in 
recent times have come into the focus of philosophical attention 
(though not always as problems), and which can only be met on 
the plane of metaphysics. Thus where I have found it necessary 
to discuss important points of interpretation, scholarship, use, or 
criticism in detail, I have done so by way of ‘Excursus’, and I hope 
that by this device, without failing to satisfy the just demands of 
exact scholarship, I have prevented the main argument from be­
coming too academic or overloaded with minutiae. The general 
reader may thus, if  he wishes, avoid discussions which happen to 
lie beyond his immediate requirements, by occasionally omitting 
an Excursus.
The main interest, then, will be neither in the dateless intellectual 
history of ideas, nor in a precise historical account; but, starting 
from the main principles and premisses of Spinoza, and preserving 
a general historical sense sufficient to avoid gross anachronism, 
I shall permit myself to subordinate to the broad current of 
intellectual development the nicer historical distinctions between 
what was written and what was thought, between what was 
thought and what was implied, between what was implied and what 
may be inferred. I shall step freely from the order of history to the 
order of the intellect, as the inquiry itself may demand: and if  the 
method is thus hybrid, it will be the better suited to the nature and 
complexity of the topics, and my own incompetence. For the 
main difficulty of philosophy, resulting from its extreme univer­
sality and concreteness, is that its problems cannot be segregated, 
so that their solution is not likely to result either from positive 
eclecticism, or from what I may call the negative eclecticism which 
is involved in a piecemeal criticism of this and that system viewed
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from the outside. Even less is to be expected from mere negation. 
The philosopher must attempt to get inside: either inside the facts 
(which is very difficult), or inside some sound interpretation of 
the facts (which is difficult enough), or he is as little likely to 
succeed in his investigation as a man is to become a painter by 
reading about technique, looking at pictures, or listening to expert 
criticisms. The sole way to become a painter is to paint, and the 
way to become a philosopher is to philosophize. Thus, successful 
philosophizing is either that very rare and godlike thing, brilliant 
creative synthesis; or it is an attempt to acquire an inside view of 
the method and development of some original thinker, followed 
by a further, and speculative, explication and application of his 
principles in new regions of the Real. These methods need not, 
indeed must not, altogether exclude each other; but the latter is in 
the main the mode here attempted.
Thus I have not been obtrusively precise in distinguishing 
between the mere ipsissima verba of Spinoza and what is added 
under demand as speculative exposition and development. And to 
critics who profess to find more of speculation than of exposition in 
my book, declining from the lofty anonymity of Spinoza himself,1 
I rep ly: would that it were so! But it seems to me that what I have 
added is little more than emphasis to that which, after many years 
of study and reflection upon the writings of Spinoza, and in spite 
of the wide unanimity of commentators in a contrary interpretation, 
appears to me to be the plain teaching of the main texts. I should 
say that I have done no more for the philosophy of Spinoza than, 
in another medium, I have attempted to do for his facial lineaments. 
For Spinoza does not deliver his profoundest thoughts in a casual 
conversation through the mediation of a biased interpreter; more 
than any other philosopher, perhaps, he has suffered from the 
antithetical expositions of rationalizing historians of philosophy. 
Hegel has supplied the impulse, Leibniz the occasion. But what 
is needed above all in Spinoza-study is the study of Spinoza. The 
situation is curious: the traditional exposition having uniformly 
failed to explain certain doctrines, so definitely and so pointedly 
advanced that they could not be overlooked (I may name the 
absolutely crucial doctrine of the eternity of the human mind), 
the overwhelming majority of expositors have passively preferred 
to believe that Spinoza was inconsistent, stupid, or even dishonest,
1 Cf. Opera Posthuma, Praefatio, § 7.
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instead of concluding, as they ought to have done, that the ex­
position was faulty. For to no philosopher could these epithets 
be less suitably applied, and it has been my constant aim to 
discover the true place and significance of the main teachings of 
Spinoza in a coherent system of thought, and to do so without 
preciosity, eccentricity, or callow prejudice.
I have said that my essay is metaphysical: that is to say, it passes 
beyond phenomenology. What I mean in this connexion by 
‘phenomenology’ will I hope become clear in the course of the 
argument, and I have discussed the general question in the Preface 
to Part II I ,1 where it will be seen that in my opinion a theory which 
fails to carry its intellectual criticism up to the ultimate analysis 
of time and temporal productivity cannot rightly be named ‘meta­
physics’, or the theory of Real Being: it is at most phenomenology, 
Now phenomenal or enduring being is not more real than eternal 
metaphysical Being, but is a limitation of it, and represents a 
descent towards that pure time which is non-being. I do not mean 
that metaphysics has no concern with time, or with phenomena, 
or even that these are illusory, but that they must not be taken as 
ultimate uncriticized and underived data. From the supreme 
amplitude of the eternal Being which includes, explains, integrates, 
and transforms all temporal differentiations and phenomena, 
metaphysics must deduce time-, and my own aim has been no less 
than this. The phenomenology which I censure is that alone 
which, put forward as ultimate metaphysics, is the source, either 
of phenomenalism (where the bias of the thinker is subjectivistic), 
or of the demand for ‘natural piety’ (where his bias is realistic); and, 
that my condemnation is thus limited, is confirmed by the sections2 
in which I myself introduce phenomenological matter (though, 
I must add, these give no more than the merest sketch, sufficient 
for my purpose, but making no claim to provide an adequate, not 
to say exhaustive, account of their topics even from the point of 
view of phenomenology).
I have ventured to include, as Part III, some criticisms of 
contemporary writers who, for one reason or another, have been 
described as Spinozists; I have done so because it has afforded an 
opportunity, both of emphasizing what I regard as fundamental in 
the philosophy of Spinoza, and also of relating m y main thesis to 
some prominent modern speculations. But again, in no case do 
1 pp. 221-7. 2 e.g. Chapter VII.
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I regard the treatment as exhaustive, or even as adequate from the 
point of view of the writers themselves ; nevertheless I hope that 
in each case it is just, as well as adequate in relation to my own 
thesis ; and though I do not subscribe to the dictum of Pope with 
reference to authors, that ‘none e ’er can compass more than they 
intend’, it does seem sufficient if  they reach that modest limit.
The description of Professors Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and 
Whitehead, as Spinozists, is not my own, and I have accepted it 
as in a real sense significant in spite of my own judgement that, 
one and all, they miss or reject the very essence of Spinozism. The 
ascription of the title to M . Bergson could only be his own: it is 
most happily expressed in a letter addressed to M . Brunschvicg 
in connexion with the celebrations of the two hundred and fiftieth 
anniversary of the death of Spinoza, and I quote this as an addition 
and offset to my treatment of the writer in the course of my book : 
‘ Il était réservé à Spinoza de montrer que la connaissance intérieure 
de la vérité coïncide avec l ’acte intemporel par lequel la vérité se 
pose, et de nous faire “ sentir et éprouver notre éternité” . C ’est 
pourquoi nous avons beau nous être engagés, par nos reflexions 
personnelles, dans des voies différentes de celles que Spinoza 
a suivies, nous n ’en redevenons pas moins spinozistes, dans une 
certaine mesure, chaque fois que nous relisons Y Éthique, parce que 
nous avons l ’impression nette que telle est exactement l ’altitude 
où le philosophe doit se placer, telle est l ’atmosphère où réellement 
le philosophe respire. En ce sens, on pourrait dire que tout 
philosophe a deux philosophies : la sienne et celle de Spinoza.’1 
The few remarks on K ant2 are no more than a natural mode 
of introducing the central contention of Part III as to the place 
of time in phenomenology and in metaphysics.
Some paragraphs of the essay have already been printed as parts 
of an article on ‘ Spinoza’s Conception of Eternity’, in Mind, N .S. 
X X X V II ,  pp. 283-303, and cordial acknowledgement is offered 
to the Editor of that journal for his kind permission to reprint them 
here. It may be noted that this article and the chapter bearing the 
same title are not, even in scope, identical.
M y obligations are so many and so heavy that I have not the 
heart to search them out in detail and set them down at length. 
Speculative passion a man must bring with him to philosophy: 
but speculative restraint is the last best lesson that he learns. I f  
1 Chronique des Lettres françaises, No. 26, 1927, pp. 202-3. 2 pp. 229-33.
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I have learned it in any measure it has been from m y honoured 
teacher, quondam senior colleague, and unfailing friend, Professor- 
Emeritus A . Seth Pringle-Pattison. No one has more consistently 
shown that the unremitting pursuit of genuine speculative unity, 
which is the ultimate end of all true philosophy, involves a constant 
resistance to the seductions of easy but premature unifications, with 
their inevitable train of mere negations. T o  him also I trace the 
inception of my study of Spinoza, and though the work itself has 
been entirely independent, both in the process and, meo periculo, 
in the result, I desire respectfully and affectionately to acknowledge 
his interest, encouragement, and inspiration over many years.
O f my obligations to Bernard Bosanquet I can speak more freely: 
indeed my indebtedness to his later speculations will escape the 
notice of no observant reader. Professor Pringle-Pattison has 
spoken1 of the deep impression produced among the young 
graduands and graduates at Edinburgh by Bosanquet’s two courses 
of Gifford Lectures when they were delivered in the old Logic 
Classroom in 1911 and 19x2. Such an influence, at such a time, 
when our minds, very naturally, were wholly turned to philosophy, 
was little likely to be effaced by subsequent development under 
other influences and impulses, and I am gladly aware of its per­
sistency in my own case. That there is a very definite limit to my 
obligations to Bosanquet I have not attempted to conceal: it has 
always seemed strange to me that one so well adapted to the study, 
both by temperament and by scholarship, should have been content 
(if that is the right term) with so defective a knowledge of Spinoza. 
Spinozism has often been asserted to be the characteristic fault 
of the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet; but it seems to me, 
on the contrary, that a more unreserved devotion to a genuine 
Spinozism would have lifted them free from the lingering, if  re­
fined, anthropomorphism which is the transcendental root of the 
whole post-Kantian tradition, and has even, and not inexplicably, 
been advanced from time to time as its main significance.
What I owe to other contemporary thinkers lies open to v iew ; 
and not least in the passages devoted to their criticism. It is 
possible that I have learned even more from some whom I have 
dared to censure than from many with whom I more cordially 
agree; but in the intellectual conflicts of true philosophers the 
‘ direst’ enemy is oftentimes the most ‘ dear’.
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1 Bernard Bosanquet, by Helen Bosanquet, pp. 125-7.
T o Professor Joachim I am especially indebted for his kindness 
in subjecting a great part of my argument to an austere but not 
unsympathetic scrutiny, which I have found most useful and 
instructive. M y obligations to him do not, of course, make him 
responsible for anything in the book: nevertheless I hope that, if 
he should think it worthy of a second perusal, he will judge that 
his criticisms and suggestions have not been in vain.
In the passage of the book through the press I have received 
valuable help, which I desire gratefully to acknowledge, from 
some of my friends and colleagues in the University of Leeds : 
especially from M r. E. E. Bibby whose scholarly aid has extended 
over the whole range of proofs. M y warm thanks are also due 
to M r. A . E. Teale, who at an earlier stage read the whole in 
manuscript, and by his keen interest and care rendered the book 
much less imperfect than it would otherwise have been.
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PART I
THE ASCENT FROM TIME TO ETERNITY
3713
B
C H A P T E R  I
TIME, DURATION, AND ETERNITY
N E  of the most promising features of recent philosophy
is its concern with the crucially important group of topics 
commonly and summarily denominated ‘The Problem of T im e’. 
Mr. Alexander has said that ‘the most characteristic feature of the 
thought of the last twenty-five years’ is ‘the discovery of T im e’ ; 
‘ I do not mean’, he says, ‘that we have waited until to-day to 
become familiar with T im e ; I mean that we have only just begun . . .  
to take Tim e seriously’ .1 Unless to take Tim e seriously means to 
accept its ultimate reality and positive character,2 he ought, 
perhaps, to have said ‘begun again’ ; for it could hardly be main­
tained that the great philosophers of the earlier modern period, 
even if  we include Kant himself, did not take these topics seriously. 
Certainly there was no subject about which Spinoza was more in 
earnest, and it is because his less sophisticated reasoning on these 
matters may, nay must, cast light upon recent speculations in the 
same direction, that I have attempted an exposition and discussion 
of his conception of the relations of time, duration, and eternity.
It is a common view of the philosophy of Spinoza that it is a 
system, finished, self-complete, rigidly logical, and altogether un­
convincing ; to be taken or left as a w hole; i f  failing at any point, 
failing in a ll; in se ipso totus, teres, atque rotundus. How little it is 
a finished system becomes increasingly clear to the serious student 
as he becomes more and more familiar with it, and begins to feel 
within it the movement of the ever-striving mind of its author. 
For its rigidity is that of the vertebrate rather than that of the 
Lucretian atom. Unfinished and plastic as it is in its details, 
inconsequent and pleonastic in its repugnances, it does not lack 
a firm and effective framework on which to function and from 
which to develop. In its fundamental principles it is as definite and 
rigid as any philosophy has ever been; and surely that is precisely 
where clearness and certainty, not to say validity, are essential.
1 Spinoza and Time, p. 15.
2 This may or may not be implied in Mr. Alexander’s explanation: ‘to realize 
that in some way or other Time is an essential ingredient in the constitution of 
things’ (Lot. «'£.).
There is no doctrine more fundamentally determinative in 
Spinozism than that of eternity and of its relations with duration 
and time. It may, indeed, be justly asserted that the conception 
of eternity is the very essence of the theory o f Spinoza. Few 
philosophers have realized (though many have suspected, and some 
have acted upon the suspicion) how essential it is for a thinker 
on ultimate subjects to face and, if  possible, to resolve the problems 
of time before proceeding to lesser matters. For this is the chart 
and compass and rudder without which it is dangerous or even 
fatuous to venture out of the port of mera experientia on to 
the high seas of speculation. Early in his career Spinoza made up 
his mind on these topics, and the main lines of his doctrine of 
time and eternity are already laid down in those Cogitata M eta- 
physica which he appended to his geometrical version of Descartes’s 
Principia Philosophiae and published with it in 1663.1 His views 
suffered no reversal or essential change right down to his untimely 
death in 1677: not that his thoughts turned away from such 
subjects; on few things perhaps did he meditate more often, for 
few are more often brought to the notice of the serious philo­
sopher whatever may be the special direction of his inquiries, and 
certainly none are more worthy of his consideration.
It is because it has not always been remembered that the order 
of discovery often reverses the logical order, i.e. the real order of 
nature, that Spinoza’s doctrine has commonly been misinterpreted 
as purely negative. In the order o f nature eternity is prior to 
duration, and duration prior to time; in the order of discovery 
time and duration are prior to eternity. And the position is not 
rendered more safe for the unwary by Spinoza’s attempt to identify 
the order of nature and the order of exposition by the use of the 
synthetic or geometrical form in his chief metaphysical work, the 
Ethics.
DURATION AND TIM E
I begin with what is more familiar to us, viz. duration. This term 
is used by Spinoza much in the same way as those of us who are 
not mathematical physicists use the term ‘tim e’. It means per­
sistence, or as Spinoza expresses it, ‘existence in so far as it is 
conceived as a certain form of quantity’ ,2 or ‘the indefinite continu-
1 See Excursus II (pp. 64-71).
2 ‘[Existentia], quatenus abstracte concipitur, et tanquam quaedam quantitatis 
species.’ {Et’n. II, xlv, Sch.)
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ance of existing’ .1 It is from this quantitative character of duration 
that there arises the notion of measuring it, which gives us time in 
the Spinozistic sense: for observing that some things persist longer 
than others, and that certain motions (such as the apparent 
motion of the sun round the earth, or that of the moon, or the 
swing-swang of the pendulum) are regularly recurrent, we find it 
convenient to take the durations thus marked off as standards by 
which to measure the durations of other things. Such measure­
ments are conventionally absolute, but really relative, for the 
standard is itself a quantity, and is, therefore, as measurable as 
any other quantity. Tim e is for Spinoza the measurement of 
duration by such comparisons;2 whence it follows immediately 
that time is not a real thing, but only an ens rationis.
I have already indicated one of the main sources of misunder­
standing in the study of Spinoza, but perhaps equally insidious, 
though by no mean peculiar to it, is the operation of the idola 
fori. This affects every exoteric philosophy so far as its leading 
ideas are expressed in terms rendered ambiguous by varied philo­
sophical application; and more especially so where the ambiguity has 
been accentuated by prior or subsequent vulgar use. From this 
danger there is but one refuge, namely, precise definition, which 
the geometrical order affected by Spinoza is specially qualified 
to provide and emphasize.3 Thus it is of the first importance 
to take Spinoza’s definitions very strictly, and very seriously; 
popular, or more recently accepted philosophical usage, must not 
be permitted to render them ambiguous, either in their content 
or in their actual use. That is a simple logical demand, to 
comply with which should be tolerably easy; and yet the history 
of Spinoza-study shows that some of the simplest distinctions are 
most easy to overlook. It has often been supposed, for example,
1 ‘Indefinita existendi continuatio.’ {Eth. II, Def. v.)
2 Cf. Cog. Met. I, iv : ‘Durationem a tota alicujus rei existentia non, nisi 
ratione, distinguí. . . . Haec autem ut determinetur, comparamus illam cum 
duratione aliarum rerum, quae certum, et determinatum habent motum, haecque 
comparatio tempus vocatur. Quare tempus non est affectio rerum, sed tantum 
merus modus cogitandi, sive, ut jam diximus, ens rationis; est enim modus 
cogitandi durationi explicandae inserviens.’ Cf. also Eth. II, xliv, Cor. i, Sch.)
3 Cf. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, I, Aph. lix: ‘At Idola Fori omnium 
molestissima sunt; quae ex foedere verborum et nominum se insinuarunt in 
intellectum . . . Unde fit, ut magnae et solennes disputationes hominum doctorum 
saepe in controversias circa verba et nomina desinant; a quibus (ex more et 
prudentia mathematicorum) incipere consultius foret, easque per definitiones in 
ordinem redigere.’
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that Spinoza must deny that the conception of duration, or any 
part of it, is predicable within the Real, merely because he denies 
that the Real is in time. W e may well imagine how he might protest 
that it would be as absurd to deny that there can be a triangle, 
because Extension itself is not triangular, or because it is not 
composed of points, lines, or figures.1
Tim e, then, cannot belong to the Real because it is a mere 
measure and its standard is arbitrary. It is an ens rationis, a mode 
of thinking, or rather of imagining (or misthinking) duration. It 
is a mere ‘aid to the Imagination’.2 Nor can there be an absolute 
measure of duration, for absolute measure implies an absolute 
u n it; but such a unit cannot be found in the duration of any exist­
ing thing, since that duration is indefinite. The duration of a thing 
is not proportioned to its absolute nature or power, but depends 
upon vicissitude; it may be long or short as the circumstances of its 
occurrence determine. In the absence of obstruction each thing 
would endure for ever. In the absence of its producing cause the 
duration of a thing cannot even begin.3 Here, therefore, no 
absolute unit can be found. Nor can it be found in the nature of 
duration itself: for duration is neither discrete4 nor is it a whole.5
1 An acute reader may detect a false suggestion in the analogy; this will be 
amply corrected in the text, and without the destruction of the essential point.
2 ‘Auxilium Imaginationis’ (Ep. xii).
3 ‘Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio. Dico indefinitam, quia per 
ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest, neque etiam a 
causa efficiente, quae scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.’ 
(Eth. II, Def. v et Explic.) ‘Nulla res, nisi a causa externa, potest destrui.’ 
(Eth. I ll, iv.) ‘Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, 
nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam. . . . [Hie] conatus . . . nullum 
tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.’ (Eth. I ll , vii et viii.) ‘Nulla res 
singularis potest ideo dici perfectior, quia plus temporis in existendo persevera- 
vit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit; quandoquidem 
rerum essentia nullum certum, et determinatum existendi tempus involvit.’ 
(Eth. IV, Praef.)
4 ‘Idem ..  . est Durationem ex momentis componere, quam Numerum ex sola 
nullitatum additione.’ (Ep. xii.) The statement at the end of Cog. Met. I, iv, 
only verbally contradicts this statement: ‘Notandum hie in duratione . . . quod 
major, et minor concipiatur, et quasi ex partibus componi, et deinde quod 
tantum sit attributum existentiae, non vero essentiae’ ; here the point is not that 
duration is composed of atomic moments, but that its nature is arbitrarily 
divisible precisely because it is not a whole or maximum, and again not composed 
of such ultimate minimal parts.
5 ‘Attendendum est ad hunc loquendi modum, ab aeterno; eo enim nos aliud 
prorsus hoc loco significare volumus, quam id, quod antehac explicuimus, ubi 
de Dei aeternitate locuti sumus. Nam hie nihil aliud intelligimus, quam dura­
tionem absque principio durationis . .  . Talem autem durationem non posse dari,
It provides for itself no absolute units either in the form of minima 
or in the form of a maximum. Every duration, however small, 
is a duration, and therefore divisible; every duration, however 
great, is partial, and therefore extendable. But in the absence of 
an absolute unit of measurement, time as a single absolute measure 
of duration cannot belong to the Real.
But what of duration itself, ‘the indefinite continuance of exist­
ing’, can this not be predicated of the Real ?
Tw o distinguishable, but not altogether separable, arguments 
maybe extracted from Spinoza’s discussions of this important point.
(i) In the first place, ‘duration is existence conceived abstractedly 
as a certain form of quantity’, and this quantity is conceived as 
divisible. But the Real cannot be divided, for it must be self- 
complete and without limit. An incomplete reality is incompletely 
real. ‘No attribute of Substance can be truly conceived from which 
it would follow that Substance can be divided.’1 For if  it were 
divided a section would either be the same as the whole (and 
therefore not a section at all), or different from the whole (and 
therefore incapable of being produced from it by mere division), 
or again, nothing real at all (which is absurd, since the Real cannot 
be wholly constituted of unreal sections).2
Now it might be objected that, whatever may be the value of these
dare demonstratur. Nam si mundus iterum ab hoc puncto retrograderetur, 
nunquam talem durationem habere poterit: ergo etiam mundus a tali principio 
usque ad hoc punctum pervenire non potuisset. Dices forte Deo nihil esse im- 
possibile; est enim omnipotens, adeoque poterit efficere durationem, qua major 
non posset dari. Respondemus, Deum, quia est omnipotens, nunquam dura­
tionem creaturum, qua major ab ipso creari non possit. Talis enim est natura 
durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit concipi, sicuti numerus.’ (Cog. 
Met. II, x .) Though the argument of this chapter is mixed with purely Cartesian 
matter, I cannot doubt that the statements concerning eternity and duration are 
genuinely Spinozistic. (Cf. Eth. II, Def. v et Explic.) Duration which is relative 
to finite created existence is not determined by the essence of the created thing 
that endures, nor by its efficient cause, but by the constellation in which it 
exists. And the duration of that constellation, again, is determined by its 
constellation; and so on to infinity. Tota Natura, the infinite constellation of 
constellations, though it too is created, does not, for itself, endure, but is 
eternal. (Cf. below Chapter V et seqq.) On the whole question of the use I have 
made of the Cogitata Metaphysica in these chapters, see Excursus II (pp. 64-71).
1 ‘Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur, sub- 
stantiam posse dividi.’ (Eth. I, xii.)
2 The argument is summary and general, and thus not, either in scope or 
arrangement, identical with Spinoza’s own demonstration of Eth. I, xii (which 
is fashioned to suit its place in the geometrical order). It will be seen, however, 
that the arguments overlap.
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arguments, they apply not only to duration but also to Extension; 
and yet Spinoza retains Extension as an Attribute of the Real, but 
denies that duration may be truly predicated of the whole. M r. 
Alexander has, indeed, objected to this procedure, and has sug­
gested a renovation of the Spinozistic theory in which duration 
would be retained as one of the Attributes of Substance.1 Spinoza 
himself, I am confident, had he been compelled to agree with the 
arguments in question, would have rejected Extension with dura­
tion, rather than have accepted duration as an ultimate Attribute of 
Substance co-ordinate with Extension. But he would not in fact have 
recognized the dilemma, for he holds that we need not, and indeed 
cannot, conceive Extension as divisible, though in imaginative think­
ing we tend to do so. ‘I f  we regard it as it is in intellectu . . . 
which it is very difficult to do, then . . .  we shall find that it is 
infinite, one, and indivisible.’2 And this is the true view of 
Extension: ‘ It is mere foolishness, nay insanity, to say that ex­
tended Substance is made up of sections or bodies really distinct 
from one another. It is as though one should attempt by the 
aggregation and addition of many circles to make up a square or 
a triangle or something of totally different nature.’3 Nor need we 
concentrate our attention solely on the intellectual conception of 
Extension in order to realize that it cannot be composed of sections 
(i.e. o f extended sections, for the term ‘unextended section of 
Extension’ involves a contradiction), for even finite magnitudes 
may be incommensurable (that is, incapable of commeasurement 
in terms of a single u n it: Spinoza gives the example of the varia­
tions in the distances between the circumferences of two eccentric 
circles one of which lies wholly within the other). A  finite, divided, 
discrete extension is an object of the Imagination; but in re­
moving the limitations we do not lose Extension itself, or even its 
quantitative character: but we find that the conception of an in­
finite, single, indivisible Extension involves no contradiction, and 
may be accepted as true.
1 In Spinoza and Time.
2 ‘Si autem ad [quantitatem], prout in intellectu est, attendimus . . . quod diffi- 
cillime fit, turn, . . . infinita, única, et indivisibilis reperietur.’ (Eth. I, xv, Sch.)
3 ‘Quare ii prorsus garriunt, ne dicam insaniunt, qui Substantiam Extensam 
ex partibus, sive corporibus ab invicem realiter distinctis, conflatam esse putant. 
Perinde enim est, ac si quis ex sola additione et coacervatione multorum circu- 
lorum quadratum, aut triangulum, aut quid aliud, tota essentia diversum, con­
fiare studeat.’ (Ep. xii.)
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It has not always been realized, or not with sufficient vividness, 
that the contention of Spinoza is that this correction is impossible 
with duration conceived as a quantity; for duration is essentially 
divided, since it is characterized by the irreversible distinction 
of past and future, or its equivalent. I f  the Real endures, then 
its existence is always essentially divided into what has already 
occurred and what has yet to occur. I f  that distinction implied 
no real division it would be a mere distinction of reason and not 
what it essentially is, the real character of duration. Nor does 
the fact that the line of division moves steadily towards the future 
render the division less fatal, for every emergent instant is in turn 
the division of past and future, and to heal the breach at one place 
is the same as to create it at the next or at another.
It might perhaps be contended that a similar argument is possible 
with Extension, which is characterized by distinctions such as right 
of and left of, above and below, nearer and farther, &c., and that 
these as much imply the real division of Extension as past and 
future imply that of duration, and that hence Extension too must 
be denied of the Real. In that contention I have here only an 
indirect interest, and it may therefore be sufficient to say that these 
spatial distinctions arise from the arbitrary selection of points or 
axes of reference, i.e. they belong to Extension limited and divided, 
and not to Extension illimitable and indivisible. How far the latter 
is really intelligible (as distinct from imaginable) it does not fall 
to me at the moment to discuss, but in any case the point of the 
argument is that past and future, before and after, earlier and later, 
are asymmetrical correlatives essential to time, while right of and 
left of, above and below, nearer and farther, are arbitrary per­
spectives of a symmetrical relation of distance.1
1 i.e. the spatial distance of two points, A and B, being mutual, is directionally 
ambiguous (either from A to B, or from B to A), and hence all spatial directions 
are relative to an origin (and to axes of reference also where only one point is 
given); but the direction of time is an absolute datum, which we can mentally 
ignore, but not really defeat.
I am anxious to make clear the precise point of my argument for a funda­
mental distinction of space and time: it is not that ‘before and after’, &c., are 
any less or any more dependent on the selection of a point of reference than are 
‘right and left’, &c.; in this respect they are both arbitrary. This fact has some­
times been expressed in the form that the distinctions in question depend upon 
the presence of an ‘experiencing subject’ whose ‘here-now’ constitutes the point 
of reference. Against that assertion two objections may be urged, the second of 
which leads to a new expression of the distinction under discussion:
(1) There is a mischievous subjectivism in the form of expression, since an 
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It is, perhaps, to some extent the failure to give due weight to 
this essential difference between duration and Extension that has 
led some commentators to deplore a double use of the term 
‘duration’ in Spinoza, or at any rate to overlook the necessity and 
importance of the admitted variety of his expressions. Thus it
‘experiencing subject’ only questionably or remotely has a ‘here’ ; it is the ex­
tended body of the observer that occupies spatial position, whereas both mind 
and body possess temporal character and position. In so far, however, as the 
mind may legitimately be regarded as observing spatial perspectives from the 
position occupied by the body, this otherwise important objection might be met 
by the substitution of Mr. Whitehead’s term ‘percipient event’, or its equivalent, 
for the ‘experiencing subject’.
(2) But further, the ‘percipient event’ is not in precisely the same way 
essential in the space-system as it is in the time-system. A is to the right of B 
from the point of view of the ‘percipient event’ X ; from the point of view of 
another ‘percipient event’ Y, B may be right of A, or over it, behind it, &c. 
Similarly we can perhaps suppose that A which is before B for ‘percipient event’ 
X, is after, or simultaneous with, B from the point of view of ‘percipient event’ 
Y, on the same principles as, for example, the lightning flash, which is simultane­
ous with the sound of the thunder (for both issue at once from the same electrical 
occurrence), appears to an observer at a distance to be earlier; or again, an 
auditor supposed to be travelling away from a concert hall at a speed greater 
than that of sound waves, would hear the programme repeated (if his sense of 
hearing were sufficiently keen) with the order of the notes reversed (I say 
nothing of their character). Now the crucial difference between the arbitrariness 
of spatial and temporal distinctions respectively is brought out if we suppose the 
‘percipient event’ to be situated not at X  or Y but at A : then in the space-system, 
B is neither right nor left, &c., of it, but simply ‘at a distance’, which is a sym­
metrical relation of A and B (for ‘near’ and ‘afar’ are measurements of the dis­
tance, and therefore relative to some further element); whereas in the time- 
system, B must be either ‘before’ or ‘after’ A, i.e. in a temporal direction, which 
involves a relation that is not itself determined by measurement, but by direct 
and absolute intuition. This intuition, of course, primarily determines the 
temporal relations of changes in the ‘percipient event’ A, so that a judgement 
concerning the temporal relations of A and the external event B must involve 
an estimate which may be at fault owing to unrecognized factors within the total 
perceptual system; but the essential temporal basis of the judgement is the 
intuition of temporal direction, which involves ‘before and after’ (i. e. an 
asymmetrical relation). Spatial distance, on the contrary, as we have seen, does 
not involve ‘right of’ or ‘left of’, ‘above’ or ‘below’, &c., but simply ‘distance’ in 
a reversible direction, which is only ‘distance to right’, ‘to left’, ‘below’, &c., 
in relation to external axes of reference which are easily provided in ordinary 
experience by the body of the extended observer. Thus while spatial distinction 
unambiguously involves only relative direction, temporal distinction involves 
an absolute direction; for events are not ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ only in relation to an 
external point of reference. From a given point of time any other point of time 
is at a temporal distance absolutely before or after-, but from a given point of space, 
on the contrary, any other point of space is simply at a spatial distance, and only 
relatively right or left. Thus, with space, direction is relative to a system of axes 
arbitrarily selected, or at least to an origin (and this is so even with a one­
dimensional space); but with time, though ‘before and after’, like ‘right and left’,
is said that in one mood Spinoza denies that an eternal being 
endures, since an eternal existence is not the same thing as indefinite 
persistence; while in another mood he speaks as i f  eternity were 
the same thing as complete and continuous duration (as opposed 
to time which is a divided fragmentary imagination of duration). 
But the inconsistency is in duration itself and not in the mind of 
Spinoza, and there is very good reason for his variety of emphasis, 
— a reason which is only obscured by our inveterate tendency to 
use the argument respecting the purification of Extension as i f  it 
would apply to duration by the mere change of terms from measure, 
body, Extension, to time, duration, eternity, respectively. The 
past and future alike seem continuous undivided durations, needing 
only to be taken without limitation and division and so applied to 
the Real. Further, the present which divides the continuous past 
from the continuous future is no fixed instant, but continuously 
moves from the past towards the future. Hence the division is 
continuously healed, it does not cicatrize the past. Thus we readily
are correlatives, the direction of time from ‘before’ to ‘after’ is an absolute 
datum.
It might, perhaps, be objected that the spatial distinction of ‘right’ from ‘left’ 
is also an absolute unchangeable datum within the ‘percipient event’ (and thus 
not capable of simple mathematical expression); I reply: undoubtedly, but 
whereas I can as easily move from left to right as from right to left (or if I cannot 
nothing in the nature of space prevents it), I find that I cannot move from after 
to before, but only from before to after: I am compelled by the very nature of 
time. Again, by changing my position I can really reverse the spatial relations 
of A and B, so that what was on the right is now on the left; but by no means 
can I reverse the real flow of time, and make what is before a given date come to 
be after it, and what is after it come to be before. I change my date, but I do not 
change the order of dates. I do not deny that we date external occurrences 
differently as a result of our motion relative to them; but that concerns our 
judgement of our spatio-temporal relations with the events, and not what I have 
asserted to be the essential basis of every judgement of temporal sequence, viz. 
the actual flow of time in the ‘percipient event’, which is directly intuited, but 
which, though in Spinoza’s sense it may be ‘imagined’, is not therefore only 
psychical. (Cf. below, p. 18, note x.)
The implications and full significance of the principles I have suggested, 
and the reservations required in their application, can only become clear as we 
proceed; and I need only add that I do not wish to suggest that Spinoza explored 
the relations of space and time along the lines indicated above: speculative 
exposition must be distinguished from crude anachronism; and Spinoza’s 
definite and grounded acceptance of Extension, and rejection of duration, as 
ultimate characters of the Real, point towards the principles suggested, and 
therefore depend upon the acceptance of their main purport. It is one of the 
underlying pretensions of this book that such exposition need not be speculative 
in the bad sense, unless by philosophy we mean history, and by history 
chronicle.
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overlook the division of duration as a perceptual accident. I shall 
have to consider in due course the attempt to construct an 
‘objective’ duration free from the peculiar limitations of crude 
experienced time, but it would be well to say at once that no way 
of escape from our present difficulties is to be found in that 
direction. W e have to make terms with the facts of our durational 
experience, for which the present is real, and past and future only 
real in so far as they were or will be real as present. It is to the 
present, therefore, that we must look for the peculiar quality of 
temporality which consists in a certain ‘sense’ or direction. For 
my purpose at the moment it matters little whether we say that 
events succeed each other in time, or that time itself flows, for the 
essential thing is that duration can only be understood as involving 
an irreversible order of procedure, and it is this that constitutes 
the hybrid character of duration, which again necessitates a double 
treatment of it as at once illusory, and also a clue to the Real. 
Duration is not a new dimension of Extension, for it is insufficiently 
determined as a mere quantity. W hat is essential to it is flow, 
‘sense’, direction, the peculiar variety of temporal quality dis­
tributed through its quantity. Duration includes both externality, 
or extensive quantity (which it shares with Extension), and also 
transformation or temporal quality (which is its differentia). From 
these two threads there is woven that successiveness which is an 
inescapable characteristic of our crude duration; and it is this 
imperfection, involving as it does negation, which incapacitates 
duration for survival in the Real. This it is which corresponds 
with Spinoza’s denial that an eternal being endures.1 But the 
qualitative element of duration does not in itself include (or perhaps 
imply) negation, and in so far as it does not, it may survive the 
processes of intellectual criticism, and so be recognized as a 
character of the Real. It is that which corresponds with Spinoza’s 
suggestion that duration is the ‘ imaginative’ expression of eternity.2
T he reason, then, why Extension survives the process of in-
1 e.g. Eth. I, Def. via et Explic. : ‘Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, 
quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur. Talis enim 
existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, proptereaque per 
durationem, aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio et fine 
carere concipiatur.’
2 e.g. Ep. xii: ‘Porro ex eo, quod Durationem, et Quantitatem pro libitu 
determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a Substantia abstractam concipimus, et 
illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur Tempus, et Mensura.’
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tellectual criticism and is admitted as an Attribute of Substance, 
while duration is excluded, is that temporal relations are essentially 
asymmetrical in a sense in which spatial relations are not. The 
latter demand no special (or spatial) variety in their terms, while 
the former can only be sustained in so far as periods differ from 
one another in date or epoch as well as in distance. T h ey must 
differ in temporal quality as well as in temporal quantity: only 
thus can they be in succession. Remove the distinctions of past 
and future, earlier and later, before and after, and you remove the 
essential character of any kind of duration, and all that is left is a 
neutral form of externality like a dimension of space. But duration 
is like Extension in one feature only, viz. its quantitativeness or 
measurability (avoiding the question as to which of these terms 
is the best expression of the common quality); in its specific 
quality it is wholly different, a fact that is too often slurred over in 
modern speculations, especially those of a mathematico-physical 
type.
(ii) These considerations lead naturally to the second and 
connected set of objections to predicating duration of the Real: 
the temporal variety' of an enduring being is necessarily a successive 
variety. Whether we think of crude perceived duration with its 
distinctions of past, present, and future, or of historical time with 
its distinctions of earlier and later (and Spinoza, recognizing 
both, argues mainly against the latter, the former being obviously 
inapplicable to the Real), the elimination of succession involves 
the destruction of duration. For without change there can neither 
be the apprehension of duration nor, indeed, duration itself; and 
without succession no change. But change cannot be predicated 
of the Real, which can lack nothing, and can surrender nothing. 
Hence in the being of Substance ‘there can be no earlier or later’ ; 1 
‘in the eternal there is no when, before, or after’ .2
Hence the existence of the Real cannot be an enduring existence, 
not even an existence enduring without beginning or end.3
How, then, is the existence of the Real to be construed? It is 
not a quantity measurable by time. It does not endure: its exist­
ence is not divisible into earlier and later stages. But neither is it
1 ‘Deo nullam tribuí posse durationem: nam cum ipsius esse sit aeternum, hoc 
est, in quo nihil prius, nec posterius dari potest.’ (Cog. Met. II, i.)
2 ‘ In aeterno non detur quando, ante, nec post.’ (Eth. I, xxxiii, Sch. ii.)
3 Eth. I, Def. viii, Explic.
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momentary. In one of his earlier works M . Bergson expressed 
the strange misconception that for Spinoza ‘the indefinite duration 
of things was all contained in a single moment, which is eternity’ ,1 
a conception comparable with the even more common opinion, 
that for Spinoza all multiplicity fades into mere identity in Natura, 
and all content into vacuity: the ‘dark shapeless abyss’ of ‘eternal 
night’ , as Hegel has it. For Spinoza, I must contend, the Real 
occupies neither one moment nor many moments, nor even infinite 
moments. God does not exist ab aeterno or in aeternum, for that 
would imply a duration than which no longer can be conceived; 
he does not exist in a moment, for that would imply a duration 
than which no shorter can be conceived: and both are impossible, 
‘for the very nature of duration is such that it is always possible to 
conceive a duration greater or less than any given duration.’ 2
M ust we then conclude that what does not exist in one, many, or 
infinite moments of duration does not exist at all ? B y no means ; 
there can be no doubt whatsoever that Spinoza himself draws, and 
could draw, no such conclusion. No one has ever doubted that 
he at least attempts to establish a species of existence beyond the 
limitations of duration and time, though many have asserted or 
implied that the attempt has failed. Such existence beyond the 
limitations of duration he calls an eternal existence, and I must 
next attempt an explanation and discussion of some of the inter­
pretations which have been put upon this conception, and make 
some introductory suggestions of my own.
ETERNITY
There is a short and easy way of interpreting Spinoza’s con­
ception of an eternal existence, which, though in itself wholly 
unsatisfactory, and, as applied to Spinoza, easily refuted, must 
first be mentioned, both because it is the common interpretation 
and also because it has some apparent basis in expressions used 
here and there by Spinoza himself. T h e reading to which I  refer
1 ‘La durée indéfinie des choses tenait tout entière dans un moment unique, 
qui est l’éternité.’ {Les Données Immédiates, p. 159.) The same interpretation is 
applied in L ’Évolution Créatrice to the ‘philosophy of Ideas’ : ‘Passé, présent, 
avenir se rétractent en un moment unique, qui est l’éternité’ (p. 346), whence 
the criticism ricochets to Leibniz, and (less clearly here) to Spinoza, who are 
said to move towards the conclusions of ancient philosophy (p. 382).
2 ‘Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit 
concipi.’ {Cog. Met. II, x.)
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is not precisely that which takes eternity as synonymous with 
necessity, but one which, realizing that necessity is at most the 
logical proprium of an eternal existence, and not its metaphysical 
essence, attempts to construe the existence which is eternal as 
equivalent to, or framed on the analogy of, the being which belongs 
to necessary truths such as the propositions of Euclid, or established 
scientific principles. And prima facie there is some evidence in 
Spinoza’s own expressions for such a view; the Explanation, for 
example, which is added to the Definition of eternity at the 
beginning of Part I  of the Ethics seems to bear this significance: 
‘Such existence’ (i.e. eternal existence) ‘is conceived as an eternal 
truth, like the essence of the thing’ ,1 and the reader has to get 
well within the mind of Spinoza before it becomes clear to him 
how little such words bear the meaning that is by us most readily 
attached to them. For eternal truths, in the customary use of the 
term, do not ‘exist’ at all as such; they ‘hold’ , or (to use the current 
philosophical cliché) they ‘subsist’ . And that is so because they 
are abstractions; in Humian phrase, they are ‘relations of ideas’ 
and not ‘matters of fact’ . They may be true of existence, they are 
not themselves existences.
Now Spinoza’s point of view is essentially different, and nearer 
to that of Plato in the ancient world than to that of Empiricism in 
the modern, though it is remote from both. For him as for Plato, 
I think, to know truly is to know the real; an eternal truth is, in fact, 
the same thing as an eternal reality. It is not an abstract universal 
or the connexion of abstract universals.2 That is the point of the 
last part of the sentence quoted: ‘an eternal truth, like the essence 
of the thing’.1 He speaks elsewhere of the essence of a man as 
an eternal truth,3 and the first Corollary to Eth. I, xx, runs: ‘ It
1 ‘Talis enim existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur.’
2 Nor is it a mere essence without existence: ‘Quod autem Authores errarunt’ 
(i.e. in ascribing duration to God), ‘in causa est Io quia aeternitatem, ad Deum 
non attendentes, explicare conati sunt, quasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae 
contemplatione intelligi posset, vel quid esset praeter divinam essentiam, atque 
hoc iterum inde ortum fuit, quia assueti sumus propter defectum verborum 
aeternitatem etiam rebus, quarum essentia distinguitur ab earum existentia, 
tribuere, ut cum dicimus, non implicat, mundum ab aeterno fuisse; atque etiam 
essentiis rerum, quamdiu ipsas non existentes concipimus ; eas enim turn aeternas 
vocamus.’ (Cog. Met. II, i.) (The italics are mine. Perhaps I may be allowed to 
digress so far as to say that Spinoza is not arguing that the world was created in 
time, as has often been supposed, but only that the term ‘ab aeterno' confuses 
duration with eternity.)
3 Eth. I, xvii, Sck.
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follows that G od’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.’ 1 
T o  a correspondent who asked him point-blank whether things 
and their modifications are eternal truths, he answered ‘ Certainly’ , 
adding that the only reason why he had not constantly so described 
them was because he wished to avoid this very misunderstanding, 
since the term ‘ eternal truth’ is also applied to general propositions 
(such as ‘Nothing comes from nothing’) which have no particular 
existence on their own account.2
A n eternal existence, therefore, must not be explained, or 
explained away, as framed on the analogy of the validity of abstract 
or universal scientific principles or mathematical truths. For the 
whole paraphernalia of abstract universals of every kind had been 
definitely relegated to the Imagination, i.e. to knowledge of the 
lowest, the most confused, and the emptiest kind, resulting rather 
from impotence than from the power of the mind.3 ‘ It is above all 
necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from . . . real entities . . . 
and not to pass over to . . . abstractions and universals, neither for 
the sake of deducing anything real from them, nor of deducing 
them from anything real, for in either way we interrupt the true 
progress of the intellect.’4 Spinoza’s own theory of Reason (the 
second kind of knowledge) is based upon a new kind of abstraction 
in which universal principles are embodied in universal singulars, 
and truths of reason are no longer mere ‘relations of ideas’ , but 
also and essentially relations of existences, infinite and eternal. 
Truth is never a mere relation of ideas thought of as pictures or 
images in the mind, for an idea is the essentia objectiva of a thing, 
and to have an idea is to know a thing, so that to have a true idea 
is to apprehend reality. T he eternity of scientific truths, therefore, 
rightly conceived, i.e. as truths about universal singulars, and not 
mere hypotheses, is not definable by negation as timelessness
1 ‘Hinc sequitur . . . Dei existentiam, sicut ejus essentiam, aetemam esse 
veritatem.’
2 ‘Omnino. Si regeris, cur eas aetemas veritates non voco? respondeo, ut eas 
distinguam, uti omnes solent, ab iis, quae nullam rem, reive affectionem explicant, 
ut, ex. gr. a nihilo nihil fit.’ (Ep. x.)
3 Cf. Eth. II, xl, Sch. i.
4 ‘Possumus videre, apprime nobis esse necessarium, ut semper a rebus 
Physicis, sive ab entibus realibus omnes nostras ideas deducamus, progrediendo, 
quoad ejus fieri potest, secundum seriem causarum ab uno ente reali ad aliud 
ens reale, et ita quidem, ut ad abstracta, et universalia non transeamus, sive ut ab 
iis aliquid reale non concludamus, sive ut ea ab aliquo reali non concludantur: 
utrumque enim verum progressum intellectus interrumpir’ (De Intell. Emend., 
Op. Post., p. 388.)
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simpliciter, but as existence of a certain kind. T he assertion that 
it is the nature of Reason to conceive things sub quadam specie 
aeternitatis 1 must not be interpreted as if  its objects were ‘ ideal 
contents’ or ‘floating ideas’ applying at any point of time because 
independent of time-reference; its objects are individual existences 
which are also universal by reason of their amplitude.
There is another interpretation which may be, and has some­
times been, given to Spinoza’s conception of eternity, which, 
though perhaps less inadequate in intention than the view I have 
been discussing, is still irreconcilable with his general trend, no 
less than his definite assertions. It approaches most nearly to his 
view of eternity as the form under which Reason, rather than the 
third kind of knowledge (scientia intuitiva) conceives things. In 
so speaking I am careful to correct the suggestion that the phrase 
‘sub quadam specie aeternitatis’ is to be taken as implying that there 
is in the Real more than one kind of eternity, and, at the moment, 
to draw only the distinction between two modes of apprehending 
it: its formal conception by Reason, and its concrete enjoyment 
in scientia intuitiva. W hat remains to be said in this Part bears 
very largely upon that distinction and its implications, and I need 
not dwell upon it more particularly at the moment.2 The interpreta­
tion of eternity to which I am now turning will best be expounded 
as the end of a process of intellectual criticism of crude perceived 
duration, in the course of which it will be convenient to review the 
main stages in the process of the refining and transforming of time, 
as well as some other attempts which have been made to determine 
the nature of eternity, and to bridge over the ‘ broad ditch’ between 
the temporal and the eternal.
1 ‘De natura Rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere’. (Eth. 
II, xliv, Cor. ii.)
2 For a discussion of the significance of the phrase ‘sub quadam specie aeterni­
tatis’ see Excursus III (pp. 99-104).
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HO W EV E R  the distinction may be expressed, between time as it is found in mera experientia, and time as the refined 
product of critical thought: whether as that of ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ duration, of duration as perceived and as conceived, 
of imagined as opposed to real time, of microcosmic and macro- 
cosmic time, the distinction remains, and is in some degree 
unavoidable.1 Already, in commonplace experience, a duration 
divided into past, present, and future is distinguished from a dura­
tion lengthened out beyond the individual subject’s remembered 
and anticipated duration, by the addition of time experienced or 
lived-through, not by him, but by earlier and later generations. 
And these further periods which were, or will be, to their possessors 
divided into past, present, and future, are by the present individual 
subject incorporated as wholly past or wholly future. Thus begins 
the criticism of duration which must lead on either to real duration 
or to the reality that is manifested as duration.
I begin, then, with crude, ‘ lived-through’ or experienced, ‘sub­
jective’, duration. It is, as I have noted, distinguishable into a 
growing past, a moving present, and a diminishing future. The 
remote past fades away into forgetfulness, and the less remote future 
into the unforeseen. M any moments of the individual’s past are
1 The alternatives named indicate what must be definitely emphasized, viz. 
that the distinction of ‘subjective’ time and ‘objective’ time is not equivalent 
to that of ‘psychical’ and ‘physical’ time. I am not, that is to say, distinguishing 
between the duration experienced by the mind in the flow of its own ideas, and 
the duration ‘lived-through’ by physical things. According to my use of the 
term, ‘subjective time’ belongs to the body of the experient equally with his 
mind (which is the essentia objectiva of the body). It is distinguished from 
‘objective time’ which is attributed equally to all bodies and animae whatsoever 
(in my view falsely, because impossibly). I shall argue in the issue that time is, 
strictly in this sense and only in this sense, ‘subjective’, i.e. it belongs only to the 
parts of the Real, as parts, and not to the whole, to the microcosm and not to the 
macrocosm. I would willingly have used a less ambiguous term if one had been 
available: ‘relative time’ and ‘absolute time’, of course, will not do; and ‘micro- 
cosmic’ and ‘macrocosmic’ time, though perhaps more accurate and less 
dangerous, are still not quite accurate (for time belongs, on my theory, to the 
microcosm only in so far as it fails to be a genuine /coojuos), and have for other 
obvious reasons been rejected. (Cf. also below, p. 122, note 2.)
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remembered as having once been present and future, and the 
remainder are judged to have been s o ; his present moment may 
be observed by him in the process of ceasing to be future and 
becoming past; his anticipation shows the moments of his future in 
turn becoming present and then past. These facts, and their 
extended correlates, constitute the peculiar unsuitability of crude 
duration as an Attribute of the Real. T he conception of the present 
is especially ambiguous, and though its ambiguity infects both the 
past and the future, yet these in the main retain their ‘sense’ and 
quality, though the past continually recedes and incorporates new 
moments, and the future continually approaches and yields its 
earlier parts to the present and the past. Still, what is once past 
remains past, and what is now remote in T im e’s untravelled space 
will for long remain future. But the present is never for two instants 
the same, and if  yesterday never was and to-morrow never comes, 
the present, though it always is, is never the same. Such, indeed, 
is the prima facie character of temporal process:
Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do our minutes hasten to their end;
Each changing place with that which goes before . . .
Each moment in turn approaches, is appropriated, becomes present, 
and then for ever ceases to be present. But it is only while a 
moment is present that its reality is actually lived-through and 
experienced; what is enjoyed is the present, and though the past 
may be remembered, and the memory of it be enjoyed, and the 
future expected, and its expectation enjoyed, the past itself that 
we remember, and the future that we expect, are never as such 
enjoyed. T he active power of the individual is confined to the 
present, or proceeds beyond it only through the present; it alone 
is actual, it alone is for action. No character of crude time is more 
vital than the distinction between the past that has been and no 
longer is, the present that is, and the future that will be but is 
not y e t; it is the basis of the common-sense habit of ‘crowning the 
present, doubting of the rest’, or rather, doubting of the future 
as a mere idea, accepting the past as fact indeed, though beyond our 
cure, but regarding the present as the real living fact. Here the 
individual seems to touch reality, and has his foothold in being; 
and the reality of the past or future, such as it is, is measured by 
the degree in which the past leaves its traces, or the future casts
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its shadow, upon the present. Actual achievements and real 
possibilities are such alone as have their grip upon the present, 
and they draw their reality, such as it is, from what alone is real 
in the primary, or rather the primitive, sense of the term, viz. 
the present.
When, however, attention is directed to the analysis of this real 
present, it is found to be thoroughly ambiguous, and even con­
tradictory, in meaning, in content, and in value. For it is at once 
the minimum in which action occurs, a cross-section having no 
durational width, and again a real period of duration, though short 
and ragged at the edges. T he enjoyed present is a ‘specious’ 
present, as the phrase goes, and is thus a real part of duration, and 
not the mere cross-section dividing past and future which analysis 
demands; the individual’s impact on time is not instantaneous but 
durational. And, indeed, since every part of duration must, as 
Spinoza says, be a duration, it is obvious that the experienced present 
of time must be ‘specious’, for if  it were not, crude time would con­
tain no present, and all perception would disappear. Nor would 
there remain a remembered past or an anticipated future, for with 
the present would go also all possibility of memory or expectation.
T he specious present, therefore, may be expected to repeat all 
the old difficulties o f duration in general, and to add some new 
ones of its own. I f  it is a duration, is it again distinguishable into 
past, present, and future? Undoubtedly within the present of 
ordinary experience the distinctions of past and future can still 
be detected, for this present is normally longer than the minimum 
sensibile of duration. But there can be no present within the present, 
no specious present of the second degree leading towards an in­
finite regress; for the inner present is the minimum sensibile of 
duration that, from the point of view of the subject, is not an 
extended duration at all, and is not composed of durations. Within 
the specious present, therefore, there is only past and future, but 
now these are not distinguished as that remembered from that 
anticipated, for all the parts of the specious present are alike 
perceived; indeed, it is thus that it is present. T he past and the 
future that are perceived within the present are distinguished only 
by their observed order, strengthened by the connexion of what 
came first with what is remembered, and of what comes last with 
what is expected. It follows also from the durational nature of the 
specious present that its observed order is already a temporal
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order, in which past and future are perceived (and not remembered 
or expected) as distinct from each other in temporal quality as 
well as temporal quantity. Under analysis, therefore, crude dura­
tion is seen to be composed of a past period that is remembered, 
a future period that is expected, and a present period composed of 
a perceived sequence of past and future. Further, it follows that 
the supposed superior reality of the present over the past and future 
belongs to it not as present (for the mere present is never experi­
enced, and the specious present is already past and future), but 
is due to its special relation to the active percipient. It is not 
that the present is 'more real than the past or future, but that 
perception is judged to be a more reliable source of knowledge than 
memory or anticipation, and again, that the specious present is avail­
able to us for action in a way in which further past and future are 
n ot; and since all the parts of crude time aré equally real or unreal, 
I may go further and deny explicitly that past, present, and future 
belong to time itself as such; they must be ascribed to the relations 
of the individual ‘subject’ (corporeally and mentally) with the 
contents of time.
The first step, then, in the refinement of duration involves the 
elimination of the present as a period or duration (it is at most a 
minimum sensibile which only has magnitude for an imaginary 
outside observer with keener faculties). W e are left, then, with 
a past composed of a large period that we remember or recon­
struct and a short period that we perceive, and a future composed 
of a short period that we perceive and a longer period that we 
expect, anticipate, or imagine. Perception shades off into memory 
and expectation, while past and future are connected within that 
perceived duration which we call (and rightly call) the ‘specious’ 
(i.e. the pretended or apparent) present.
Spinoza, of course, knew nothing about the modern conception of 
the specious present, which was popularized by William James and 
had first been put forward in James’s own time, though Spinoza’s 
doctrine that all the parts of duration are durations implies that 
the experienced and ‘lived-through’ present is a duration and 
not a minimum or a cross-section of time. There are, however, good 
reasons for its introduction and criticism here, for not only was it 
exploited by Royce 1 as an analogue of the eternal character of the 
Absolute, but the resulting conception is an approximation to one
1 See Excursus I (pp. 34-42).
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of the most popular theories of the M iddle Ages, which must 
have been well known to Spinoza, viz. the conception of the 
existence of God as an eternal ‘now’, as we find it put forward by 
Boethius in his treatise On the Consolation of Philosophy. These 
reasons are amply sufficient to warrant a further consideration at 
this convenient point of these twin conceptions of eternity as a 
specious present including the whole of time without the loss of 
its temporal distinctions, and, in the words of Boethius, ‘a total and 
perfect possession of an endless life all at once’ .1
AN IN FIN ITE SPECIOUS PRESENT
Enough has perhaps been said to bring out the essential nature of 
a specious present as a ‘duration block’ containing past and future 
without serious confusion in a single act of perception. Its element 
of past is neither remembered nor inferred; its element of future 
is neither inferred nor expected; but both are directly perceived 
in a moving stretch of duration.
T he first difficulty about the extension of this conception to the 
whole of time is that in our experience the present is not at rest, 
but moves continuously forward towards the future, so that time, 
as it were, sweeps back through it. Thus its parts are distinguished 
as past and future. I need not argue that the past elements of the 
specious present are recognized as past by their continuous fading 
away into the past that is not perceived but only remembered; and 
its future elements as future by their shading off into the future 
that is expected or imagined, but not perceived; but I must and do 
argue that if  the distinction is not made in that way it is necessary 
to rely upon the closely connected fact that relative to time in 
general the specious present moves on, the past elements being 
the earlier ones and the future the later ones. But in a specious 
present comprehending all duration limitation disappears, and 
with it the relative movement of time in general and the specious 
present. Time-distinctions, therefore, on either hypothesis, are 
lost, and duration becomes a motionless order of externality. W ith 
some such conception I shall have in due course to deal, so that 
I need not consider it at the m oment; but in any case it is not a 
time-order, and hence cannot be described as an infinite specious 
present. It is important to notice what is the exact point of the
1 ‘Aeternitas igitur est, interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.’ 
(Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, V, Prosa vi.)
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criticism I have been urging, viz. that a movement of time within 
the specious present implies, indeed is identical with, the movement 
of the specious present through time, so that time-distinctions 
cannot be supposed to remain within a specious present which, 
comprehending all time, cannot move through time. Nor can 
resort be had to the alleged infinity of time, for ‘infinity’ must here 
mean either ‘indefmity’, in which case no specious present can 
comprehend all time; or the ‘wholeness’ of time, in which case 
a second difficulty with respect to the extension of the specious 
present to the whole of duration must be met, viz. that there can 
be, and can be conceived, no whole of duration, and much less can 
such a whole be imagined: ‘the very nature of duration is such 
that it is always possible to conceive a duration greater or less than 
any given duration.’1 This fact alone,— that duration cannot be 
taken as a whole, because however much is taken there must 
always be more, and not more of the same symmetrical nature (as 
with Extension), but more characterized by serial temporal rela­
tions which, though transitive, are essentially asymmetrical, and 
thus by unique temporal qualities— this consideration alone would 
have provided Spinoza with ample grounds for rejecting the con­
ception of an infinite all-inclusive specious present.
AN ETERNAL ‘N O W ’
I f  the notion of an infinite specious present, in spite of the im­
pressive character of our experience of present extended duration, 
would not have commended itself to Spinoza, still less did the 
monstrous current transcript o f it, according to which the existence 
of God is an eternal unmoving Now. Here the attempt had been 
made to establish a whole including infinite duration without loss 
of temporal relations and qualities. This involves at least the 
possibility of temporal order without transiency by the immediate 
recognition of before and after as such, without the later ever 
having been future or the earlier ever becoming past.
Although this ancient conception has by frequent emphasis 
gathered an air of religiosity, has indeed become a piece of ‘shabby 
theology’, it was in its time a respectable speculation, being, among 
other things, an attempt to reconcile the omniscience of God 
(involving foreknowledge of human actions) with human freedom 
and responsibility. More generally speaking, it was an attempt
1 ‘Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit 
concipi.’ (Cog. Met. II, x.)
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to relate the conceptions of eternity and duration without re­
ducing either to illusion. As I have already noted, a very clear 
account of it is to be found in the treatise of Boethius which 
directly and indirectly exercised so great an influence over 
Western thought. He expounds it in the sixth Prosa of the fifth 
Book of The Consolation o f Philosophy as propaedeutic to a discus­
sion of Divine prescience, which he infers is to be called Providentia 
rather than Praevidentia.1 Although Boethius does not, of course, 
put forward the notion of the eternal present as an extension of 
our experienced ‘saddlebacked present’, it is interesting to notice 
that .he tells us that our own momentary present bears some likeness 
to that enduring present which is experienced by God.2 He is care­
ful to insist that from the eternal present which is the form of the 
existence of God, past and future are neither excluded nor do they 
lose their quality as earlier and later, but the whole of infinite time 
is perfectly possessed at once; an eternal existence has always with 
it ‘the infinity of moving time’.3 T he essential thing in such an 
experience is after all not its infinite extent, but its single posses­
sion ‘all at once’4 yet without loss of the specific temporal flavour; 
and the main limitation of a temporal existence is its inability to 
comprehend the whole space of its life at once. Thus the passage 
from an eternal existence to a temporal is at once a broadening out 
and a diminution. T he eternal ‘ diminishes from the simplicity 
of a present into the infinite quantity of future and past tim e’.2 
This process, however, is not to be taken as a change from quali­
tative moment to a quantitative whole (though there are not
1 Cf. below: p. 25, note 1.
z ‘Hunc enim vitae immobilis praesentariunj statum infinitus ille temporalium 
rerum motus imitatur: cumque eum effingere, atque aequare non possit, ex 
immobilitate deficit in motum, et ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infini- 
tam futuri ac praeteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitae suae plenitu- 
dinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, 
illud quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur aemulari, 
alligans se ad qualemcumque praesentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: 
quae, quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibus- 
cumque contigerit, id praestat, ut esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non 
potuit, infinitum temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum est ut continuaret 
eundo vitam, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit permanendo.’ (Boethius, 
De Consolatione Philosophiae, V, Prosa vi.)
3 ‘Quod igitur interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, 
ac possidet; cui neque futuri quicquam absit, nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum 
esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper 
assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem.’ (hoc. cit.)
4 ‘Tota simul.’ (hoc. cit.)
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wanting signs of a tendency towards such a conception), for 
Boethius quite clearly asserts that though past is not past to God, 
nor future future, but all time is present, yet the knowledge of 
God contains ‘the infinite spaces of present and past time con­
sidering all things as if  they were now being done’1— a conception 
which might perhaps be interpreted as meaning that past is not by 
God remembered, nor the future by Him expected, but that past 
and future are perceived together, while remaining in sequence; 
which seems to be precisely the notion of an infinite specious 
present. Certainly no more favourable interpretation of the eternal 
present can be extracted from the statements of Boethius, and if  it 
is incorrect it must be put aside in favour of the notion of an eternal 
Now, similar to that ascribed to Spinoza himself by M . Bergson, 
which I have already proscribed, that ‘the indefinite duration of 
things was all contained in a single moment, which is eternity’ . 
I f  the former interpretation made time unreal, even more certainly 
the latter makes eternity unreal. I return, therefore, to the main 
path of the inquiry.2
Let us fix our attention next upon the terms past, present, and 
future, as they are predicated of the parts of duration. Is past time, 
for example, different in itself from future time? And i f  so, what 
changes in any period as it passes the gates of the present ? I speak 
of the periods of time, and not of their empirical contents, for we 
know but too well, we are too often reminded, that ‘Tim e that 
gave doth now his gift confound’. It cannot be supposed that a 
future period is any less or any more a time than one that is past, 
nor that in itself it gains or loses anything more than relative date 
when it becomes past. Past and future refer, as I have said, rather 
to the relations of enduring active beings with time. M y past is
1 ‘Itaque sí digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum 
quidem aeternum, mundum vero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur 
omne j udicium secundum sui naturam, quae sibi subj ecta sunt, comprehendit: 
est autem Deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status: scientia quoque ejus, 
omnem temporis supergressa motionem, in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae, 
infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens, omnia quasi jam gerantur, in 
sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praescientiam pensare velis qua 
cuneta dignoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam 
deficientis instantiae, rectius aestimabis. Unde non Praevidentia, sed Provi- 
dentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituía, quasi ab excelso 
rerum cacumine cuneta prospiciat.’ (Boethius, De Consol. Phil., V, Prosa vi.)
2 Some further discussion of these and allied conceptions is attempted below, 
p. 306 et seqq., in connexion with Plato’s figure of time as a ‘moving image 
of eternity’. (Timaeus, 37D.)
3713 p
T H E  A S S A Y  O F  T I M E  25
the time in which I did once act and live; my future is the period 
in which I shall live and a ct; while my present is that duration in 
which alone I act, and which is thus the time that I perceive, 
and in which I remember, perceive, and anticipate.
So far I have not sought to pass from ‘subjective’ duration, not 
even in the discussions of the ‘eternal now’ ; I have not attempted 
to escape from the relations of past, present, and future, which 
are ‘subjective’ in their reference. In crude time, past, present, 
and future are sections of duration; in the specious present, past 
and future constitute the whole which is present; in the ‘eternal 
now’, past and future are subordinated to, if  not lost in, an all-com­
prehending present.
But if  I am right in my assertion that pastness, presence, and 
futurity belong not so much to time as to the place of the individual 
‘subject’ in time, and his relations to the time-series, then the next 
step in the assay of time must be the correct analysis of this situa­
tion with a view to obtaining, if  possible, a conception of the nature 
of duration out of relation to individual experiences or events 
located in it. I shall thus at the same time be able to examine the 
contention that it is precisely this relation to individual experience 
or occurrence, and the consequent misreading of the character of 
duration, which incapacitates all enduring existence for survival 
in the Real; since divisibility and successiveness, which together 
constitute the prima facie vice of time, are the result of this very 
relation. It is the successiveness of the time-series that renders 
its divisibility fatal, because no passage from Imagination to Reason 
or scientia intuitiva can, as with Extension, re-cement the fragments 
of duration so long as its successiveness remains; thus it has 
sometimes been held that if  it can be shown that successiveness is 
a character, not of time in itself, but of the relations of enduring 
things to one another and to time, then eternity may be adequately 
construed as that attribute of the Real which remains when the 
offending successiveness has been removed from duration. W ith­
out succession there can be no duration: so much will perhaps be 
admitted as a basis of agreement, but may there not remain a non- 
durational form of externality which is eternity ?
T h e probable argument, then, is that the successiveness which 
infects, or even appears to constitute, enduring existence, is relative 
only to this or that observer or experient or event, or at best to 
some supposed resultant, mean, or representative observer or
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experient or indicator, and is thus a ‘subjective’ or relative addi­
tion to (or, rather, subtraction from) the eternal co-existent facts. 
Existence, it will then be argued, purged of these ambiguities, 
is not a successive existence, and does not ‘endure’ in the objection­
able sense of the term; but for analytic thought, as for ‘subjective’ 
perception, features of the eternal whole may be apprehended 
successively; and though perception presents them in an irrever­
sible order, analytic thought can order them according to its special 
requirements. In other words, the Real is eternal in a sense 
which makes eternity the fourth dimension of the mathematical 
physicists, and therefore indistinguishable in nature from any of 
the dimensions of space. In it there is no past, present, or future, 
and the passage from the ‘subjective’ perspectives of duration to an 
‘objective time’, by the simple process of removing the point of 
reference given by an observer’s now, implies also a passage from 
an irreversible time to a neutral time, the order of which may be 
read according to the special needs of the thinker.
The relation of such an argument to the conceptions I have just 
been examining is too obvious to need special consideration; but 
as it is one of the most common of modern inferences or assump­
tions it is necessary for me to deal with it directly, and to indicate 
the grounds of my refusal to accept the conclusion that duration 
can be wholly purged of the reference to some individual, average, 
or standard punctum, and time yet remain a successionless form 
of existence or externality. From this dilemma there is no 
escape: if  ‘objective’ duration is a neutral order it is no adequate 
expression of the reality which appears sub specie durationis; if, on 
the contrary, it is successive, then it is no adequate representation 
of the existence of an eternal Real.
‘OBJECTIVE’ DURATIONS
The various kinds of ‘objective’ or macrocosmic duration—  
historical time, Absolute Tim e, &c.— are durations purged of the 
offending ambiguities, or, as I shall hold, purged of some of the 
ambiguities which arise from the reference of empirical time to a 
real or supposed observer or indicator. They do not directly depend 
upon the temporal location of this or that individual indicator or 
observer, though historical time depends upon a generalized 
reference to the epochs of human observation and experience. 
History refers to the past alone, and is thus able to overlook the
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distinction of this from the future, and even, in a more qualified 
degree, from the present. And in ‘objective’ durations generally 
there is no present, past, or future, for every instant is in turn 
future, present, and past, or rather is at once future with respect 
to what comes before, past with respect to what comes after, and 
present with respect to what occupies it. Thus in place of the 
relations of past, present, and future, ‘objective’ duration is 
determined by the relation of before and after which is indepen­
dent of any unique point of reference or ‘now’. Every point 
of time is before what follows it, and after what it follows, and it 
can at once enter into these contrary relations because it does so 
with respect to different terms. So far so good. There is no 
special objection to our making the point of reference slide freely 
backwards and forwards along the time-dimension, so long as we 
do not forget that the required ‘ objectivity’ of the relation of before 
and after implies, what indeed we cannot afford to surrender, that 
time itself flows freely only in one direction, viz. from past to 
future through the present, or from before to after, or, if  we adopt 
the point of view of the experient, from future to past through the 
present, or from the after towards the before.1 Time has a sense. 
But on what grounds do we assume that this is so in the ‘objective’ 
order which we propose to establish by the purification of crude 
time ? W e must not yet assume that the banishment of the dis­
tinctions of past, present, and future as they exist in the crude 
time-order without the substitution of adequate temporal dis­
tinctions of a less ‘subjective’ flavour, but no less ‘subjective’ origin, 
will leave untouched the temporality of the resulting order. It may 
well be that the distinctions in question are not merely ‘subjective’ 
or relative accretions, but that they involve, and involve inextricably, 
the essential ‘sense’ of time. That, indeed, is the gist of my con­
tention at this point; we lose the gold with the dross. For the fact 
that ‘subjective’ duration moves from past to future is one with 
the fact that what was future becomes past, and that again with
1 It must be noticed that this alternative mode of expressing the ‘movement’ 
of time, does not imply its reversibility, but only its relativity. The confusion of 
these two things is facilitated and concealed through the common association 
of space and time as analogous orders. In Space, relativity of motion implies the 
symmetrical character of space, and it may be supposed that with time too 
relativity implies reversibility. But we must, of course, distinguish motion in 
space and time, and motion o/time. I shall show in due course that the relativity 
of time is its essential feature, arising from the mode of its derivation from the 
eternal Real. It signifies both its ‘subjectivity’ and also its partial reality.
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the fact that past means that which has been given, present that 
which is being given, and future that which is yet to be given. It 
is, of course, natural and inoffensive to begin with what we already 
have had, and are now having, and pass on to what we shall have; 
but in ‘objective’ time, considered strictly as such, no such dis­
tinctions are forthcoming, and they only appear to be so because 
we transfer to it distinctions only valid for ‘subjective’ time. W e 
do so by imagining ourselves at a point of ‘objective’ time, calling 
what is before that point the past, and what is after it future, then 
determining the flow of time from past to future as it is for our 
individual experience, and thus making ‘objective’ time flow, too, 
in one direction only, viz. from before to after, from earlier to 
later. This illegitimate transference is further concealed from us by 
the use of terms saturated with time derived from our personal 
experience, such as ‘before and after’ , ‘earlier and later’ , and the 
like; but if the distinctions of ‘subjective’ time are not ‘objectively’ 
valid, by what right do we transfer what is inextricably woven 
with them, viz. the direction or ‘sense’ of time, to a macrocosmic 
time purged from the dross and crudity of our finite experience ? 
In our ‘subjective’ duration the past has been given, the present is 
being given, and the future is to be given', but in ‘objective’ time 
all is given, and therefore time for which there is neither past nor 
future cannot flow, and the sense of duration which lurks about the 
terms ‘before’ and ‘after’ must carefully be excluded if  we are to 
continue to use them in the determination of ‘objective’ time. W ith 
the terms ‘earlier’ and ‘ later’ I need not especially deal, for they are 
even more shameless petitiones principii.
The main ‘objective’ times which have been put forward, there­
fore, are hybrids derived from the illegitimate union of qualitative 
distinctions derived from the transformations of individual experi­
ences, with the final product of the assay of time (for I cannot call it 
‘pure time’). Historical time, for example, is an ‘objective’ order 
into which (by the use of memory and imagination) we place first the 
objects of our immediate experience, thus determining a direction 
of flow, and then proceed to fill out the earlier periods with events 
lying beyond our immediate experience but connected therewith in 
various ways. This time we may then transform into scientific, 
Absolute, or macrocosmic time by leaving out the point of reference 
given by the now or by the present epoch, but carefully (and 
illegitimately) retaining the direction of flow from earlier to later.
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This is not the place to attempt more than the most superficial 
and incidental comment on M r. Alexander’s conception of Space- 
Tim e, but I may perhaps venture to suggest that even the Tim e 
element of Space-Time does not escape this analysis: for even if 
its characteristics can be shown to cohere with (I must not 
say ‘depend on’) the three dimensions of the space-element, 
M r. Alexander expressly disclaims any intention of explaining 
why there are three dimensions of space, except that it thus 
coheres very well with the empirical— that is, for him, the real—  
characteristics of time, viz. its continuity, successiveness, irre­
versibility, and uniformity of direction. But the question I have 
been discussing is whether these would be the characteristics of 
a ‘tim e’ emancipated from all points of reference; or whether they 
do not belong to time only in its relation to that moving origin 
of reference, this or that finite individual, or supposed mean or 
representative, experient or indicator; and whether when that 
point of reference is in every sense and form excluded, time will 
still flow. That question is not resolved by weaving together space 
and time (though space may thus serve to combine the instants of 
time which otherwise are loose ‘nows’), for succession cannot be 
instituted by the mere expedient of combining ‘nows’ into a 
continuum ; unless, indeed, already these nows all differ in sequent 
date, i.e. are related to what is given {datum) or not yet given in 
some individual experience or existence (as the very term ‘date’ 
might have suggested).
M y argument, then, is that the distinctions of past and future, 
before and after, earlier and later, &c., as well as the equivalent 
one of date, depend upon relation to an individual or supposed mean 
or representative experience or origin o f reference, and that, there­
fore, i f  the ghosts of past and future are resolutely exorcized from 
earlier and later, from before and after, no absolute dates in a 
continuity of macrocosmic time can remain. W ith the exclusion 
of past and future (both body and ghost) from an order which had 
already lost its present, nothing of the essential nature of time 
remains. And, indeed, the exclusion of the present already meant 
as much, for it is precisely the present (with the past pressing upon 
it, and the future emerging from it) that constitutes the reality in 
empirical duration: past is gone, the future is not yet realized. 
But in an ‘objective’ duration the distinction of realized and un­
realized disappears, and with it duration itself, and we are left
30 A E T E R N I T A S
with a neutral order o f externality; in attempting to escape from the 
limitations and particularities of empirical duration (for ‘our dates 
are brief’) we find ourselves condemned to a ‘dateless night’ . Yet 
this neutral order was in one sense the object of the experimentum 
or assay: will it not serve as an image of the eternity which is 
enjoyed by the Spinozistic Substance ? Prima facie there is some­
thing to be said in favour of the hypothesis: it is at least free from 
some of the objections urged against the conception of duration as 
an Attribute of the Real. It is, in fact, a sort of Extension and 
therefore more capable of surviving intellectual criticism than 
any genuine duration which remains essentially successive.
Nevertheless, I must assert that no such neutral order is an 
adequate representation of Spinozistic eternity even as it is con­
ceived by Reason. For though it is conceived as an order of 
existences, this is not the order that characterizes the Real. Such 
an identification would imply that the order of things in time is, 
with minor corrections for the spatio-temporal perspective of the 
experient, the real order of existences. But according to Spinoza 
it is not so: for him the real order is the logical or intellectual 
order, which is not a mere corrected temporal order, but proceeds 
on a different plan: there is no point-to-point correspondence 
between events in time and the stages of logical order. No dis­
tinction, indeed, is more clear in Spinoza than that between ‘the 
common order of nature’1 and ‘the order of the intellect’,2 through 
which the actual time-order of our experiences is distinguished 
from the logical order of essences. Indeed, it is the order in which 
things can be conceived which determines their degree of reality; 
for all things are real and eternal in so far as they survive the process 
of being arranged in the intellectual order, as all things are illusory 
and corruptible as objects of unenlightened Imagination.
Furthermore, and in the second place, the logical order is not 
neutral, but moves from essence to expression, from ground to 
consequent, from Substance to mode.3 For Intellectus the process
1 ‘Communis naturae ordo.’ (Eth. II, xxix, Cor. et Sch.; xxx, Dem.)
2 ‘Ordo intellectus.’ (Eth. II, xviii, Sch.) ‘Ordo ad intellectum.’ (Eth. II, xl, 
Sch. ii; V, x.)
3 The motion is not, I need hardly say, even sub specie extensionis, locomotion, 
but real motus et quies. That is to say, essence is prior to expression, ground to 
consequent, Substance to mode. And in knowledge, though for the learner or 
inquirer the matter of the conclusion may often seem to be derived from a direct 
observation or from authority, and thus to be temporally prior to the premisses, 
which are the result of subsequent inquiry or instruction, yet, even here, in
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in time from cause to effect (the Berkeleian transition from ‘sign’ 
to ‘thing signified’ : a description which Spinoza might so far have 
accepted) gives place to the procession of grounds and consequents 
in eternity, and in the same transvaluation Imagination, the first 
kind of knowledge, gives place to adequate knowledge of the second 
or third kinds. T he change from the time-order to the intellectual 
order, therefore, is not a change to neutrality, but a change from 
a serial order of mutually exclusive elements, to an order of inclu­
sion ; from an order of logical neutrality and irrelevance, to one 
of logical implication, and therefore, real productivity;1 from
reality the full conclusion can only be known as following from the premisses. 
But it does not follow that the premisses are therefore temporally prior to the 
conclusion. Thus for the mind which in any degree genuinely knows, premisses 
and conclusion stand in no temporal relation to each other; or, if we conceive 
the knowledge as enjoyed at a period in the history of the knower (as we well 
may) we must say that the premisses and conclusion are simultaneous. For him 
the conclusion is the explained conclusion, which includes the middle (S is P 
for it is M ); the premisses are for him the syllogized premisses (S is M which 
is P); so that, adequately conceived, the premisses and conclusion constitute an 
identity in difference. But the concrete identity or togetherness of the premisses 
and the conclusion must not be interpreted as implying a symmetrical relation 
between them: the premisses are necessarily and timelessly prior; the conclusion 
is necessarily and timelessly posterior; for such is the essential character of their 
nisus. (Cf. Bosanquet: Logic (2nd ed.), ii, pp. 4-8.) Nor should the fact that the 
logical movement may be read either as from conclusion to premisses, or as from 
premisses to conclusion, be allowed to suggest any such neutrality of order. 
It is failure to realize this simple but important principle that suggests that the 
universe of Spinoza is necessarily a ‘block universe’ ; and it is this very conclusion 
that I am attempting to discredit.
1 A similar distinction is indicated by Bacon when he emphasizes the im­
portance of the search for forms rather than efficients. For if we know only the 
efficient, which is the temporal vehicle of the form, we are only able to produce 
the particular nature under circumstances similar to those in which we have 
discovered it; but if we know the form itself (i.e. the law of the nature, its genetic 
cause) then we know how to produce the nature itself in new ways, in unpre­
pared circumstances, with different material. We can invent new vehicles and 
efficients. ‘Qui causam alicujus naturae (veluti albedinis, aut caloris) in certis 
tantum subjectis novit, ejus Scientia imperfecta est; et qui effectum super 
certas tantum materias (inter eas, quae sunt susceptibiles) inducere potest; ejus 
Potentia pariter imperfecta est. At qui Efficientem et Materialem causam 
tantummodo novit (quae causae fluxae sunt, et nihil aliud quam vehicula et 
causae Formam deferentes in aliquibus), is ad nova inventa, in materia aliqua- 
tenus simili et praeparata, pervenire potest; sed rerum terminos altius fixos non 
mo vet. At qui Formas novit, is naturae unitatem in materiis dissimillimis com- 
plectitur; itaque quae adhuc facta non sunt, qualia nec naturae vicissitudines, 
neque experimentales industriae, neque casus ipse, in actum unquam perduxis- 
sent, neque cogitationem humanam subitura fuissent, detegere et producere 
potest. Quare ex Formarum inventione, sequitur contemplatio vera, et operatio 
libera.’ (Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, II, Aph. iii.)
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a symmetrical time-order which cannot explain the irreversible 
character of duration, to an asymmetrical logical order for which 
‘prior’ and ‘posterior’, though seemingly reversible in the order of 
learning, are essentially and constitutively irreversible. For time, 
as distinct from duration, is not asymmetrical and irreversible, 
since all its moments are alike: pure Spinozistic time is neutral, 
indeed n u ll; and duration becomes a real order only in the degree 
in which it transcends time by its dependence on quality. Only 
a relative whole can endure, and only the duration of a relative 
whole is irreversible. It escapes neutrality as the expression of 
systematic order.
The assay of time is thus complete. Step by step we have refined 
the ore; step by step we have made trial of the metal. And though, 
in the process, time has been deprived of its temporality, yet we 
could not regret the loss, if  the residue in the crucible were the 
pure gold of eternity. For the experimentum was, after all, no mere 
assay, but alchemy. And though the magic has proved doubly 
ineffectual (for time is lost, and eternity not gained), yet still 
we need not count the work as wholly vain : for, as Bruno sug­
gests,1 useful discoveries may be made even in the futile search 
for the lapis philosophicus. Like men digging in a vineyard for 
buried treasure, though we have found no gold, we may have 
improved the vintage.2
1 ‘Nonne multoties nobis certum scopum praefigentibus aliud quaesito 
nobilius occurrit ? Ipsum sane frequentissime alchimicis accidere experimentis 
non est quem lateat, quibus multoties auto perquisito longe meliora vel ex aequo 
desiderabilia adinvenisse accidit.’ (Giordano Bruno, Triginta Sigilli, Septimi 
Sigilli Explicatio.)
2 ‘Neque tamen negandum est, Alchymistas non pauca invenisse, et inventis 
utilibus homines donasse. Verum fabula ilia non male in illos quadrat de sene, 
qui filiis aurum in vinea defossum (sed locum se nescire simulans) legaverit; 
unde illi vineae fodiendae diligenter incubuerunt, et aurum quidem nullum 
repertum, sed vindemia ex ea cultura facta est uberior.’ (Francis Bacon, Novum 
Organum, I, Aph. Ixxxv.)
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3 7 1 3 F
E X C U R S U S  I
A  C O M P L E T E  T IM E
A t t e m p t s  have sometimes been made to save the reality of time by 
showing how it may be regarded as whole and complete, and therefore 
not essentially indefinite. I select for brief comment two modern 
attempts in this direction— that of Mr. J. S. Mackenzie, according to 
which time is conceived as complete but finite, and that of Royce, 
which makes time infinite but nevertheless complete.
(i) Mr. J. S. Mackenzie 1 makes the serious suggestion that the terms 
‘beginning’ and ‘end’ may have significance when applied, not merely 
within, but also to the time-series: that is to say that time itself may begin 
and end. ‘I should suppose that the first occurrence in the universe of 
events might simply step forward as that from which change sets out.’ 2 
I confess that I find very great difficulty in conceiving how the hypo­
thetical first moment of time can be other than in time; and hence 
subsequent to a previous moment; and so not the first. The conception 
of a moment of time which is a present related only to a future and 
‘free from time-determinations’ on its other side, calls for close scrutiny. 
Such a moment must be wholly future even when it is said to be present, 
for its present is either nothing real at all, or it is a specious present 
wholly composed of an experienced future. For the first moment of time, 
all time, including itself, is future. Similarly for the last moment of 
time, all time, including itself, is past. That these facts constitute a 
difficulty I do not suppose that Mr. Mackenzie would deny; the 
question which I shall raise is whether the difficulty is not self-made, 
and therefore superfluous.
Mr. Mackenzie attempts to resolve some of the confusions inherent 
in the prima facie implications of his theory by means of the distinction 
between time as a ‘form or order’ within which events occur (in which 
case ‘it is evident that there can be no ground for thinking of it as having 
either a beginning or an end’),3 and time as a concrete order within 
which lies the totality of events. The former, which without events is 
nothing, is infinite (being without beginning or end), but not whole; 
the latter is whole but not infinite (for it both begins and ends): ‘Time, 
that takes survey of all the world, must have a stop’. And this is real 
time; to it therefore we must turn our attention.
1 ‘The Infinite and the Perfect’ (Mind, N.S. X III, pp. 355-78); ‘Notes on the 
Problem of Time’ (Mind, N.S. X X I, pp. 329-46); Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics, V: Art. ‘Eternity’, pp. 404-5.
2 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 338.
3 Loc. cit., p. 336.
I have indicated the immediate difficulty which presents itself: there 
must be a moment which succeeds no past, and a moment which pre­
cedes no future; that these are impossible in the abstract is admitted 
by Mr. Mackenzie,1 but can we conceive such moments even in the 
concrete ? The popular mind has become accustomed to the paradoxical 
assertion of the relativists that space is finite, and it may be equally 
ready to accept Mr. Mackenzie’s paradox with reference to time, but 
the serious inquirer will be well advised to reflect again, and in both 
cases. I do not expect ever to stand at the ultimate edge of space with 
room beside me and behind me but with none before; nor at the last 
moment of time, with the past behind me and no future yet to come; 
nor do I believe that any one, whether finite or infinite, ever will do so. 
It is not my business to discuss the implications of relativity, but I 
suggest that they appear paradoxical because no attempt has been made 
to distinguish between our measures of space and time (however 
‘objective’ we may make them), and that which .we set out to measure. 
In the nature of things, our processes of measurement must depend 
upon some form of motion, and we naturally make use of the most 
rapid motion known to us (viz. that of light); but this too is finite, 
and it is not surprising, therefore, that there should be a limit to our 
capacity to measure space, and that the limit should be a function of the 
velocity of light. But, though we can thus account for the critical 
importance of that velocity in the formulae of relativity, it does not 
follow that space is itself limited, or that the velocity of light is a real 
maximum. For the world which we can determine under the cate­
gories of physics, it may be so, and the space of that world may be 
finite; but the interests of the metaphysician are not so limited to the 
phenomenology of physics, his object is the Real as it is in and to itself, 
and not in and for the limited measurements of its microcosmic parts. 
There is thus nothing to be gained from mathematico-physical para­
doxes in support of the idea of a finite total time, and I speak with 
becoming restraint when I say that the discaudate and decapitated 
first and last monstrous moments of time of Mr. Mackenzie’s fancy 
could only be accepted if they could be shown to be essential features 
of some carefully analysed inescapable concrete situation. But nothing 
of the kind appears to be forthcoming.
Mr. Mackenzie’s theory thus seems to be that, though abstract time 
is infinite, yet actual concrete time must begin and end with the total 
process which fills i t ; and that process, again, may well be finite. It is, 
of course, undoubted that empirical events and processes in time do 
begin and end, though their precise limits are elusive, and thus there 
must be ‘first’ and ‘last’ moments, i.e. dates before and after which
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1 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, pp. 331-2.
the event or process has no existence. But these are real moments of 
time within the duration of wider processes or events, and thus do not 
imply a beginning or end of time, but only of some finite duration. 
The question is whether we are justified in extending the analogy of the 
finite process, without correction, to the all-inclusive process of tota 
Natura, and thus in supposing that concrete time itself has a real 
beginning and end, so that periods before time and after time are, 
indeed, ‘abstractly conceivable’,1 but no more. I am not sure whether 
Mr. Mackenzie means to argue that the finitude of time follows from the 
incoherence of the notion of empty time (since the first event would 
be preceded, and the last event succeeded, by time without events), 
but if so I should say that nothing but speculative perversity could have 
prevented him from concluding thence, not that time is finite, but that 
there are no first and last events in the imaginative conception of tota 
Natura.
One way of escape from this problem is by denying that tota Natura 
is a valid conception, and Mr. Mackenzie shows some signs of the 
disposition to move in that direction. The conception of a being which 
‘contains all possible reality within itself’ he describes as ‘absurd’ ;2 but 
if that is so what can be the precise point of the assertion that all reality 
lies within the limits of a finite time read as non-transient ? ‘The con­
ception of a rounded whole, which yet contains a time-process within 
itself’ is, he says, ‘not altogether unintelligible’,3 and, I gather, this 
conception is to be applied to the total time-process. Again I cannot 
think that there is any real way of escape through the emphasis on 
responsive finitude as the essence of perfection.2 Doubtless a finite 
being is more perfect as he is more responsive to the whole, but only 
because thereby he more perfectly reproduces the infinite completeness 
or all-inclusiveness of the Real, which rests in itself and expresses 
itself in all things, and, in their degree, in each. As I shall argue in 
later chapters, empirical beginnings and endings are in time because 
time emerges as the concomitant of the hierarchical individuation which 
characterizes the Real. But tota Natura, at the head of that hierarchy, 
and informing all its parts, cannot begin or end in time because it is not 
a subordinate within a more inclusive individual the existence of 
which could be imagined as an indefinite time within which the sub­
ordinate might begin and end. For itself tota Natura must be neither 
finitely nor indefinitely extended in time; it must be eternal. For its 
subordinate individual parts it may appear to endure indefinitely, with­
out beginning or end, while, as so related to the whole, these begin 
and end within its sempiternity. We cannot even imagine tota Natura
1 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 337.
2 ‘The Infinite and the Perfect’, p. 376.
3 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 344.
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as finite in duration, much less think it, and I think that Mr. Mackenzie 
only imagines that he thinks it, because there are things that we can 
think but cannot imagine.
Now Mr. Mackenzie’s difficulties, which he meets by the invention 
of his monstrous semi-temporal first and last moments of time, arise, 
as the Kantian antinomy arose, from the attempt to equate the imagina­
tive conception of the existence of tota Natura, which a subordinate 
part most readily entertains, with the intellectual conception of its 
existence which the whole alone can fully possess (and a part only in so 
far as it reproduces the whole without imaginative qualification). Time, 
if, as such, it is taken as ultimately real, must, of course, have a begin­
ning if we are to avoid the self-contradictory conclusion that an 
indefinitely long series has at any moment been completed. But since 
this is so, we have to choose between conceiving a beginning to time, 
and denying that time is an ultimate character of tota Natura. Yet even 
if the latter alternative is chosen, it does not become necessary to deny 
that time has a place in the Real as an ‘imaginative’ , and not altogether 
false, expression of the dependence of the finite individual on the 
infinite whole. Further, the denial of a beginning and end to time need 
not imply that empty time exists before and after the occurrence of 
tota Natura; for, on the contrary, it is the infinite character of Natura 
that determines the indefinity of time. Time cannot stretch beyond the 
imagined duration of the whole, not even as an ‘abstract conception’ ; 
but Natura, if I may so speak, ‘inflates’ time beyond all limits. It does 
so because time is an inadequate expression of the infinite self-depen­
dence of tota Natura.
Hence it may not only be denied that the principles governing 
abstract time are, as Mr. Mackenzie asserts, ‘of no real importance’ in 
the determination of the limits of real time;1 we may go further and 
assert that they apply a fortiori in this region because abstract time is 
but an extract of concrete occurrence. If we can even abstractly con­
ceive a period of time before the beginning of events, then there can 
be no such beginning; ‘quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, 
ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi pos- 
sunt, producenda’.2
I am as ready, therefore, as Mr. Mackenzie himself to equate the 
‘good’ infinite with the perfect as opposed to the indefinite or endless; 
the extraordinary thing is that it should be supposed that this equation 
implies that the absolutely infinite must have a beginning and end, that 
it is identical with the ‘completely determined finite’.3 But, following 
Spinoza, I ask whence could arise the limitation? Not, Mr. Mackenzie
1 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 338. 2 Eth. I, App.
3 ‘The Infinite and the Perfect’, p. 369.
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assures us, from the time-order itself: ‘there is nothing in the nature 
of the time-order as such to prevent the occurrence of something before 
the beginning or after the end’.1 Nor can it arise from external things 
(for it is of tota Natura that I speak). The limitation thus arises from 
within Natura itself, which is thus unable to occupy all the duration 
‘abstractly conceivable’ by the finite intellect of man (I cannot here 
speak of the infinite intellect of God). ‘But’, says Mr. Mackenzie, ‘the 
question is not with regard to what is abstractly conceivable, but to 
what did take place.’2 I accept the correction; but ‘what did take place’ 
is not an historical question, but must be determined by what is con­
cretely conceivable, i.e. as true of tota Natura. This, as Mr. Mackenzie 
rightly asserts, cannot begin or end in time; its duration must be the 
duration of time ;3 but reciprocally, and more strictly and intelligibly, 
we must say that time can only begin or end with the exhaustion of 
Natura. And it is because Natura is inexhaustible, that real concrete 
time (the ‘imaginative’ transcript of its inexhaustible existence or 
essence) has neither beginning nor end.
I turn from the question of the beginning and end of time to consider 
the temporal process between these limits. The issue of Mr. Mackenzie’s 
argument is that eternity is identical with the concrete developing pro­
cess of time: ‘Time would not be, as with Plato, “ the moving image of 
eternity” but eternity itself.’4 In this part of his discussion emphasis is 
laid upon some of the paradoxical characters of process developing 
towards an end. Here, though it is the means that produce the end, it 
is the end that explains the means: if now time is wholly occupied and 
determined by a single developing process (tota Natura) which, though 
retaining its temporal character, is eternal, then there arise two 
problems, viz. (a) how such a process can begin when ex hypothesi its 
first moment contains no more than a naked possibility, which is 
nothing; and (b) how it can be real when its complete character is only 
realized at its end, i.e. when it has ceased to exist. For it looks as if 
eternity is one, not with the total process of time, but with the last 
moment of concrete time (which contains all the others in the sense 
that it completes, synthesizes, and explains them). But how can it 
otherwise contain the process (or rather be it without its transiency) 
when the process has already vanished away? For the finite individual 
contemplating a finite process which falls within his own duration, the 
case is easy, for he endures after the last moment of the process, enjoy­
ing the synthesis of the development in a subsequent period of his own
1 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 336. 2 Loc. cit., p. 337.
3 ‘Si autem ante caelum et terram nullam erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid 
tunc faciebas?’ ‘Videant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura’
(Augustine, Confessiones, X I, xiii et xxx).
4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, V : Art. ‘Eternity’, p. 404.
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duration; but tota Natura is in a less advantageous position on the 
hypothesis of Mr. Mackenzie, for its last moment is the last moment. 
Of course this does not really matter very much, since Natura possesses 
the whole time-order without its transiency;! but how its life can remain 
a process in any genuinely temporal sense I find it impossible to 
explain— a difficulty which Mr. Mackenzie seems to share, for he pro­
ceeds weakly to suggest that ‘in the case of the universe as a whole [we 
must suppose] . . . the end returns upon the beginning’.2 This is a 
suggestion which seems to me to bring serious discussion to an end; 
‘It is certainly difficult to make this quite intelligible’, he adds; I go 
further and assert that it is impossible to do so unless ‘end and be­
ginning are dreams’ ; in which case the hypothesis itself is unnecessary. 
‘Haec est clarissimi hujus viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis 
conjicio) quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatum esse, si minus 
acuta fuisset’.
(2) In discussing the views of Mr. Mackenzie I have been compelled 
to advance beyond the point so far reached in my main argument; I 
shall be compelled to go even further in dealing with Royce’s idea of an 
infinite time which is also complete because it involves a single ex­
pression of the Divine Will and thus falls under the conception of ‘the 
actual infinite’.
Royce lays emphasis upon two features which belong to our temporal 
experience: (a) the double aspect of our consciousness of a series of 
events (whether in the specious present, or in our experience of wider 
successions such as the appreciation of a melody or phrase): we can 
‘overlook a succession and view at once its serially related and mutually 
exclusive events’,3 and if we could not do this ‘we should never know 
anything whatever about the existence of succession, and should have 
no problem about time upon our hands’.4 This is ‘a matter of the most 
fundamental importance for our whole conception of Time, and . . .  of 
Eternity’.5 In the apprehension of successions wider than the specious 
present we are able, in spite of transiency, to grasp the succession as a 
whole; and in the specious present we go further, and so far as the 
‘time-span’ itself is concerned we grasp a succession all at once and 
without loss by transiency. For Royce there is no fundamental difference
1 The conception of eternity as a time which has order without transiency will 
receive adequate attention in my main argument, as well as the question of the 
ultimate adequacy of temporal as opposed to intellectual order. Cf. ‘Notes on 
the Problem of Time’, p. 346: ‘Time . . . may itself be timeless in the sense 
that it does not pass . . .  It may be an inseparable aspect of the life of the 
Absolute, though the Absolute cannot be held to be in it. Such a view . . .  is 
the only one that seems to me to be finally coherent.’
2 ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 343.
3 The World and the Individual, ii, p. 117.
4 Loc. cit. 5 Loc. cit.
E X C U R S U S  I 39
in the two cases: ‘A consciousness related to the whole of the world’s 
events, and to the whole of time, precisely as our human consciousness 
is related to a single melody or rhythm, and to the brief but still ex­
tended interval of time which this melody or rhythm occupies,— such 
a consciousness, I say, is an Eternal Consciousness. In principle we 
already possess and are acquainted with the nature of such a conscious­
ness, whenever we do experience any succession as one whole. The 
only thing needed to complete our idea [of it] is the conceived removal 
of that arbitrary limitation which permits us men to observe . . .  at 
once a succession, but forbids us [if] it occupies more than a very few 
seconds’.1 Thus eternity is God’s specious present: a conception with 
which I have dealt sufficiently in the course of Chapter II.
(b) The second feature which is emphasized by Royce is that of 
purpose or will. ‘Our temporal form of experience is thus peculiarly 
the form of the Will as such’ ;2 ‘What is earlier in a given succession 
is related to what is later as being that from which we pass towards a 
desired fulfilment, or in search of a more complete expression of our 
purpose’.3 ‘Time is thus indeed the form of practical activity; and its 
whole character, and especially that direction of its succession . . . are 
determined accordingly’.4 That there is vital truth in these statements 
I shall not deny, but it is necessary to point out that Royce seems very 
undecided as to its nature. It is possible to distinguish in his statements 
two distinct interpretations: there is the notion of time as the natural 
ally of real purpose and its fulfilment, as well as the precisely opposed 
view of it as the natural obstacle to the satisfaction of the will. ‘The 
present, in our inner experience, means a whole series of events grasped 
by somebody as having some unity for his consciousness, and as having 
its own single internal meaning’ ;5 ‘only in terms of Will, and only by 
virtue of the significant relations of the stages of a ideological process, 
has time . . . any meaning’ :6 these expressions emphasize the alliance 
of time and the will. ‘The real world is a temporal world in so far as, 
in various regions of that world, seeking differs from attainment, pursuit 
is external to its own goal, the imperfect tends towards its own per­
fection . . .’ ;7 ‘Our experience of time is thus for us essentially an 
experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness’ :8 here time is the 
opponent of fulfilment. More generally Royce combines the two aspects 
in what I may call a neutral statement: ‘In pursuing its goals, the Self 
lives in time’ ;9 but in fact this distinction is of the first importance, 
even if it is true that real duration combines both in a single character.
1 The World and the Individual, ii, p. 142.
2 Loc. tit., p. 124.
3 Loc. tit., p. 123-4. 4 Loc. tit., p. 126. 5 Loc. tit., p. 129.
6 Loc. tit., pp. 132-3. 7 Loc. tit., p. 133. 8 Loc. tit., p. 125.
9 Loc. tit., p. 134.
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For the question must arise as to the relations of the two elements of 
duration in the ideal progress towards complete satisfaction in the 
Absolute. Although the problem as to the meaning of ‘purpose’ in a 
complete being is also important, I do not at the moment consider 
that ultimate difficulty; but even supposing that it is true that ‘the goal 
of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, 
is a fragment. When I seek my own goal, I am looking for the whole of 
myself’ ;T that ‘the Self in its entirety is the whole of a self-representative 
or recurrent process, and not the mere last moment or stage of that 
process . . . there is in fact no last moment’ ;2 still the question must 
arise as to whether the resistance of time to the- will does not become 
less and less as the absolute whole of time is approached, while its scope 
and alliance increase pari passu, until in the limit, i.e. with the Absolute, 
the resistance ceases and the alliance is complete. But, if so, is the ‘time’ 
which is the eternity of the Absolute recognizably ‘time’ at all? If we 
gained all our ends without resistance, I take it that we should have no 
experience of a transient time at all. But should we experience suc­
cession ? There would perhaps be the succession of fulfilled purposes; 
but in the Absolute this too must disappear, since its ‘purpose’ is single: 
the eternal order of the world. How, then, can that order be temporal? 
It is successive neither transiently nor intransiently.
In spite of these difficulties it is evident that Royce approaches very 
near to a solution of the problem of time and eternity; if he has failed to 
solve it that is because he did not sufficiently emphasize the ambiguous 
character of duration, and thus, in effect, by a curious inversion has 
used the wrong premiss in his inference. In his laudable endeavour to 
avoid the Bradleian impasse which loses the relative in the Absolute, 
he has argued as if time were essentially an aid to the will, whereas the 
truth rather is that by purpose we mean the defeat of time, and by con­
tingency time’s triumph. In an occasional passage or expression Royce 
is even willing to concede that ‘in principle a time-sequence, however 
brief, is already viewed in a way that is not merely temporal, when, 
despite its sequence, it is grasped at once’.3 That supersession of the 
temporal is one with our conquest of time, and this manifests itself as 
the real duration of the finite individual, which thus reveals its eternity; 
and in the limit, i.e. in the Absolute, the defeat of time is complete, so 
that eternity can no longer be imaged as an enduring whole, but known 
for what it really is.
Thus the conception of ‘the actual infinite’4 must be applied, not to the 
imagined complete whole of infinite time (which as I have shown in the 
main argument is an incoherent conception), but to tota Natter a as an
1 The World and the Individual, ii, p. 135.
2 Loc. at., pp. 135-6. 3 Loc. cit., p. 142.
4 See Excursus V (pp. 160-3).
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Individual which infinitely reflects itself within itself as an ordered 
hierarchy of finite individuals. The unique actual infinite and eternal 
Individual thus reproduces itself in infinitely many partly eternal finite 
individuals, and their times are the efflux of their partialitas, and not of 
their totalitas. But time in itself is the very incarnation of the indefinite 
or ‘bad’ infinite.
Further, as time is the expression of our partialitas, and is reflected 
in the ‘common order of nature’ as that appears to our Imagination, so 
our real duration is the expression of our relative totalitas, that is to say, 
of our nature as it is arranged in the intellectual order. To that extent 
time is superseded by real unity. But not completely: hence we are 
identical beings persisting through, and able to review, time. Our unity 
is not temporal but essential; and thus, in the limit, Natura must be a 
unity, not temporal but essential, i.e. eternal. In so saying I am going 
far beyond the point yet reached in my essay; these summary statements 
will be more fully explained in the course of its main argument, but 
meanwhile sufficient has been said to show that in the speculations of 
Mr. Mackenzie and of Royce there is to be found no ground for 
supposing that the indefinite character of temporal extension can be 
conceived as complete, without either an illegitimate truncating, or an 
essential transcending, of time.
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SPINOZA’S CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY
I T U R N  next to Spinoza’s own precise account of eternity. The distinction, he says, between eternity and duration arises 
from the fact that we conceive the existence of Substance as entirely 
different from the existence of modes.1 Again, eternity is ‘an 
attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God. 
Duration is an attribute under which we conceive the existence of 
created things in so far as they persevere in their actuality’ .2 Or 
again, ‘from our division of being into that the essence of which 
involves existence, and that the essence of which involves only a 
possible existence, there arises the distinction’ between eternity and 
duration’.3 ‘B y duration we can explain only the existence of 
modes, but by eternity the existence of Substance, that is, the 
infinite enjoyment or realization of existence or being.’4 Further, 
as the duration of a thing is its whole existence (for ‘ to whatever 
degree you deprive a thing of duration to that degree you deprive 
it of existence’5) so eternity is that ‘infinite existence’ which 
coincides with the real essence of G o d ; ‘which is attributable only 
to God, and not to created things, no, not even if  they endure 
for ever’ .6 For this existence is not something which is superadded
1 ‘Clare apparet, nos existentiam Substantiae toto genere a Modorum exis- 
tentia diversam concipere’. (Ep. xii.)
2 Aetemitas est ‘attributum, sub quo infinitam Dei existentiam concipimus. 
Duratio vero est attributum, sub quo rerum creatarum existentiam, prout in 
sua actualitate perseverant, concipimus’ (Cog. Met. I, iv). On the use of the 
term ‘attributum’ in this connexion, see Excursus II (pp. 64-71).
3 ‘Ex eo, quod supra divisimus ens in ens, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, 
et in ens, cujus essentia non involvit nisi possibilem existentiam, oritur distinctio 
inter aetemitatem et durationem.’ (Cog. Met. I, iv.)
4 ‘Per durationem . . . modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus; Sub­
stantiae vero per aetemitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, 
essendi fruitionem.’ (Ep. xii.)
5 ‘Quantum enim durationi alicujus rei detrahis, tantundem ejus existentiae 
detrahi necesse est.’ (Cog. Met. I, iv.)
6 ‘Deo infinita actu existentia competit . . . atque hanc infinitam existentiam 
aeternitatem voco, quae soli Deo tribuenda, non vero ulli rei creatae; non, 
inquam, quamvis earum duratio utroque careat fine.’ (Cog. Met. II, i). I have 
commented in Excursus II (pp. 64-71) on the important change of emphasis 
in Spinoza’s views when, in the Ethics, he assigned eternity to mens humana, 
thus in a sense going beyond solus Deus; but only ‘in a sense’, for man is eternal 
only in so far as he is a reproduction, and thus also an essential part, of God.
to God, even by right; it is not something that God enjoys or 
possesses, it is the divine being. ‘W e cannot affirm that God 
enjoys existence, for the existence of God is God himself.’1 Dura­
tion is, indeed, the enjoyment of existence, but eternity is existence 
itself. It is this infinite realization of existence and not an indefinite 
emptying of existence that must give us our clue to Spinoza’s 
conception of eternity. What duration is to a conditioned existence, 
that, or not less than that, is eternity to the necessary existence of 
G od; it is its essence. ‘As we cannot attribute duration to God, 
we call him eternal’ , he says, hastily correcting his not uncon­
sidered assertion that ‘by the term eternity we explain the duration 
of G od’.2 I need not reconsider here the reputed double valua­
tion of duration by Spinoza to which I have already made 
reference; it would be easy to show that the ambiguity belonged, 
not to the mind of Spinoza, but to duration itself; it was essential 
for him both to distinguish and to relate the two conceptions, 
duration and eternity: to distinguish them, since he was very much 
concerned to distinguish an eternal existence from an existence 
ab aeterno et in aeternum; to relate them, since not only are both 
for him forms of existence, but they are both forms of the same 
aspect o f existence; for duration is clearly related to eternity in a 
way in which number (e.g.) is certainly not. These are facts which 
have too often been overlooked, especially by those who have been 
wont to think of Spinozistic eternity as the mere negation of 
duration, or as equivalent to timelessness.
Eternity, then, is a kind o f existence, it is existence par excellence, 
an infinite existence, or, as the formal definition runs: existence 
‘conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition [i.e. the 
essence or nature] of the eternal thing’ ;3 that is to say, where the 
distinction of essence and existence is a mental device rather than 
a real difference.4 And in one of his great sayings, characterized 
by his peculiar intensity of meaning and restraint of expression, 
Spinoza lays bare the source of the errors of metaphysical writers
1 ‘Deus vero non potest did frui existentia, nam existentia Dei est Deus ipse.’ 
(Cog. Met. II, i.)
2 ‘Praedpuum attributum . . .  est Dei Aeternitas, qua ipsius durationem ex- 
plicamus; vel potius, ut nullam Deo durationem tribuamus, didmus eum esse 
aetemum.’ (Loc. cit.) See Excursus II (pp. 64-71).
3 ‘Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aetemae 
definitione necessario sequi concipitur.’ (Eth. I, Def. viii.)
4 i.e. a distinctio rationis and not a distinctio realis.
44 A E T E R N I T A S
on this subject, namely, their vain and futile attempt to explain 
eternity in abstraction from the nature of God or perfect being: 
‘as if  eternity could be understood apart from the contemplation 
of the essence of God, or indeed as if it were anything other than 
the divine nature.’1 Evidently the ultimate view of eternity, if  we 
are to do justice to the conception of Spinoza, must be something 
more even than a certain abstract intellectual order, which is but 
its empty schema. It is real existence as flowing from, nay, as 
identical with, essence: it is an essential existence.
It remains, then, to inquire into the peculiar nature of this 
existence which is not to be conceived as a mere persistence. Has 
the human mind any experience of such a form of existence? In 
the absence of such experience the unreality of duration and the 
necessity of a certain intellectual order might well be accepted 
as abstract conclusions, but the mind would'not attain any more 
inward apprehension of the nature of eternity.
I may, with advantage, say at once that I shall in the issue argue 
that the essence of Spinoza’s teaching is that not only has man such 
experience or knowledge, but that he only has knowledge of any 
kind, even Imagination of a changing world of finite modes, in 
so far as such imagined or ‘imaginative’ existences have removed 
themselves from the divisions and exclusions of finite empirical 
duration, and begun to approximate to the whole and inclusive 
character of eternal being; that a temporal existence in so far as it 
is purely temporal is the same as non-existence, and is perishing 
in proportion to its fragmentariness and exclusiveness; and that 
existence in every range in so far as it gains content moves already 
towards an ideal of perfection which is one with eternity itself. But 
even at the present stage of my argument I can and must affirm 
that according to Spinoza the human mind, finite as it is, is not left 
without knowledge, not merely of a partially ‘ eternized’ duration, 
but of eternity itself. It is, perhaps, characteristic of Spinoza’s 
metaphysical fervour (I might even call it ‘passion’, for it is to 
some extent a failing in him) that he seems to leap direct to the 
goal instead of approaching it by ordered and graded steps. Plato 
had, in his own way, known much better: ‘the form of the Infinite 
must not be applied to the M any until all the species intermediate
1 ‘Quasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae contemplatione intelligi posset, 
vel quid esset praeter divinam essentiam.’ (Cog. Met. II, i.)
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between the One and the Infinite have been surveyed . . .  The wise 
men of our time make their One by chance, and their M any too 
quickly or too slowly, and from the One pass direct to the Infinite, 
so that the middle terms always escape them.’1 This tendency to 
be too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity is, indeed, 
the characteristic unwisdom of the wise, and not merely of sophists, 
in all ages. For Spinoza, we are not merely other than temporal, 
possessing an actual duration, but we are even to some degree 
eternal, and as such, therefore, share the eternity of undivided 
Substance. I have not yet reached the proper point in my argu­
ment for the discussion of the difficulties of such a conception, but I 
may, perhaps, suggest that this is Spinoza’s own way of expressing 
the truth which had appeared to Descartes in the form of the 
absolute certainty of our own existence as the starting-point of all 
knowledge. It is in a very real sense as important for Spinoza to 
establish the eternity of the mind, as it was for Descartes to establish 
the certainty of the existence of the self. Unless, in some sense, 
the knower is eternal he must for ever be cut off from absolute 
truth and from the knowledge of God. He would have no status in 
the Real, and therefore could not even be aware of its reality. It 
was thus essential for Spinoza to affirm the eternity of the mind, 
or, what is the same thing, its knowledge of its eternity. W e are 
not left without that affirmation: ‘we feel and prove by experience 
that we are eternal’,2 for we as men have commerce with, and enter 
into, reality; and we do so most truly in so far as, both corporeally 
and mentally, we reproduce the Real in those ordered intellectual 
perceptions and precise corporeal responses that constitute at once 
our groundedness in the Real, and our real contribution to it. 
Thus only do we enjoy our true being. Only in so far as we fail to 
apprehend and respond to the Real do we suffer birth and death and 
vicissitude, and are thus excluded from the Real.3 ‘For the mind 
feels those things that it conceives by the intellect no less than those 
that it [imagines]. For demonstrations are the eyes o f the mind 
whereby it sees and observes things.’4 Further, as we saw before,5
1 Philebus, 1 6 D ,  E .
2 ‘Sentimus, experimurque, nos aetemos esse.’ (Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.)
3 Cf. below: Chapters IV et seqq.
4 ‘Nam mens non minus res illas sentit, quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas 
in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi, quibus res videt, observatque, sunt ipsae 
demonstrationesA (Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.)
s Above, pp. 14-17.
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Spinoza does not regard our demonstrative knowledge as merely 
hypothetical and concerned with abstract universal features of 
existence, for the objects of Reason are universal singulars, viz. 
the common properties or universal bases of all finite being, those 
‘fixed and eternal’ things of which he speaks in the Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emendatione as the source of the inmost essence of all 
individual things. ‘These mutable singulars depend so intimately 
and essentially (so to speak) upon the fixed [and eternal] things 
that they cannot either be or be conceived without them.’1 ‘Whence 
these fixed and eternal things, though they are themselves singulars, 
will, nevertheless, owing to their omnipresence and the supreme 
amplitude of their power, be to us as universals.’2 Reason no less 
than scientia intuitiva brings us into contact with the Real, and its 
peculiar failing is not that it is merely hypothetical (though if  its 
incomplete parts were taken alone that would be true of them), 
but that it is selective and analytic in procedure. Its main concern 
is not the concrete nature even of thesefixa et aeterna as universal 
individuals (much less of the mutable singulars) but their necessary 
connexions and relations. Undoubtedly, these are also constituents 
of their natures, but they are conceived by Reason for themselves, 
and not as constituting this or that unique individual. But in spite 
of these special limitations, it is none the less of the nature of Reason 
to perceive things sub quadam specie aeternitatis. 3  This in itself is 
a notable conclusion, implying, as it does, that the Real is a totum 
which partly manifests itself in those eternal and necessary rela­
tions between whole ranges of content which are familiar as the 
principles of geometry (extension), of dynamics (motion and rest), 
and of the special sciences generally, culminating for us in the 
physiology of the central nervous system of m an; but even more 
important, as I shall indicate in the issue, is the assertion that the 
finite mind is capable of the third kind of knowledge, scientia
1 ‘Haec mutabilia singularia adeo intime, atque essentialiter (ut sic dicam) 
ab iis fixis pendent, ut sine iis nec esse, nec concipi possint.’ (De Intell. Emend., 
Op. Post., p. 389.)
2 ‘Haec fixa, et aeterna, quamvis sint singularia, tamen ob eorum ubique prae- 
sentiam, ac latissimam potentiam erunt nobis, tanquam universalia, sive genera 
definitionum rerum singularium mutabilium, et causae proximae omnium 
rerum.’ (Loc. cit.)
3 Eth. II, xliv, Cor. ii. A fuller discussion of the significance of this phrase in 
the light of the wider issues raised in the course of my argument will be found 
in Excursus III (pp. 99-104).
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intuitiva,1 which views things as eternal individuals within and 
flowing from Natura. Doubtless our capacity for such ‘intuitions’ 
is limited as the result of our special range of individual perfection, 
but we must not too readily conclude that ‘intuitive’ knowledge is 
only possible in so far as human minds are corrected and amplified 
beyond recognition as they become identical with the mind of God. 
Full and complete intuitive knowledge undoubtedly belongs to 
God alone, but we too can possess knowledge of Natura as a 
universal Individual: knowledge which, though not full and 
absolutely complete, is yet true and adequate so far as it goes.2 
Scientia intuitiva, therefore, is possible even where knowledge is 
incomplete: nor need the incompleteness be confined to the ex­
clusion of whole types of being (or ‘Attributes’) from the grasp of 
the knower. Even within the Attributes of Thought and Extension 
incompleteness of adequate range does not exclude the possibility 
of an ‘ intuitive’ apprehension of part of the content available. And 
i f  this were not so, as has been said, all ‘Rational’ knowledge would 
for us be purely hypothetical (and thus empty and unmeaning); 
for by no mere collection of laws, but only by their systematic 
connexion, can we apprehend in their full concreteness the natures 
of Extension or of Thought: demonstrations’ are the eyes of the 
mind. But the ‘ demonstrations’ which constitute scientia intuitiva 
are not the serial proofs of the learner, nor these made timeless for 
contemplation,3 but the intuitive proofs of the real knower, who
1 ‘Summus Mentis conatus, summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cogni- 
tionis genere.’ (Eth. V, xxv.)
2 ‘Unaquaeque cujuscunque corporis, vel rei singularis, actu existentis, idea 
Dei aeternam, et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit. . . . Cognitio aeternae, 
et infinitae essentiae Dei, quam unaquaeque idea involvit, est adaequata, et 
perfects. . . . Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae, et in­
finitae essentiae Dei.’ (Eth. II, xlv—xlvii.) ‘Ad quaestionem tuam, an de Deo 
tam claram, quam de triangulo habeam ideam, respondeo affirmando: Si me 
vero interroges, utrum tam claram de Deo, quam de triangulo habeam imaginem, 
respondebo negando: Deum enim non imaginari; sed quidem intelligere pos- 
sumus. Hie quoque notandum est, quod non dico, me Deum omnino cognoscere; 
sed me quaedam ejus attributa; non autem omnia, neque maximam intelligere 
partem, et certum est, plurimorum ignorantiam, quorundam eorum habere 
notitiam, non impedire. Quum Euclidis elementa addiscerem, primo tres 
trianguli angulos duobus rectis aequari intelligebam; hancque trianguli proprie- 
tatem clare percipiebam, licet multarum aliarum ignarus essem.’ (Ep. hi.)
3 I need hardly say that I do not think that the essence of any proof is in time, 
even for the learner. Its progressive clarification is in time. I add this note 
because even timeless proof is ‘serial’ in the sense that the distinction of prior 
and posterior is essential to it.
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grasps the instance in the concrete universal and the concrete 
universal in the instance, and whose intellectual life is thus an 
enjoyed concrete sorites. It is an essential part of my general 
thesis that all real existence, qua real, is the object of such scientia 
intuitiva, and is, as such, eternal: not merely in the negative sense 
of ‘timeless’, nor merely in the neutral sense of ‘necessary’, but in 
the real and positive sense that its content or quality is a draught of 
the very nature of the eternal whole.
That is a conclusion not yet established, to which I must 
approach by ordered steps; but it is the principle which must 
govern my interpretation of the common judgement that for 
Spinoza ‘to know the eternal is to be eternal’ . This statement is 
formally no more than a particular expression of the general 
principle that ‘the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the 
order and connexion of things.’1 In so far as we know the temporal, 
we are temporal; in so far as we know the eternal, we are eternal. 
And the same principle applies not merely as between the Attributes, 
but within each Attribute: in so far as our bodies or our minds 
reflect or reproduce the eternal whole of Extension or Thought 
respectively, they too are eternal. And this is the real significance 
of the statement: in knowing the eternal we do not put aside our 
finitude and lose ourselves in the divine. In knowing the eternal 
we do not become ‘T he Eternal’ ; though the divine nature alone is 
eternal in the full and complete sense. A ll finite things are, in their 
measure, eternal: they may, and must, be truly apprehended sub 
qaadam specie aeternitatis; they are no mere sections of the divine 
nature capable of eternity only in so far as they receive amplifica­
tion in pari materia (though that is true to some extent with all 
finite beings), but they are themselves inchoations of the eternal, 
and draughts of the Real. So much by way of presage of the general 
direction of my argument.
In the proof of Corollary ii to Proposition xliv of Part I I  of the 
Ethics, Spinoza shows special concern about excluding all time- 
relations,2 and thus emphasizes the logical character of an eternal 
existence, i.e. its necessity. This has misled many into supposing 
that he intends here to convey the metaphysical essence of eternity. 
But we may be confident that he had no such intention, for it is 
necessary to pass beyond Reason to scientia intuitiva to obtain that 
further knowledge; the necessary connexions and relations of things
1 Eth. II, vii. 2 ‘Absque ulla temporis relatione’ (Eth. II, xliv, Cor. ii).
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must be woven into concrete individuals as such, and not as mere 
assembled implicates.1 Similarly, in order to experience eternal 
existence we must be able to take a single view of our own individual 
existence from inside, and thus also to have adequate knowledge 
of external things and of the whole. And it is in this sense alone 
that to know things sub quadam specie aeternitatis is also ‘to feel and 
prove by experience that we are eternal’ . There need be, for us 
there can be, no real separation of the two forms of knowledge ; 
Reason blossoms into scientia intuitiva, which enlarges and recon­
structs itself by means of Reason. Thus our finitude genuinely 
reveals itself.2 T he Ethics of Spinoza is itself a notable example of 
these relations of Reason and scientia intuitiva', in the main it is 
a system of Reason, but again and again it uses conceptions which 
imply the presence of scientia intuitiva, both in the author, and in 
the reader if  he is to understand his philosopher. O f no part of 
the work is this more true than of the second section of Part V  : 
and I might go so far as to assert that it is just those propositions 
which most truly exemplify the processes of Reason, that provide 
the text for the view of Spinozism as reducing relation to identity, 
and existence to a moment; as it is the more concrete teaching of 
Part V  that must become the essential ground for a true view of 
Spinozistic Eternity.
THE AFFECTS3
But although it is to scientia intuitiva that we must look for the 
main clue to the Spinozistic conception of eternity, it is not 
necessary, indeed it would be pernicious, to separate the second 
section of Part V  of the Ethics from the rest of the work. Spinoza 
means to tell a single story ; and in order to show that in the main
1 The reader who finds this summary phrase, and the ensuing sentences, 
obscure, is referred to later discussions, and especially to Excursus III 
(pp. 99-104).
2 For in the perfect individual experience, or Thought, no such enlargement or 
reconstruction could be forthcoming or needed. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, 
of Extension as the perfect extended individual. (Cf. also below, p. 102.)
3 I use the term ‘affect’, in spite of some obvious objections, rather than the 
more usual ‘emotion’ because (1) it is less ambiguous, since the word ‘affect’ 
has no other common substantival meaning in English ; (2) it is a near relation 
of the Latin affectus which is Spinoza’s own term, and thus constantly recalls 
the reader’s attention to the original; (3) because it does describe the nature of 
these modifications, which arise only in finite beings, and as a result of their 
relations with external things by which they are ‘affected’, and which they 
‘affect’.
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he succeeds in doing so, I shall consider next the theory of the 
Affects, which is found in Part III, and which has an important 
bearing on our main problem, providing us, as it does, with a clue 
to a Spinozistic phenomenology.
Spinoza draws a clear distinction between the joy (laetitia), 
sorrow (tristitia), and desire (cupiditas) of the finite mode on the 
one hand, and the eternal blessedness (beatitudo) of God and the 
free man on the other. Conscious of its finitude, each fluctuating 
mode suffers continual change, which it as continually resists so 
far as it can, i.e. so long as it exists. This change, and the striving 
against change, are experienced as joy or sorrow, and desire, 
respectively. In these affects we are directly aware of processes, 
which are not to be taken as alternating, unconnected states, but 
rather as felt qualities in which succession has been transcended 
but not lost, and in which transformation has become a felt, and 
therefore direct, datum. For Spinoza is emphatic in his insistence 
upon the identity of the affect with the process, and not with the 
termini of the process : ‘ I say [joy and sorrow] are transitions : for joy 
is not perfection itself, for i f  a man were born with the perfection 
to which he passes, he would possess the same without joy. . . . 
Neither can we say that sorrow consists in the absence of greater 
perfection ; absence is nothing, whereas sorrow is an actual positive 
affect, and hence a transition.’1 T he finite mind, in other words, 
does not merely apprehend its objects and its ideas in their logical 
or perceptual distinction and order, it directly apprehends their 
changes towards or away from perfection, and it apprehends its 
own existence as a ceaseless urge or struggle against an obstructive 
environment.
As opposed to these direct experiences of transition and of 
duration which belong to the finite mode, Spinoza contrasts the 
eternal blessedness of G od: ‘ I f  joy consists in the transition to 
a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in this, 
that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.’2 No assertion in
1 ‘Dico transitionem. Nam Laetitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum 
perfectione, ad quam transit, nasceretur, ejusdem absque Laetitiae affectu 
compos esset. . . . Nec dicere possumus, quod Tristitia in privatione majoris 
perfectionis consistât; nam privatio nihil est; Tristitia autem affectus actus est 
qui propterea nullus alius esse potest, quam actus transeundi ad minorem per- 
fectionem.’ (Eth. I ll , Aff. Def. in, Explic.)
2 ‘Si Laetitia in transitione ad majorem perfectionem consistit, Beatitudo sane 
in eo consistere debet, quod mens ipsa perfectione sit praedita.’ (Eth. V, 
xxxiii, Sch.)
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the Ethics is more decisive for my argument, for joy belongs to an 
enduring existence, but blessedness to one that is eternal. As 
opposed to duration, which implies change towards or from per­
fection, an eternal being, incapable of change, enjoys fullness and 
perfection of existence, enjoys blessedness, not as though it were 
something different from its essence, which it might therefore be 
without while still existing, but as the very content of its reality.
It has sometimes been asserted that, in view of Spinoza’s own 
statements about the nature of the fundamental affects, the con­
ception of blessedness, though in itself one of the most attractive 
features of the system, is really only a beautiful excrescence.1 For 
the affects, as transitions to or from perfection, are essentially 
durational in character; an eternal being, on the contrary, being 
incapable of such transitions, must lack all affective experience.2 
I shall meet that contention by tracing the development of the
1 The phrase is Mr. Alexander’s, dropped in the course of a discussion arising 
out of a paper on Spinoza’s doctrine of Eternity which I read at the Manchester 
University Philosophical Society in January 1928.
2 A parallel, or rather inverse, ‘excrescence’ appears in the doctrine of Part II  
of the Ethics, where Spinoza tells us that the human mind knows only its own 
body and its changes directly, and other things only through the propria com- 
munia. He then goes on to affirm that ‘the human mind has no knowledge of 
the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifica­
tions whereby the body is affected’ (Eth. II, xix), and the impression gathered 
is that but for the interference of external things causing changes in the human 
body, the mind would be wholly unaware of its body; and, in effect, that the mind 
only perceives changes and their termini. That principle, if carried through 
to the end, would deprive Substance of the Attribute of Thought, just as an 
insistence on the transitional nature of joy seems prima facie to deprive God of 
blessedness.
It is obvious that Spinoza desires to advance no such conclusion; and in the 
demonstration of the Proposition that I have quoted, his line of argument becomes 
clear: the reason why the body would not be known by the mind but for the 
action of other things on it, is that it does not exist in isolation from other 
things, and ultimately from the whole universe which, in its measure, it repro­
duces. It is the tendency of Imagination to take things in isolation, both 
external things and also our bodies, that constitutes its peculiar danger, and 
renders it liable to err. Thus even where we seem to know the body without 
relation to external things, the knowledge is inadequate, and is only possible 
because external things co-operate with our bodies to form reproductive 
‘images’ on certain soft parts of the organism. The point, therefore, is not that 
we cannot know anything but changes in the body, but that knowledge is always 
of a world or connected system; and since the human body is a finite, and there­
fore incomplete, system, deriving both its content and its complement from 
Natura as an infinite and complete whole, it follows that knowledge of the body 
must depend upon its reciprocal relations with the facies totius Universi. Thus 
not least when its object seems most independent and whole in its partialitas 
does knowledge point to the infinite Attribute of Thought.
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notion of blessedness. The transition to this conception from that 
of joy is through the conception of inward mental repose1 which is 
defined as ‘joy arising from the contemplation of ourselves and 
our own power of acting’2, that is to say, it is not mere abstract joy, 
but one that is grounded, and which arises from the perception 
of a perfection already possessed. Now the perfection or reality 
of a thing, according to Spinoza, is identical with its activity, it is 
the possession within its own individual nature of adequate genetic 
causes for its particular content. The essence of a thing in so far 
as it is real is this activity or grounded content. ‘Our mind is 
sometimes active . . . [and] in so far as it has adequate ideas, it is 
necessarily active.’3 The ‘actual essence’ of a finite thing is this real 
essence modified in proportion to its finitude by the passivity 
involved in, or concomitant with, inadequate ideas. T he result of 
this qualification or finitude is to limit existence to the form of 
duration, so that thepotentia of a thing appears as its conatus in sno 
esse perseverandi, and as desire, the third fundamental affect. It 
follows that desire does not belong to God, for whom actual and 
real essence are identical, and who therefore cannot be conceived 
as enduring. These statements involve important principles which 
I cannot here elaborate; for the present I must be content to sum 
them up dogmatically by saying that genuine activity, as it is found 
in God and in the eternal part of the free man, is not identical with 
desire, and does not imply transient causality; it is one with the 
logical nisus of adequate or grounded ideas.
It follows, further, from the well-known doctrine of idea ideae 
that the mind is capable of a ‘reflective’ joy in contemplating its 
concrete achievements, over and above the direct joy of this or 
that achieving. For the mind could not unknowingly possess this 
nisus to wholeness which belongs to adequate ideas, because its 
being is its knowledge: ‘The essence of our mind consists solely 
in knowledge.’4 Thus though it is not true to say that ‘reflective’ 
knowledge constitutes individuality,5 it is certainly one with the
1 Mentis acquiescentia in se ipso.
2 ‘Laetitia, orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum, suamque agendi potentiam con- 
templatur.’ (Eth. I ll , Aff. Def. xxv.)
3 ‘Mens nostra quaedam agit . . . quatenus adaequatas habet ideas, eatenus 
quaedam necessario agit.’ (Eth. Ill, i).
4 ‘Nostrae Mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit.’ (Eth. V. xxxvi, Sell.)
5 Cf. Camerer: Die Lelire Spinoza’s, II, i, 2. In discussing this conception, 
Professor Joachim says:‘If we ask what Spinoza intended to establish by his 
conception of “idea ideae”, the answer can hardly be doubtful. Pie intended
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enjoyment of individuality or perfection, and is thus the source of
mentis acquiescentia in se ipso. The mind, therefore, not only
experiences its duration or temporal transitions as affects, it also
knows itself, and, so far as it is active or real, as in some degree it
to restore that unity and continuity in all our thinking, which his conception 
of the mind as a complex of “ideae” seems to have destroyed . . .  It does 
not seem erroneous to suppose that Spinoza intended to find such a unity 
in the “idea ideae”—the consciousness of our thinking which every act 
of thinking involves. But if this was his intention, it must be confessed that 
he has failed’ (A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, pp. 140-1). I do not think 
that Spinoza had any such intention, nor do I think that any such restoration 
of unity was needed. That the human mind is not fully individual is, of course, 
one of his main contentions ; but that it is a mere aggregate of atomic ideas is an 
entirely Humian misrendering of his theory of the nature of finite mind. 
Professor Joachim’s interpretation of Eth. II, Post, i, and II, xv in this sense, is, 
I think, to say the least, very unsympathetic, and in effect fundamentally 
erroneous. This point is further discussed in connexion with the notion of the 
corpus simplicissimum below (Excursus IV, pp. 137-41), but I may here add 
that no doctrine of mind could in itself be further removed from mental atomism 
than that of Spinoza ; for according to him, mind is essentially systematic, and 
the human mind is only rightly so called in so far as it is not completely pulveru­
lent. True mind, even finite mind, is in its measure active, that is, it contains 
within itself adequate generating causes for its ideas: its content is grounded 
(not transiently caused), and therefore systematically connected in accordance 
with logical principles, which are also the principles of real production. The 
mind is really individual in proportion as its ideas are in ‘the intellectual order’ ; 
it is an aggregate only in so far as it remains in ‘the common order of nature’. 
Nor does this mean or imply, as Professor Joachim asserts, that the human 
mind has being and individuality only in and for God; ‘but in and for God man 
is no longer what he is for himself and for other men. His real being and 
individuality is God’s being and individuality, and is “his own” only in the 
sense in which God is all things and all things are in God’ (Loc. cit., p. 142). 
In the course of subsequent chapters I have attempted to distinguish clearly 
between the little truth and the very great error of such a statement, and to that 
further discussion I must refer the reader.
I conclude that a more sympathetic interpretation of this part of Spinoza’s 
theory would have shown that the doctrine of ‘idea ideae’ or reflective knowledge 
has no special relation to his supposed combination of Atomism in Physics and 
Psychology with Parmenideanism in Metaphysics, but is intended to elucidate 
the nature of thinking being, and of our awareness of it as a distinct form of 
existent.
I may add that the atomistic misreading of Spinoza’s theory leads Professor 
Joachim to ascribe to him the truly hopeless contradiction involved in asserting 
at once (1) that the idea ideae is identical with the idea itself (‘in fact, so absolutely 
one are they, that they cannot even be conceived as identical : for identity with 
no difference is a meaningless term’ (Loc. cit., p. 140), a statement which is 
perhaps intended to relieve the contradiction; but if so, at the expense of the 
whole theory of the idea ideae) ; and also (2) that the idea ideae involves a process 
in infinitum (Loc. cit., p. 141). I have shown elsewhere that the Scholium to 
Eth. II, xxi (on which he bases these views) definitely repudiates the suggestion 
of the infinite series ; and in the same place (below, p. 260, note 5) I have in­
dicated what I take to be the essence of Spinoza’s intention and meaning.
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must be, knows itself adequately, and in this self-knowledge may 
be supposed to pass to a greater perfection as ‘reflective’ know­
ledge becomes more effective and profound. For the ‘reflective’ 
knowledge of the mind must more and more approximate to 
scientia intuitiva, for which the temporal transitions of Imagination 
are superseded by ‘ logical transitions’ ;1 and these are rightly 
apprehended in scientia intuitiva as the eternal nisus of grounds 
and consequents. Such concrete intuition is, according to Spinoza, 
accompanied by delight proportioned to the degree of perfection 
already achieved, so that acquiescentia is not, like joy, an unreal 
abstraction or passio, but an actio, and the proper affective enjoy­
ment of adequate knowledge. It would be strange indeed if  the 
mind could feel its transition to a greater perfection, and yet be 
wholly unaware of the perfection itself to which it has passed; for 
thus perfection would be wholly relative, instead of being the very 
standard of absoluteness: ‘By reality and perfection I mean the 
same thing.’2 Nor can grounds and consequents be rightly separated 
as successive or as coexistent in an intellectual space or neutral 
‘time’ : their distinctness is not spatio-temporal, and their coexis­
tence, though not spatial, does not lapse into identity or confused 
altogetherness, nor again into ‘ identity’ in mere ‘difference’ : their 
relation is asymmetrical. It becomes quality.3 And when Spinoza
1 Objection may, perhaps legitimately, be raised to this extension of the use 
of the term ‘transition’ to timeless logical relations in which there can be no 
‘transience’ in the literal sense of a going over or across to something else. I hope 
that the course of my argument will indicate that I am quite aware of the partial 
unsuitability of the term; what I am anxious to make clear is that even when 
all time-relations are abstracted from logical content there remains something 
in the nature of ‘process’. For though they are ‘together’, premisses and con­
clusion form no symmetrical identity in difference, but there remains the funda­
mental distinction between the logically prior and the logically posterior.
I cannot think that the theological term ‘procession’ is any less objectionable 
than ‘transition’ ; and, in view of Mr. Whitehead’s use of the term, ‘passage’ 
seems definitely worse. ‘Direction’ which is more neutral is also more spatial 
in suggestion (see p. 158, note 1).
2 ‘Per realitatem, et perfectionem idem intelligo.’ (Eth. II, Def. vi.)
3 As will be seen in due course, even the ‘common order of nature’ is never a 
mere series distributed in temporal points without ‘permeation’. The world of 
Imagination lacks the wholeness of the ‘intellectual order’, but it cannot be 
entirely lacking in connexion and continuity: it is at least an ‘order’ of nature. 
And the causes which we detect in nature are never Humian causes, but bear 
some real relation to their effects: they are ‘genetic’ or producing causes; and 
in so far as the world of perception lacks such real causes it lacks causation 
altogether, it exhibits mere transitions, and duration gives place to time, 
quality to quantity, and reality to nonentity.
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speaks of the possession of unchanging perfection as being without 
joy, he must not be understood to deny that it involves acquie- 
scentia, the positive experience of inward mental repose; rather 
it must be asserted that jo y  itself would be impossible without 
some awareness of its termini, since though change is not the same 
thing as difference simpliciter, still less is it pure process. Aware­
ness of change without awareness of achievement or loss is, in 
strictness, inconceivable, though the actual estimation of the result 
may be vague and inadequate.
N ow blessedness is identical with that highest possible mental 
repose1 which arises from the third kind of knowledge. It is the 
affective apprehension, not of temporal transition to or from per­
fection, but of perfection itself, not of achieving but of achievement. 
But, it may be objected, the real fallacy in Spinoza’s doctrine is not 
its assertion that joy, or the affective perception of transition, 
implies acquiescentia, or the affective perception of the termini of 
transition, and that hence an eternal being is not deprived of 
affective or qualitative content; but the converse assertion that 
there can be awareness of achievement without awareness of 
achieving: that a perfect and complete being can, without change or 
struggle, enjoy not merely the fruits, but also the sense, of victory. 
That is an objection that seems to run nearer to the heart of the 
thesis, and I must admit that Spinoza’s own statement about the 
genesis of acquiescentia in se ipso is not altogether unambiguous. 
‘When the mind is able to contemplate itself it is thereby supposed 
to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by III, xi, Sch.) to feel 
jo y ,’2 which seems to make acquiescentia after all only a transi­
tion, and therefore a particular example of joy. But the use of 
the term ‘suppo^tur' is significant; for there can be no genuine 
transition in such a case, since the idea and the idea ideae are one 
and the sam e: ‘T he idea of the mind and the mind itself are one 
and the same thing.’3 True, there may seem to be, with the finite 
mind, a transition to a greater degree of ‘reflective’ clearness, 
arising from our ideas becoming more adequate; but this is 
necessarily absent from the free mind in proportion to its freedom ;
1 ‘Surama, quae dari potest, Mentis acquiescentia.’ (Eth. V, xxxii, Dem.)
2 ‘Cum ergo fit, ut Mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem 
perfectionem transire, hoc est (per Schol. Prop, xihujus), laetitia affici supponitur.’ 
(Eth. I ll , liii, Dem.)
3 ‘Mentis idea, et ipsa Mens una, eademque est res, quae sub uno, eodemque 
attributo, nempe Cogitationis, concipitur.’ (Eth. II, xxi, Sch.)
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and in any case, it is not a transition from knowledge of an object 
to ‘reflection’ upon knowledge itself: ‘He who knows anything 
by that very fact knows that he knows it, and at the same time he 
knows that he knows himself to know it, and so on to infinity.’1 
Acquiescentia, therefore, is not a transition in the same sense as is 
joy, it is not a temporal transition, but a ‘supposed’ transition, and 
this must be explained as meaning that the ‘transition’ is logical 
rather than temporal. And it is because the transitional nature of 
joy does not infect its qualitative content, that perfection itself, 
which is no literal transition, may be enjoyed as quality in acquie­
scentia. In joy the moments of temporal transition are summed up 
as enduring quality; in finite acquiescentia the moments of logical 
‘transition’ are concretely enjoyed sub specie durationis\ and in 
blessedness the eternal nisus of grounds to consequents is appre­
hended and enjoyed as that intellectual love which alone among 
the affects is eternal.
The same distinctions are pertinent in the interpretation of the 
unchanging character of the Real. The lack of transition in Natura 
is not meant by Spinoza as an imperfection in it, but, on the con­
trary, as an alternative expression of its perfection, i. e. of its 
absolute completeness. Transition is denied because it implies 
imperfection either in its terminus a quo or in its terminus ad quern, 
indeed, ultimately in both; but logical ‘ transition’, or the nisus 
of grounds towards consequents, involves no such defect, but is the 
very ground of all perfection, and the essence of the Real.
It is the distinction between unreal or temporal transition, and 
real ‘transition’ or logical nisus (which in analytic exposition appears 
as feigned transition) that makes clear the essential nature of 
acquiescentia and blessedness, and their relation to joy. Temporal 
transition is unreal because it is a contradiction in term s; duration 
itself is only possible as achieving grows out of achievement, and 
achievement out of achieving; while in eternity achievement and 
achieving are identical, and in Cogitatio their identity is intellectual 
love: ‘Although this love towards God has no beginning, it never­
theless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had originated 
as we feigned in the Corollary of the last Proposition.’2
1 ‘Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, 
quod scit, et sic in infinitum.’ (Eth. II, xxi, Sch.)
2 ‘Quamvis hie erga Deum Amor principium non habuerit (per Prop, praec.), 
habet tamen omnes Amoris perfectiones, perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in 
Coroll. Prop, praec. finximus. Nec ulla hie est differentia, nisi quod Mens
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Similar considerations will be found to govern Spinoza’s con­
ception of the relations of alternation, causation, and perfection. 
N o theory that accepted the externality of causation could escape 
the objections with which I have been dealing, for achievement 
would be external to the process of struggle, and could only be 
recognized as achievement through our memory of the process 
which led up to it.1 But Spinoza’s view is that all genuine causation 
is immanent or genetic in its real nature, though to the partialitas 
of a finite being it may appear as transient, and therefore, as having 
duration. That is an inescapable imagination in the experience of 
the finite individual; but it need not be and remain an error. Even 
the finite mind can recognize the ultimate nature of the Real (within 
its determining Attributes), and of causation, not because it is 
finite, but because it is intellect. Causation cannot be wholly ex­
ternal if  there is to be real process and achievement. Even the 
continuous memoria2 (either in the mental or corporeal sense) of a 
series of events up to the present (performing the duties of Hum e’s 
too useful ‘imagination’) cannot make the series a real process 
working to a terminus. T he last event of an associated series only 
becomes a real terminus or achievement in so far as the whole 
series forms a connected system. Where that condition is entirely
easdem has perfectiones, quas eldem jam accedere finximus, aetemas habuerit, 
idque concomitante idea De tanquam causa aetema.’ {Eth. V, xxxiii, Sch.)
But, it may be asked, is not the Ethics arranged in accordance with the 
synthetical method? And if so, why speak of the fiction as a feature of the 
analytical exposition? I reply that if the Ethics had been in the synthetical 
order with any reasonable degree of exactness then the doctrines of Part V, 
Propp. xxi to xlii would have preceded those of Parts II, III, IV, and V, Propp. 
i to xx. And, to come to the present point, the whole of the exposition of the 
affects is obviously analytical, beginning as it does from the tendency towards 
perfection (laetitia); and proceeding to the recognition and enjoyment of finite 
perfection (acquiescentia); and lastly to perfection itself (beatitudo). But a 
synthetic exposition should have begun from perfection and proceeded to its 
imperfect temporal expressions. (On the distinction of analytic and synthetic 
method, cf. Descartes, Meditationes, Resp. ad Sec. Obj. vii.)
Thus though the terms ‘supponitur’ and ‘finximus’ which I have emphasized 
in the passages quoted, refer primarily to what has been supposed and feigned 
in earlier passages, yet my argument is that these suppositions and fictions were 
necessary at those points because, having begun with imperfection there was no 
possibility of ever reaching the principles governing perfection without the use 
of these devices. Beatitudo is no fiction, and acquiescentia no mere supposition; 
but acquiescentia can only be reached from laetitia by means of a supposition; 
and beatitudo by the use of a fiction.
1 But memory would, of course, be impossible on such a theory.
2 Cf. Eth. II, xviii, Sch.
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unfulfilled there cannot be even transiency: as in the theory of 
Hume, each event is absolutely temporary and disconnected. 
Where it is only partly fulfilled there is a measure of genuine 
transiency, and the process endures. Only where the condition is 
completely fulfilled is there real process in the sense of production 
as distinct from conditioning; and here transiency gives place to 
immanency. The perfection of the whole, therefore, must already 
contain all the stages of its achieving, not sub specie durationis as 
stages external to one another and to their end, and leading up to 
perfection, but sub specie aeternitatis, and after the manner in which 
premisses are contained in their explained conclusion: i.e. as con­
stituting, not an identity in mere difference, or symmetrical differ­
ence, but an identity uniting and retaining the difference of the 
logically prior and the logically posterior.
Spinoza’s theory of joy, then, must be taken as his recognition 
that the finite mind perceives duration, not as separated puncta, 
but as quality. Pure externality belongs only to time and measure, 
and these are unreal. His theory of acquiescentia, again, must be 
taken as signifying that it is insufficient to establish the continuity 
of duration, since it cannot be adequately perceived as pure process 
without termini. It is always possession, achieving, and achieve­
ment, inextricably woven together. Duration is only duration by 
the pressing in of the past upon the present and the emergence of 
the future therefrom. It is not a succession of nows, it is process ; 
but it is not pure process, for successive positions in a real duration 
are different in quality; and the essence of existence, even of 
enduring existence, is that very qualitative growth through which 
we escape the ‘absolute relativity’ of mere time (and the self-con­
tradictory phrase exactly describes the logical vice of both time 
and measure).
M . Bergson has well argued that real duration is not a kind of 
space, but is an intensive quantity, i.e. a quality; the past con­
centrates itself at the growing point of the present,1 which it
1 ‘ “ Durée”, the operative concentration of the self’s past history at the growing 
point of the present, is one with the relative timelessness of a finite self. If, then, 
it is admitted that timelessness is an essential constituent of time—and this 
much will hardly be denied to-day—then to say of any finite being that it is 
temporal (has or is “durée”) includes, strictly speaking, all that can be demanded 
for the description of such a self by the theory which takes eternity to be its full 
and perfect character.’ (Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, 
P- 339-1
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permeates. And it is this permeation of achievement or creation 
by possession that constitutes the reality of duration, which is 
thus an enjoyed quality rather than a measurable quantity. This 
conception of duration was regarded by M . Bergson as a refuta­
tion of what he conceived to be Spinozism, viz. the theory that 
causation is identity and duration nothing. I f  the view which 
I have put forward is correct, the Bergsonian theory of duration 
is but a partial and inadequate Spinozism; for it is not, strictly 
speaking, the past as past that permeates the present, but only the 
past as the given, and therefore as our main source of creative 
essence. T he permeation of the present by the past as such could 
not make intelligible the reality of duration. Its creativity becomes 
a miracle! W hat really operates at the present to produce the 
future cannot be merely past, but both past and future, while 
remaining such, must also in some sense be present at the grow­
ing point of process; and thus what operates must be relevantly 
efficient in past, in present, and in future, and must permeate 
them a ll: viz. eternal essence. W ith a stern eye directed towards 
M . Bergson, M r. Alexander protests: ‘ In what sense it can be held 
that Tim e as we experience it in ourselves is other than a duration 
which is intrinsically successive passes my understanding.’1 But 
the implication is not that temporal process is merely successive: 
or even that it is sufficient to establish its continuity in succession. 
There can be no succession without change of quality, nor change 
of quality without permeation of some sort. But the permeation 
is not that of the present by the past as such, any more than by 
the future as such ; it is the permeation that we find in the relation 
of premisses and conclusion, through which the conclusion re­
ceives its justification, and the premisses their full content. When 
we say that the conclusion follows from the premisses, we do not 
mean that the premisses precede the conclusion in time, but that 
they determine the conclusion. There may be a sense in which, on 
occasion, e. g. in the process of learning, the premisses do precede 
the conclusion in time, but the premisses are still premisses after 
the conclusion has been drawn, and indeed, are not, strictly 
speaking, premisses at all until the conclusion is drawn. The 
conclusion, again, cannot in any but the most superficial sense be 
said to follow the premisses in time, since it is only a conclusion in 
so far as it is determined by the premisses. Further, even where 
1 Space, Time, and Deity, i, p. 124.
60 A E T E R N I T A S
the recognition of the conclusion follows the postulation of the 
premisses, it is not the premisses alone as postulated that deter­
mine the conclusion, but the system within which the premisses 
operate and the conclusion remains.
W hile admitting the analogical character of this account, I must, 
nevertheless, contend that it does elucidate the nature of the per­
meation that belongs to duration. T he conditions governing 
abstract formal inference are necessarily an inadequate representa­
tion of real productivity; but a perfectly adequate expression of 
this would pass beyond analogy to identity, beyond abstract 
implication to concrete production. The creativity of duration is 
one with the determination of the temporal occurrence of indi­
vidual things and minds, and this again with the production by 
the eternal whole of its own finite expressions or partial content. 
It is the nature of the whole so to express itself and, in expressing, 
to constitute itself; and since ‘matter was not lacking to him for 
the creation of everything from the highest down to the lowest 
degree of perfection’,1 the expressions are of every degree of 
completeness, and cannot but appear, therefore, to the finite 
expressions themselves, as incomplete and successive, i.e. as in­
volving limited duration. The creativity of duration is thus but 
a finite extract of real creativity, which is eternal and constitutive.2 
There is some danger that in our anxiety to maintain the reality 
of duration, upon which all other reality seems to, and in a sense 
does, depend, we may imagine either, on the one hand, that it can 
be real as an unmoving and immovable vXrj, or, on the other hand, 
that its reality must be conceived as a creativity that ‘passeth under­
standing’ and can only be met appropriately in that spirit of 
artificial stupidity which is sometimes made to pass under a better 
name.3 But the reality of duration consists in its positive quality 
rather than in that quantitative exclusiveness which is its prima 
facie character. That positive quality is caught up into eternity,
1 ‘Ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis 
gradum, creanda.’ (Eth. I, Appendix.) 
z This point is more fully examined and elaborated below.
3 ‘Natural piety’ should be exhibited from the beginning of our speculations, 
and not introduced at a later stage to mitigate the seemingly miraculous irruption 
of insistent factors which have been overlooked in the collection of our data. 
All existence is, in a sense, miraculous: that is the significance of the term 
‘creation’ ; but there is nothing in ‘emergent qualities’ more demanding natural 
piety than in the constitution of Space-Time itself. My thesis is that Space-Time 
and its so-called ‘emergent’ qualities should never have been divorced.
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while its externality and limitation, its negativity, is lost. In the 
same way the eternal blessedness of God is not a summation of the 
joys of finite modes (which would necessarily be qualified by their 
sorrows); it is their consummation, explanation, and infinite 
completion. .Joy is the realizing of perfection in its degrees, its 
temporal achieving; acquiescentia is the realization of a perfection 
already achieved; blessedness is the realization of perfection and 
its eternal achievement; it is the ideal limit of both desire and joy 
as they constitute a being for whom transformation involves no 
succession. Duration only elapses in so far as the mind drifts; for 
the thinking mind it ‘wells u p ’ ; for the free man it is a ‘well spring­
ing up into eternal life’ ; and for the being that thinks all things, 
and is all things in their real order and efficiency, the existence 
which ‘wells up ’ is eternity itself.
Spinoza, too, is quite clear that neither the joy of the finite mode 
nor the blessedness of the free man or of God is a mere feeling 
divorced from its object. T he joy is a caused transition towards 
perfection, and blessedness, as I have contended, is a grounded 
enjoyment of perfection. Thus as for the contemplative finite mind 
joy is always joy in, i.e. love for, some object; so blessedness, arising 
not from reasoning but from intuitive knowledge of the articu­
lated whole, is one with the infinite intellectual love wherewith 
God loves himself. As I have indicated, and as will become even 
clearer at a later stage of my argument, this supreme beatitude is 
not wholly beyond the experience of finite modes,1 for nothing is 
wholly unreal when rightly apprehended: ‘There is nothing positive 
in ideas on account of which they are called false.’2 In so far as a 
man recognizes his context adequately, he puts his mind within 
the intellectual order, and may come to know himself and things, 
not as perishing fragments, nor merely as implicates, but as eternal 
existences flowing from the divine essence. In such knowledge 
‘this or that’ man attains to and recognizes a relative perfection, 
experiences blessedness, becomes free, and ‘proves by actual
1 I mean that the finite individual as finite (though not because finite) can 
participate in ‘blessedness’. As we proceed the reader will find that I hold, as 
against the common view, that for Spinoza (and in truth), when man places his 
mind within ‘the intellectual order’, he does not become identical with God, 
but remains finite (for God is not divided). He then achieves and enjoys the 
grade of perfection which he is eternally. God is not merely our complement 
and completion: he is our creative ‘constellation’.
2 ‘Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur.’ (Eth. II, xxxiii.)
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experience’ that he is eternal.1 T he existence of ‘ this or that’ man, 
therefore, is at once a limited duration for Imagination; it lies 
within an intellectual order of implicates for Reason; while for 
scientia intuitiva it is known as what it essentially i s : a beam of the 
eternal love wherewith God loves himself.
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1 Cf. Eth. V, xxii-xxiii, Sch.
E X C U R S U S  II
T h o u g h  it is not my main purpose in this book merely to provide a 
conservative account of the philosophy of Spinoza, it is my aim, never­
theless, to approach historical accuracy with respect to doctrines which 
fall within the scope of his writings or might have come under his notice. 
I take this early opportunity, therefore, of indicating the degree of 
authority which I assign to the Cogitata Metaphysica as an expression 
of Spinoza’s own views. It has been customary to emphasize (often, it 
seems to me, unduly, or at least too uniformly) the admittedly important 
statements of Lewis Meyer’s Preface to the whole work, a preface which 
was evidently passed for publication by Spinoza himself, and, so far as 
the passages in question are concerned, probably inspired by him. 
‘Animadverti tamen vel imprimis velim in his omnibus, nempe tarn in 
i et 2 Princip. partibus, ac fragmento tertiae, quam in Cogitatis suis 
Metaphysicis Authorem nostrum meras Cartesii sententias, illarumque 
demonstrationes, prout in illius scriptis reperiuntur, aut quales ex 
fundamentis ab illo jactis per legitimam consequentiam deduci debebant, 
proposuisse. Cum enim discipulum suum Cartesii Philosophiam docere 
promisisset, religio ipsi fuit, ab ejus sententiae latum unguem discedere, 
aut quid, quod ejus dogmatibus aut non responderet, aut contrarium 
esset, dictare. Quamobrem judicet nemo, ilium hie, aut sua, aut tantum 
ea, quae probat, docere. Quamvis enim quaedam vera judicet, quaedam 
de suis addita fateatur, multa tamen occurrunt, quae tanquam falsa 
rejicit, et a quibus longe diversam fovet sententiam.’ No one familiar 
with the mature doctrines of Descartes and Spinoza will be inclined to 
question the main purport of such a statement, but neither, I think, 
will he hold, after consideration, that it implies that the work is ‘of no 
authority for determining Spinoza’s own opinions’ (for convenience 
I quote the most recent English statement of this point of view.1 Is it 
not rather true (to quote the same author) that ‘it betrays throughout 
some of Spinoza’s characteristic points of view’ ?2 Mr. Roth himself 
names Spinoza’s nominalism, his doctrines of contingency, of the un­
reality of time, of the relativity of good and evil, his anti-anthropo­
morphism, his idea of the unity of nature, and of man as a coherent 
part of nature, and so on: a sufficiently imposing array for a tractate of 
about fifty pages, said to be ‘of no authority’.
It may be noticed that there is some confusion in Lewis Meyer’s
THE AUTHORITY OF THE COGITATA METAPHYSICA
1 L. Roth, Spinoza, p. 24 2 Loc. tit., p. 25.
account of the Cogitata Metaphysica in relation to the doctrines of 
Descartes: he speaks of it as referring to important and difficult questions 
‘a Cartesio nondum enodatas’ (which implies that it contains either 
further deductions from Cartesian principles, or an expression of 
Spinoza’s own views, or again only statements of commonly accepted 
opinions); but a little later he expressly states that in this work (i.e. 
including the Cogitata Metaphysica) Spinoza expounds nothing more 
than the opinions of Descartes with their demonstrations. I cannot but 
feel that this confusion results from loose writing, and that the former 
statement is the more accurate, while the latter account belongs in the 
main to the version of the Cartesian Principles, to which the Cogitata 
Metaphysica are appended. My feeling is strengthened by the occur­
rence of a converse inaccuracy of expression in the earlier statement 
which suggests that the Cogitata Metaphysica are ‘more illo geometrico 
demonstrata’ . I am not, of course, denying that there is much in this 
Appendix which is Cartesian rather than Spinozistic; indeed, the main 
example given by Lewis Meyer himself is also found, as he says, in 
Cog. Met. II, xii.
The argument of those who depreciate the authority of the Cogitata 
Metaphysica seems to be that since it is known that certain doctrines 
(only partly specified) are not the author’s, therefore no part of the 
treatise may be taken as authoritative in the determination of his real 
views. But such an inference is defensible only on the assumption 
that the treatise in question is the sole source of knowledge respecting 
the opinions of the author, or has nothing in common with any other 
source. In isolation, the Cogitata would, for our purpose, certainly be 
of very little authority (though a careful comparison of its teaching with 
that of Descartes might well reveal something of its author’s own mind); 
but happily it does not stand alone, so that it becomes possible to dis­
criminate between the various doctrines of the treatise, and to escape 
from general uniform doubt with reference to them all. Thus, if an 
essential (if not complete) agreement between any of the doctrines of the 
Cogitata Metaphysica and those of the Ethics, the Epistolae, &c., can be 
recognized, and no relevant direct or implied contradiction, and if 
the former account is fuller, more detailed, more systematic, or in some 
way better, then on that topic its authority will be greater than that of 
the Ethics, Epistolae, &c.; for these will give the initial assurance, will 
sweep away doubt, and the fuller account will thus be free to produce 
its just effect. Greater authority could only be conceived if the better 
account belonged to the Ethics itself. In considering this argument it 
is important to keep clearly in mind that the problem is not the origin 
of the doctrine in question, or whether it is peculiar to Spinoza, but 
rather whether Spinoza accepted it.
It has been necessary to state the case in quite general terms, but in
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the application of the principles laid down the precise degree of authority 
developed will depend on the importance of the agreement detected 
between the Cogitata Metaphysica and the Ethics, &c., in relation to the 
elaboration of the doctrine in the former. An example of the value of 
this critical procedure (a procedure which, perhaps indistinctly underlies 
Mr. Roth’s exaggerated and seemingly contradictory assertions) is found 
in the case of the doctrine of time. The passage which I have quoted 
from Cog. Met. I , iv on p. 5,1 is nowhere precisely repeated or paralleled 
in the main writings of Spinoza; but statements may be found in the 
Ethics and the Epistolae, for example, which, with less detail, either imply 
the same general principles, or by their harmony with the statement of 
the Cogitata Metaphysica, suggest that its truth is being assumed: ‘nemo 
dubitat, quin etiam tempus imaginemur, nempe, ex eo, quod corpora 
alia aliis tardius, vel celerius, vel aeque celeriter moveri imaginemur’,2 
where the point clearly is that time arises from a comparison of 
motions, which is the doctrine I quoted from Cog. Met. I, iv, though 
without the inference that time is a mere modus cogitandi. That this 
conclusion is not drawn in this passage of the Ethics is due, not to the 
rejection of it, but to the special interest of Spinoza’s argument, which 
is directed to the explanation of contingency and not to the description 
of time. But further, Ep. xii shows that Spinoza did hold that time is a 
modus cogitandi sive imaginandi, an ens rationis, an auxilium Imagina- 
tionis: ‘Porro ex eo, quod Durationem, et Quantitatem pro libitu deter- 
minare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a Substantia abstractam concipimus, 
et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur Tempus, 
et Mensura; Tempus nempe ad Durationem; Mensura ad Quantitatem 
tali modo determinandam, ut, quoad fieri potest, eas facile imaginemur. 
Deinde ex eo, quod Affectiones Substantiae ab ipsa Substantia separa­
mus, et ad classes, ut eas quoad fieri potest, facile imaginemur, redigi- 
mus, oritur Numerus, quo ipsas determinamus. Ex quibus clare videre 
est, Mensuram, Tempus, et Numerum nihil esse praeter cogitandi, seu 
potius imaginandi Modos. . . . Neque etiam ipsi Substantiae Modi, si 
cum ejusmodi Entibus rationis, seu imaginationis auxiliis confundantur, 
unquam recte intelligi poterunt. . . . Ubi quis Durationem abstracte 
conceperit, eamque cum Tempore confundendo in partes dividere 
inceperit, nunquam poterit intelligere, qua ratione hora ex. grat.
transire possit Quare multi, qui Entia rationis a realibus distinguere
assueti non sunt, Durationem ex momentis componi, ausi sunt asseve- 
rare, et sic in Scyllam inciderunt cupientes vitare Charybdim. . . . 
Porro cum ex modo dictis satis pateat, nec Numerum, nec Mensuram, 
nec Tempus, quandoquidem non nisi auxilia imaginationis sunt, posse 
esse infinitos. . . .’3 I may add that the doctrine of the ‘imaginative’
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1 Note 2. 2 Eth. II, xliv, Cor. i, Sch. 3 Ep. xii.
character of time which underlies the statements of Eth. II, xxx-xxxi; 
IV, Ixii et Sell., &c., is in harmony with this conclusion, though their 
approach is from a different angle. I conclude, therefore, that the full 
and explicit statement of the Cogitata Metaphysica conveys Spinoza’s 
own view of the nature and value of time, and that it is thus not to be 
included among the passages of that treatise (of which only one is 
precisely indicated by Lewis Meyer) against which the Preface utters 
its warning.1
If scholars have been disposed to underestimate the possible 
authority of the Cogitata Metaphysica (which, after all, is part of the 
only work which in the lifetime of Spinoza bore his name on its title- 
page), they have often, I think, been equally prone to over-estimate the 
value and authority of the Korte Verhandeling, which we do not even 
know with certainty to have been written by Spinoza. It would be 
unwise and unjustifiable to emphasize the doubtful character of this 
work, but it is prudent to recall that internal and external evidence is 
not unambiguously in favour of the authorship of Spinoza himself, 
though we can say with some confidence that its writer was an immature 
Spinozist of somewhere near the time of Spinoza. But there must have 
been several persons falling under that description, other than Spinoza 
himself; and in any case the unresolved doubt is a more serious obstacle 
to the acceptance of the treatise as authoritative in the determination 
of Spinoza’s early views than the doubt thrown over the Cogitata 
Metaphysica by the admonitions of its Preface.
I have also looked to the Cogitata Metaphysica for light upon Spinoza’s 
conception of eternity, more especially to I, iv, and II, i. Here again 
the use in these passages and elsewhere, of the term ‘attributum’ as 
applied to eternity, may suggest to some of my readers that Spinoza is 
only expounding the philosophy of Descartes, since, as is well known, 
the author of the Korte Verhandeling had definitely argued, as against 
the popular theology and philosophy of his day, that eternity (together 
with infinity, immutability, self-subsistence, &c.) is not an attribute 
(eigenschap) of God, but only a mode (wyz) or extrinsic denomination 
(;uytwendige benaming) attributed to him with respect to all his ‘proper 
attributes’ (eigene eigenschappen); just as omniscience and omnipresence 
are attributed to him with respect to Thought and Extension respec­
tively. The real Attributes are ‘infinite substances’ (oneyndige zelf- 
standigheeden)— clearly a reference to the doctrine of Descartes. 
‘Aangaande de eigenschappen van de welke God bestaat, die zyn niet 
als oneyndige zelfstandigheeden, van de welke een ieder des zelfs 
oneyndig volmaakt moet zyn. Dat dit noodzaakelyk zoo moet zyn, daar 
van overtuygt ons de klaare en onderscheidelyke reeden, dog datter
1 For a discussion of the Cartesian doctrine of time see Professor Norman 
Kemp Smith’s Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, pp. 128 et seqq.
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van alle deze oneyndige, tot nog toe maar twee door haar zelf wezen 
ons bekend zyn, is waar; en deze zyn de Denking en Uytgebreidheid, 
voort alles dat gemeenlyk aan God werd toegeschreven, en zyn geen 
eigenschappen, maar alleen zekere wyzen, de welke hem toegeeigent 
mögen werden of in aanmerkinge van alles, dat is alle zyne eigenschap­
pen, of in aanmerkinge van Een eigenschap. In aanmerkinge val alle, als 
dat hy is een, eeuwig, door zig zelfs bestaande, oneyndig, oorzaak van alles, 
onveranderlyk. In aanmerkinge van eene, als dat hy is alwetende, wys, 
enz., het welk tot de denking, en weder dat hy is overal, alles vervult enz. 
het welk tot de uytgebreidheid toebehoort.’1 ‘Tot hier toe dan gesproken 
van wat God is, zullen wy van syn eigenschappen, maar gelyk als met 
een woord zeggen hoe dat de zelve, welke ons bekend zyn maar bestaan 
in twee namelyk Denking en Uytgebreidheid, want hier spreeken wy 
maar alleen van eigenschappen die men zoude eigene eigenschappen 
Gods können noemen, door de welke wy hem in zig zelf en niet als 
werkende buyten zig zelfs komen te kennen. AI wat dan de menschen 
aan God buyten deze twee eigenschappen, meer toeschryven, dat zal 
(indien het anderzins tot hem behoort) moeten zyn, oft’ een uytwendige 
benaming, gelyker wys, als dat hy is door zig zelfs bestaande, eeuwig, 
eenig, onveranderlyk, enz. ofte, zeg ik, in opzigt van syne werkinge, 
gelyker wys, als dat hy is een oorzaak, een voorbeschikker, en regeerder 
van alle dingen: welke alle eigen aan God zyn, zonder nogtans te kennen 
te geven wat hy is.’2 It has been thought that it is to this account that 
Spinoza refers in Ep. vi, where he speaks of a complete treatise on how 
things began, their dependence on the first cause, and the improvement 
of the understanding (a description which does not fit the Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emendatione in its present form). In this letter he mentions 
the point I am discussing: ‘Ut scias quid in meo hoc opere contineatur, 
quod concionatoribus offendiculo esse possit, dico, quod multa attributa, 
quae ab iis et ab omnibus, mihi saltern notis, Deo tribuuntur, ego tanquam 
creaturas considero; et contra alia, propter praejudicia ab iis tanquam 
creaturas consideratas, ego attributa Dei esse et ab ipsis male intellecta 
fuisse contendo.’3 I may note that in the account of the Korte Verhande- 
ling the reference to eternity, immutability, self-subsistence, See., as 
modes, is not insisted upon in the further discussion, where the 
term ‘propria’ (eigenen) is introduced to describe them (though omni­
scient, wise, merciful, &c., are still said to be modes of the thinking 
being).
The account is not altogether clear, but the distinction which the 
author seems to be making is between constitutive attributes, i.e. sub­
stances (e.g. Thought and Extension), through which we can know 
what God is in se; and descriptive attributes, i.e. either (i) propria,
1 Korte Verband. I, vii, Aanteek. 2 Loc. dt., I, ii. 3 Ep. vi.
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which give us no knowledge of what God is in se, but are mere de- 
nominationes extrinsicae (e.g. eternity, infinity, &c., and perhaps, 
omniscience and omnipresence); or (2) modes, through which we can 
know God only as he operates extra se (e.g. merciful, wise, &c.).
Thus when he finds a definite reference to eternity in the Cogitata 
Metaphysica as an ‘attributurri, the reader is apt, as I have said, to infer 
that this is one of the points on which Spinoza is there content to 
reproduce Descartes, or at least that it is not possible with safety to base 
an account of his own doctrine of eternity upon it. The allied point, 
in relation to the doctrine of time, has already been discussed, but 
as the conditions in the present case are somewhat different, it will 
be well to defend this further dependence on the text of the Cogitata 
Metaphysica.
In the first place, it may be pointed out that the doctrine of the Korte 
Verhandeling is known to diverge in essential points from the mature 
views of Spinoza: e.g. Thought and Extension are not substances; 
infinity, immutability, &c. are not modes; God does not operate extra 
se, See. There is thus no reason why the Cogitata Metaphysica should 
not diverge from the Korte Verhandeling and yet give Spinoza’s own 
views of eternity; the fact that it is a change hack must not too much 
impress us, so long as it does not involve the complete reversal of the 
whole doctrine. But in fact only the attribute of eternity is affected.
Further, the Korte Verhandeling itself uses ‘attribute’ as a general 
term under which may be included ‘proper attributes’ and the ‘attri­
butes which we call propria’, and in this way even speaks of the latter 
as ‘attributes’ simply (e.g. I, ii <fin.); I, vi <(initi)); so that even on the 
assumption that the Korte Verhandeling represents Spinoza’s settled 
views on this subject, the return of the expression in the Cogitata Meta­
physica might indicate no more than the author’s willingness to ignore 
a distinction not discussed by Descartes, and not imply that the whole 
argument was foreign to Spinoza.
It is important to remember, also, that the doctrine of eternity in the 
Cogitata Metaphysica is much more adequate and mature than any­
thing to be found in the Korte Verhandeling, and agrees with what we 
know, from his correspondence, of Spinoza’s own views at the date of 
the publication of the Principia Cartesii (1663): compare for example 
the passage quoted on p. 431 with the considered words of Ep. xii 
(1663): ‘Unde clare apparet, nos existentiam Substantiae toto genere a 
Modorum existentia diversam concipere. Ex quo oritur differentia inter 
Aeternitatem, et Durationem; per Durationem enim Modorum tantum 
existentiam explicare possumus; Substantiae vero per Aeternitatem, 
hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.’
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1 Note 2.
The account given in the Ethics is, of course, not precisely that of the 
Cogitata Metaphysica. It agrees with it in making eternity an ‘attribute’ 
of Substance (and of all its constitutive Attributes): ‘Deinde per Dei 
attributa intelligendum est id, quod Divinae substantiae essentiam ex- 
primit, hoc est, id, quod ad substantiam pertinet: id ipsum, inquam, 
ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiae pertinet 
aeternitas.’1 I make no further comment here on this subject as I have 
discussed its significance in a later chapter. The doctrine of the Ethics 
also most certainly modifies that of the Cogitata Metaphysica, a fact 
that will surprise no reader who remembers that the Ethics is not an 
absolutely complete and final expression of the Spinozistic philosophy, 
but represents only the point to which Spinoza himself had brought his 
settled principles; it gives but little hint of the directions of his recent, 
or probable subsequent, development; but in my opinion the elabora­
tion and application of the doctrine of eternity was undoubtedly one of 
the growing points of the system, and I have elsewhere noted the 
striking development which took place when Spinoza was able to 
ascribe eternity not to ‘solus Deus’ , but also to ‘mens humana’. This 
amazing step was in itself a more than sufficient reason for a partial 
revision of the account of Cog. Met. I, iv; II, i; and Ep. xii, which by 
implication, and directly (II, i), had denied eternity of all modes of 
Substance. The definite assertions of the Ethics that the immediate 
and mediate infinite modes are eternal, must also be recognized as a 
significant change from the doctrine of the Korte Verhandeling that Natura 
naturata generalis has been ‘van alle eeuwigheid’, and will remain 
immutable ‘in alle eeuwigheid’— phrases which imply not aeternitas but 
only semperaeternitas (which are sharply distinguished already in the 
Cogitata Metaphysica, 2  and, of course, also in the Ethics).
It must have been a very real difficulty to Spinoza, when he came to 
write the Ethics, to give a definition of eternity capable of retaining its 
real essence, while leaving the way open for the conclusions of Eth. I, 
xxi-xxiii and V, xxi et seqq., and however the parsimony and austerity 
of Eth. I, Def. viii may lead to serious underestimation of its content, 
we cannot but admire its ingenuity and real potency for its work. For 
it had at once to retain the identity of eternity with the essence of the 
eternal being, as it is explained in the Cogitata Metaphysica (cf. ‘Aeter­
nitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessarium involvit existen- 
tiam (perDefin. viii, Pt. I )’3— the reference is interesting), and also to make 
possible the eternity of the real modes of Substance, which the Cogitata 
Metaphysica had denied. I shall show in due course how these ends were 
achieved.
To conclude this excursus, let me say that the Scholium to Eth. I, xix
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1 Eth. I, xix, Dem. 2 II, i. 3 Eth. V, xxx, Dem.
(‘Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna’) makes pointed reference 
to Prin. Cartesii, I, xix (‘Deus est aeternus’), which again in its proof 
refers to Cog. Met. II, i, from which I have so largely drawn the details 
of Spinoza’s conception of eternity. This series of references is note­
worthy, for Spinoza is not at all likely to have gone out of his way to 
direct the attention of his readers in the Ethics, without warning or 
correction, to an account and further reference in another book which 
he did not believe to be, in its main purport, true.
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C H A P T E R  IV
BE C A U S E  the important doctrine of the eternity of the human mind involves more than a mere application of Spinoza’s 
general doctrine to a special instance; because it provides 
further evidence as to the conception of eternity which he enter­
tained ; and because it carries further the elucidation of the nature 
of the eternal existence of extended and thinking Substance; for 
these reasons I must, however inadequately, discuss it here. Nor 
can the account of man’s survival in the Real be separated from 
that of the nature of the eternal existence which he may enjoy in 
spite of (nay rather, because of) the resolution of the ‘common 
order of nature’ into the ‘order of the intellect’ . Here, too, im­
portant collateral evidence as to the positive character of eternity 
will be found.
In a later chapter1 I have commented on the development 
which seems to have taken place in Spinoza’s conception of the 
ultimate destiny of the human soul or mind: starting from the 
doctrine of the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being2 
that the soul becomes immortal (onsterfelyk) through union with 
God in the knowledge of the divine nature; modified by the 
Cartesian elements of the Cogitata Metaphysica; up to the mature 
doctrine too briefly, but most weightily, expounded in the Ethics. 
Leaving aside the interesting critical questions as to Spinoza’s 
earlier beliefs and our evidence for them,3 I now turn to his final 
and characteristic teaching as it is laid down in the momentous 
propositions of Part V  o f the Ethics.
Very little would be achieved at this stage of the discussion by 
a mere transcription of these propositions with their demonstra­
tions and scholia; they are so famous and so familiar as almost to 
have become dark by repetition. More profitable will it be to lay 
down the main characters of his conception. This may be done, 
sufficiently but not exhaustively or exclusively, in four propositions:
1 Chapter VIII. See also p. 43, note 6, and Excursus II, p. 70.2 Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand, II, xxiii.
3 Some remarks on these questions are added on p. 193, note 2.
THE ETERNITY OF THE HU MAN M IN D
(i) Eternity does not mean aevum,r and the eternity of the human 
mind does not mean immortality in the sense of endless persistence
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1 It has not seemed desirable to devote special attention in the course of the 
argument to the rather obscure Thomistic conception of aevum, partly because 
it would involve a lengthy analysis of technicalities, the study of which offers 
little prospect of further enlightenment with respect to the main thesis of my 
essay, and partly because it has seemed that the principles involved have been 
elsewhere discussed at sufficient length, and destructively.
An account of aevum and of its relations with time and eternity is given by 
Aquinas in the Summa Theologica, I, Ouaestio x, Art. 5: ‘Aevum differt a tem­
pore, et ab aeternitate, sicut medium existens inter ilia. Sed horum differentiam 
aliqui sic assignant dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet 
principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec 
differentia est per accidens. . . . Alii vero . . . per hoc quod aeternitas non habet 
prius et posterius; tempus autem habet prius et posterius cum innovatione et 
veteratione; aevum habet prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed 
haec positio implicat contradictoria. . . . Est ergo dicendum quod cum aeternitas 
sit mensura esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia 
essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a per­
manentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis, vel in trans- 
mutatione consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur tempore, sicut omnis motus, et 
etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia 
essendi, quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subjectum trans­
mutationis ; tamen habent transmutationem adjunctamvel in actu, vel in potentia; 
sicut patet in corporibus coelestibus, quorum esse substantiale est intransmuta- 
bile; tamen esse intransmutabile habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum; 
et similiter patet de Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile, quantum ad 
eorum naturam pertinet, cum transmutabilitate secundum electionem, et cum 
transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum et locorum, suo modo; et ideo 
hujusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter aeternitatem, et tempus. 
Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adjunc- 
tum. Sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius; aevum autem non habet in se 
prius et posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius 
neque posterius, neque ea compatitur. . . . Creaturae spirituales quantum ad 
affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. . . . 
Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, mensurantur aevo; sed quantum ad 
visionem gloriae, participant aeternitatem. . . . Aevum est totum simul, non 
tamen est aeternitas; quia compatitur secum prius et posterius.’
It is evident that what is here advanced is a mode of duration subject to 
speculative, rather than definitive, exposition. Aevum is totum simul because 
succession does not belong to its essence. But it is not totum simul in the same 
sense as eternity, for while the latter can in no way admit of mutability, aevum is 
subject to initiation, termination, and vicissitude, if not actually, at least 
potentially. It would seem, therefore, that it must possess a schema capable of 
determination under the category of succession. But the statement of Aquinas 
leaves it still in doubt as to whether aevum is to be conceived as possessing 
durational extent, or whether this too is to be excluded, together with durational 
sense or successiveness. The general atmosphere of the discussion, beginning 
as it does from the definition of eternity given by Boethius, seems to favour the 
retention of such durational externality; in which case aevummust be conceived as 
a temporally neutral extent of existence, without intrinsic beginning or end, but 
capable of being extrinsically determined or limited or subjected to vicissitude.
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through time after death. Nor does it mean sempiternity. It does 
not even imply either immortality or sempiternity. This distinction 
must be not only asserted but emphasized, for Spinoza’s verbal 
slips, or more probably his difficulties in expressing his conception 
in language primarily developed for purposes of ordinary temporal 
experience, have frequently been preferred to his clear formal 
utterances as they are found in such important or key passages 
as Eth. I, Def. viii et Explic. and V, xxiii, Sch.1 I need not again 
labour the point.
(ii) W hat Spinoza is asserting is the eternity of the individual 
mind of ‘this or that’ man, not the eternity of some general mind of 
humanity, or of the ‘ infinite idea of G od’, or of ‘Science’ . From 
the perfectly true assertion that by the eternity of the mind 
Spinoza does not mean personal immortality, it has sometimes been 
wrongly concluded2 that he means the survival of a system of
Such a conception of a neutral order of externality has been sufficiently discussed 
in the course of the main argument.
As opposed to this extensive interpretation of Thomistic aevum, Baron von 
Iliigel has described it as ‘an interesting groping after what M. Bergson now 
describes under the designation of Durée, the succession which is never all 
change, since its constituents, in varying degrees, overlap and interpenetrate 
each other; a succession which can be anything from just above the chain of 
mutually exclusive, ever equal moments,— artificial, clock-time,—to just below 
the entire interpenetration and Totum Simul of Eternity’ (Eternal Life, p. 106). 
The question of the precise justice or adequacy of this comment on Aquinas 
need not be discussed at length in a note such as this, but while I acknowledge 
the interesting character of the comparison, not only in itself, but even more in 
its implicit recognition of the problem of the separating of durational extension 
and durational sense, I cannot detect in the account of Aquinas any special un­
easiness on this point, or, therefore, any sense of groping towards its solution. 
On the contrary, the discussion seems to be directed towards the very natural 
end of softening the impact of time and eternity by means of a series of abstrac­
tions. It has been my aim to accomplish the same general end by means, if I 
may so speak, of a series of concretions.
1 ‘Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae 
definitione necessario sequi concipitur . . . Talis enim existentia . . . per dura- 
tionem, aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio, et fine carere 
concipiatur.’ ‘Sentimus . . . mentem nostram . . . aeternam esse, et hanc ejus 
existentiam tempore definiri, sive per durationem explicari non posse.’
2 e.g. by Martineau (A Study of Spinoza, pp. 296 et seqq.). So again Professor 
Taylor asserts that‘ by the survival of the Mind as “intelligence” ’ Spinoza means 
‘simply the fact that an adequate idea, when once thought, forms a permanent 
addition to the stock of scientific knowledge in the world’ (A. E. Taylor, ‘The 
Conception of Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics’, Mind, N.S. V, p. 164). The 
date of this article (1896) indicates that it was one of the earliest of Professor 
Taylor’s massive sequence of publications, and this explains its obvious imma­
turity and lack of originality. The line of argument by which the result I have 
noted was reached, helps to redeem its prima facie extraordinary inconsequence,
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adequate ideas, not constituting the mind of ‘this or that’ man, but 
of ‘man’, or of God. But it is not the personality or individuality of 
the mind that must be denied, but its immortality in the sense of 
endless duration. The formal assertions of Spinoza could not be 
misunderstood by an unbiased and unsophisticated reader; it is 
puzzled reflection that introduces doubt: ‘In God there is neces­
sarily an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human 
body under the form of eternity’1 ; ‘Although we do not remember 
that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far 
as it involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity, 
is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of 
time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be 
said to endure in so far as it involves the actual existence of the 
body’2; ‘ I f  we look to men’s general opinion, we shall see that they 
are indeed conscious of the eternity of the mind, but that they 
confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination 
or the memory which they believe to remain after death’,3 that is 
to say their error is not their belief in the eternity of the mind 
but their confusion of eternity with duration. Once more, I need 
not labour the point: it is sufficiently clear that Spinoza intended 
to establish the individual eternity of ‘this or that’ m an; the further 
important point as to whether he succeeded in doing so will 
necessarily be noticed in due course.
(iii) Spinoza puts forward the doctrine of individual eternity as 
belonging to the human mind in some sense or degree beyond that 
eternity in the whole which belongs to all positive content. Falsity 
is fundamentally a defect of order, for ‘there are no ideas confused
but certainly without establishing its truth. If Spinoza intended to establish no 
more than this, his expressions are little better than an elaborate pretence; but 
why a writer who had already given up human freedom and divine purpose 
without pretence should have pretended that he was establishing individual 
survival is something of a mystery. (See also p. 96, note 4; and p. 125, note 1.)
1 ‘In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quae hujus, et illius corporis humani 
essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.’ (Eth. V, xxii.)
2 ‘Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante Corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen 
Mentem nostram, quatenus Corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, 
aeternam esse, et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri, sive per durationem 
explicari non posse. Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare, 
ejusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest, quatenus actualem Corporis 
existentiam involvit.’ (Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.)
3 ‘Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suae 
Mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios; sed ipsos eandem cum duratione 
confundere, eamque imaginationi, seu memoriae tribuere, quam post mortem 
remanere credunt.’ (Eth. V, xxxiv, Sch.)
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or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind’.1 A ll positive 
content finds a place in the Real and is eternal in that place. That, 
in truth, is the sole ground upon which writers have, mistaking 
proprium for essence, identified Spinozistic eternity with logical or 
scientific necessity. Now it cannot be supposed that when Spinoza 
asserts the eternity of the human mind he means simply that man 
is within the world of psychical and physical nature, and is eternal 
only as such and merged in it. W e shall find reason to question 
whether, and in what sense, and how, infinite Natura can have 
parts at all, but I shall argue without delay that if  Natura has parts 
in no sense, then the human mind cannot be said to remain in the 
Real; yet if, on the other hand, Natura is divisible into sections, 
the partition cannot, on the present hypothesis, be stayed until the 
universe is reduced to the ultimate dust of an infinitude of corpora 
nmplicissima animata (or even of instantaneous puncta) in which 
the body, and with it the mind, of ‘this or that’ man could hardly 
be said to ‘remain’. T he mere formulation of such a dilemma is 
sufficient to show that the eternity of a human mind, if  it is to be in­
dividual, must be peculiar to that m ind: in some sense its ultimate 
possession. Not, indeed, that Spinoza admits exclusive or atomic in­
dividuality in any sense that would defeat the ultimate unity of the 
Real. M an is not ‘situated in nature as a kingdom within a king­
dom’2 ; he follows nature’s order rather than disturbs i t ; he is not 
determined solely by himself. But even if  Natura were finite, and 
man external to it, his due subordination would not imply nonentity; 
much less can he be nothing who is a part of Natura, and a finite 
expression of its infinite power.3
1 ‘Nullae inadaequatae, nec confusae sunt; nisi quatenus ad singularem 
alicujus Mentem referuntur.’ (Eth. II, xxxvi, Dem.)
2 ‘Plerique, qui de Affectibus, et Hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt . . . 
hominem in natura, veluti imperium in imperio, concipere videntur. Nam 
hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi . . . credunt.’ (Eth. 
Ill, Praefatio.)
3 In view of the ‘vulgar error’ that Spinoza denies the reality of the finite 
individuals, and resolves all things into the single all-embracing individual 
Deus sive Natura (which thus becomes an empty unity), a passage in the Tracta- 
tus Theologico-Politicus is of interest: ‘Naturae . . . potentia ipsa Dei potentia est, 
qui summum jus ad omnia habet: sed quia universalis potentia totius naturae nihil 
est praeter potentiam omnium individuorum simul, hinc sequitur unumquodque 
individuum jus summum habere ad omnia, quae potest. . . ’ (c. xvi), the crude but 
common translation of which uses the term ‘aggregate’ : ‘the power of nature at 
large is nothing more than the aggregate of the powers of all her individual 
components’. Undoubtedly, Spinoza’s phrase was unguarded, but the false 
suggestion is unwarrantably emphasized in the translation. The main point
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(iv) The same general conclusion is in harmony with the fourth 
character of Spinoza’s conception of human eternity. It is not the 
whole mind that is eternal: there is a part that perishes at death; 
and it is possible for a man so to live that what perishes is of small 
importance in comparison with what remains (i.e. what is eternal).1 
‘That part of the mind which remains, be it great or small, is more 
perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind is the 
Intellect . . . the part which we have shown to perish is the 
Imagination.’2 T he use of the word ‘remanet'1 as meaning ‘abides’ 
or ‘remains unaffected by resolution into the intellectual order’ 
requires but a minimum of good will in a reader who takes the 
argument as a whole. T h e translation of the word (by Elwes) as 
‘endures’ is particularly infelicitous, since the essential thing in 
Spinoza’s theory is that the eternal part of the mind never was, is, 
or will be, in time: we cannot remember or,imagine before birth 
any more than after death, for the eternal part of the mind which 
is unaffected by birth and death did not exist before birth and will 
not exist after death. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, for ‘in 
the eternal there is no when, before, or after’ .3 Here we have 
further assurance that the eternity of the mind is not identical 
with the general eternity of all positive content in its dependence 
upon Substance; for Imagination and memory are not necessarily 
false: their positive content, too, is eternal. Y et human eternity ex­
cludes that of Imagination and m em ory; and it does so, clearly, not 
because these are wholly unreal, but rather because they do not as 
such belong to the mind as an individual, but are a confused appre­
hension of its relations with its context, and belong to the limbo of 
its finitude. In ‘the order of the intellect’ all that is positive in 
them is eternal. In ‘the common order of nature’ they pass.
here, as the context amply certifies, is that Natura is an individual of individuals, 
and not an individual among individuals, even prima inter pares. There is no 
finite individual outside of Natura; but Natura is certainly not the aggregate of 
all finite individuals. The precise relation of the individuals and the Individual 
will be determined in the course of the discussion. Cf. below, Chapter V, and 
especially Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).
1 ‘Mentem humanam posse ejus naturae esse, ut id, quod ejus cum corpore 
perire ostendimus, in respectu ad id, quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti.’ 
(Eth. V, xxxviii, Sch.)
2 ‘Partem mentis, quae remanet, quantacunque ea sit, perfectiorem [est] 
reliqua. Nam pars Mentis aeterna est intellectus; . . . ilia autem, quam perire 
ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio, . . . atque adeo ilia, quantacunque ea sit, hac 
est perfection’ (Eth. V, xl, Cor.)
3 ‘In aeterno non detur quando, ante, nec post.’ (Eth. I, xxxiii, Sch. ii.)
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Such are the four main characters of the eternity of the mind as 
it is conceived by Spinoza, and a satisfactory exposition of his 
doctrine must harmonize with them all or must wholly fail.
An essential distinction between the eternal and the perishing is 
that the former is ordered and whole, while the latter is disordered 
and fragmentary. T he eternity of the human mind, therefore, 
consists in its ability to survive the resolution of all things into an 
enjoyed intellectual order; and the fact that Spinoza begins his 
exposition from the side of the body is important both for our 
understanding of his theory and as a significant element in the 
theory itself. For the distinctions of human minds (and bodies) 
cannot sustain themselves through intellectual criticism if, and in 
so far as, they rest upon the mere exclusiveness and quantitative 
externality that seem to distinguish the regions of extension. Not 
division and exclusion but implication and inclusion characterize the 
intellectual order whether in corporeal nature or in mind. And this 
must be so even within the Attribute of Extension where, as I have 
said, externality appears to be a primary character of the Real, and 
where, therefore, mutual exclusion of co-existing parts seems, 
prima fade, to be the rule in spite of the indivisibility, unity, and 
wholeness which Spinoza insists upon as the true characters of 
Extension.1 This point is worth elaboration.
In one of his latest letters, written only a few months before his 
death, Spinoza expresses his view of the nature of Extension with 
some warmth, though, unfortunately, with but little direct ligh t: 
‘W ith regard to your question as to whether the variety of things 
can be deduced a priori from the conception of extension alone 
I believe I have shown clearly enough already that it cannot; and 
that therefore matter has been wrongly defined by Descartes as 
extension; it must necessarily be explained through an Attribute 
which expresses infinite and eternal essence’.2 T h e distinction
1 ‘Si . . .  ad quantitatem attendimus, prout in imaginatione est, quod saepe, 
et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis, et ex partibus conflata; si 
autem ad ipsam, prout in intellectu est, attendimus, et earn, quatenus Sub­
stantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, turn, ut jam satis demonstravimus, 
infinita, unica, et indivisibilis reperietur.’ (Elh. I, xv, Sch.)
2 ‘Quod petis, an ex solo Extensionis conceptu rerum varietas a priori possit 
demonstrari, credo me jam satis clare ostendisse, id impossibile esse; ideoque 
materiam a Cartesio male definiri per Extensionem; sed earn necessario debere 
explicari per attributum, quod aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimat.’ 
(Ep. Ixxxiii.)
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which Spinoza is here expressing is not primarily that between 
extension as we imagine it, and as it is for ‘science’, though that 
distinction is implied and essential; he is thinking rather of the 
difference between an abstract conception of extension as a 
‘quiescent mass’1 whether finite or infinite, occupying one or several 
instants of time, and a concrete conception of infinite and eternal 
Extension. T he former distinction is between imagined extension 
for which the standpoint of the observer is an origin for measure­
ment, the main directions of his body giving axes of reference, 
and his magnitude an arbitrary unit; and an ‘objective’ extension 
for which these relations are universalized and largely discounted. 
Every point of such ‘objective’ space may be an origin, every 
direction an axis of reference, and every magnitude a unit for 
measurement. Imagined extension is limited in time and indefinite 
in magnitude; ‘objective’ space is infinite in magnitude and time­
less in the sense that it bears no essential relation to the date of any 
individual observer. As I have indicated, such an extension, unlike 
duration, may survive the process o f ‘objectification’ because spatial 
relations are symmetrical and therefore reversible, the actual appli­
cation of correlatives being itself relative to our arbitrary choice 
of axes of reference. Within it there is no absolute magnitude and 
no absolute location; it is infinite and undivided. It may, neverthe­
less, become the underlying object of the science of geometry, for 
it may be conceived as modified, its finite determinations being 
relatively limited. ‘ Objective’ extension, in other words, is charac­
terized by externality and relation, though not by these as localized 
and measurable in any absolute sense. Measure is an ens rationis, 
and hence all measures are relative. Euclid, for example, does not 
prove truths about this or that figure, occupying this or that 
position in space, and having this or that absolute magnitude. He 
makes no reference to absolute location or size, but reasons about 
the proportions of extension and about relative location. Relative 
magnitude and position have meaning only for an extension con­
ceived as modified in definite forms, but the special figures which 
we determine in space do not occupy space as a building occupies 
a site, thereby excluding all other buildings. Curves, quadrilaterals, 
tetrahedrons, &c., are the modes in which spatial externality and
1 ‘Ex Extensione, ut earn Cartesius concipit, molem scilicet quiescentem, cor- 
porum existentiam demonstrare non tantum difficile, ut ais, sed omnino im- 
possibile est.’ (Ep. Ixxxi.)
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relation are expressed, and the infinite space of the geometer is 
not an indefinite collection of mutually external measurable parts, 
but rather the infinite ground or essence of which these figures are 
determinate expressions or modes. In respect of size or location 
or direction, infinite extension is neutral. In it there is no mutual 
exclusion of separate parts, but only a differentiation of modes 
expressing its universal nature.
It has been commonly held, as I have said, that this ‘objective’ 
extension of the geometer is the Attribute which Spinoza assigns 
to Substance, but m y contention has been and is that, on the con­
trary, he would have rejected any extension, whether imagined or 
reasoned, which is out of all relation to duration or eternity, and 
which therefore has no real existence. The extension which we 
imagine endures through an indefinite period; that which we con­
ceive by the use of the intellect is also a singular, though universal, 
existent; it is conceived sub quadam specie aeternitatis. O f such a 
real Extension no adequate imaginative conception can be formed. 
It is not to be defined as the mere absence of finite determination, 
for its content is infinite and eternal; it is not empty but supremely 
full. But it is not full in the sense that a bookcase may be full of 
books. It is full as the universal ground of all possible determina­
tions. In the processes of geometry we limit it ‘imaginatively’ , 
whereupon it appears as partly filled and as occupying a period of 
time; since, however, the period is neutral, we think of Extension 
as occupying any and every period of time, i.e. as enduring without 
limit. It is in this sense that Spinoza speaks, to the surprise of the 
unwary, of duration as one of the attributes of Extension: ‘ It 
would be an imperfection in [Extension] if it . . . lacked duration, 
position, & C . ’ 1 ; again, ‘Extension can only be called imperfect in 
respect of duration, position, or quantity’ .2
Infinite Extension conceived sub quadam specie aeternitatis, not as 
the finite enduring ground of this or that mode, but as the infinite 
and eternal ground of every extended mode, is a universal singular 
rather than a timeless form of externality; and it is because it is 
such, that it can be a universal ground capable of ‘imaginative’
1 ‘Quamvis enim ex. gr. extensio de se cogitationem neget, nulla tamen hoc 
ipsum in ea est imperfectio. Hoc vero, si nimirum extensione destitueretur, 
in ea imperfectionem argueret, ut revera fieret, si esset determinata, similiter 
si duratione, situ, &c. careret.’ (Ep. xxxvi.)
2 ‘Extensio soluihmodo respectu durationis, situs, quantitatis imperfecta dici 
potest.’ [hoc. cit.)
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expression in indefinitely many various forms through an indefinite 
duration. Its duration as so conceived is the ‘imaginative’ ex­
pression of its capacity for various related but non-compossible 
expression or modification; for its modes do not co-exist super­
imposed on each other, nor as side by side in an instantaneous 
extension: they flow eternally from the infinite nature of Extension, 
and it is thus that abstract geometrical truths are regarded as valid 
at all epochs of time. In geometry as in kinematics and even in 
dynamics (where time as a measure appears as a factor) absolute 
date has no significance.
Eternal Extension, then, must not be conceived as an instan­
taneous form of externality, nor even, if it were possible, as an 
enduring but ‘quiescent mass’ within which singular things must 
be introduced or created. It is not the vacant site on which the 
building has to be erected by the use of some extraneous material. 
Even for abstract geometry such an extension would be wholly 
inadequate. Far more futile would it be as a ground from which 
to deduce the variety of the universe. Its futility reduces in 
the end to its temporality; it is pulverized by time; it is the 
mere being which is non-being. It provides no ground of union 
between its successive contents (for we cannot now speak of its 
modifications or manifestations). As Descartes himself had seen, it 
would demand not one day of creation, nor even six, but every 
day and every moment the world would need to be recreated. 
This is not explanation but mystification.
As opposed to such a view, however, viz. that it is time that 
prevents instantaneous or recurrent extension from being the ground 
from which particular existence may be deduced, there is M r. 
Alexander’s astonishing contrary suggestion that Spinoza’s solution 
of this difficulty is a failure ‘because he has omitted T im e’1 ; but 
surely the truth rather is that he omitted time of set purpose because 
it constituted the main difficulty in the deduction. For time is 
essentially divided and limited. A n undivided and unlimited time 
is, as I have said, ipso facto non-temporal. It was this that 
divided, indeed pulverized, imagined extension, and in the con­
ception of an instantaneous or recurrent extension no adequate 
cement has been provided. For the geometer this problem is not 
vital, for he is not concerned with the deduction of curves, figures, 
and solids from space, and even on Spinoza’s more concrete view
1 Spinoza and Time, p. 33.
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of geometry the deduction would be selective, temporal, and 
phenomenological, rather than complete, eternal, and metaphysical.
It is the transition to a more adequate conception of extension 
as an ‘Attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence’ that 
Spinoza adumbrates in the letter I have already quoted. This is 
undoubtedly one of the growing points of Spinozistic philosophy, 
and though there can be little doubt that Spinoza had long 
recognized the special requirements of his own theory, as opposed 
to that of Descartes, he had certainly not satisfied himself about 
the proper way of expounding his views. ‘Perhaps some day,’ he 
says, ‘if my life be prolonged, I may discuss the subject with you 
more clearly. For hitherto I have not been able to put any of these 
matters into due order’ .1 This was the last of Spinoza’s published 
letters, and seven months later he was dead; we are left, therefore, 
without the final and ordered deduction of his thoughts on this 
important matter, and I must attempt, therefore, however feebly 
and artificially, to fill in the lacuna as well as I can by speculative 
exposition. Happily we are not left without valuable clues to the 
main structure of his conception.
The conception of extension as purified from ‘subjective’ refer­
ence, as reunited, complete, and temporally neutral, is insufficient 
as a ground for metaphysical deduction. The Real cannot be 
adequately represented as occupying successive instants of an 
infinite ‘duration’ even when the contents of the instants are ex­
ternally united by ‘causation’, each state of the whole being the 
transient cause of the next. Spinoza would certainly have denied 
that such purely temporal succession was rightly called connexion 
or causation at all. The unity and indivisibility of infinite and 
eternal Extension must relate not only to its extensiveness, but 
also to its existence, and to every existence within it. For it com­
prehends them all, indissolubly, totally. It is Imagination that 
pulverizes eternal Extension, dividing the whole, both in its exis­
tence and also in its essence. It divides its existence into the suc­
cessive moments of duration, variously filled in, though not 
without a lingering unity expressed as continuity or transient 
causality. It divides its essence; for each instantaneous extension
1 ‘ M ateriam  a C artesio  m ale d e fm iri p er E xte n sio n e m ; sed earn necessario 
debere e xp lic a ri p er attrib u tu m , quod aetem am , et in fin ita m  essentiam  exp rim at. 
Sed de h is forsarL aliq uand o , s i v ita  sup p etit, c la riu s tecum  agam . N am  hue 
usque n ih il de h is o rd in e disponere m ih i lic u it .’ (E p. Ix x x iii.)
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is broken up into mutually exclusive sections or bodies, though again 
not without a lingering unity expressed as reciprocal relatedness. 
And both the transient causality and the reciprocity are derived 
from the positive spirit of the whole, that alone is the source of 
the degree of reality which, because no positive content can be 
wholly unreal, belongs to the world of Imagination. So the infinite 
and eternal nature of the extended Real is spread out in time and 
divided in extension, and thus imagined as a complex process in 
which the warp of Time and the woof of Space are woven into 
the web of .the Real conceived as a concrete Space-Time. But 
the Real is the undivided essence, and not the divided process; it 
is not Space-Time but sub hac specie eternal Extension, or rather 
(if the reader will permit the bizarre and ambiguous phrase), 
extended Eternity.
How, then, is the concrete nature of eternal Extension to be 
conceived? If it is neither an empty instantaneous form, nor a 
‘quiescent mass’, nor again a whole composed of sections (the 
sections being bodies); and if again from it ‘the variety of things’ 
is to be deduced, how must its nature be conceived (for we must 
not attempt to imagine it) ? How, in other words, is the transition 
to be made from Extension to the extended universe ?
Spinoza’s doctrine is well known: the formal descent is made in 
two stages, through the immediate infinite and eternal mode of 
‘motion and rest’ to the mediate infinite and eternal mode which 
he calls ‘the face of the whole universe’ .1 As commonly interpreted 
that ‘deduction’ presents a very mechanical appearance: it looks 
like a miracle followed by a dissection. As Spinoza puts forward 
his view in conscious opposition to that of Descartes, it cannot be 
supposed that he means the deduction to be temporal as it might 
be represented in a crude picture of the Cartesian theory: ex­
tension coming first, motion and rest being imparted to it, or 
produced in it, by God, the world of interacting bodies being the 
final result of the process. The process is certainly to be taken as 
logical, immanent, and eternal, not physical, transient, and tem­
poral. M otus et quies is a real mode or expression of Extension, 
and the extended universe is a real mode following from that mode
1 ‘ E xem pla, quae p etis [i.e . o f the th ings pro duced im m ediately and m ediately 
by G o d ], p rim i generis su n t . . .  in  E xtensio n e . . . m otus et q u ie s; secu n d i 
autem , facies to tiu s U n iv e rsi, quae quam vis in fin itis  m odis va riet, m anet tam en 
sem per eadem .’ (E p .lx iv .)
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of Extension, and exhausting its infinite content. These modes 
flow from the very character of Extension as an infinite and eternal 
reality: they are not superadded to it as an extraneous filling. 
Nor again must motion and rest be conceived as motion through 
space in time, or rest in space for a time. It is an infinite and 
eternal mode, and cannot therefore be in time or for a time, not 
even though the time be without beginning or end.
I say that the motion cannot for intellectual apprehension be 
locomotion, nor the rest, locoquiescence or the mere exclusive 
occupation of a place or region. Indeed we have not motion and 
rest as two modes of Extension standing in contradictory, or 
even contrary, opposition, but motion-rest, a single mode con­
stituting an infinite, universal, singular being, expressing the nature 
of eternal Extension. The motion and rest that belong to an 
‘imaginative’ section of the whole are rightly and necessarily 
pictured as locomotion and locoquiescence; but even here the 
simplest application of thought shows that both the motion and 
the rest are relative, since they mean motion or rest with respect 
to axes of reference (usually, but not always or necessarily, 
supplied by the position and orientation of the observer’s body). 
Locomotion among bodies is, in fact, an obvious expression of 
their finiteness in relation to the indivisibility of Extension. Bodies 
move through space because, being of one substance with it, they 
differ solely in their proportions of motion and rest. Nor can a 
body be defined by its occupation of a region of Extension: if it 
were so defined, and adequately, it could not even appear to move 
from region to region. And in the Real it does not so move, since 
in the Real there are no identical regions. The indivisibility of 
Extension has ‘imaginative’ expression in the neutrality of absolute 
position, i.e. in the relativity of all position. Thus Extension appears 
to do nothing, to be neutral, because it does everything. So the 
whole cannot move or rest, because it is not in, but is Extension.1
The nature of the infinite and eternal mode of motus et quies must
1 T h e  m ore in d iv id u a l a th in g  is  the m ore its motus et quies depends on itse lf, 
i.e . the m ore it  resem bles the w hole w h ich  determ ines the p ro p o rtio n s o f m otion 
and rest w ith in  itse lf, and its e lf rem ains unm o ving  and u n restin g . T h u s  lo co ­
m otion and locoquiescence are sig n s o f partialitas  (fo r a fin ite  th in g  is  m oved 
from  place to place, o r rem ains w here it  is , p re cise ly  because it  is  p assive (i.e . 
really  re s ts)); w h ile  real motus et quies is  a sig n  and exp ressio n  o f w holeness, i.e . o f 
self-d eterm in in g  and self-m ain tain in g  a ctiv ity . T h ro u g h  its  re al in fin ite  re st­
lessness it  transcends the p o ssib ility  o f locom otion (o r even lo coquiescence), fo r, 
as I  have said, it  is  no longer in  space, it  is  space in  its  concrete re ality .
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thus be deduced from that of Extension characterized as it is by 
formal diversity or externality, and by unity. Extension is at once 
the infinitude of externality or multiplicity with its nisus to eternal 
unity, and the eternal unity with its nisus to infinite diversity or 
externality: res extensa naturata and res extensa naturans. It is thus 
that motus et quies constitutes the immediate infinite and eternal 
mode of extended Substance; for concrete Extension necessarily 
expresses itself through this reciprocal nisus to externality and to 
unity, and again, through this reciprocal nisus, the unity and con­
tinuity and infinity of Extension are further ‘modified’ and expressed 
as the infinite variety of the eternal universe as an extended 
whole. In th& facies totius Universi as a whole which also is infinite 
and eternal, motus et quies is still not through or in time, but is 
regarded in its infinite variety and organization as the constituent 
essence of individual extended things. Viewed imaginatively as it 
belongs to finite singular things, motus et quies necessarily, and 
therefore rightly, becomes spatio-temporal for external observers; 
but even here, as I shall argue in due course, the motion and rest 
of any given thing, in so far as the thing is real, is viewed by 
Intellect, not as locomotion and locoquiescence (for these indicate 
the outward-looking apprehension of a part within a larger whole), 
but as a harmony or balance of motion-rest.
How these simple facts relating to the distinctions of eternal and 
infinite motus et quies on the one hand, and spatio-temporal loco­
motion and locoquiescence on the other, can so uniformly have 
escaped the attention of even careful interpreters of Spinoza, is 
no small mystery. It has probably been supposed that since motion 
is essentially relative and balanced in the whole (for the whole 
qua whole does not move) that therefore the contradiction is 
‘somehow’ resolved; but however fond Spinoza may have been 
(according to the popular gibe) of the word ‘quatenus’ , he had little 
use for the phrase ‘nescio quo modo’ to qualify his solutions. Though 
a whole of moving sections may, as a whole, remain unmoved, a 
genuinely indivisible whole, which does not itself move, cannot 
‘contain’ (and certainly not ‘produce’) movement in the sense of 
change of place in time. These facts were perfectly clear to 
Spinoza, and I thus infer that if extended Substance expresses 
itself as infinite and eternal motion and rest it follows that these 
must be given another significance than that of motion and rest as 
they are for Imagination.
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The clue to the solution of this problem, as well as to that of the 
eternity of the mind, towards which I am making my way, is to 
be found in the series of Lemmata following Proposition xiii of 
Part I I of the Ethics. These are ‘physical’ propositions introduced 
to facilitate the exposition of the processes of perception and of 
knowledge generally. Spinoza expressly disclaims any intention of 
dealing in them with the constitution of bodies or of the material 
universe as a whole with any completeness: ‘I should feel bound to 
explain and demonstrate ... at more length, if I were writing a 
special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not 
my intention, I have only touched on the question because it 
enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.’1
The doctrine of the Lemmata is that any individual whole or 
body is constituted not by its separate region of Extension, nor by 
the identical material of its parts, but by a certain relation or union 
or balance of motion and rest in its members or parts. Thus in so 
far as a body is an individual, it does not move through space in 
time, nor does it, strictly, rest in space for a time (rest and motion 
being relative). But in so far as some section of this individual is 
regarded in isolation from the individual as a whole, it cannot but 
be regarded as moving or at rest in space. Every individual thing, 
therefore, has motion or rest in space-time in so far as it is regarded 
as a section of some wider individual thing, but has. no spatio- 
temporal motion or rest in so far as it is regarded as an individual. 
To this conception there are two corporeal limits: there is, on the 
one side, the facies totius TJniversi as an infinite individual which 
cannot be regarded as a section of any wider individual, and 
therefore cannot have spatio-temporal motion or rest at all, but is 
itself an infinite complex of balanced, and therefore real, motus et 
quies; and at the other end of the scale of things, there are the 
corpora simplicissima, which are the mere dust of being, since they 
are nothing but ‘infinitesimal’ or minimal relative movements in 
space-time.2
Between these corporeal limits there is a hierarchy of individual 
forms of which the human body is a notable example as a complex 
of complex individuals of a certain order, possessing a high degree
1 ‘ H aec, s i anim us fu isse t de corpore ex professo agere, p ro lix iu s  e xp licare, et 
dem onstrate debuissem . Sed ja m  d ix i m e a liu d  ve lle , nec alia  de causa haec 
adferre, quam  q u ia  ex ip sis  ea, quae dem onstrare co n stitu i, fa cile  possum  
deducere.’ {Eth. I I ,  Lem. v ii, Sch.)
2 See E xcu rsu s IV  (p p. 13 7-4 1).
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of individuality as a complicated system of reciprocal nisus, but 
which, being finite, is subject to spatio-temporal motion and rest 
as a single thing in relation to others within some wider individual 
(e.g. the world).
In such a view it is evident that spatio-temporal motion and 
rest is but a symbol of finitude, or an ‘imaginative’ expression of 
unbalanced nisus from externality towards unity, due to partialitas 
and fragmentariness. Motion and rest in space-time is incomplete 
nisus; individuality is reciprocal or balanced nisus. And the re­
lativity of spatio-temporal motion and rest is itself an expression of 
the reciprocal nature of the relations of the moving or resting, i.e. 
finite, sections. For these move or are at rest only relatively to each 
other: the whole has no spatio-temporal motion or rest.1 Nor do 
the real parts or members of any whole in themselves move in so 
far as they are regarded (and rightly regarded), as wholes, but only 
in so far as they are regarded as sections.2
Thus by a new path the familiar truth is reached, that for Spinoza 
reality and eternity are the same as completeness and individ­
uality ; for finite individuals are all one in respect of Substance. 
They do not either move or rest in Extension. Their reality is 
their individuality, it is the self-determined, and therefore balanced, 
mobility and quiescence of their members. But as finite sections 
of a more inclusive individual their individuality is qualified by 
spatio-temporal motion and rest, i.e. their real motion and rest is 
limited and truncated. The perfect Individual, the facies totius 
Universi, does not, from any point of view, move or rest in space­
time; its parts or members, considered as sections, have relative 
motion and rest, though their movements are a balanced harmony 
in the whole. But again, these parts or members of N atura them­
selves, regarded as partial wholes, are without spatio-temporal 
motion or rest, and their parts or members in turn, regarded as 
sections, move and rest in space-time, and are in their degree 
balanced in their system; and so to infinity.
The real motus et quies which is the immediate infinite and 
eternal mode of Extension is without transition in space-time, but 
it is progressively dissected and dissipated into transiency for the
1 T h o u g h  it  contains, o f course, a ll degrees o f balanced motus et quies.
z T h e  d istin ctio n  betw een a p a rt and a section, w h ich  I  sh a ll have occasion 
freq u en tly to use and to em phasize, is  here im p o rtan t. F o r though no section can 
also be a w hole, a real p art m ust be so re g a rd ed ; and in  th is sp ecial case it  is  essen­
tia l to regard it  as a relative w hole (in  its  m easure) re p ro d u cin g  the absolute w hole.
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imaginative apprehension of ever lower grades of individuality 
within the whole. Motion and rest in space-time, as the expression 
of finitude, are mainly constituted by negation, and where they are 
absolute (the limit asymptotically approached in the corpora sim- 
plicissima), the negation is complete; for absolute motion and 
absolute rest are one and the same, and null. In the Real there is no 
movement through Extension, or rest in a region of Extension; for 
Extension is undivided, and the Substance of all things is the same.1 
That, as I shall show, is the source of our eternity.
My immediate conclusion is that infinite and eternal motus et 
quies is that reciprocal nisus between externality or multiplicity 
and unity which is one with individuality, and is the expression 
of the essence of Res extensa as at once infinitely multiplex yet one 
and indivisible. A point of view is thus attained from which at 
last it becomes profitable to consider the place of ‘this or that’ 
human mind in the infinite and eternal Real.
The individual human mind does not, according to Spinoza, 
survive resolution into the intellectual order by becoming infinite, 
or by being merged and lost in the infinite, but, at least partly, it 
remains unaffected by that resolution: it ‘feels and proves by 
experience that it is eternal’. The human body, of which it is the 
essentia objectiva is finite; it is only a part of N a tu ra; it thus appears 
as depending upon sempiternal nature for its temporal origin, 
career, and survival. But though a part, it is not merely a section 
of Natura, it is also an individual capable of self-maintenance and of 
determining the relations of its subordinate parts in accordance 
with those universal principles of synthesis that we call the intel­
lectual order, and that are most fully exemplified and expressed 
in the universe as a whole. Those principles are universal in 
essence, though the degree in which they are exemplified in the 
different complexes of motion and rest that are the individual 
things with which individual minds are correlated, varies through 
the widest range: ‘a mouse no less than an angel depends on God; 
yet a mouse is not a kind of angel’ .2 Further, some of the things
1 ‘ C o rp o ra ratione m otus, et q u ie tis, cele ritatis, et ta rd itatis, et non ratione 
substantiae ab in vicem  d istin g u u n tu r.’ (Eth. I I ,  Lem. i.)
2 ‘ Q uam vis opera . . . om nium  eorum , quae sun t, ex D e i aetem is leg ib u s, et 
d ecretis necessario p ro flu an t, co ntinuo que a D eo dependeant, attam en non 
solum  g ra d ib u s; sed et essentia ab in vicem  d iffe ru n t: lic e t etenim  m us aeque, 
ac angelus, et aeque tristitia , ac lae titia, a D eo dependeant, n e q u it tam en m us 
species angeli, et tristitia  species laetitiae esse.’ (Ep. xx iii.)
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that we call individual or singular things are such only for 
Imagination because they appear as occupying separate regions of 
imagined extension; they are not real individuals constituted by 
the reciprocal nisus of a range of multiplicity or externality and a 
partial unity: a stone or a chair, for example, may only be an 
‘imaginative’ individual, its reality may depend wholly on its place 
in a much wider system for which it is a more or less insignificant 
detail possessing no independent value. But, according to Spinoza, 
the human body transcends such absolute dependence. In its degree 
it is an expression of a genuine unity within its range of exter­
nality. It is not merely a section of nature but a genuine part, i.e. 
a relative whole within nature. This is possible because Natura is 
not a mere aggregate of exclusive pieces, but is infinite, one, and 
indivisible. Its variety is qualitative rather than quantitative, or 
quantitative only because it is primarily qualitative. I have said 
that the facies totius Universi does not contain or suffer spatio- 
temporal motion and rest, though its imagined sections must either 
contain or suffer, and may both suffer and contain such motion and 
rest. But its real parts are not exclusive; they are in thoroughgoing 
relation with the whole, and in their way reproduce the whole. 
That they can do so without becoming identical with the whole 
follows from the nature of extended Substance as at once infinite 
in multiplicity, diversity, or externality, and also one and in­
divisible. If it were a mere empty form it could be nothing at all, 
for the unity would resolve the diversity, or the diversity would 
destroy the unity. It is both one and infinite in so far as it is an 
eternal existent, and, as such, its real parts retain their partialitas 
while reproducing the whole, and also, as parts, reciprocating with 
each other. Their reality as parts and their expressiveness of the 
whole are one and the same thing, for it is the essential character 
of an infinite whole that each of its parts reproduces it, and, as I 
have said, sections which do not reproduce it are not rightly 
called its parts.1
1 In  th is p art o f ra y  in te rp reta tio n  o f S pino za I  am , o f course, engaged in  
speculative e xp ositio n. I  beg the reader to rem em ber that by th at term  I  do not 
m ean ‘im a g in a tive ’ e xp ositio n , b u t an attem pt to get at the s p irit  both in  the 
letter and beh ind  the letter, b u t alw ays th ro ugh  o r by m eans o f the letter. M y  
view s are based upon certain  u n o b tru sive  but, to the prep ared reader, p ro ­
vocative statem ents and suggestions in  S p in o za’s w ritin g s, as w e ll as upo n the 
im p licatio n s o f the m ain  p rin c ip le s o f h is system . T h e  broader basis o f the 
in terpretatio n w ill becom e clear as the argum ent develops, and I  sh a ll endeavour 
to indicate fro m  tim e to tim e the bearing o f S p in o za’s statem ents upon the 
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The variety of the facies totius Universi is not, therefore, wholly 
illusory. If it were, there would cease to be an extended world of
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su b je ct; b u t prom inent am ong the assertions w h ich  fo rm  the points d’appui 
o f m y account o f S p in o za’s thought as in v o lv in g  a q u a lified  form  o f the m acro- 
cosm -m icrocosm  theory o f the u n iverse  and m an, are to be placed those o f 
P art I I  o f the Ethics w ith  reference to the propria communia. ‘ O m nia corpora in  
quibusdam  co n ve n iu n t’ (Eth. I I ,  Lem. it ) ;  th is becom es the basis o f the p o ssi­
b ility  o f adequate know ledge fo r the fin ite  m in d , fo r ‘ Ilia , quae om nibus com - 
jn u n ia , quaeque aeque in parte, ac in toto sunt, non possunt co n cip i, n is i adaequate’ 
(Eth. I I ,  x xxviii). T h u s  there are propria  w h ich  sin g u la r th ings possess in  
com m on w ith  one another and w ith  the w hole o f N atura  (an d the sam e is  tru e 
also o f ideas). B u t it  m ay be objected th at th is d o ctrine o f Spinoza re a lly  opposes 
the in terp retatio n  w h ich  I  am  defending, sin ce these communia are o n ly  ab stract 
propria, and do not even constitute any fin ite  sin g u la r th in g , as the preceding  
p ro p o sitio n  in d ica te s: ‘ Id , quod om nibus com m une (de h is v id e  su p ra Lemma ii) ,  
quodque aeque in  parte, ac in  toto est, n u lliu s  re i s in g u la ris essentiam  c o n stitu it’ 
(Eth. I I ,  xx xvii).  M y  re p ly  is  th at it  is  the Demonstration o f th is p ro p o sitio n  
th at m ust determ ine the sig nificance o f its  Enunciation; and th at ind icates that 
b y ‘ co n stitu tin g  the essence o f a sin g u la r’ S pinoza m eans ‘depending upo n the 
sin g u la r th in g  fo r essence and existence’. So that the p o in t re a lly  is  not that 
‘ fin ite  sin g u la rs’ are too com plete to be constituted by a re la tive ly  abstract 
proprium, b u t rath er th at the propria  are too com plete to be constituted b y  a 
re la tive ly  lim ite d  sin g u lar. F o r the e x trin sic  determ inations o f sin g u la r th ings 
are negations, and it  is  the negation th at cannot be derived fro m  the propria  
communia. H o w  fa r S p in o za’s consciousness o f the am b ig uity o f h is  expression 
here is  re a lly  acute, does not appear from  the text. P erhaps he is  th in k in g  fo r 
the m om ent o f the proprium  commune apart from  Substance, i.e . as abstract, and 
though m ore am ple in  scope, re la tive ly  em ptier than the fin ite  m odes (th o ug h t 
o f as m odes of Substance). B u t in  any case, h is vie w  is , I  th in k , q u ite  c le a rly  
that the propria communia do constitute ‘fixed  and e tern al’ s in g u la rs: ‘ U nd e haec 
fixa, et aeterna, q uam vis sin t sin g u la ria , tam en ob eorum  u b iq u e  praesentiam , 
ac latissim am  potentiam  eru n t n o b is, tanquam  u n ive rsa lia , sive  genera defi- 
n itio n u m  reru m  sin g u la riu m  m u tab iliu m , et causae proxim ae om nium  re ru m ’ 
(De Intell. Emend., O p. P ost., p. 389 ). B u t they do no t constitute these m utable 
sin g u la r th ings.
B u t th at no fin ite  th in g  fu lly  reproduces any external th in g  o r the w hole, 
S pino za is  em phatic. T h e  m icrocosm  is  no com plete re p ro d u ctio n  o f the 
m acrocosm , and even the ‘ eternal p a rt’ o f the m in d  is  not id e n tica l w ith  the 
infmita idea Dei, b u t o n ly  a p art o f it , i.e . an in d iv id u a l ab stractio n fro m  it.
T h e  thoughts o f the reader w ill here doubtless tu rn  to the com parable d o ctrin e 
o f L e ib n iz  w ith  reference to the m onads as reflectio ns o f the u n iverse  (and some 
also, b y special grace, reflectio n s o f G o d ). B u t though L e ib n iz , lik e  S pinoza, 
lim its  the adequacy o f the reflectio ns o f the fin ite  in d iv id u a ls, the tw o theories 
are w id e ly  diverg ent in  m ost other essential respects. T h a t o f L e ib n iz  is  ve ry  
m uch m ore b rillia n tly  detailed than are the broad and general statem ents o f 
S pinoza, though I  th in k  that there is  disco verab le in  and u n d e r the latte r, the 
o u tlin e s o f a theory m ore satisfacto ry, p ro fo un d , and in  accordance w ith  o u r 
experience, than the L e ib n iz ia n  theory o f m onads. I  have attem pted in  the 
course o f the text to b rin g  the S p in o zistic  theory to d istin ct exp ressio n , and I  
have added a m ore detailed d iscu ssio n  and com parison o f the tw o theories in  the 
Preface to P art I I  (p p . 1 0 7 -1 1 ). G reat as w as the in flu en ce on L e ib n iz  o f h is 
stud y o f the Ethics o f S pinoza, perhaps the effect on subsequent speculatio n
nature. But its unity and variety must be such that the order 
which constitutes the whole shall constitute also every genuine 
part, though not the ‘imaginative’ sections, of the whole. And 
this is true of the human mind in genuine knowledge as distinct 
from mere memory and Imagination as such. Those who have 
concluded, therefore, that all minds become one in rational know­
ledge, have forgotten that thefo tis  et origo of this part of Spinoza’s 
theory is extended Substance as an infinite self-maintaining whole 
of real parts constituted by the same intellectual order without 
loss of individual distinction. Hegelians and idealists generally 
will, doubtless, reject that foundation, and thus become involved 
in familiar difficulties about the reality of finite personality, but 
Spinoza must not be entangled in difficulties that do not belong 
to his theory as it stands. He must be attacked, if at all in this 
connexion, through his conception of Substance as really extended : 
realists will not be inclined to attack him there, and idealists 
who feel the inclination may be invited to remember the aperçu 
of Bosanquet that monadology explains the ‘insides’ but not 
the ‘outsides’ of things. And this may have an even wider 
application.1
A further corroboration of my general conclusion is to be found 
in those propositions scattered throughout the Ethics in which 
Spinoza defines the place of body in the act of perception, especially 
the significance of the organism with reference to the acquiring 
and possession of adequate knowledge by the mind. He asserts, 
on the one hand, that the mind knows only the body2; yet, on the 
other hand, that it is capable of possessing an adequate idea of 
God3 ; and the seeming contradiction is uniformly resolved through 
the principle of the unity and interconnectedness of N atura. ‘The 
human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is 
so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number 
of impressions.’4 Nor does he find any incoherence between these
w ould have been even greater i f  S pino za co uld  have read the sho rt resum é that 
cam e in  the course o f a cen tury o r so to be called  ‘L a  Monadologie’, though I  do 
not th in k  th at it  w o uld  have changed the real character o f S pin o zism .
1 F u rth e r thoughts on th is sub ject w ill be fo und below , e sp e cially  in  the 
discussio ns o f the in fin ite  A ttrib u te s o f the R ea l, in  C h apter X I.
2 Eth. I I ,  x iii.
3 Eth. I I ,  x lv ii.
4 ‘ M ens hum ana apta est ad p lu rim a  p ercip ien d um , et eo ap tio r, quo ejus 
C o rpu s p lu rib u s m odis d isp o n i potest.’ (Eth. I I ,  x iv .)
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assertions and the equally emphatic one that ‘the human mind has 
no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save 
through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is 
affected’ .1 The human body in the midst of nature is, indeed, very 
roughly analogous to an instrument in an orchestra: its contribu­
tion is a part of the whole symphony, but it also sotto voce con­
tributes a reproduction of the whole; each instrument takes its 
part with the others in the whole, but a very acute ear would 
detect it playing its own responsive, and therefore selective, 
version of the whole in a normally unnoticed undertone. To bodily 
responsiveness in Extension there corresponds an appropriate 
relation in Thought, and it is because nature (both psychical and 
physical) is a whole of responsive parts, parts which as capable 
of adequate response are more than mere sections— are, indeed, 
relative wholes, that complete knowledge is an ideal for man, or, 
in truth, that knowledge is for him possible at all.2 Further, and 
even more important, this reproduction of the whole is not a mere 
insubstantial reflection, for the orchestral analogy here breaks 
down: there each instrument plays a section of the symphony as 
its main work, and reproduces the whole, in its measure, sotto 
voce ; but in nature it is the reproduction of the whole in each 
that is its contribution to the whole. ‘ Sotto voce ’ must here refer 
not to a concealed additional undertone, having no real part in 
the whole, but to the very contributions of the parts which re­
produce the whole partialiter, i.e. sotto voce. It follows that the 
parts are real with the whole; for they are one with it in substance, 
and therefore one with it, in their degree, in form. Their finitude 
means not their unreality, but their inadequate responsiveness. In 
so far as any part of nature is capable of adequate attunement with 
the whole, to that degree it is, in Leibnizian phrase, ‘big’ with 
the whole; but no part can be wholly equal to the whole and yet 
remain a part; nor can a whole be infinite which is not a whole of 
infinite parts: ‘the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from 
their own nature and power; ... matter was not lacking to God for 
the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; 
or, more strictly, the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice 
for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite
1 ‘ M ens hum ana ipsum  hum anum  C o rp u s non cognoscit, nec ipsu m  existere 
scit, n is i p er ideas affectionum , q u ib u s C o rp u s a ffic itu r.’ {Et.li. I I ,  x ix .)
2 C f. Eth. I I ,  xix.
92 A E T E R N I T A S
intellect’ .1 ‘When you say that by making men so dependent on 
God, I reduce them to the likeness of the elements, plants, or 
stones, you . . . confuse things which pertain to the Intellect with 
the Imagination. If you had understood the meaning of depen­
dence on God puro intellectu you certainly would not think that 
dependence on him rendered things dead ... for who ever dared 
to speak so meanly of the supremely perfect Being; on the contrary, 
you would understand that it is because they depend on God that 
they are perfect, so that this dependence . . . may be best under­
stood ... by considering not stocks and plants but the most 
intelligent and perfect of created things.’2
The distinctness of the parts of extended nature arises, therefore, 
from their relation to nature as a whole, through which relation 
they are at once both parts and also reciprocating parts. They 
could not be real parts if they did not reciprocate; they could not 
reciprocate if they were not real parts. And as reciprocating parts of 
the whole they are distinct from each other and within the whole. 
They are distinct as parts of an infinite extended whole charac­
terized by spatial externality; they are reproductions as parts of 
an infinite extended whole characterized by individuality and unity. 
As I have already noticed it is mainly for those who deny the 
ultimate reality of Extension that difficulties have arisen in main­
taining both the distinctness and the wholeness of the genuine parts 
of the Real; and it is only a further mark of the expository and 
polemical acuity of Spinoza that he approaches the question of the 
reality and the eternity of the mind, not primarily from the side 
of Thought, but by insisting on the nature of extended Substance.3
1 ‘ R erum  p erfectio  ex sola earum  natura, et potentia est aestim anda . . . e i 
non d e fu it m ateria ad om nia, ex sum m o n im iru m  ad infim um  p erfectio n is 
gradum , crean d a; ve l m agis p ro p rie  loquendo, q uia ip siu s naturae leges adeo 
am plae fu e ru n t, u t sufficerent ad om nia, quae ab aliq u o  in fin ito  in te lle ctu  con- 
c ip i possunt, p ro ducend a.’ (E th . I ,  Appendix.)
3 ‘ Q uod vero ais, m e hom ines, eos a D eo tarn dependentes faciendo, ideo 
elem entis, h erb is, et la p id ib u s sim ile s reddere, id  su fficien ter ostend it te m eam  
opinionem  p erversissim e in te llig e re , et res, quae in tellectum  spectant, cum  
im aginatione confundere. S i enim  p uro  in te lle ctu  percepisses, q u id  s it a D eo 
dependere, certe non cogitares, res, quatenus a D eo dependent, m ortuas, co r- 
poreas, et im perfectas esse (q u is unquam  de E nte sum m e perfecto tarn v ilite r 
ausus fu it lo q u i), e contra caperes, ea de causa, et quatenus a D eo dependent, 
perfectas esse. A deo u t hanc dependentiam  atque necessariam  operationem  
quam  optim e p er D e i decretum  in te llig am u s, quando non ad tru nco s, et h e rb a s; 
sed ad m axim e in te llig ib ile s, et res creatas perfectissim as attend im us.’ (Ep. xxi.)
3 T h o u g h  an analogous deduction from  the side o f T h o u g h t sho uld in vo lve  no 
insuperable d ifficu ltie s.
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The second kind of knowledge, Reason, is adequate knowledge 
of th e  propria communia of things and of their implications. These 
common properties are not so much abstract universals as universal 
singulars, but these viewed in their universality rather than in 
their individual character. This has been generally understood, 
but it has for the most part been overlooked that these propria  
communia form not a mere list, but an ordered hierarchy. Reason is 
concerned both with their content and implications and also with 
their order, but with these distributively rather than systematically. 
Spinoza is himself largely responsible for this persistent over­
sight, because two only of the most universal of these singular 
existences are actually named by him, viz. extension, and motion 
and rest.1 A comparison of Propositions xxxv ii and xxx ix of Part I I ,  
however, reveals the important fact, signalized by the variation of 
phrase from ‘common to all’ to ‘common to the human body and 
to such other bodies as are wont to affect it’, that grades of univer­
sality are admitted among these propria.2 ‘The mind is fitted to 
perceive adequately more things in proportion as its body has 
more in common with other bodies’3; ‘Whatsoever so disposes the 
human body that it can be affected in many ways, or which renders 
it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to 
man, and is more useful in proportion as the body is thereby better 
fitted to be affected in many ways, and to affect other bodies . . . 
In proportion as the body is rendered more fitted for [affecting or 
being affected by other bodies] the mind is rendered more capable 
of perception (by Prop, x iv , P t. I I ) . ’4 It is the peculiar function 
of Reason to work within these ranges of universality, but, as 
Reason, it cannot weave them together into a concrete conception 
of the ordered hierarchy of notions as a whole constituting the
1 ‘ In  h is  . . . om nia corpora co n veniunt, quod u n iu s, ejusdem que a ttrib u ti 
conceptum  in vo lvu n t. D ein d e, quod ja m  ta rd iu s, ja m  cele riu s, et absolute 
ja m  m o veri, ja m  quiescere p o ssu n t.’ (Eth. I I ,  Lem. ii.)
2 C f. also Eth. I I ,  xxxvHi, C o r.: ‘ notiones omnibus hominibus com m unes.’ B u t 
n o th ing  com es o f the d istin ctio n .
3 ‘M en s eo ap tio r est ad p lu ra  adaequate p ercip ie n d um , quo ejus C o rp u s 
p lu ra  habet cum  a liis  co rp o rib u s com m unia.’ (Eth. I I ,  xxxix, Cor.)
4 ‘ Id , quod C o rp u s hum anum  ita  d isp o n it, u t p lu rib u s m odis p o ssit a ffici, ve l 
quod idem  aptum  re d d it ad C o rpo ra externa p lu rib u s m odis afficiendum  h o m in i 
est u tile ; et eo u tiliu s, quo C o rp u s ab eo ap tiu s re d d itu r, u t p lu rib u s m odis 
afficia tu r, aliaque corpora afficiat, et co ntra id  n o xiu m  est, quod C o rp u s ad 
haec m inu s aptum  re d d it. Q uo co rp us ad haec ap tiu s re d d itu r, eo M en s 
ap tio r ad p ercip ien d um  re d d itu r (p e r Prop, x iv, P . I I )  . . .’ (Eth. I V ,  x x x v iii 
et Dem.)
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individuality, or some partial manifestation of the individuality, 
of the infinite whole or One. It is precisely this which is accom­
plished by the mind in the exercise of the third kind of knowledge, 
scientia intuitiva, the peculiar character of which is that it proceeds 
‘from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes 
of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ .1 
In such ‘intuitive’ knowledge there is an inweaving of infinite 
common notions of common properties, in their logical order and 
precedence, to form the notion of an individual whole.2 It is not 
the mere abstract deduction of the narrower propria from the wider, 
beginning with absolutely infinite extension conceived as an 
abstract universal, for that is an impossible process; but it proceeds 
from an adequate or concrete notion of the more universal existences, 
to the implied variety constituted by the less universal determina­
tions. It is knowledge of a thing ‘solely through its essence’ ,3 i.e. 
as a singular or individual thing reproducing (and only as repro­
ducing) the whole.
The ideal instance of such knowledge is that which is in God as 
the knowledge of that eternal infolding and unfolding of Natura  
naturans and N atura naturata which is ‘the infinite love wherewith 
God loves himself’, and which constitutes the eternity of God.4
1 ‘ H o c cognoscendi genus p ro ced it ab adaequata idea essentiae fo rm alis 
quorundam  D e i attrib u to ru m  ad adaequatam  cognitionem  essentiae re ru m .’ 
(Eth. I I ,  xl, Sch. ii.)
2 O n the questio n o f the m in d ’s passage from  R eason to scientia intuitiva, see 
E xcu rsu s I I I  (p p . 9 9 -10 4 ).
3 ‘P erceptio . . . u b i res p e rc ip itu r p er solam  suam  essentiam .’ (D e Intell. 
Emend., O p. P ost., p. 36 2.)
4 ‘ D eus est absolute in fin itu s (p e r Def. vi, P . I ) ,  hoc est (p e r Def. vi, P . I I ) ,  
D e i natura gaudet in fin ita  perfectio n e, id q ue  (p e r Prop, iii, P . I I )  concom itante 
idea su i, hoc est (p e r Prop, x i  et Def. i, P . I ) ,  idea suae causae, et hoc est, quod 
in  Coroll. Prop, xxx hujus A m orem  intellectualem  esse d ix im u s’ (Eth. V , xxxv, 
Demi). ‘ D eu s absolute in fin itu s ’ m eans acco rd ing  to Eth. I ,  Def. vi, to w h ich  
Spinoza here refers, ‘ S ub stantia constans in fin itis  a ttrib u tis, q uo rum  unum - 
quodque aeternam , et in fin ita m  essentiam  e x p rim it’ ; and G o d , he says, re fe rrin g  
sig n ifica n tly  to Eth. I I ,  i i i,  ‘re jo ices in  in fin ite  p erfectio n  and in  the accom panying 
idea o f h im se lf’ ; th is p ro p o sitio n  ru n s : ‘ In  D eo datu r necessario idea, tarn ejus 
essentiae, quam omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur’ ; so th at G od 
rejoices in  h is  nature as in v o lv in g  the w hole to ta lity  o f A ttrib u te s with the 
infinite expressions of their essence, i.e . N atura naturata. B u t th is re jo ic in g  is  
accom panied b y ‘idea su i, hoc est idea suae causae’, he know s h im se lf as the 
eternal cause o f h is ow n in fin ite  perfectio n s and expressions, i.e . N atura  
naturans. A n d  th is eternal re jo ic in g  in  exp ressio n and exp ressin g  is  the Am or 
intellectualis infinitus w ith  w h ich  ‘D eu s se am at’ (Eth. V , xxxv). A g ain , ‘aeternitas 
est ipsa D e i essentia, quatenus haec necessariam  in v o lv it e xistentiam ’ (Eth. F ; 
xxx, Demi), a statem ent w h ich  also exp lain s the reference in  Eth. V , xxxv, Dem _
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But scientia intuitiva is not confined to the infinite whole, for ‘he 
who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, 
possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal’ ,1 for such a 
mind does not possess the various common notions of its ever 
widening circle of affinities as a mere list, it can weave them together 
in such a way as to reproduce within itself that universal and eternal 
order which constitutes the Real as an infinite whole. And in so 
far as it does so, it possesses at once ‘a great knowledge of itself and 
of God’ so that its ‘greatest or chief part is eternal’ .2 In so doing it 
puts aside all those ideas which belong to Imagination in so far as 
they are confused or inadequate, i.e. in so far as they are mere 
memories or imaginations; not because they are in themselves 
false, for it is through our relations with the whole that we have 
knowledge at all, and memories and imaginations are confused 
apprehensions of our relations; it puts them aside because they 
do not clearly and wholly belong to the real essence of the finite 
individual in whose world they have intruded. ‘There are no ideas 
confused or inadequate except in respect to a particular mind.’3 
They symbolize our finitude; they constitute no part of our eternal 
being: in life they do not, and out of life they cannot.
It is thus that in our ‘rational’ and ‘intuitive’ apprehension of
the nature of the Real ‘we feel and prove by experience that we
are eternal’. We do so even in those abstract conceptions of the
universal laws of being and their implications, that constitute the
content of Reason; but we do so more completely and concretely
when we seek to escape that abstractness of reasoned truth which
expresses itself for ‘imaginative’applicationsastemporalneutrality.4
to Eth. I ,  x i;  and fin a lly , to com plete the c irc u it: ‘ D eu s vero no n  potest d ic i fru i 
existentia, nam  existen tia D e i est D eu s ip se , s icu t etiam  ip siu s essentia’ (Cog. 
M et. I I ,  i ). T h u s  the ve ry  being  o f G o d  as T h o u g h t is  in te lle ctu a l love, w h ich  
is  a draught o f e tern ity  it s e lf; o r sin ce each A ttrib u te  is  b u t the obverse to w h ich  
the in fin ite  rem ain ing  A ttrib u te s are the reverse (see below , C h apter X I) ,  the 
in fin ite  in te lle ctu a l love w h erew ith  G o d  loves h im se lf is  one w ith  etern ity itse lf.
1 ‘ Q u i C o rp u s ad p lu rim a  aptum  habet, is  M entem  habet, cu ju s m axim a pars 
est aeterna.’ (Eth. V , xxxix.)
2 ‘ Q uia C o rp o ra hum ana ad p lu rim a  apta sun t, n o n d u biu m  est, q u in  ejus 
naturae p o ssin t esse, u t ad M entes refera n tu r, quae m agnam  su i, et D e i habeant 
cognitionem , et quarum  m axim a, seu p raecipu a pars est aetem a, atque adeo u t 
m ortem  v ix  tim eant.’ (Eth. V, xxxix, Sch.)
3 ‘ N u lla e  inadaequatae, nec confusae su n t; n is i quatenus ad sin gularem  
a licu ju s M entem  re fe ru n tu r.’ (Eth. I I ,  xxxvi, Dem.)
4 A n d , I  m ay add, as n e u tra lity  w ith  respect to in d iv id u a l d istin ctio n s, w here 
the tru th s o f R eason are regarded as m ere connexions o f ab stract u n ive rsa ls. 
It  is  as a re su lt o f th is sim ple e rro r, together w ith  the related fa ilu re  to grasp
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the sig n ifican ce o f S p in o za’s d o ctrin e o f scientia intuitiva, that leads in e vita b ly  
to such  extra o rd in a ry theses as those o f P rofessor T a y lo r, to w h ich  I  have 
in cid e n ta lly  referred  (p . 74 , note 2 ), and o f M artin eau , w ith  reference to the 
m eaning o f S p in o za’s assertions about the etern ity o f the hum an m ind . ‘ I t  is 
o n ly  as id e n tifie d  w ith  necessary tru th  that it  [i.e. the hum an m in d ] is  “ e ternal” : 
the “ oculi mentis”  are the “ p a rt”  o f it  th at is  so ; and they are the “ ipsae 
dem onstrationes” . E ach  “ dem onstration”  m akes bu t one “ e ternal” , how ever 
m any the in d iv id u a ls  w ho “ see”  it , o r the copies o f E u c lid  th at co ntain it :  it  
goes hom e to a n ature com m on to a ll, and not to the differences w h ich  m ark o ff 
person fro m  person. I t  is  the u n ive rsa l organism  o f reason, the system  o f in ­
te lle ctu a l law , expressed in  o u r “ m ode o f th in k in g ” , w h ich  S pino za sets free 
from  tim e -re la tio n s: and he b y no m eans in ten ds to constitute a p o pu latio n  o f 
“ eternals”  in c lu d in g  as m any in d iv id u a ls  as can understand a p ro o f. It  is  as if  
“ the m ental eyes” , instead o f being repeated in  each o f us, had p roclaim ed th e ir 
u n ity  o f fu n ctio n  by being planted, lik e  a telescope, outside us a ll, yet availab le 
fo r a ll. T h e n , w hoever cam e and looked and passed aw ay, the sam e v isio n  w ould 
be there’ (A  Study of Spinoza, p p. 2 9 6 -7). B u t th is is  im aginative, rath er than 
speculative, exp ositio n  ru n  m ad ! T h e  source o f the (no t uncom m on) e rro r begins 
to reveal itse lf, how ever, in  the issu e, fo r M artin e au  proceeds to reject the re la­
tiv e ly  m ore satisfacto ry theory o f C am erer (D ie Lehre Spinoza’s, I I ,  v), m ain ly  
on the g ro un d  th at it  reads etern ity as personal im m o rtality, instead o f tim eless 
necessity. D o ub tless he is  rig h t in  denying  that aeternitas is  aevum o r sempiter- 
nitas; b u t in  denying  th is, it  is  no t necessary to proceed also to deny that it 
is  individual etern ity o f w h ich  S pino za speaks, and so to reduce it  to m ere tim e­
less n ecessity. T h e  tw o questions m ust be kept d istin ct, and it  is  n o th in g  b u t an 
obstinate attem pt to im pose a false E m p iric ist theory o f ideas upon Spinoza 
(cf. p. 298: w ith  S pino za ‘there is  no m in d  as the sub ject o f ideas, b u t o n ly  ideas 
that in  the aggregate are ve rb a lly  u n ifie d  and called the m in d ’) th at leads 
M artin eau  hopelessly to confuse them .
N ow  the w hole theory o f S pino za depends upo n  h is  rejectio n o f m ere h ypo - 
theticals and ab stract u n iv e rsa ls: a ll real being is  in d iv id u a l (though not 
necessarily therefore p a rtia l and frag m entary). T h e re  is  th us no reason at a ll 
(apart fro m  the e rro r about ideas) fo r denying that it  is  the in d iv id u a l hum an 
m ind that is , in  p art, eternal. A ll the reasons are in  favo u r o f the affirm ation.
O n the other hand, it  is  as false o r fatuous to read etern ity as tim elessness, 
as to read it  as aevum o r se m p ite rn ity : fatuous, i f  tim e is  completely d ifferen t 
from  e tern ity  (as e.g. num ber is ) ; false, because self-co n trad icto ry, i f  tim e and 
eternity are related (sin ce ‘tim elessness’ can then o n ly  m ean ‘m om entary’ o r 
‘ under a n e u tral o rd er o f e xte rn ality ’).
I  have called  the theory o f Cam erer ‘re la tive ly  m ore satisfa cto ry’ because 
w hile it  is  ce rta in ly  in  e rro r in  assignin g  to Spinoza a b e lie f in  in d iv id u a l im ­
m o rtality, it  is  nearer the tru th  in  affirm ing  the m in d ’s genuine in d iv id u a lity , 
both as a dw eller in  tim e and as an ‘ eternal’ re ality . O n the other hand, M artin e au  
is  in  e rro r both w ith  reference to the nature o f the in d iv id u a l hum an m ind , and 
also in  read in g etern ity as tim elessness simpliciter. A n d  no m ore notew orthy 
exam ple than th is co uld , perhaps, be fo und , o f the necessity o f read in g  S pinoza 
in  h is ow n lig h t, and no t b y m eans o f a borrow ed candle, i f  fatal confusions 
are to be avoided. I t  m ay, indeed, be said, both w ith  reference to the theory 
thus im puted to S pinoza, and no t less to the m ind s o f its  a u th o rs: ‘i f  the lig h t 
that is  in  thee be darkness, how  great is  that darkness!’
3713 O
can be no such neutrality (however it is to be expressed in relation 
to an eternal being) for the truth which constitutes the eternal 
part of the mind. Duration cannot be neutral for concrete 
‘imaginative’ existence, for it is that existence; and eternity is not 
neutral for the Real: it constitutes its essence no less than its 
existence.
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EXCURSUS III
S U B  Q U A D  A M  S P E C IE  A E T E R N I T A T I S
S o m e t h in g  has been done in recent years towards discovering the literary and philological origin of this often quoted expression, and to trace the developments of its significance, as well as the exact meaning which it bore in the mind of Spinoza.1 The phrase occurs in the writings of Spinoza both in the longer form as it stands at the head of this Excursus, and also in the shorter form ‘sub specie aeternitatis’; and it is my business, not to trace the possible developments of its significance in the mind of Spinoza, but rather to determine its precise meaning in his developed doctrine, and to indicate the probable basis of the variety of emphasis which it seems to bear, and which is signalized by the frequent introduction of the word ‘quadam’, or its equivalent.When Spinoza says that ‘de natura Rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere’ ,2 or ‘ad Mentis naturam . . . pertinet Corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipere’ ,3 he does not, I need hardly say, mean that Reason and scientia intuitiva view things under a false appearance (species) of eternity. On the contrary, they rightly grasp the nature of eternal things, and eternity is no ‘specious’ appearance.Again, the phrase is not completely understood as meaning simply that Reason and ‘intuition’ view things from an eternal standpoint (ex 
specula aeternitatis), though doubtless, rightly interpreted, that meaning is not wholly alien to the doctrine of Spinoza; it is, however, meta­phorical, and hence unlikely to indicate the very precise significance that Spinoza assigned to his often repeated and emphatic phrase.I shall best indicate its import, not by attempting to find an exact English translation of it, but by examining the conditions which govern knowledge of the ‘rational’ and ‘intuitive’ kinds respectively. The distinction drawn by Spinoza between four (or three) kinds of know­ledge4 belongs only to finite minds; for Natura neither ‘imagines’ nor ‘reasons’, but ‘intuits’, and its ‘intuition’ is, by reason of transcendence, homonymous with ours. Thus finite thought is only a ‘part’ of the divine Thought in so far as it is ‘intuitive’, and no longer merely ‘rational’ or ‘imaginative’. The distinction between Reason and scientia intuitiva can
1 C f. e.g. B ar. de Spinoza, E th ik, übersetzt von O . B aensch, io  A u fl., p. 284; 
‘ E w ig ke it und D au e r bei S p in o za’ (Kant-Studien, X X X I I ,  i, Spinoza Festheft, 
1927, pp. 72 et seqq.; C . G eb h ard t, ‘ S pino za und der P la to n ism u s’ (Chronicon 
Spinozanum I ,  p p . 200 et seqq.); & c.
2 Eth. I I ,  xliv, Cor. ii.  3 Eth. V, xxix, D em .
4 De Inteil. Emend., O p. P ost., p p . 362 et seqq. ; Eth. I I ,  xl, Sch. ü.
therefore only be elucidated by an examination of typically finite knowledge.The general nature of the Real will be laid down in the text with sufficient detail to indicate that the finite individual knows the eternal Whole only in the degree in which he reproduces it mentally and corporeally.1 That reproduction can never be complete, either with the mind or with the body, but it can be adequate,2 and in particular this is the case with the ideas of Reason and scientia intuitiva (and their corresponding corporeal modes). ‘Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem, et tertii est necessario vera’ .3
Reason
The objects of Reason are the propria communia, including both those which are common to all bodies whatsoever,4 and those which are common to the human body and the bodies which chiefly affect it.5Now the human mind is the essentia objectiva of the human body, and its knowledge is thus primarily a knowledge of its body; it follows that the propria communia known to man must be of many grades of con­creteness according to the number of types of individuality interposed between that of a man and that of a corpus simplicissimum (with its ‘idea’). In verbal strictness a proprium is not ‘commune' unless it is possessed in common by the knower’s body and some other body external to it; so that we may regard the knowledge possessed by the knower of his own peculiar individuality as the ideal limit to which Reason as such does not proceed. But it is also, the reader must not forget, the real object of all our knowledge, and thus also of our knowledge of the whole. For though not all finite things possess all propria communia, the Whole which they all in their measure and manner express, does possess all 
propria, in a rationally synthesized form, i.e. in ‘the intellectual order’ (which is no uni-dimensional range of contents); and no other being possesses them all. Our idea of the Whole, therefore, is our idea of the body (but ‘writ large’ as the expression of our experience of the magni- potence of the external world); and our true idea of the whole is our idea of the body, rearranged, corrected, delimited, in accordance with the demands of the Intellect.From these principles it follows that our knowledge is adequate with respect to the propria communia possessed by the Whole and by all things whatsoever; but it is only thin and abstract. Our knowledge with respect to the propria communia possessed by the Whole but only by some parts of the universe will still be adequate, but error may arise through false attribution to parts which cannot accept them; but it is
1 Eth. I I ,  x iv ; I V ,  xxxviii. I  am , o f course, an ticip atin g  the co n clu sio n s o f m y 
ow n late r chapters.
2 Eth. I I ,  x lv -x lv ii.  3 Eth. I I ,  x li. 4 Eth. I I ,  x xxviii. 5 Eth. I I ,  xxxix.
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more concrete. And thus in the limit our knowledge of our real propria 
(propria propria), which we share only homonymously with the Whole and other ‘enveloping’ individuals, will be adequate, but liable to error from our tendency to impose them, either on external things (as in the ‘pathetic’ fallacy), or on the Whole (or other ‘enveloping’ individual) without proper delimitation (as in anthropomorphistic theologies).It has not, I think, been commonly recognized that the propria of things, whether they are propria communia or propria propria with respect to this or that knower, are identical with either the Attributes, or the infinite and eternal modes, of Substance. The only propria 
communia actually named by Spinoza are Extension and motus et quies.1 I have elsewhere pointed out2 that in this part of Spinoza’s theory a great lacuna remains to be filled in before it can be regarded as in any sense adequate. But something is done at the other end of the series of individuals by the important doctrines of Part V of the Ethics, according to which man as intellect is eternal, and God can be explained in some degree ‘per essentiam humanae Mentis, sub specie aeternitatis con- sideratam’ .3 Thus the eternal essence of each man finds its place in God as one of his infinite and eternal modes: infinite, in that it expresses a draught of the undivided divine nature, though finite as doing so in­completely or abstractly. Thus the infinite and eternal modes must be infinitely various, and not limited to the few outstandingly concrete ones expressly named by Spinoza: Extension, motus et quies, facies totius 
Universi; Thought, intellectus absolute infinities, infinita idea Dei. (It must also be remembered that in proportion to their real concreteness will be their relative abstractness for us.)
Scientia intuitiva
But though all our adequate knowledge is of the propria of Natura, it does not follow that it is limited to ‘reasoning’. The presence in 
Natura of propria communia implies the presence in the human mind of certain ideas or ‘notiones omnibus hominibus communes’ ,4 and our knowledge may concern itself with these, and with their relations and connexions, and those of their objects. But if it does so it will fail to achieve genuine individuality, not because the propria Naturae are not individuals, for they are, but because their structure and relations will be considered, rather than their wholeness or individuality. For the Real is no mere series or collection of laws, but these are abstractions from its concrete nature. This is seen from the start in the fact that the immediate object of finite knowledge is the finite individual himself, both mind and body, and it follows that for knowledge, not merely
E X C U R S U S  f i l l  l o i
1 Eth. II, xxxvii, referring to Lem. ii.
3 Eth. V, xxxiii, xxxvi.
2 Below,  p. 182.
4 Eth. II, xxxviii, Cor.
adequate, but also as perfect as is possible to the finite individual, the universe is simply himself with the limitations transcended and the perfections realized.Thus his most perfect knowledge of the Real is of an Individual possessing all his perfections without their limitations, and infinitely more. And this knowledge must take the form, not of a collection or serial order of abstract universal laws made concrete by surreptitious introduction of precise minor, or vague major, individualities (such as ‘electrons’, ‘atoms’, ‘plants’, ‘animals’, ‘men’, &c.); but of scientia in­
tuitiva : the knowledge of a universal Individual in which an ‘adequate knowledge of the natures of things’ follows from an ‘adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes’ of Natura.1Such scientia intuitiva arises not from the imaginative idea of himself as a being actual in the time-series, but from his rational knowledge2; and though there is doubtless a technical difficulty in understanding how the finite individual can pass from purely ‘rational’ abstract knowledge to ‘intuitive’ concrete knowledge, yet when it is remembered that the 
propria communia are of all grades of concreteness down (or up) to that of the knower, and that Reason is only excluded from the knowledge of the propria propria of the knower as from a ‘limit’, it must be admitted that the difficulty is at least mitigated. The propria propria of the individual (which he can only know by scientia intuitiva) are not sundered from the propria communia (which he can know in their precise structure and relations by Reason); and hence the former can be corrected and delimited by ‘rational’ criticism and construction. And this self-knowledge, qualified by knowledge of the things that limit the power of the self, becomes knowledge of the Whole; and when it is corrected by Reason, becomes true knowledge of the Whole by the delimitation of its content: ‘Ignarus enim, praeterquam quod a causis externis, multis modis agitatur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui, et Dei, et rerum quasi inscius, et simulac pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur; sed sui, et Dei, et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit; sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur.’ 3 (It is of interest to compare the accounts given by Spinoza and Descartes of the relations of the self, of God, and of things, and to see the central importance of the doctrines of human eternity and of the ‘cogito ergo sum’ in the two systems respectively.)The essential thing about scientia intuitiva, therefore, is not primarily its detail or range of content, but the form and order in which it syn­thesizes its content (and thus realizes it). It is knowledge not of abstrac­
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1 Eth. II, xl, Sch. ii. 2 Eth. V, xxviii et xxix. 3 Eth. V, xlii, Sch.
tions but of entia realia1 in the ‘order of the intellect’ as they flow necessarily from the essentia Dei. But ‘ aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam’ ,2 so that scientia in­
tuitiva rightly views things in the form and order in which they really are as eternal modes of Substance, i.e. sub specie aeternitatis, in the form in which they constitute eternity, or essence which is identical with existence. And it is not as if essences could be ordered as they really are and yet not exist (being in intellectu but not in re): when they are so ordered they are the real things: if mental essences, minds; if corporeal essences, bodies. I say ‘minds’ and ‘bodies’, not necessarily Thought and Extension; for these principles apply in due measure even when the systematic order of essences does not extend from Natura down through all its parts to the infinitely remote corpora simplicissima and their ideas. If the essences involved are in ‘the order of the intellect’, i.e. not merely in the right linear series, but in their hierarchical order of ascending and descending individuality, there is scientia intuitiva rooted in the divine nature (though abstractly), and therefore real existence flowing from the essentia Dei-, blessedness; eternity. It is thus that the human mind (and body) is eternal.But Reason, taken alone, can present and achieve no such concrete reality, though its genuine results are adequate and certain. It does not constitute an individual; even in its most concrete flights, it does not reveal an individual, for no individual is composed of serially connected laws. It considers relations rather than relata (though it constantly assumes these as pieds-a-terre). But the subordinate individuals which are so ordered ¡by Reason are placed in the or do ad intellectum, i.e. they take their places in an order corresponding to that which they really have in Natura-, they are apprehended, not as constellated to form (and thus subordinated to) a higher individual, and hence not as coristituting eternity (sub specie aeternitatis), but sub quadam 
specie aeternitatis, in their correct order among co-ordinate indivi­duals. ‘At quoniam naturae leges (ut jam ostendimus) ad infinita se extendunt, et sub quadam. specie aeternitatis a nobis concipiuntur, et natura secundum eas certo, atque immutabili ordine procedat, ipsae nobis eatenus Dei infinitatem, aeternitatem, et immutabilitatem aliquo 
modo indicant.’3In conclusion I may perhaps notice the fact that, on rare occasions, Spinoza shows a certain carelessness in his use of the variants of this phrase. Thus in Eth. V, xxix, Dem., he quotes Eth. II , xliv, Cor. ii, in the shortened form, in spite of the fact that he has emphasized the 
‘quadam' in the Demonstration of that Corollary by the phrase: ‘sub hac aeternitatis specie’. This is probably a mere accident. The use of the
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1 Eth. V, xxx, Deni. 2 Loc. cit. 3 Tr. Theo.-Pol., cap. vi.
longer form in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,1 where intellect in general is being discussed, may involve no more than ease of expres­sion, though it might conceivably indicate the process of transition from his earlier view, which confined eternity ‘to God alone’,2 if that phrase, as is most probable, indicates his own opinion), to his mature view, which assigned eternity, as I have indicated, to all the infinite modes in their ordered hierarchy. In that case the ‘quadam’ might bear a limiting significance with reference to Reason, and an apologetic significance with reference to finite scientia intuitiva. But the former hypothesis seems the more likely in the absence of further evidence.
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1 O p. P ost., p. 391. 2 Cog. M et. I I ,  i.
PART II
I N D I V I D U A T I O N
PREFACE
LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA
KEADERS more familiar with the philosophy of Leibniz than -with the details of that of Spinoza may be tempted to suppose 
that I am permitting myself in these chapters to drift towards an 
interpretation of the latter in terms of some of the leading principles 
of the former, and thus to spoil the balance and harmony of the 
one without elucidating the other, because the two are in essential 
opposition. It may therefore be of value if I attempt to state as 
briefly and pointedly as possible what I take to be the extent of the 
agreement and disagreement of the two systems in their main 
features. Happily this can be done without attempting the im­
possible feat of giving an adequate statement and valuation of the 
complex and profound theory of Leibniz in a brief essay.
The real point of contact is, I think, the doctrine of the macro­
cosm and the microcosm which receives special embodiment in 
both theories, though more obviously in that of Leibniz. In spite 
of the suggestiveness of Spinoza’s pregnant expressions, there is, 
perhaps, no reason to believe that there is any direct connexion 
between these two expressions of this ancient and persistent theory 
of the relations of the universe and man. It is difficult, indeed, 
to deal with the theory of knowledge without recourse to some such 
view, so that a considerable history of philosophy might well be 
written round its development, culminating in its ultimate subtle 
misapplication in modern theories of subjective, and, in some of 
its forms, transcendental, idealism. Thus we cannot represent the 
theory of Leibniz as a development of hints received from the 
Ethics of Spinoza; on the contrary, it seems to me that the theory 
of Leibniz might with greater plausibility be regarded as essentially 
a brilliant confusing of issues already elucidated by Spinoza, though 
not by him developed in detail: a confusion from which philo­
sophy has not yet recovered.
If we examine the analytic and synthetic movements by which 
Leibniz passes from the world of ordinary experience to the recon­
structed world of the ‘monadology’ we find that the first process, 
corresponding to the Spinozistic movement towards the corpora 
siviplicissima animata,1 is one of analysis by which he reaches the 
1 T h e  conception is  discussed in  E xcu rsu s IV  (p p . 1 3 7 -4 1 ).
idea of the simple monad as an unextended, positionless ‘mathe­
matical’ punctum, endowed with activity which takes the form of 
the representation of the whole universe, partly actual (viz. per­
ception) and partly potential (viz. appetition). The infinite varia­
tions of the proportions of actuality and potentiality provide an 
infinite series of monads, each totally independent of all the others, 
except for their common reAos, i.e. their so-called ‘pre-established’ 
harmony. Already, therefore, in the analytic process important 
divergency is apparent between Leibniz and Spinoza: for the 
corpora simplicissima are not puncta (which for Spinoza could be 
nothing real at all, and are only real for Leibniz through the 
imputation of activity), but are what may be called ‘minimal’ 
extensions ‘momentarily’ distinguished by actual motions, and by 
these constituted. Potentiality belongs to the corpora simplicissima 
animata only through their relations within some total system of 
which they are the ‘momentary’ expressions. This divergence is, 
of course, directly connected with the contrasted attitudes of 
Spinoza and Leibniz to the reality of Extension. For Leibniz it 
is, as such, phenomenal, and is only a mode in which the possible 
relations of co-existence of the monads are represented; for 
Spinoza, on the contrary, real concrete Extension is an ultimate 
Attribute of Natura.
Divergency becomes even more pronounced in the upward 
synthetic movement from the simple monads, to empirical in­
dividuals, and on to the universe, and God. For Leibniz, each 
monad is independent, it has no ‘windows’, and thus empirical 
things and organisms can be existentially no more than aggregates 
of monads, and their differences of grade must be due, not primarily 
to their systematic order, but to the natures of their ‘dominant’ 
monads or ‘souls’. Thus the distinctions of inorganic things, 
plants, animals, men, &c., are reached. But the ‘dominant’ monad of 
any compound substance is only existentially extraneous to its 
‘body’: essentially it is related in such a way that metempsychosis 
is impossible; for while the ‘soul’ represents the whole universe 
in some measure, it also, in so doing, represents the different 
aggregates of monads within the universe with different degrees 
of clearness, and the aggregate that it represents most clearly is 
its ‘body’, which thus, as reflected in it, becomes the ‘point of 
view’ from which the ‘soul’ reflects the universe. It follows that 
the ‘body’ must be an aggregate only existentially; essentially, it
108 A E T E R N I T A S
is an organic whole. As composed of independent monads, it is 
an aggregate; as represented in its ‘dominant’ monad or ‘soul’, it 
is an organism or microcosm through which the complete unity of 
the macrocosm is represented in a single monad. Thus in essence 
the ‘body’ stands midway between the universe and the ‘soul’; 
both ‘body’ and ‘soul’ are representations of the universe and are 
contained in it emine?iter. But in existence the ‘soul’ is not con­
tained in the ‘body’ eminenter, for the body is a mere aggregate, 
but contrariwise, the ‘body’ as an organism is contained in the 
‘soul’, and again in the universe. The ambiguous position thus 
occupied by the ‘body’ in the theory of Leibniz, arises from the 
differences which distinguish his analysis and synthesis from that 
of Spinoza. It is because he takes Extension as phenomenal, and 
thus analyses it into co-existent non-extended puncta without 
position, that he must make the ‘body’ existeritially an aggregate. 
It is because he takes Thought seriously, and thus makes the 
universe something more than an aggregate (since it is reflected 
in the single monad) that he is forced to make the ‘body’ an organic 
unity. Now for Spinoza, with his more adequate view of both 
Extension and Thought, the analytic process cannot reach mere 
puncta, so that it becomes possible to return synthetically up to the 
organic animated body, and so to the universe, mental and corporeal 
individuality varying pari passu in an ordered hierarchy. The 
special difficulty about the body as both a part of the universe, and 
also a representation of it, is capable of resolution on the principles 
which govern the nature of the ‘soul’ in the theory of Leibniz. 
In other words, Spinoza applies the ‘microcosm-macrocosm’ rela­
tion adequately to both body and soul, while Leibniz fails to apply 
it satisfactorily to either. For if each monad is existentially in­
dependent of all others, how can these others be reflected, with 
even partial adequacy, in its single experience, and how can they 
all be reflected with entire adequacy in the M onas monadum ? Again, 
if they are all independent, how can the ‘body’ be really organic? 
Its ‘organicity’ becomes a mere phenomenon pessime fundatum, 
belonging only to the representation of it in the ‘soul’. For Spinoza, 
on the contrary, no finite singular can be independent either in 
existence or in essence, but only the perfect whole.
Thus the whole problem is, after all, transferred to the rela­
tions between the parts or members of the whole within the whole 
itself, i.e. to the nature of the universe. Is it an infinite series or
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collection of singulars and aggregates, or is it a genuine individual ? 
To that question it appears that Leibniz could give no unambiguous 
answer, because his individuals are at once existentially puncta and 
essentially k ¿ < j ¡ j l o i . Even the universe as a whole is only real as 
the content of a single M onas monadum which is existentially 
distinct from all subordinate monads, the essences of which form 
part of its essence, or are derived from it. Happily, however, the 
‘Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles’ enables us to neglect 
the existential differences, and to pass direct to the question of the 
essential relations of the grades of individuality within the whole, 
i.e. within the M onas monadum (for ultimately existential differ­
ences must, by that Principle, depend on differences of essence). 
In the M onas monadum, then, all things are present (in essence) 
as they really are. In a subordinate monad only its own content 
is present (in existence and essence) as it really is, while the 
contents of other monads are present (in essence) only as pheno­
mena. How then are the essences present in the M onas monadum, 
i.e. how are they related in the universe as a whole? It is no 
answer to say that they are present ‘ideally’ (even if that were, for 
Leibniz, a distinctive form of presence): the question refers to 
their relations within the whole, or more succinctly, how is a 
grade of being also a part of the whole ? The answer to this question, 
which appears to be ‘deficient’ in the philosophy of Leibniz, is 
what is most prominent in the Spinozistic theory which I have 
expounded. Spinoza, I think, recognized, though he did not 
precisely and clearly expound his opinion, that the grades of soul 
and body are related under the category of whole and part. Two 
corpora animata are related to each other, either as whole and part, 
or as parts within a whole, or both. For Leibniz, the grades form 
an infinite linear series with no ultimate gaps (except that 
between soul and spirit, which is the result of ‘transcreation’); 
and thus in the M onas monadum, the finite monads must ultimately 
lose their distinctness, and with it their existential independence 
outside of the M onas monadum. So far, therefore, from Leibniz 
finding a place for the finite individual that Spinoza had submerged, 
the truth rather is that it is Spinoza who finds a place for finite 
individuals in their ordered hierarchy, possessing definite irre­
ducible grades of individuality, and no merely continuous series 
of gradations (if that self-contradictory phrase may be permitted).
Doubtless it was some perception of these consequences, as well
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as the necessity of explaining how the monads become existentially 
independent when they are essentially related within the universe 
as a whole, that led Leibniz to pass beyond the account to which I 
have so far referred, and to make a distinction between the universe, 
which is reflected by ‘ bare monads' and ‘ souls', and God, the 
creator of the universe, who is reflected by ‘ spirits’ (which are also 
‘souls’ and ‘bare monads’). To this I must refer very briefly. God 
is more than the universe: as its creator, He contains in thought 
all the monads, including free ‘spirits’, and all the infinite 
possible universes containing them, of which the actual universe 
is only the best (and does not, presumably, contain the others 
eminenter). Thus the potentiality of God transcends the actuality 
of the world. Spirits are transcreated from souls, and reflect their 
creator; they are therefore free, and can act, not in ways not 
conceived by God (for all possibilities are in the mind of God), 
but in ways not determined by him. But, just as Spinoza had 
explained the potentialities of the finite individual as due to his 
partialitas under some whole, so he held that the conception of 
pure potentiality in an absolutely perfect being is incoherent. And 
even on Leibniz’s own principles it is difficult to understand how 
possible arrangements of monads (constituted by thought) can be 
conceived by a Being (himself constituted by thought) without 
thereby becoming actual. This whole development of the Leib- 
nizian theory is rendered impossible by the principles laid down 
by Spinoza. In God or N atura all possibilities are actual; in man 
contingency is one with his partial wholeness within the necessary 
whole. And freedom is thus the expression of the whole within 
the part, and varies with the completeness of that expression. If 
this appears to deprive the finite individual of genuine freedom, it 
is because the natures of time and eternity have been misconceived; 
for in N atura all possibility is actualized, not at this or that epoch 
of time, but eternally, and hence without compulsion. All com­
pulsion arises from partialitas, as all freedom from totalitas; whence 
only N atura is perfectly free. In time, the finite individual may 
become increasingly free, though he cannot transcend the limit 
of his eternal partialitas (for in time he cannot ever at once realize 
his eternal reality) ; 1 and the corpora simplicissima animata alone 
approach the limit of ‘iron necessity’.
1 T h is  su b ject is  expanded in  the text, and som e o f the m ore im p o rtan t points 
are discussed in  E xcu rsu s V I I I  (p p . 3 0 1-4 ).
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CHAPTER V
D U R A T I O N  A N D  I N D I V I D U A T I O N
IT is in the light provided by the Lemmata of P art I I of the Ethics, that the relations of duration and eternity, as they are 
conceived by Spinoza, become most clear; for he there gives a more 
exact account of his conception of the nature of true and false 
partialitas and wholeness, on which, again, are founded the dis­
tinctions of Imagination and Intellect, of duration and eternity. 
N atura as an infinite whole, I have said, is a system which is not 
in time, does not endure, but is eternal, and is the perfect ideatum 
of ‘intuition’. It has, thus, neither limited nor unlimited duration: 
it has not existed ab aeterno, it will not exist in aeternum, precisely 
because its existence is eternal, and ‘existence of this kind... cannot 
be explained in terms of duration or time, not though the duration 
be conceived without beginning or end’ .1 It is only when N atura  
is considered, not as an infinite One, but as a whole of parts, whether 
adequately by the Intellect as a whole of real parts, or inadequately 
by the Imagination as a whole of unreal parts or mere sections, 
that it is thought of as enduring beyond all limits as compared with 
its parts or sections, which are then regarded as limited in duration: 
having a beginning, enjoying existence, and suffering death. 
N atura as a whole thus appears as sempiternal, but man perishes, 
and things are never the same for two moments together. But 
N atura is not fo r  itself sempiternal; not because it is mortal or 
illusory, but, on the contrary, because it is eternal and real. 
Sempiternity is the account given of the existence of N atura from 
the point of view of one of its parts.
In this conception of temporal or enduring existence we are 
partly right and partly wrong. If all the parts of the infinite whole 
were mere sections, we should be wholly right (on the impossible 
assumption that such knowledge could be ours at all). We are 
right in so far as we recognize the perishing character of all 
‘imaginative’ sections of the whole. In so far as the human body 
is a mere section of nature it is born and it dies: there was a time
1 ‘ T a lis  enim  existentia . . . p er durationem , aut tem pus e x p lic a ri non potest, 
tam etsi du ratio  p rin c ip io , et fin e carere co n cip ia tu r.’ (Eth. I ,  Def. v iii, Explic.)
when it was not, and there will be a time when it has ceased to be. 
It is produced through the operation of causes lying beyond its 
own nature, and it will in due course be destroyed in one way or 
another by other such causes. Indeed, its content is, within limits, 
always changing even during its lifetime: it may change so 
radically as to become almost wholly different both in form and in 
matter; and if this ‘seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? 
A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he 
can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy 
of other men’ .1 But so long as the variations which occur do not 
pass a certain limit, the body is said to remain identical, and as 
such to endure. It is this balance or harmony or proportion of 
motion and rest that constitutes the actual essence of the body, and 
so long as this remains the body remains. ‘This body of ours had 
a different proportion of motion and rest when it was an unborn 
embryo; and in due course, when we are dead, it will have a 
different proportion again.’ 2 As a section of the extended universe, 
therefore, the human body is a perishing existence: not that before 
its birth or after its death anything real is lacking from N a tu ra; for 
N atura is infinite and eternal, and cannot change. Every ‘imagina­
tive’ section of it undergoes perpetual change: its ultimate sections 
are perpetual changes; for the corpora simplicissima would be pure 
unbalanced motions, incapable of concrete identity or, consequently, 
of continued duration. They would be the dust of physical being. 
And what would be true of these ultimate elements of the whole, 
is true in great measure of the various congeries of them which 
constitute the ‘imaginative’ and the imagined things of nature; and 
it is wholly true of them in so far as, and only in so far as, they 
are mere congeries.
Duration itself, therefore, belongs to the sections of the extended
1 ‘ C o rp u s tu rn  m ortem  o b ire  in tellig am , quando ejus partes ita  d isp o n u n tu r, 
u t aliam  m otus, et q u ie tis rationem  ad in vicem  obtineant . . . N u lla  ratio  m e cogit 
u t statuam  co rp us non m o ri, n is i m utetur in  cad aver; q u in  ip sa exp erientia 
a liu d  suadere vid e tu r. F it  nam que aliq uando , u t hom o tales p atiatu r m utationes, 
u t non facile  eundem  iliu m  esse d ixe rim , u t de quodam  H isp an o  Poeta narrare 
a u d iv i . . .  S i hoc in c re d ib ile  vid e tu r, q u id  de in fa n tib u s dicem us? Q uorum  
naturam  hom o provectae aetatis a sua tarn diversam  esse cre d it, u t persu ad eri 
non posset, se unquam  infantem  fu isse , n is i ex a liis  de se conjecturam  faceret.’ 
(Eth. I V ,  xxxix, Sch.)
2 ‘D o g  in  andere p ro p o rtie  van bew eginge en stilte  w as d it ons lighaam  een 
ongeboren k in d  z y n d e ; en in  gevolge daar na, en in  andere za lt bestaan als w y 
dood z y n .’ (Korte Verhandeling, I I ,  Voor Reeden, Aa?iteek, i, 10).
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universe only in so far as they are parts of N atura, possessing an 
individuality through which they achieve a relative permanence 
in the waste of time. Their duration is their existence viewed from 
the external standpoint of partialitas in the whole. In so far as an 
organism is considered as a part of N atura possessing relative 
wholeness as a harmony or proportion of parts, to that degree it 
must be considered as infected by time (for it is a part of the whole), 
but yet as surviving the infection, and thus enduring through time 
(for it is a relative whole of parts). It remains for a time, but then 
perishes, as it was produced, through the operation of external 
things. It is an existence, but a transitory, perishing, existence. 
The facies totius Universi is eternal and therefore essentially 
beyond time and duration; the ultimate puncta of instantaneous 
extension, on the other hand, are so purely temporal as to be 
absolutely temporary. They cannot endure. They are not born, 
they do not live, they cannot die; for to them birth, life, and 
death, are all the same. Their essence is pure accident, and their 
existence non-existence.1 The corpus simplicissimum, again, is the 
creature of the vanishing moment. It flashes into temporal being 
under the ‘induction’ of the whole, and as quickly disappears for 
ever. It enjoys but a ghostly eternity in the all-comprehending 
Attribute.2 But the corpus humanum, together with all the parts 
of nature in so far as they are genuine parts, is born and lives and 
suffers death; it is at once temporal and eternal, and thus it 
endures. The distinction, therefore, between duration and eternity 
is based upon a difference of viewpoint, and it is this that makes 
the instance of the human individual so important for a correct 
understanding of Spinoza’s general conception. For the individual 
man is not merely a section of the universe, existing only per  
accidens or not at all: viewed from the outside he is at least a section 
of the universe exhibiting a certain identity or individuality as 
a persisting harmony of partly balanced motion and rest; he is a 
partial whole and is thus capable of being viewed by himself from 
the inside as a relative whole, and, therefore, after the pattern of 
N atura, which is an absolute whole. And only so can he be 
correctly viewed; the external view is necessarily inadequate since
1 ‘ T h a t shady n o th in g  o u t o f w h ich  the w o rld  w as m ade’ (T h o m as T rah ern e, 
Centuries of Meditations').
2 A  fu rth e r d iscu ssio n  o f the im p o rtan t question o f the n ature o f the corpus 
simplicissimum is  added in  E xcu rsu s IV  (p p . 1 3 7 -4 1 ).
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it represents the individual as a section of the universe acted 
upon by other sections to infinity. But the true nature of the 
individual must be derived, not from purely external things, but 
immediately or mediately from the whole which it reproduces in 
the measure of its capacity to respond. Its relation to that whole 
is not an external relation of exclusive things, but an internal one, 
whether we think of the being of the individual as within the whole, 
or of the knowledge of the whole as within the individual part. 
The true view of a finite individual, therefore, is the view which 
he must take of himself when he resolutely attends to his positive 
character as a whole, not ignoring the negativity implied by his 
dependence on the wider whole which he reproduces. That view 
again will be one with God’s apprehension of the individual as a 
real part of N atura naturata, reproducing the whole, constituting 
the whole, and in a sense co-extensive with the whole, at least in 
the measure of its individual perfection.
In such a view the individual is not confined to a region of 
extension separate from the regions occupied by other parts of 
the whole. Extension is infinite, one, and indivisible, and has no 
regions separate from one another. The finite individual is, rather, 
a whole, though an abstract whole, not rising up to the absolutely 
singular or concrete universal, but none the less real and eternal.1
1 O u r com m on ‘ N o m in a listic ’ m ode o f representing  the relatio ns o f in d iv id u a ls 
and u n iversa ls is  as a p yram id  w ith  the sin g u lars (possessing the m axim um  o f 
concreteness, and being  indeed, the o n ly  th in g s re a lly  e xistin g ) at the base, as 
the fo und atio n o f the w hole stru ctu re , and ris in g  u p  th ro ugh  infimae species by 
re g u lar stages to a summum genus o f p ure B ein g, w h ich  is  th us the m ost abstract 
o f a ll, and fu rth e st rem oved fro m  re al existence. It  cannot too soon be recognized 
that, though S pinoza w as a ‘ N o m in a list’ , th is schem e does no t g ive a ju s t  idea o f 
h is theory o f the relatio n s o f th ings w ith in  Natura. F o r h im  the apex o f the 
p yram id is  not o n ly  the m ost u n ive rsa l, b u t also the m ost concrete, in d iv id u a l, 
and re al, o f a ll th in g s. Its  existence is  id e n tica l w ith  its  essence, that 
is  to say, it  is  a self-crea tin g  in d iv id u a l. N o w  sch o lastic ‘R e a lists’ had re p re ­
sented these relatio ns, p u ttin g  the em phasis on the re a lity  o f u n iversa ls, not as 
a p yram id such  as I  have sketched, b u t as a k in d  o f A rbor Porphyriana, proceeding 
from  a tru n k  o f perfect B ein g  (as, at least ve rb a lly , opposed to mere B e in g ) out 
to the branches and u ltim ate tw igs o f m ore and m ore lim ite d  genera, species, 
and instances. B u t though th is co rre ctly  reverses the e xiste n tia l em phasis, it 
does no t represent the vie w  o f S p in o za: he is  no ‘ R e a list’ b u t regards a ll termini 
transcendentales (ens, res, aliquid, & c.), notiones universales {homo, equus, etc.), 
and so fo rth , as the m ost confused and inadequate o f a ll ideas, and as belonging 
to cognitio p rim i generis o r Im ag in atio n  {Eth. I I ,  xl, Sch. i).  T h u s  he is  a 
‘ N o m in a list’ as denying the re a lity  o f ab stract u n iv e rsa ls; b u t he is  a ‘ R e a list’ as 
affirm ing  that fin ite  in d iv id u a l th ings are no t the m ost real beings. R eal being, 
acco rd in g  to S pinoza, though it  belongs o n ly  to in d ivd u a ls, yet belongs to
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In such intuitive knowledge the individual knows nothing of birth 
or death or of persistence through time. From that inner stand­
point birth and death and duration are unmeaning. Are they not 
always unmeaning while we think? And though our duration is 
a positive experience to us as men living and acting within a world 
of connected things, yet even for that experience birth and death 
are nothing. We cannot remember, perceive, or imagine, we cannot 
intuit, our birth or death. They are nothing for us; if they were 
something for us they would not be our birth or death. They only 
seem to have meaning for us because we slip away from the 
perception of ourselves in our individual existence and view our­
selves as we view other men and things, as parts or sections of 
the all-comprehending universe, enjoying or suffering with them 
the vicissitude of enduring but finite being. And our existence 
itself, as distinct from its beginning or end, in our ordinary 
experience has duration only in so far as it is constantly brought 
home to us that we are finite and subject to the operation of things 
outside of us.1 That is Imagination; and thus we endure. But the 
real life of man is not to be found in such experiences, but in the 
existence which is thought, intellectual love, blessedness, the 
welling-up of eternal life.
It follows further from what I have said that eternal life must 
not be imaged as a recurrent experience in the drawn-out life of
in d iv id u a ls  in  p ro p o rtio n  to th e ir u n ive rsa lity  and concreteness. T h u s  the 
apex o f the S p in o zistic  p yram id  (to continue the fig u re ) is  the m ost concrete 
and u n ive rsa l o f a ll th in g s, the m ost in d iv id u a l, and therefore the m ost re a l: the 
p yram id rests upo n its  apex. A t the m ost rem ote stage there are the corpora 
simplicissima (o r th e ir ‘ ideas’), the m ost lim ite d  and ab stract o f a ll beings and the 
least real (fo r they flash  in to  and out o f being in  an ‘in fin ite sim a l m om ent’). 
T h e se  are the tru e ‘ghosts’ o f the u n iverse . Betw een these extrem es there are 
fin ite  in d iv id u a ls  o f a ll k in d s, arranged and constellated in  due o rd er, and a ll 
in  th e ir m easure expressions o f the w hole w ith in  w h ich  they ‘liv e  and m ove 
and have th e ir b e in g ’. T h e  co rre ct o rd er o f dependence fo r the fin ite  in d i­
v id u a l is  th us not up to ab stract species and genera, n o r down to m olecules, atom s, 
and e le ctro n s; b u t from  N atura  th ro u gh  the va rio u s ranges o f in d iv id u a lity  
and concreteness. F o r a ll genuine in d iv id u a ls, even if  they are n o t com plete, 
have th e ir p o in t o f contact in  the R e a l; and th u s, though th e ir response to it, and 
know ledge o f it , m ay be ab stract and th in , it  is  yet re al and so fa r adequate. It  
is  th is p rin c ip le  that m akes it  p o ssible  fo r m an to have an adequate (though 
incom plete) know ledge o f G o d , and to know  th in g s sub specie aetemitatis. (See 
also E xcu rsu s I I I ,  p p. 9 9 -10 4 .)
1 ‘ M ens hum ana ipsu m  hum anum  co rp us non cognoscit, nec ip su m  existere 
scit, n is i p er ideas affectionum , q u ib u s corpus a ffic itu r.’ (Eth. I I ,  x ix .)  ‘M ens 
se ipsam  non cognoscit, n is i quatenus co rp o ris affectionum  ideas p e rc ip it.’ 
(Eth. I I ,  x x iii.)
man in time. That is to fall back on our fragmentariness, and to 
forget that we are real parts of the eternal whole. The foiled 
searching of mortality is too often due to the assumption that the 
eternal must establish itself within, and accommodate itself to 
the conditions of, time. We must not picture the Real as a mere 
ghost within the actual. The eternal life which we ‘feel and prove’ 
does not, in and for itself, occupy time, it only does so when 
viewed inadequately from the outside by Imagination. It does not 
begin at one moment of time, and cease some moments later; it 
neither begins nor ends. What occurs, recurs, or persists in time, 
though it may be a partial expression of our eternity, cannot precede 
it, or follow it, or affect it in any way. ‘Nor Eternity serves Time, 
where all must fade that flourisheth.’ The life of man is a mixed 
life, and it is so because he is not the infinite whole. But we must 
not attempt to mix these elements incongruously, or simply to 
sum them arithmetically. For N atura ‘end and beginning’ are not 
even ‘dreams’; but for a partial whole, conscious of its partialitas, 
and thus of its dependence, not merely and directly on the whole 
that it reproduces, but indirectly also on other parts of the whole 
external to itself,— which complex dependence is its occurrence 
and duration in time;— for such a being experience must be 
mixed: it will be partly temporal and temporary, and partly 
eternal. But we must not say that individual existence before 
birth and after death are less than during life, as if temporal 
existence were to be added to eternal existence to get a mixed total. 
They are incommensurable:1 the length of an individual’s life is
1 C f. O . B aensch, ‘ E w ig ke it und D au er bei S pino za’ (Kant-Studien, X X X I I ,  i, 
Spinoza Festheft, 1927, pp. 4 4 -8 4 ). P rofessor B aensch d istingu ish es three kin d s 
o f existence: ‘ die E w ig k e it-E xiste n z G ottes als der S ubstanz und ih re r A ttrib u te, 
die E in b e g riffe n h e its-E xiste n z der M o d i als W esenheiten, u nd  die D au er- 
E xiste n z d er M o d i als E in ze ld in g e ’ (Loc. cit., p. 7 1 ); the first tw o belong to 
eternity in  an extended sense o f the term , w h ile  the th ird  in vo lve s ‘der D in g e  
V ersin ken  in  nebelhafte V ergangenheit, ih re  s ich  aufdrängende N ähe in  g re lle r 
G egenw art u n d  ih r E m portauchen aus d u n kle r Z u k u n ft’ (Loc. cit., p . 84). T h o u g h  
his m otive is  u ndo u btedly the p erfe ctly  legitim ate one o f attem pting to show  
how  S pinoza conceived the re latio n  o f these k in d s o f existence w ith in  the 
ultim ate R ea l w ith o u t denying  the v a lid ity  o f either, it  is  none the less asto nish ing  
that, h a v in g  em phasized the d istin ctio n s so clea rly, D r. B aensch perm itted 
h im se lf to d rift in to  the fa m ilia r e rro r o f supposing, indeed assertin g, p a rtly  
d ire ctly  and p a rtly  by im p lica tio n , that acco rd in g  to S pinoza since it  is  the 
‘flo w in g ’ character o f duratio n, and not its ‘ e n d u rin g ’, that is  its d istin ctive  im p er­
fection, it  is  possible, by e xclu d in g  the fo rm er, to in clu d e  d u ratio n  at one blow  
and as a w hole in  G o d ’s eternity. ‘D ie  D au e r ist kein  b lo sser S chein. S ie 
besteht w irk lic h  und u n en d lich  in  G o tt. A b e r in  G o tt is t sie  ganz u nd  au f
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not the measure of his perfection; there is no proportion subsisting 
between the finite and the infinite. Man is powerless before the 
infinite forces of the universe which determine his duration. Not 
only is it true that ‘the endeavour whereby a thing endeavours to 
persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time’ ,1 
but also that ‘the force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, 
and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes’ .2 
Though our occurrence within a period of time is an imagination, 
it is not, therefore, wholly illusory (for nothing positive is wholly 
illusory). It expresses a twofold truth, viz. our total dependence 
on the whole for our existence; and our reality as responsive parts 
within the whole. The dependence appears for Imagination as the 
dependence of our lives on the operations of external things which 
produce, maintain, and destroy our bodies; the reality appears as the 
endeavour to persist in proportion to the degree of perfection 
enjoyed. ‘The endeavour wherewith each thing endeavours to 
persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the 
thing itself.’3
The total reality of ‘this or that’ man, therefore, is not merely 
his positive part, his eternal part, but this in dependence upon the 
eternal whole; and only the eternal whole is wholly positive. But 
a man’s total existence is not his eternity plus his duration (which 
is an impossible congeries), but his eternity in its reality and real 
dependence on the whole. That total existence eternally enjoyed 
by ‘this or that’ man, though it may, and perhaps must, by us be 
pictured through imaginative conceptions, has never been in time,
einm al ew ig enthalten, ohne zu  dauern oder ric h tig e r ohne zu  fliessen ’ (L o c. cit., 
p. 84). B u t th is is  o n ly  the tota simul o f B oethius and the m ediaevals over again! 
I t  w ill be seen th at I  h o ld  as re so lu te ly  as P ro fesso r B aensch that d u ra tio n  is  no 
m ere appearance: its p lace and character can be deduced fro m  the nature o f the 
R ea l conceived as an eternal w hole o f re al p a rts; b u t the existence o f the total 
R ea l m ust no t be conceived as tem p o rally extended, n o r as e n d u rin g  w ith o u t 
flo w in g : fo r d u ra tio n  esse n tially  flow s, it  can o n ly  endure as flo w in g ; it  cannot 
be conceived eith e r as stand in g  o r as a w hole. D o ub tle ss, i f  d u ratio n  co u ld  be 
conceived as standing, it  m ig h t be conceived as a w h o le ; and if  it  co u ld  be con­
ceived as a w hole, it  m ig h t be tru e th at ‘ die gesam te u n en d lich e  D a u e r-E xiste n z 
dauert n ich t, sondern is t ew ig ’ {Loc. cit., p . 7 8 ); but, as I  have show n, the co n d i­
tio n  cannot be fu lfille d .
1 ‘ C onatus, quo unaquaeque res in  suo esse preseverare co n atur, n u llu m  
tem pus fin itu m , sed in d e fin itu m  in v o lv it.’ (Eth. I l l ,  v iii.)
2 ‘V is , qua hom o in  existendo perseverat, lim ita ta  est, et a potentia causarum  
externarum  in fin ite  su p e ratu r.’ {Eth. I V ,  iii. )
3 ‘ C onatus, quo unaquaeque res in  suo esse perseverare co natu r, n ih il est 
praeter ip siu s re i actualem  essentiam .’ {Eth. I l l ,  v ii.)
and cannot vary because of ‘imaginative’ occurrences in time; it 
contains all the variations that appear in its time, but not as 
successive. In N atura they are transmuted into quality, and only 
thus achieve their reality, i.e. their eternity. So far from time 
ruling the real existence of ‘this or that’ man, temporal occurrences 
are governed by the latter; so far as they are positive they are pro­
duced by it in its dependence on the whole; and so far as they are 
not real, they need no cause other than the impotence of non-being.
I have said that the essence of the individual is his positive 
character as an individual part of Natura qualified by the negativity 
involved in his dependence on external things. His dependence 
on Substance is complete without qualification, and his dependence 
on N atura naturata, though also complete, is qualified by the fact 
that he is a real part of the whole on which he totally depends. 
His eternity, therefore, as a part of N atura naturata is not to be 
defined as totally independent or self-dependent existence; it is 
existence in reciprocal relations with all things. It is thus partly 
dependent and partly independent; as a part, it is dependent on 
other things; as a relative whole, it is self-dependent (in a sense that 
also implies its complete dependence on the whole). Now the 
existence of a whole as such is necessary existence, infinite 
existence, eternal existence; the existence of a part as such is 
conditioned existence, finite existence, duration. Thus the existence 
of a finite individual is partly eternal and partly durational. As a 
real part of the whole the individual is eternal with the whole; as 
a part which is also a whole it is eternal within the whole (which, 
in its measure, it reproduces); as a part of the whole reciprocating 
with other parts it endures. So far no special difficulty occurs; 
different appearances result from different standpoints.
But the question immediately suggests itself as to how the exis­
tence of an individual when he is not enduring, differs from his 
existence during life. This, however, seems a difficulty mainly 
because we suppose the assertion about the existence of the 
finite individual as being ‘partly eternal and partly durational’, 
to mean that during his life he has two existences: the eternal 
and the enduring, lacking the latter before birth and after death. 
But he has, of course, only a single existence, which from one point 
of view is eternal, and from another is duration. But both points 
of view are, for the finite being, justifiable: he is eternal, and he does 
endure. Before birth, he endures in the future; after death, he
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endures in the past; during life, he endures in a moving present 
enlarged by remembered and anticipated periods of the past and 
future respectively. Again, his position before birth and after death 
is no worse than in the past (or even the future) periods of his 
lifetime; childhood exists in the past, we can do nothing about it; 
and though our future is to some extent within our derived power, 
it is not so while it remains future. Our actual duration is thus only 
a veiy small part of the prolonged period of remembered and 
anticipated duration. Still, it might be contended, there is a lengthy 
period during which we do actually enjoy existence, not all at once, 
but in successive moments, and two indefinitely longer periods in 
which we never endure, and the question is, what is the relation 
between our eternal existence in the eternal whole as eternal parts, 
and our short duration of life within the sempiternity of nature ? 
My general reply is that it is a difference of standpoint, which again 
is justifiable in so far as there are real parts in nature. Though all 
existence is ultimately eternal, yet man’s ‘eternal part’ does not 
fully represent ‘his’ total existence, since he is, after all, only a part 
of N atura. God’s eternity alone is sufficient in itself, and includes 
all being; and man’s eternity as a real part of the divine nature is 
the ultimate transcript of what he represents to himself under the 
categories of his impotence as an eternal life plus a finite duration. 
In this he is more right than he would be in denying either the 
‘eternal part’ or the finite duration. But, nevertheless, the account 
remains faulty so long as th e plus remains unresolved. In the divine 
nature all such conjunctions are resolved by synthesis into quality. 
In so saying I run beyond the precise point of my argument, and 
it is necessary to return for a little to the details of my account of 
the relations of duration and eternity in finite experience. Those 
details may best be elucidated by a more general discussion of 
the relations of limited and unlimited duration and of eternity 
within the systematic nature of the facies totius Universi.
In the Ethics Spinoza gives a general description of the facies  
totius Universi: ‘We thus see how a complex individual can be 
affected in many ways, and nevertheless retain its nature. So far 
we have conceived an individual which is composed of bodies 
which are only distinguished from one another by motion and rest, 
speed and slowness, that is, the most simple bodies. If now we 
conceive another individual composed of many individuals of 
diverse natures, we shall discover that it may be affected in many
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other ways, its nature nevertheless being preserved ... If we now 
conceive a third kind of individual composed of individuals of 
this second kind, we shall discover that it can be affected in many 
other ways without any change in its nature. Thus we may proceed 
to infinity and easily conceive the whole of nature as one individual, 
the parts of which, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways without 
any change in the whole individual’ .1 This passage indicates the 
type of situation we have to consider in determining the relations 
of eternity and duration in Natura. Further light is gained from 
a most precise and illuminating passage in Ep. xxx ii.2
Now let A be the facies totius Universi ( tota natura in the 
lemma quoted), the perfect Individual.
Let B be a real part of A; this is also, therefore, in its degree an 
individual. Let me take the corpus humanum, as an example.
Then B partly reproduces A (in activity or active response) and 
partly fails to do so (through passivity) ; i.e. B is partly whole and 
partly partial.
Let C be some real part of B. I take as an example the ‘little 
worm living in the blood’ which Spinoza uses in his account of the 
relations of whole and part in the passage of Ep. xxx ii.2
1 ‘ H is  itaq ue videm us, qua ratione In d iv id u u m  com positum  p o ssit m u ltis 
m odis affici, ejus n ih ilo m in u s natura servata. A tq u e  h ucusque In d iv id u u m  
concepim us, quod non, n is i ex co rp o rib u s, quae solo m otu, et quiete, celeritate, 
et tarditate in te r se d istin g u u n ter, hoc est, quod ex co rp o rib u s sim p lic issim is 
co m p o nitur. Q uod s i ja m  a liu d  co ncip iam us, ex p lu rib u s diversae naturae 
In d iv id u is  com positum , idem  p lu rib u s a liis  m odis posse affici, reperiem us, 
ip siu s n ih ilo m in u s natura servata. . . . Q uod s i praeterea tertium  In d iv id u o ru m  
genus, ex h is secundis com positum , co ncip iam us, idem  m u ltis a liis  m odis affici 
posse, reperiem us, absque u lla  ejus form ae m utatione. E t si sic  p o rro  in  
in fin itu m  pergam us, fa cile  co ncip iem us, totam  naturam  unum  esse In d iv id u u m , 
cu ju s partes, hoc est, om nia corpora in fin itis  m odis va rian t, absque u lla  to tiu s 
In d iv id u i m utatio ne.’ (E th . I I ,  Lem. vü, Sch.)
2 ‘ F in gam us jam , s i p lacet ve rm icu lu m  in  sanguine v ive re , q u i v isu  ad d is- 
cernendas p artícu la s san g uin is, lym phae, etc. valeret, et ratione ad observandum , 
quom odo unaquaeque p a rticu la  ex a lte riu s o ccursu , vel re s ilit, ve l partem  su i 
m otus com m unicat, etc. Ille  quidem  in  hoc sanguine, u t nos in  hac parte 
u n ive rsi, vive re t, et unam quam que san g uin is p articu lam , u t totum , non vero ut 
partem , consideraret, nec scire  posset, quom odo partes om nes ab u n iv e rsa li 
natura san g uin is m oderantur, et in vicem , p ro u t u n ive rsa lis  natura san g u in is 
e xig it, se accom m odare coguntur, u t certa ratione in te r se consentiant. N am  si 
fingam us, n u lla s d a ri causas extra sanguinem , quae novos m otus san g u in i 
com m unicarent, nec u llu m  d a ri spatium  extra sanguinem , nec a lia  co rp o ra, in  
quae p articu lae san g uin is suum  m otum  transferre  possent, certum  est, sanguinem  
in  suo statu sem per m ansurum , et ejus p artícu la s n u lla s alias variatio n es passuras, 
quam  eas, quae possunt co n cip i ex data ratione m otus san g uin is ad lym pham , 
ch ylu m , etc. et sic  sanguis sem per, u t totum , non vero u t p ars, co n sid eran
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Then C will partly reproduce B (in active or adequate response), 
and, as passive, will partly fail to do so; it will reproduce A even 
less fully than does B, which already fell short of complete re­
sponsiveness. Thus C is a whole in a degree lower than B, and to 
a greater degree partial.
Let D be an ultimate part of body, i.e. corpus simplicissimum.1 Its 
capacity for response, either to the absolute whole or to any partial 
whole, is ‘infinitesimal’ but real (for it is not simplex but simpli­
cissimum). Its duration is ‘momentary’, and in that sense only is the 
corpus actual. As I shall show, it is in principle incapable of being 
identified, for it is but the ideal limit of corporeal (i.e. real) analysis.
Let E be an ultimate punctum of instantaneous extension, i.e. a 
mere ideal limit of mathematical analysis. Evidently it has no 
capacity for response, for it does not endure even for a ‘moment’. 
Its individuality is merely potential, and thus, in isolation, nothing. 
Such a punctum is therefore identical with absolute non-being.
Now in this selective system of things reality is present at every 
stage until the last, which is not, in the strict sense, a stage at all. 
A is wholly real; E is wholly unreal; intermediate individuals are 
partly real and partly ‘imaginative’ .2
deberet. V eru m  q u ia  p lu rim ae  aliae causae d antu r, quae leges naturae san g uin is 
certo m odo m oderantur, et v ic issim  illa e  a sanguine, h in c  fit, u t a lii m otus, 
aliaeque variatio n es in  sanguine o ria n tu r, quae co n seq uu ntu r no n a sola ratione 
m otus ejus p artiu m  ad in vice m , sed a ratio ne m otus san g u in is, et causarum  
extem arum  sim u l ad in v ic e m : h oc m odo sanguis rationem  p a rtis, no n vero to tius 
habet. D e  toto, et parte m odo d ix i.’ (Ep. xxxii.)
1 See E xcu rsu s IV  (p p . 1 3 7 -4 1 ).
3 I  say ‘im ag in ative’ ra th er than ‘im agined’ o r ‘im a g in a ry’, because these 
latte r term s suggest th at the th ings so describ ed are, at least in  p art, m ental o r 
sub jective in  character. I  am  aw are, o f course, that ‘im a g in a tive ’ n o rm ally  
q u a lifies m ental facts, b u t I  am  here u sin g  it  as a d e scrip tio n  o f physical th in g s in  
so fa r as they are n o t u ltim ate ly  re a l, b u t are appearances o f the R e a l, u n d er 
fin ite  categories, and in  tim e. B u t they are real appearances, and m ig h t th us be 
called ‘phenom enal’— a use w h ich  w o uld  harm onize w ith  the sig n ifican ce w h ich  
I attach to the term  ‘ phenom enology’ (see P a rt III, P reface, p p. 2 2 1 -7 ). B u t 
as I  have said , the latte r term  is  already am biguous, and I  have o n ly  used it  fo r 
lack  o f a better. ‘ Im a g in a tiv e ’ also em phasizes the essential idea th at these 
th in g s are the objects o f Imaginatio  (the first k in d  o f know ledge)— a use o f th is 
term  p e cu lia r to S pinoza, and no t in v o lv in g  the u n re a lity  o r su b je ctiv ity  o f its  
ideata. Im ag in atio n  is  no t n e cessa rily  fa lla cio u s (Eth. I I ,  xxxvi, Dem.), though 
a ll fa ls ity  belongs to it  (Eth. I I ,  xxxv et x li). Its  p o sitive  content is  n o t u n re al 
(Eth. I I ,  xxx iii).  T h a t w h ich  reveals and conveys the ro u g h  edges o f fin ite  being 
cannot be w h o lly  false and u n real, though it  m ay w e ll be inadequate. In d e e d , 
it  must be so. I  am  th us im p elle d , as fa r as p o ssib le, to a v o id  the term s ‘su b ­
je c tiv e ’, ‘im agined ’, ‘im a g in a ry’, ‘phenom enal’, ‘u n re a l’, and have taken refuge 
in  ‘im a g in a tive ’ . (B u t see also above, p. 18, note 1.)
Let us consider next the relations which exist between these 
grades of individuality. For the sake of convenience I do so under 
the Attribute of Thought:
(1) Consider first A’s apprehension of itself and of its subordinate 
parts:
(a) For itself, A is eternal, for its existence depends on nothing 
outside of itself, but only on the immanent causality of N atura  
naturans. Its existence follows from its essence when it is thus 
rightly considered.
(b) For A, the existence of B is partly eternal (as reproducing A 
through adequate response), and partly ‘imaginative’ (as it depends 
on other parts as transient causes). That part of its being which 
is confused, unformed, mixed, must be ‘imaginative’, and for the 
absolute whole in which all is clear, formed, and distinct, it must 
suffer transforming synthesis, without loss of positive content. 
B’s reproduction of the whole is indistinct and incomplete there­
fore, not so much in scope as in arrangement. It succeeds in clarify­
ing a part of the whole, and thus is real and eternal with the whole; 
it fails to clarify the whole as an absolute whole, and thus becomes 
involved in Imagination, and in ‘ortality’ 1 and mortality. Thus 
from A’s point of view, B is partly responsive or active, and partly 
inert and passive. And its inertia is not mere negation, but the 
confused appearance of the spirit of the absolute whole within the 
finite whole. For only thus can what is finite also be a whole in 
a relative sense: its reach exceeds its grasp.
(c) For A, the existence of C, again, is partly eternal and partly 
‘imaginative’. But its eternal part is ‘smaller’ than that of B, and 
its element of confusion greater. If B fails adequately to reproduce 
A, and C again fails adequately to reproduce B, then C must even 
more seriously fail to reproduce A. It is even less responsive and 
more inert.
(d) A can only apprehend D as ‘infinitesimal’ activity and 
indefinitely great inertia; as a ‘momentary’ response to the precise 
demands of a definite spatio-temporal configuration. For D is but
4
1 I  venture upon the su ccin ct, and som ew hat barbarous, neologism , in  o rd er 
to em phasize w hat p o p u lar thought, w ith  its  active eye directed m a in ly  on the 
fu tu re , is  apt to o ve rlo o k: the fin itu d e  o f tra n sito ry  th ings in vo lve s the necessity 
o f b irth  as w ell as o f death. A  sim ila r defect d istingu ish es the conception o f 
aevum from  that o f semperaeternitas. (See p. 7 3 , note 1.)
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the image of the facies totius Universi within the ‘infinitesimal’, and 
is thus the offspring of time.
(e) Considered strictly in isolation, E must appear for A as a 
mere ideal limit, devoid even of a point of view; and thus un­
touched by the spirit of the whole without either activity or inertia.
(2) Consider next B’s apprehension:
(a) For B, the existence of A will appear both as eternal and as 
sempiternal. The difference corresponds to the two senses in 
which A is the whole of which B is the part. It is the whole to 
which B’s nature approximates; and it is the whole in which he 
exists as a part, acted upon throughout his duration by all the other 
parts. As the ideal end of reproduction or reflection, A will 
necessarily be apprehended by B as eternal; as the whole of 
N atura, including the ‘magnipotent’ external universe, together 
with the human body upon which that universe acts, it will appear 
as sempiternal in comparison with the ‘ortality’ and mortality of 
each of the interacting parts.1
(b) For itself, B will be not only eternal but also ‘ortal’ and 
mortal, and even in a certain sense sempiternal. As a part of A, it 
will be, with A, eternal. In fact A’s idea of B, and B’s own true 
idea of himself as a part of A, are one and the same.
But in his perception of himself as only a part of N atura, in­
finitely overshadowed and compelled by external things, B will 
know himself as transitory in comparison with the sempiternal 
appearance of A. But he may also know that the part of him which 
is eternal, because it is also a part of A, cannot be either ‘ortal’ 
or mortal,2 but may by him be regarded (‘imaginatively’) as, with A, 
in a certain sense sempiternal. Absorbed as the mind is in the
1 C f. Cog. M et. I I ,  x : T lli fa cillim e  iste  exim etur, s i advertat, nos illa m  d u ra- 
tionem  non ex sola contem platione creatarum  reru m , sed ex contem platione 
in fin ita e  D e i potentiae ad creandum  in te llig e re : N o n  enim  creaturae co n cip i 
possunt, u t p er se existentes, siv e  durantes, sed tanquam  p er infm itam  D e i 
potentiam , a qua sola om nem  suam  durationem  h ab ent.’ T h e  statem ent arises 
ou t o f the seem ing co n trad ictio n  betw een d u ratio n  being  dependent upon 
created th ings, and creation h avin g  o ccurred , ‘ s i vera est C h ro n o lo g o rum  
com putatio’, at a p o in t o f tim e. T h e  w hole chapter affords an in te restin g  exam ple 
o f an alm ost unconfused in te rp la y  o f C artesian  and S p in o zistic  conceptions, 
w ith  a background o f sch o lastic theology, th us g iv in g  the total im p ressio n  o f 
a ‘ double concerto’ .
2 H e  w ill know , too, th at the p art o f h im  w h ich  is  m o rtal cannot as such be 
sem piternal. I  have yet to in d icate in  w hat sense, i f  any, th at m o rtal p art o f h im  
is  also eternal.
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contemplation of a durational and ‘imaginative’ being, its eternal 
part may be imagined as persisting, with A, beyond the period of 
B’s own lifetime, thus existing before his birth and after his death 
unchanged; but, less crudely, it may be conceived as a certain 
unchanging validity and applicability, such as intellectual truths 
exhibit; it will then appear not as changing from moment to 
moment, nor exactly as perduring through time, but as subsisting, 
as we say,‘timelessly’. Its sempiternity would be the immortality of 
‘science,’ which does not, of course, itself, as an individual, exist 
immortally without dependence on human minds (for if man and 
all similar beings ceased to exist, ‘science’ would disappear with 
them), though we are so prone to image it to ourselves as existing.1 
Under the Attribute of Thought, therefore, the eternity of B 
concerns his intellect which, in its measure, reproduces the whole; 
the ‘ortality’ and mortality concern his Imagination (which 
represents the action of external causes on him, rather than his 
active response to them.2
(c) For B, the existence of C will appear as even more transitory 
than himself in comparison with the sempiternity of A. Never­
theless it will be apprehended by the intellect of B as not wholly 
transitory, but as possessing an eternal part in so far, and only in 
so far, as it is a necessary element in the whole which, to that 
degree, it reproduces.
(d) and (e) Cf. (1) (d) and (e).
(3) Consider C’s apprehension:
(a) On the assumption that C is acted upon, not only by parts 
of B, but also by parts of A which lie beyond the nature of B, 
then C’s apprehension of A will correspond (mutatis mutandis) 
to B’s apprehension of A. If, however, we assume that C is only 
acted upon by and through other parts of B, then it will mistake 
B for A, regarding it as tota n a tu ra l
(b) For C, the existence of B will be either eternal, sempiternal, 
or transitory, according to the conditions. The intellect of C will
1 T h is  was the special problem  at w h ich  P rofessor T a y lo r w as w o rkin g  in  the 
a rticle  quoted above (p. 74, note 2 ). B u t he th us m ade o f a side issu e the m ain 
q ue stio n ; fo r the vie w  o f the eternal p art o f the m in d  as im m o rtal in vo lve s a 
one-sided and therefore ille g itim ate  em phasis on o u r partialitas.
2 ‘ S i ad hom inum  com m unem  opinionem  attendam us, vid e b im u s, eos suae 
M e n tis aeternitatis esse quidem  co n scio s; sed ipso s eandem  cum  duratione 
confundere, eam que im ag in atio n i, seu m em oriae trib u e re , quam  post m ortem  
rem anere cre d u n t.’ (Eth. V, xxxiv, Sch.) 3 C f. p. 121, note 2.
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recognize its own eternity, and with that, the eternity of B which 
it partly reproduces. If, then, C is wholly confined within B, 
and has therefore no relations with things outside of B except 
through its mediation, then it will be unaware that B is only a part, 
and, taking it for A, will regard it as sempiternal. If, on the contrary, 
C is acted upon chiefly by other parts of B, but also by parts of A 
outside of B, then C will regard A as sempiternal, B as relatively 
permanent, and itself as relatively transitory.1
(c) For itself C, like B, will be partly eternal, partly transitory, 
and partly sempiternal.
(d) and (e). Cf. (i) (d) and (e).
(4) The ‘infinitesimal’ character of D clearly renders ‘infinitesimal’ 
also its capacity for distinguishing between A, B, and C. It is 
but the ‘momentary’ response to the‘momentary’system of nature. 
That system, therefore, as it appears to D will be a mere ghost, 
with ‘infinitesimal’ reality. Here the distinction of duration and 
eternity becomes evanescent,— a deduction which reciprocates with 
the position already reached, that the corpus simplicissimum is no 
identifiable corpus simplex, but a limit of corporeal analysis. It is 
thus not unreal, but ‘infinitesimally’ real: a character which its 
universe must share. That there are no ultimately isolable simple 
motions, and no real ultimate puncta without motion, follows from 
the nature of the extended Real, which expresses itself in the 
infinite and eternal mode, motus et quies, which again, from the very 
nature of motion, as essentially continuous, modifies the extended 
Real in infinite ways.
(5) Lastly, E has no point of view. It is nothing; it knows nothing; 
it responds to nothing. Equally from the point of view of A, B, C, 
and D, the punctum E is an ideal limit of the mathematical analysis 
of instantaneous extension. It is nothing actual; it is not eternal, it 
is not sempiternal, it is not even ‘ortal’ or mortal; it is timeless, and
1 T h is  is  ve ry m uch  the p o sitio n  o f m an as a p art both o f society and o f nature 
as a w hole. N atu re  th u s appears to u s as sem piternal, so ciety as re la tive ly  
perm anent, and in d iv id u a l m en as re la tive ly  tra n sito ry . W e also recognize th at 
nature as a w hole is  eternal, th at i f  so ciety w ere, as su ch , in d iv id u a l o r perfect, 
it  w o uld  have an eternal p art, and th at m an as an in d iv id u a l has a ‘ sm alle r’ 
eternal p art. B u t, in  fact, we cannot conceive society as an in d iv id u a l in  the 
sense in  w h ich  nature and m an are in d iv id u a ls. T h e  status o f society in  nature 
is  an im p o rtan t problem  too com plex fo r serio us d iscu ssio n  h e re ; b u t it  w o uld 
dem and consid eration in  any adequate a p p lica tio n  o f the p rin cip le s o f the present 
w ork to the m oral and p o litic a l spheres. C f. also below , p. 203, note 2.
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thus absolutely temporary. Possessing neither activity nor inertia 
it is non-being, or at most an ens rationis.
It thus becomes clear how, and how far, it is possible for one 
individual to be, from different points of view, and with different 
degrees of‘speculation’, at once eternal, sempiternal, and transitory. 
From the viewpoint of N atura we are eternal, and the ‘imaginative’ 
elements of our minds are illusory in so far as, being confused and 
fragmentary, they appear as clear and whole: from that point of 
view Imagination is wholly ‘imaginative’; and it is so because for 
Natura everything positive in Imagination has been sorted out, 
and has found its place in some eternal being. Only the confusion 
or negation is lost, therefore, and that is wholly empty and illusion. 
From the point of view of human individuality, in the degree in 
which it adequately reproduces N atura, we see ourselves as we 
are, i.e. as N atura sees us, and thus ‘we feel and prove by experi­
ence that we are eternal’, for so we belong to the whole as its real 
parts. But our passivity, our inertia, our finiteness (and we are 
truly finite), is represented in our Imagination. For this is the 
torn edge of finite individuality, the limbo of appearance and dis­
appearance. And this twilight of the Imagination seems over­
whelmingly real to us as we recognize our minuteness in the face 
of ‘magnipotent’ external nature. We cannot wholly rise above 
it; it absorbs and holds our attention, often to the entire exclusion 
of all that is real in our experience. It does so because it is the 
upwelling of the whole within -the part, the inchoation of the 
infinite within the finite. Man’s impotence is the obverse of the 
power of things external to him; his power is its reverse.1 Imagina­
tion, therefore, is for us not wholly illusory: it has a basis of truth, 
and thus alone has it power over us. Our duration is not wholly an 
illusion, for it would be as untrue to say that we as intellects set 
in a limbo of Imagination, are wholly transitory, as that we are 
wholly eternal. Nor can it even be said that Intellect is eternal 
while Imagination is wholly transitory. Within Imagination and 
its objects there is a certain individuality, which is a confused 
reproduction of connexions within the whole. And these, as 
rightly understood, are real connexions. Within Imagination the 
chaff must be distinguished from the grain: unenlightened Imagi-
1 B u t a ll pow er o r conatus, w hether in  us o r in  external th in g s, is  d e rived  from  
the in fin ite  pow er o f N a tu ra : it  is  that pow er, im m anent in  and co n stitu tin g  us 
and them .
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nation is illusion, but, in the light of analysis, clarification, right 
understanding, it contains truth, and its objects have a certain 
reality. This combination of completeness and incompleteness, 
which is proper to finite individuality, is read as duration; and it 
is in this sense only that time is real. Butit is no unimportant sense.
Further, it must be remembered, we are only parts of N atura, 
and hence we can never wholly clear up our Imagination. I shall, 
indeed, go so far as to say that our Imagination is not strictly ‘ours’ 
at all, and that it is thus that it can find no place in ‘our’ eternity; 
its eternity, the eternity of its positive elements, belongs elsewhere, 
to other subordinate parts of the whole, not necessarily human. 
And in that sense it is also true that the human body, as it is for 
Imagination, is not wholly ‘ours’, nor are external things wholly 
other than us; in some degree a man’s body is a rough section of 
the universe, the outlying regions of which do not rightly belong 
to him at all, but are only the connecting links between him and 
the universe. Again, his environment is not rightly understood 
except as, in some sense and degree, belonging to him. Clearly 
the actual boundary of the body is vague and indeterminate; its 
contours are differently placed for different purposes. In a 
stricter sense than is usual, it may be very small indeed: merely 
the nervous system, sense-organs, and muscles; and the connecting 
membranes, bony structure, skin, hair, nails, &c., thus belong 
to the individual only in a remoter sense, much as a long-used pen 
may become a part of the writer’s body in a sense a little more 
remote. In an even stricter sense, the body may not be so much as 
the attenuated nervous system, but some essence of it, or of some 
part of it, or of some whole within which it lies, which is per­
manent even through death, though beyond the range of normal 
sense-presentation. On the other hand, and in the widest possible 
sense, everything which aids in a man’s response to the universe, 
and therefore in his power over the parts of N atura, may be con­
ceived as belonging to his body: the motor car that he drives, the 
‘Flying Scotchman’ on which he travels, the dry land and the 
water and the air, ‘the great globe itself, yea, all which it inherit’, 
‘the sun and the moon and the other stars’; all, or his perspectives1
1 T h e  term  ‘p ersp ective’ m ust no t be taken to im p ly  to tal o r even p a rtia l 
‘ su b je c tiv ity ’ in  the mental sense. T h e  nature and ch aracteristics o f ‘ o b jective ’ 
persp ectives fo rm  a d iffic u lt and essential p a rt o f the sub ject m atter o f pheno­
m enology, and M r. W hitehead has m ade som e progress tow ards its e lu cid atio n .
128 A ET ER NIT AS
of them, are parts of his body: in a remote sense.1 The boundaries 
may be drawn where it is convenient to draw them and normally 
this is round the contours of the visible organism, because that 
is the part that a man carries about with him, and uses in his active 
life. His body is his partialitas; and since it is the correlate of his 
mind,it follows that according as ‘mind’ is read broadly or narrowly, 
so'body’ must be read broadly or narrowly. Extension is not divided 
up into the exclusive pieces or parcels commonly called ‘bodies’,nor 
is N atura naturata so divided. A man’s body is his responsive per­
spective of Extension ; his mind is his conscious draught of Thought. 
He is real, but he is not the whole; he is finite,but he is not atomic.
This, then, is the truth of our duration. Our eternal parts do 
not in themselves endure, nor do any of the parts in that quasi­
aggregate we call the ‘body’, not, at least, in so far as they are real; 
if in any sense they endure (and they do) it is because, though they 
may be ‘imaginatively’ disconnected from the real, essential, body, 
they are not wholly disconnected. Their duration belongs to us 
only in so far as they themselves are ours; and though the con­
nexion may for a time seem to us to be intimate and essential, that 
too is Imagination: valid for us as parts, but integrated and made 
perfect in the whole. What endures for us is that corporeal limbo of 
our individuality, which truly is organized with, and is an extension 
of, our real individuality. But the organization of that limbo is not
1 T h e  idea is  no no velty, bu t alm ost a com m onplace o f contem plative lite ra tu re : 
‘Y o u  never enjoy the w o rld  arig h t, t ill the sea its e lf flow eth in  y o u r vein s, t ill you 
are clothed w ith  the heavens, and crow ned w ith  the stars. . . . T il l  y o u r s p irit  
fille th  the w hole w o rld , and the stars are y o u r jew els. . . .  T il l  you m ore feel it  
than y o u r p rivate estate, and are m ore present in  the hem isphere, co n sid erin g  
the g lo ries and the beauties there, than in  y o u r ow n house.’ (T h o m as T ra h e rn e , 
Centuries of Meditations.)
‘ T h e  grass is  not grass alo n e; the leaves o f the ash above are not leaves o n ly. 
F ro m  tree, and earth, and soft a ir m oving, there com es an in v is ib le  touch w h ich  
arranges the senses to its w aves as the rip p le s o f the lake set the sand in  p a ra lle l 
lin e s. T h e  grass sways and fans the reposing m in d ; the leaves sw ay and stroke 
it, t ill it  can feel beyond its e lf and w ith  them , u sin g  each grass blade, each leaf, to 
abstract life  from  earth and ether. T h e se  then becom e new  organs, fresh  nerves 
and veins ru n n in g  afar out in to  the fie ld , along the w in d in g  brook, up  th ro ugh  the 
leaves, bringing a larg e r existence. T h e  arm s o f the m ind open w ide to the broad sky.
‘Som e sense o f the m eaning o f the grass, and leaves o f the tree, and sweet w aters 
hovers on the confines o f thought, and seems ready to be resolved in to  defin ite 
form . T h e re  is  a m eaning in  these th in g s, a m eaning in  a ll th at e xists, and it  
comes near to declare itse lf. N o t yet, not fu lly , n o r in  such  shape th at it  m ay be 
form ulated— if  ever it  w ill be— but su fficie n tly  so to leave, as it  w ere, an u n w ritten  
im p ressio n  th at w ill rem ain w hen the glam our is  gone, and grass is  b u t grass, and 
a tree a tree.’ (R ich a rd  Jefferies, The Sun and the Brook.)
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clear to us, and is not, perhaps, complete in itself so as to form 
a single ultimate individual thing; it does not, therefore, find a 
place in our real active being, but belongs rather to our passivity. 
So far as it is organized, it is real; so far as it is confused, it is illusory; 
and its organization thus appears as duration. If the organization 
were complete, the duration would appear to the individual as 
sempiternity; as it does not so appear, it must be incomplete, and 
man’s bodily limbo must remain compound rather than single and 
individual; it is thus that its duration appears as limited. But each 
of the real parts constituting the compound, or including it, is 
eternal in its place in N atura naturata.
Each thing in nature, therefore, is eternal in proportion to its 
wholeness, and possesses a finite duration in proportion to its 
incompleteness. In so far as the mind is able to put itself into the 
‘intellectual order’, it must resolve Imagination by analysing it, 
and reorganizing its positive content; thus ‘imaginative’ experience 
is temporal and subject to birth, vicissitude, and death, while 
intellectual being is eternal. The objects of Imagination, including 
the ‘imaginative’ body, necessarily share in its mortality, while 
the objects of Intellect, including the body as it is for Intellect, 
are eternal. The fact remains, however, that while Imagination 
can, by Reason, increasingly be resolved, the ‘imaginative’ content 
itself stubbornly remains, and thus evinces its commensurate 
reality. ‘When we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant 
from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in 
this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not 
know the sun’s true distance, or the cause of the fancy. For 
although we afterwards learn that the sun is distant from us more 
than six hundred of the earth’s diameters, we none the less still 
fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us because 
we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification 
of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said 
body is affected thereby.’1 We can get rid of our illusion (in virtue
1 ‘ C u m  solem  in tu em u r, eum  ducentos c irc ite r pedes a n o b is distare im agina- 
m u r, q u i e rro r in  hac sola im aginatio n e non co n sistit, sed in  eo, quod dum  
ipsu m  sic  im aginam ur, veram  ejus distantiam , et h u ju s im a g in atio n is causam  
ign oram us. N am  tam etsi postea cognoscam us, eundem  u ltra  600 terrae diam etros 
a no b is distare, ipsu m  n ih ilo m in u s prope adesse im a g in a b im u r; non enim  solem  
adeo p ro p in q uu m  im aginam ur, propterea quod veram  ejus distantiam  ignoram us, 
sed propterea, quod affectio n o stri co rp o ris essentiam  so lis in v o lv it, quatenus 
ip su m  co rp us ab eodem  a fficitu r’ (Eth. I I ,  xxxv, Sch.).
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of our wholeness), but not of ‘imaginative’ content (for we are 
truly partial). It is thus that we are both eternal, and enduring but 
transitory, beings. And although we cannot when we will, or 
entirely, get rid of‘imaginative’ content, it is none the less infected 
with illusion, and it cannot therefore appear as sempiternal. It 
suffers continual change. Further, our Imagination is not solely 
of our own body, nor solely of other bodies, it is of our own body 
as affected by other bodies; its mortality, therefore, does not imply 
that of our body as it really is in its eternal relations. It is our 
‘imaginative’ world that passes away when we are said to die; and 
it is an ‘imaginative’ thing that passes away when another person is 
said to die. The difference is that he that is said to die loses his whole 
world of Imagination (but does not ‘survive’ without it in time), 
while those that remain lose only a part of theirs (and that not 
wholly, since memory remains). Death in each involves partial 
death in all; but death never touches an eternal being, or its eternal 
relations. Death as the resolution of illusion is itself illusory. And 
the same must be true mutatis mutandis of birth. The content 
that is the basis of our illusion is due to our partialitas; it is so 
far necessary, though the illusion is not; the resolution of the 
illusion may arise from the self, as in intellectual criticism, or it 
may come from the development of the ‘imaginative’ content itself 
towards dissolution (for it is not as such eternal). Thus birth and 
duration and death belong to the ‘imaginative’ world of things; 
and thus, further, it must not be said that death relieves us of 
‘imaginative’ content, as if we still endured after death, but without 
a world to live in. If we still endured we should still be infected 
with Imagination, but now in the form of memory.1 Nor must it 
be thought that in an after-life we shall persist, but with a new 
world of Imagination into which we shall be born,2 in which we 
shall, in a new time-order, live, and out of which we shall once 
more be shaken, when illusion shall have developed into non-being. 
For we do not persist after death any more than we existed before
1 A n  aevum o f m em ory (= co n scio u sn ess o f existence in  the p ast) cannot be 
ours after death, fro m  the ve ry  nature o f m em ory as in vo lve d  in  ‘ im a g in a tive ’ 
confusion. A ll th at is  real in  o u r du ratio n  is  otherw ise conserved and co nceived.
2 In to  the fin e cloth w hite lik e  flam e 
W eavin g the golden thread,
T o  fashion the b irth -ro b es fo r them  
W ho are ju s t bo rn, being dead.
( The Blessed Damozel).
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birth. ‘Before birth’ and ‘after death’ have meaning only for those 
others that endure in these periods; the individual experiences time 
only while he himself endures, though it is true that he then 
experiences more of time than he perceives: for he remembers part 
of the past, and anticipates something of the future. We cannot 
exist before our birth (except in utero), or after our death, for to 
be expected or remembered by others is not to exist.1 Yet a man’s 
birth and death cannot be wholly without meaning even for him: 
through them he knows that he is partial, for his limited duration 
is the expression of his real finitude. Nevertheless as an eternal part 
of N atura he cannot die, for he never was born; his real existence is 
not an enduring existence at all, it is eternal. Real or eternal 
existence involves self-dependence; ‘imaginative’ or enduring exis­
tence involves dependence on external things; but all finite existence 
is dependent on the infinite self-dependent whole, which alone is 
eternal in its own right. Man’s dependence on external things is 
fully represented by his birth, vicissitude, and death; that is his 
complete duration. Thus our real existence is not a series of births 
and deaths and re-births, either in this ‘imaginative’ world, or in 
other ‘imaginative’ worlds, or in worlds without Imagination: not 
in this world, for we have no lien on parts of the world’s duration 
beyond our lifetime; we have our day and cease to be; we cannot 
‘lie down for an aeon or two’ and then begin again refreshed: for 
without memory we cannot be said to be the same within a single 
time-series?  After death it may be said that our ‘imaginative’ 
experience ‘endures’ in the past; before birth that it ‘endures’ in 
the future; during life alone it endures in the present: and as 
thinking and extended modes of Substance we need no more of 
duration, and can have no more.3 Nor can we recur or occur in 
other ‘imaginative’ worlds before or after this, for thus the new 
worlds would become parts of this time-order, preceding or 
succeeding the present world in a single duration. Nor can we have
1 I t  does no t fo llo w  th at no sig nifican ce is  to be attached to the no t uncom m on 
b e lie f that the m em ory o f o u r frie n d s is  o u r sole im m o rtality.
2 O f course m em ory is  no t essential fo r id e n tity  in  an eternal b e in g : fo r such 
there is  no passing aw ay, and hence no need fo r the retentio n o r the re trie vin g  
o f a past.
3 W h eth er in  any other o f the in fin ite  A ttrib u te s o f the R eal the fin ite  in d iv id u a l 
has other m odes o f real o r ‘ im a g in a tive ’ existence, is  a q uestion w h ich  fo r lack  
o f prem isses cannot be answ ered. Human  existence is  a certain  u n io n  (b u t no t 
concatenation) o f body and m in d , b u t no t o f co rrespo nd in g  m odes o f other 
A ttrib u te s.
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before-life or after-life in a world without Imagination, for such 
a world would be without duration, and thus could not precede or 
succeed the present world.1 Hence we do not exist before birth, 
nor do we go on existing after death; our true existence is not that 
which we enjoy as parts of the universe having a limited duration. 
It is because we are so prone to think (and not wholly illegitimately) 
of duration as real existence (as opposed to the empty ‘subsistence’ 
of abstract conceptions and laws), and thence to pass to the (wholly 
illegitimate) notion of temporal existence as something in pari
1 N o r can it  here be determ ined w hether there are other ‘im ag in ative’ tra n ­
scrip ts o f the eternal relatedness o f fin ite  in d iv id u a ls w ith  and w ith in  N atura  
naturata in  d istin ct tim e-o rders. F o r such  tim e-o rd ers co uld  n e ith e r succeed 
no r be contem poraneous w ith  each other (though a general harm ony o f th e ir 
elem ents seems to be essential). H ence such  en d u rin g  live s w o uld have no 
temporal relatio ns w ith  each other. T h u s if  the in d iv id u a l has one eternal being 
and a p lu ra lity  o r in fin ity  o f duratio ns in  tim e-series w ith o u t tem poral re latio ns 
w ith  each other, then h is m any o r in fin ite  live s are w h o lly  devoid o f tem poral 
relatio ns w ith  each other, being o n ly  in d ire c tly  related as h is  through the 
m ediation o f h is sin g le  eternal being in  eternal re latio n s w ith  and w ith in  N atura  
naturata. A n d  thus o f live s other than h is  present life  he co u ld  have no m em ory, 
expectation, o r even ‘in tim a tio n ’ . T h e y  can n e ith e r precede, succeed, n o r o ccu r 
w ith  h is present life . N o r, s tric tly  speaking, does any d u ratio n  precede 
succeed, o r o ccu r w ith  h is eternal b e in g : fo r th is is  not in  tim e. T h e se  are regions 
in  w h ich  Im ag in atio n  (confined to a sin g le  tim e -se rie s) m ust fa il to enlighten, 
so that reso rt m ust n ecessarily be had to In te lle c t fo r a so lu tio n  or re so lu tio n  o f 
such questions.
T h e re  m ay be some evidence, not o f lin e a r re latio n , b u t o f intersection o f such 
diverse tim e-o rders in  the ra re ly  re cu rre n t hum an experiences o f m o ral, in ­
tellectual, and aesthetic v is io n  o r ‘in tu itio n ’ ; fo r in  m any so -called  ‘e tern al’ 
m om ents the in d iv id u a l seem s to be not w h o lly  free fro m  d u ratio n, b u t rath er 
to have passage in to  a transform ed tim e-o rd er, w h ich  is  at once the sam e, and 
yet m ysterio usly no t the sam e. S uch  questions co u ld  o n ly  be answ ered sa tis­
facto rily, o r w ithd raw n , as the re su lt o f a m etaphysical deduction o f tim e from  
the relations o f fin ite  eternal beings, the deduction being carried  out in  co n sid er­
able detail, and no t in  the fo rm al m anner adopted in  the present essay. S uch  
a deduction w o uld be essential w ith in  a m etaphysics o f eth ics (though no t fo r 
ethical science), fo r th us o n ly  co uld  it  be exp lained how  the tem poral life  o f a 
p artly  eternal being co u ld  be, not im p ro ved (fo r that m ig h t be the accidental 
p ro du ct o f tim e), b u t ru le d  and determ ined here and now  b y eternal va lu e s: 
how  the determ ined tim e-series o f the in d iv id u a l’s du ratio n  co u ld , w ith o u t the 
m iraculo us irru p tio n  o f absolute values (w h ich , as eternal, have no tem poral 
relations w ith  th is o r that o ccasion), be am ended w ith o u t ceasing to be a tim e- 
series in  p recise harm ony w ith  the standardized tim e-series o f so cia l life . T h ese 
are questions w h ich  I  m ust beg leave to postpone, w ith  the fin a l re m in d e r that 
though separate tim e-series cannot be regarded as tem p o rally related (i. e. as 
seria l or co n curren t), o r th us as fre e ly  in te rse ctin g  w ith  each other, yet a ll tim e- 
series as em anations o f eternity m u st be focused in  the eternal. It  is  th u s that 
G od can see into the hearts o f m en, dissipated as they are b y tim e and change; 
and it  is  thus, perhaps, that m an’s eternal p art can ru le  the changing d estin ies o f 
its ow n e n d u rin g  co unterfeit. C f. also below , E xc u rsu s V I I I  (p p . 3 0 1 -4 ).
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materia which must be superadded to eternal existence, that we 
tend to interpret eternal existence (from which duration has been 
removed) 1 as further persistence through time. But temporal 
existence is not, from the point of view of the eternal, a real or 
additional existence; but only a faint copy of real, i.e. infinite 
existence: it is eternity mixed with non-being. And this is appro­
priate only to a finite, and not to an infinite, eternal being, for the 
finite demands a complement which, as finite, it cannot grasp 
except under the categories of its impotence. As a thinking and 
extended mode of Substance, therefore, man is both eternal and 
also enduring; he is eternal as an adequate (though not complete) 
reproduction of the whole N atura naturata\ he endures as an 
incomplete part of that whole, and his lifetime in the sempiternity 
of nature is his full duration as a part: he has no right to 
immortality, and it may seriously be questioned whether he has 
any genuine desire for it.2
1 O r ra th er, in  w h ich  d u ratio n  is  fin a lly  integrated o r ‘ co nstellated’. F o r 
etern ity, as I  have said , is  no t the sum o f a ll d u ratio n s, b u t th e ir perfection. T h is  
conception can o n ly  be elaborated at a later stage o f m y argum ent.
2 S u ch  desire as we do u ndo ubtedly en tertain , except w here life  has achieved 
a re lative  tem poral com pleteness, and fades aw ay in to  fo rg etfulness, is  due to o u r 
im potence. O u r dem and is  re a lly  fo r w hat is , in  o u r m easure, e tern ally  o u rs, 
v iz . genuine existence, not fo r that strife  o f g ain  and loss w h ich  is  o f the essence 
o f d u ratio n . O u r dem and is  fo r com pletion, longer life  being  dem anded o n ly  
as the seem ing p re -re q u isite  o f th a t; and com pleteness, w h ich  is  in  fact p erfect 
response to the w hole, is  im aged as m ore satisfacto ry co nnexio n w ith  the persons 
and th in g s w h ich  re a lly  o r ap p aren tly co nstitute o u r environm ent. D eath seems 
to tear these fro m  u s, and to m aim  o r destroy o u r b e in g ; and th u s o n ly, bating  
the e rro rs o f su p e rstitio n , do w e sh rin k  fro m  death. T h e  in ve rse  o f th is tru th  
is  fa m ilia r eno ug h : T h o m as H a rd y  has g ive n  it  apt, and now  classical, exp ressio n 
in  h is  ‘ F rie n d s B eyo nd’ :
W e have triu m p h e d : th is achievem ent tu rn s the 
bane to antidote,
U nsuccesses to success,
M a n y th o u gh t-w o rn eves and m orrow s to a m orrow  
free o f thought.
N o  m ore need we co rn  and clo th in g , feel o f o ld  
te rre stria l stre ss;
C h ill detractio n stirs  no s ig h ;
F ea r o f death has even bygone u s : death gave a ll 
th at w e possess.
A s I  have suggested, the dem and fo r m ore o f tem poral life  com es m ost p o ig nantly 
fro m  those w hose purposes are in co m p letely re alized , and w hose im p ulses are 
thw arted b y m ere occasion o r v ic iss itu d e : a few  m ore m onths o r years and the 
w o rk w ould have been com pleted, the im p u lses satisfie d ! So we suppose, and 
the argum ent is  to us fin ite  beings im p re ssive ; nevertheless it  is  in co n clu sive . 
T h e  real ‘p urp o se’ ( if  I  m ay so speak) m ay be to leave the hum an purpose
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The mind, then, and the body are equally eternal and equally 
‘ortal’ and mortal; the mind does not live on after the body is 
dead, nor is the body born with a mind already old. The essential 
human body is neither the body that we perceive, nor any mere 
section of it. It is eternal while the things of Imagination perish. 
But though bodies are in themselves real and eternal as parts of 
N atura, we do not share the eternity of all bodies, but enjoy only 
our own; they are represented to us selectively and confusedly as 
enduring things. Yet nothing real is other than eternal. If we are 
finite (as we must be if the whole is to have content) then our 
eternity must be that of a finite part. The things with which we 
are connected and related form in themselves no essential part of 
our being, though in so far as they awaken response in us they are, 
in us, adequately reflected or reproduced.1 They only appear to be 
our body, as distinct from completely external bodies, for Imagina­
tion, which confuses relation with identity, and the section with 
the part. Thus we include in our ‘imaginative’ body what is not 
essentially ours, and paint the Real with what is ours only per  
accidens (being but the limbo of our impotence). Nor are we wholly 
wrong when we impute our own nature to the Real; for our being 
is our sole clue to the nature of the extended and thinking Real; 
we are wrong in so far as we do these things confusedly. For 
everything in the world is ours for thought and in organic response; 
we must understand the Real as it is reproduced in our own nature. 
Imagination does it wrongly, and so becomes the seat of illusion. 
It and its objects perish because, or in so far as, they never had any 
real being. As relative wholes we eternally are, both corporeally 
and psychically; but as only relatively whole we are dependent on
u n fu lfille d ; o u r fin itu d e  in  th is respect too m ay be essential to the in fin ite  being 
o f the R e a l: ‘ It  is  lik e  the m anager disch arg in g  from  the stage som e actor w hom  
he has engaged: “ B u t I  have no t fin ish ed  the five  a cts; I  have played bu t th ree.”  
“ G o o d : life ’s dram a, m ark yo u, is  com plete in  three. T h e  com pleteness is  in  
h is hands w ho first au th o rized  y o u r com position, and now  y o u r d isso lu tio n . 
N e ith er was y o u r w ork. S erenely take y o u r leave; serene as he w ho gives you 
the discharg e.”  ’ (M a rcu s A u re liu s, To Himself, x ii, §  36.)
1 I  need h a rd ly  p o in t o u t that repro d u ctio n is  not here confined to know ledge 
(o r essentia objectiva) ;  it  m eans actual repro d u ctio n o f the w hole in  the p art, 
both on the side o f T h o u g h t and on that o f E xten sio n . In  m in d , it  is  m ental 
response to other m in d s; in  body, it  is  b o d ily  response to outside th ings. Id eas 
do not reproduce o r represent th in g s: they are o u r know ledge o f th in g s. M in d  
does not respond to body, n o r body to m in d ; b u t in  re a lity  they are the sam e 
m ode o f Substance u nd er d ifferen t A ttrib u tes.
DURATION AND INDIVIDUATION 135
other things. That dependence could only appear before birth 
as existence in a future period; after death, it can only appear as 
existence in a past period; during life, it is existence through a 
period which is a moving specious present lengthened out by 
memory and anticipation. There is no real difference. If it is 
asked how an eternal dependence can appear, now as existence 
then and not now, and again as existence now but not then, the 
reply must be that it does so because we are here considering it 
as dependent, not on the absolute whole, but on an indefinitely 
great number of parts of the whole external to the dependent part; 
i. e. the dependence is not categorical but conditional, and must 
so remain while we are considering only the infinitely many parts 
as parts. Duration is conditioned existence, i. e. existence conceived 
as distinct from, and added to, essence; eternity is necessary 
existence, i. e. existence following from essence, which thus can 
neither be, nor be conceived, except as existing. And the true 
reason why the duration of a thing is not proportioned to its perfec­
tion or wholeness is, firstly, that its perfection is always a derived 
perfection; and, secondly, that external nature, which derives its 
being from the same infinite source, is always infinitely stronger than 
any one, or combination, of its parts. How else could it be infinite ?
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E X C U R S U S  I V
C O R P O R A  S IM P L IC IS S IM A
S p in o z a ’s conception of the corpus simplicissimum, and his explanation of individuality in nature and man in terms of the ‘composition’ of these elements, have for long been sources of misunderstanding and of conse­quent adverse criticism, and I must here attempt to examine, as far as possible, the main questions which arise in this connexion. My argu­ment in Chapter V has shown that some fundamental doctrines depend directly upon the correct interpretation of this conception. I have already indicated1 that Professor Joachim’s account of the human individual lays great emphasis upon its ‘aggregate’ character, and does so very largely as a result of his reading of the doctrines of the ‘physical’ sections of Part I I of the Ethics. ‘The human body is a complex aggre­gate of many complex aggregates. Its “unity”-—when it is regarded as “a single thing”— is the coactivity of its multiple constituents. Every elementary corpuscle has its soul-side: and the mind is therefore in reality a complex aggregate of many complex aggregates of ideas.’ 2 But if we are to take ‘compositum’ thus in the crude, and ultimately impossible, sense of ‘aggregated’, must we not take ‘individuum’ also in its crude and impossible sense (‘for identity with no difference is a meaningless term’3)? But to do so would reduce the whole theory, culminating in the doctrine of Eth. I I , Lem. vii, to crude and impossible nonsense. I suggest that this interpretation overlooks the very im­portant and significant assertions of the first two Lemmata: ‘Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt’,4 i.e. all are extended, and have 
motus et quies, and thus ‘ratione motus, et quietis, celeritatis, et tardi- tatis,... ab invicem distinguuntur’.5 Thus their aggregation will involve something more, where there is real compounding, for the constituent motions will fall into system, and aggregation will, so far, be superseded by concrete wholeness or real individuality. Doubtless there is a sense and degree in which every finite whole is an aggregate, but in so far as it is a whole it transcends aggregation, and enjoys integration. The human body falls between mere aggregation (which applies only at an ideal limit of analysis to Simplicia which are no more than entia rationis), and complete concrete individuality (which belongs to tota Natura alone).I am ready to agree that Spinoza’s assertions about the corpora sim-
1 P- 53 . note 5. 2 A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p p. 13 0 -1.
3 hoc cit., p . 140. 4 Eth. II, Lem. ii. s Eth. II, Lem. i.
plicissima do, prima facie, admit of an atomistic misreading (especially if his doctrine of time and eternity is not grasped), but it must be remembered that the Axioms, Lemmata, and Postulates of Part I I of the 
Ethics, where this conception is introduced, are admittedly concerned with physics (in the sense that they are de natura corporum) and that they do not pretend to give a complete account even from that point of view : ‘Qua de causa operae pretium esse duxi, haec ipsa accuratius explicare, et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est, pauca de natura corporum prae- mittere’.1 ‘Facile concipiemus totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque haec, si animus fuisset, de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare, et demonstrare debuissem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa haec adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere’ .2 Thus it follows that the analysis of complex corporeal individuals will be carried no further than the stage of the most elementary bodies. Now ‘per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem, longam, latam, et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam’ ,3 and, of course, as the same 
Scholium emphasizes, extended Substance is not composed of such, or indeed any, parts (in the sense of ‘sections’): ‘quod jam {Prop, xiicum  
Coroll. Prop, xiii) absurdum esse ostendi’. Thus a complete analysis of the universe of extended bodies would not result in an aggregate of extended atoms, but in puncta endowed with such motus et quies as a 
punctum can accept. Now we are told that the corpora simplicissima ‘solo motu, et quiete, celeritate, et tarditate ab invicem distinguun- tur’ ,4 and thus there is here, it must be admitted, a certain unresolved ambiguity : for the statement will be true both where the corpuscles are all of the same extensive magnitude, shape, extensive complexity, See., and also where they are all entirely devoid of these further attributes (or some of them). In the former case, we have a sort of atomism (though, as we shall see, not an unqualified atomism) ; in the latter case, it may be a fore-shadowing of the more precisely expounded theory of Leibniz with reference to materia prima and materia secunda.According to Leibniz, materia is more than mere instantaneous ex­tension,5 and involves vis activa (including actus and conatus), which in the complete analysis that results in materia prima, appears as antitypia or impenetrability resident in unextended points. Here we have the ideal limit of the analysis of extension together with the minimum of
1 Eth. I I ,  x iii, Sch. 2 Eth. I I ,  Lem. v ii, Sch. 3 Eth. I ,  xv, Sch.4 Eth. I I ,  A x . i i  alt.
5 C f. Plan of a Letter to A rn a u ld : ‘ L ’étendue est u n  a ttrib u t q u i ne sçau ro it
co n stitu er u n estre acco m p li, . . .  e lle  exp rim e seulem ent u n  estât présent, m ais 
nu llem ent le  fu tu r et le passé, com m e d o it fa ire  la  n o tio n  d ’une substance’
(G e rh a rd t, ii,  p . 72 ).
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activity (or passivity, which is not the mere absence of activity). But such passive points only have real existence in relation with one another; as isolated, each is but an ens rationis. All real matter is materia secunda, which is extended, collective, and active now in the further sense that it possesses entelechy.Now Spinoza, I think, leaves on one side the questions that resulted in the Leibnizian theory because, as indeed he suggests, they are not essential for his immediate purpose; nevertheless we must suppose that he did have views on the subject which, if they could be reconstructed, would bring greater order into his theory. It is plain, in the first place, that he did not mean to suggest that the facies totius Universi is completely explained as a mere collecton of ultimate extended and sempiternally enduring atoms wholly unprepared for their office; I need hardly stay to support that indubitable truth. We get to the ultimate corpuscles by analysis rather than by division; we get to tota Natura extensa by synthesis rather than by aggregation. The main question at the moment is where exactly Spinoza calls a halt in the corporeal analysis of the universe. Plainly, the final results of a corporeal analysis must be corpora; but if so, such an analysis cannot be ultimate: for so long as we are left with particles or grains or minima of matter, it is possible to proceed further by mathematical analysis. In that case, however, the ultimate 
simplicia will not be corpora but puncta of some description.All this is well understood by Spinoza, I make no doubt, and it seems to me therefore that he confines himself to a corporeal analysis in the sections we are considering, because he wishes to explain the nature of bodily individuality, and because he recognizes that to carry the process of analysis to an ideal mathematical limit would necessarily involve the introduction of the immediate infinite mode of motus et quies, without which the ultimate simplicia would be mere entia rationis. For if we proceed right down to unextended puncta, we approach an impossible limit where there is finite motion at a point, and not through a point; in which case the motion can be no more than potential, i.e. for Spinoza (as opposed to Leibniz) nothing at all. For him the so-called potentiality is an actual function of the total system of motions constituting the eternal extended universe as it is related to an ideal ‘tempunctum’ within it. Thus the ultimate simplicia turn out to be expressions of the infinite and eternal in terms of the absolutely finite and instantaneous; i.e. no expressions at all, and therefore nothing. From such units nothing could be ‘compounded’ in any sense of that ambiguous term; but the fault is not in the theory of a hierarchy of individuals, but in the supposition that eternal Extension is composed of timeless points endowed with mere potentiality of motion. These constitute, therefore, only an ideal limit, and not a real stage of the analysis, not even the last.In view of the difficulties which I have indicated, it seems to me that
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the rapid account given by Spinoza is as satisfactory as could be expected in the absence of a terminology founded upon the developed notion of the ‘infinitesimal’ (which was only shortly after to become available). We shall see that, at its worst, the suggestion of the term corpora sim- 
plicissima is atomistic only in a qualified sense, and, as I have said, the immediate purpose of the discussion demanded no more thorough analysis or exposition; indeed, further analysis was excluded, for the phenomenological account of the Lemmata is only fruitful in so far as it is limited to enduring individuals. Forced down to the instantane­ous, it becomes sterile. But, I need hardly add, this does not mean that it is valueless in the elucidation of the nature of the Real.I take the corpus simplicissimum, therefore, as standing between the supposedly isolated, and therefore unreal, puncta of a hypothetical in­stantaneous extension, on the one hand, and the supposed sempiternally enduring atoms (or minimal bodies) of Epicurus, on the other. They are bodies in so far as they are actual ‘infinitesimal’ motions through ‘infinitesimal’ spaces, so that they may become the origin of phenomeno­logical construction, composition, or aggregation; but they are real only in the sense that they possess ‘infinitesimal’ duration. The ‘atom’ that endures beyond a moment is so far complex, and thus the corpora sim- 
plicissima are only atoms in a qualified sense. Further, though it is true that the isolated puncta of an instantaneous extension are in­distinguishable from each other (for they do not even possess position, which is always relative), yet at every stage short of that absolute limit there must be distinction of the individual elements. At the limit of 
corporeal analysis, the corpora simplicissima are distinguished solely by their motion and rest; at the higher stages, the individuals are also dis­tinguished by their capacity for self-maintenance and adequate response to external things and to the universe at large. Again, the differences of motion and rest which distinguish the corpora simplicissima arise solely from their relations within the facies totius Universi (which flows from eternal Extension as that Attribute is modified by infinite and eternal motus et quies), and these relations must change continually, through the infinite diversity of temporal expressions demanded by an infinite and eternal being. Though the corpora simplicissima are not timeless, their duration is essentially ‘infinitesimal’, and they are thus perpetually generated and destroyed. They are ‘momentarily’ actual, and the least of eternal things. Their reality is only the efflux of the eternity of the extended Real within a spatio-temporal ‘infinitesimal’, and they are of all degrees of motion and rest as the situation and circumstances of their appearance may demand. But like all finite individuals, to use the image of Augustine, they are made ‘towards’ 
Natura, and are restless till they find rest in it.Turning to the question of the actuality of the corpora simplicissima,
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we must recognize that they are, not merely in fact but also essentially, unidentifiable. This follows from their definition: for since there can be no minimal duration, no atomic moment, it follows that there can be no corpus simplex. Nevertheless we may legitimately proceed towards more and more simple bodies, and thus in an ideal limit of corporeal (and not mathematical) analysis, to the corpora simplicissima possessing ‘infinitesimally’ small duration; and again from that limit proceed in the direction of the re-integration of individual things, i.e. a phenomeno­logical construction of tota Natura extensa. It is significant in this reference that Spinoza’s term is corpus simplicissimum rather than corpus 
absolute simplex (nor, I think, does his use of the term ens perfectissimum for the absolutely perfect being really lessen the significance). The conception of a corpus absolute simplex is, as I have shown, incoherent: if it is simplex it is no corpus (for it does not endure), but an instantaneous 
punctum, and pure potentiality, that is, nothing.To speak, therefore, as Professor Joachim dqes, as if corpora sim­
plicissima and God are individuals in a strict sense, and human bodies are individuals only ‘in a loose sense’,1 is, in my opinion, unjust to Spinoza. The sense is surely much looser with the corpus simplicissimum than with the corpus humanum; and if man himself does not stand within nature as ‘imperium in imperio’,2 much less do the corpora sim­
plicissima stand within the human body as ultimate individual particles constituting it by mere aggregation. For while the human body (with the mind) endures, and is even in part eternal, the supposed constituent ‘atoms’ are approximately temporary, and disappear as they change. One of the main characteristics of the complex individual, on the contrary, is its ability to survive large changes, both in its individual constituents, and in its magnitude as a whole.3 How, I ask, could this occur if it were a mere aggregate ? But even for mathematics the integra­tion of infinitesimals is not the same thing as their aggregation.
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1 A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p . 141, note 3.
2 Eth. I l l ,  Praef. 3 Eth. I I ,  Lemm. iv -v i.
CHAPTER VI
T H E  I N D IV ID U A L S  A N D  T H E  I N D I V ID U A L
IN the ordered hierarchy of extended individuals, the corpus humanum occupies an ambiguous position between the facies  
totius TJniversi (which is eternal, and does not for itself endure) on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the isolated puncta of in­
stantaneous extension (which as instantaneous do not in any sense 
endure). It is at once temporal and eternal. It is temporal in so 
far as it is not completely whole; because it is incompletely whole 
it fails to be a perfect part, and so far fails to be real. To that 
degree it is a mere section of the whole, and is thus the basis of 
illusion. But it is not merely a section, it achieves a relative 
wholeness, and is therefore partly eternal (though as a real part 
of nature, imagined as occupying regions within nature, it is 
‘ortal’ and mortal). Its real partialitas, as I have indicated, is not 
its occupation of a region of extended N atura, but its partial 
reciprocation with N atura as a whole. Each man comprehends 
N atura as a whole, in his degree, but N atura comprehends 
them all.
The separate individuality of man, which I have mainly illus­
trated from the nature of Extension as providing a basis for that 
infinite differentiation of identical form which is finite individua­
tion,1 is thus seen to depend for its positive content not on its 
occupation of regions of extension, but on the degree of responsive­
ness possessed by the various bodies of the individuals. Extension 
is not divided, but the individuals that are its real modes or 
expressions are none the less distinct individuals. That distinct­
ness is pictured by Imagination as the occupation of different 
regions of ‘imaginative’ extension. But the distinctness itself 
means variety in the reproduction of, and responsiveness to, the 
whole; and this again is part of the content of infinite and eternal 
Extension as an Attribute of the Real.
A human body, therefore, is not a mere aggregate of corpora
1 F o r it  m ust be rem em bered that p u re  re p e titio n  never o ccurs in  n ature. N o r 
is  th is m erely an in te restin g  e m p irica l datum : it  is  a m etaphysical necessity. T w o  
in d iv id u a ls  p re cise ly  alike  are eith e r id e n tica l, and hence n o t tw o, o r they are 
d istin g u ish e d  sp a tia lly, tem p o rally, o r spatio -tem p o rally. S p atial d istin ctio n s, 
how ever, are not d istin ctio n s o f p lace (fo r E xte n sio n  is  in d iv is ib le ) b u t o f 
co n te n t; place is  th us p o sterio r to q u a lity . A g ain , tem poral d istin ctio n s are, as 
I  have su fficie n tly  em phasized, p o sterio r to in d iv id u a tio n .
simplicissima, nor indeed of complex bodies of higher degrees of 
individuality than these. It is not a mere complex motion within 
a region of extension, for as such it would be nothing at all. 
Reality means connexion and wholeness, and the real being of the 
body must therefore be at once partial and whole, at once finite 
and infinite. Its partialitas is not a mere illusion: viewed even by 
Intellect itself we are but partial individuals, with a corporeal 
environment and a perceptual consciousness of external things. But 
o u t  partialitas does not exclude a certain wholeness, which implies 
for the body a certain responsiveness to the whole, and for the mind 
reproduction of the infinita idea D ei, i.e. knowledge of the whole. 
It is in this sense only that knowledge is our eternity, not as opposed 
to our extended reality, but as revealing its genuine character.1
It follows, further, that even if per impossibile each of the infinitely 
many real parts of the whole completely reproduced the whole, 
they would only be the more perfectly individual, and not the 
less. But, it may be asked, if they were thus identical in content, 
would they not be one, rather than infinitely many?2 From
1 It  is  m a in ly  in  th is respect th at the so lu tio n  o f the pro blem  o f hum an eternity 
in  the Ethics is  a fu rth e r cla rifica tio n  o f th at offered in  term s o f ‘im m o rta lity ’ 
(onsterfelykheid) in  the Short Treatise. In  the latte r w o rk (cf. below , p. 192, 
note 1) we are to ld  that because the so ul is  a m ode o f T h o u g h t it  can u n ite  itse lf 
w ith  G o d on that sid e o f h is being, and thus share h is im p e rish a b ility . (A t the 
end o f Korte Verhand. I I ,  x x ii he says that ‘ u y t deze L ie fd e  en V ereeniginge eerst 
kom t te volgen een eeuwige en o nveranderlyk bestend igh eid’, b u t in  any case 
the w ord ‘o n sterfe lykh eid ’ is  am biguous and does not exclude real e tern ity). T h e  
prima facie  im p lica tio n  o f the statem ent is  that the body as a m ode o f E xten sio n  
cannot in  the sam e w ay becom e ‘im p erish ab le ’ (Korte Verhand. I I ,  Voor Reeden, 
Aanteek. i, 1 5 ;  cf. I I .  x x iii).  B u t th is w o u ld  confuse the w hole theory. 
Perhaps b y ‘u n io n  w ith  the bo d y’ is  m eant ‘im a g in a tive ’ u n io n  w ith  low er 
types o f in d iv id u a lity  p a rtly  external to m an, and th us ‘im a g in a tive ly ’ d is in ­
tegrated and passing; and by ‘u n io n  w ith  G o d ’, u n io n  w ith  the w hole w h ich , 
rig h tly  integrated, abides. T h a t is , ‘b o d y’ m eans the ‘im a g in a tive ’, and no t the 
real, body. In  the Ethics, as I  have said, the e xp ositio n  is  m ore m ature, and th is 
m ay p o ssib ly  be due to the fact that S pinoza had begun to see h is w ay from  the 
conception o f extension as it  was h eld  b y D escartes bu t m o d ified, o f course, by 
h is ow n e arly a ttrib u tio n  to it  o f in trin s ic  motus et quies (cf. Korte Verhand. I ,  
ii, Aanteek. 7 ) tow ards the m ore concrete conception that I  have attem pted to 
expound. T h e  fact that the Short Treatise denies that eternity is  an A ttrib u te  
o f G od, m aking it  a m ere proprium, p o ints in  the sam e d ire c tio n ; b u t o th er­
w ise the evidence seems too slig h t to lead to certainty.
. 2 Readers w ho fin d  in  the text a suggestion th at the developm ent o f fin ite  
in d iv id u a ls m ay im p ly  the u ltim ate m erging o f the m any in  an undifferentiated 
one, through the operation o f the P rin cip le  o f the Id e n tity  o f In d is c e rn ib le s ; o r 
in versely, that the u ltim ate partialitas o f the fin ite  in d iv id u a ls  im p lie s the im ­
p o ssib ility  o f in d iv id u a l progress, are referred  to the m ore general d iscu ssio n  o f 
Chapter X I I ,  and p a rticu la rly  to E xcu rsu s V I I I  (p p . 3 0 1 -4 ).
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non-numerable in the sense of infinitely many, they would become 
non-numerable in the sense of unica.1 The reply must be that an 
actual one or whole must be, not indefinitely, but infinitely, many; 
and an actual infinitude must be whole or unique. To fall back either 
on the unity to the exclusion of the infinitude, or the infinitude to 
the exclusion of the unity, is to fall back on nonentity. If the actual 
infinite ceased to be infinitely many in being one, the one would be 
empty, and hence not actual: for its content can only be the infinite 
totality of the reproductions of the whole in the infinitely many 
parts, and even an indefinitely great sum of nothings cannot make 
an infinite. If the parts go, the whole goes. Contrariwise, if the 
one ceased to be one in being infinitely many, then the whole 
would be naught: for each part, as a reproduction of the whole, 
would be pulverized, and the whole would be the dust of dust to 
infinity. An empty ‘one’ and an indefinite ‘infinite’ are equally 
incoherent, and therefore unreal. What is actual must be the one 
which is also infinitely many: i.e. the true infinite.2
Thus the reality of the infinite whole, and therefore of each of 
the infinitely many real parts which reproduce it, depends on the 
‘uniquity’ and actual infinity of the whole. Now if each part were 
completely to reproduce the whole, each would be, with the whole, 
one and infinite; and the parts and the whole would either be 
identical or ultimately atomic: and on either hypothesis equally 
unintelligible. But for Spinoza the Real is necessarily the in­
telligible (though not constituted by anthropomorphic intellect); 
it is the very norm of intelligibility; it is ‘conceived through itself’ .3 
Thus it was necessary for him to maintain both the reality and the 
incompleteness of the parts as modes of Substance; and thus the 
doctrine of the eternity of the human mind, so far from being an 
excrescence on his theory, an elaborate pretence, or a last relic of 
superstition, is the keystone of the system. Only thus can the absolute 
whole be at once one and infinitely many, i.e. a real whole, for thus 
it possesses content; only thus can the parts be at once both distinct
1 A n d  it  m ust be rem em bered that though Substance is  w ith o u t num ber, w h ich  
is  a ‘ m ere aid  to the Im a g in a tio n ’ (Ep. x ii),  it  is  n e ith e r w ith o u t in fin ity  (Eth. I ,  
v ii i  et xv i), n o r w ith o u t u n ity  (Eth. I ,  xiv, Cor. i ) : it  is  ‘ [u n ica  S ub stantia] constans 
in fin itis  a ttrib u tis, quorum  unum quodque aeternam , et in fin ita m  essentiam  
e xp rim it’ (Eth. I ,  x i). A ctu a l in fin ity  and actu al ‘ u n iq u ity ’ are no t integers bu t 
‘ id e al lim its ’ w h ich  becom e actual b y real id e n tity .
2 O n the nature o f ‘ the actual in fin ite ’ see E xcu rsu s V  (p p . 16 0 -3).
3 Eth. I ,  Def. in.
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and dependent, i.e. real parts, for thus they have form. T h e  parts 
must be real i f  the whole is to be intelligible; they m ust be, not 
indefinitely num erous, but infinitely m any, i f  the whole is to be 
infinite; and, in their own perspective, they m ust be distinct 
though not separable, i f  they are to be both real and, in this sense, 
infinite. Substance, therefore, has not m erely im mediate and 
mediate infinite and eternal modes, it m ust also have finite eternal 
modes w hich are the real parts o f Natura naturata. A n d  that is 
the significance w hich m ust be attached to the w o rd s: ‘ M atter was 
not lacking to G od  for the creation o f every degree o f perfection 
from highest to low est; or, more strictly, . . . the laws o f his nature 
are so vast, as to suffice for the production o f everything con­
ceivable by an infinite intellect.’ 1 ‘From  the necessity o f the 
divine nature m ust follow  infinite things in infinite ways: that is 
all things w hich can fall w ithin the sphere o f infinite intellect.’2 
T here is a place in or under the infinite for the fin ite; the real 
finite, indeed, constitutes the partially disintegrated content o f the 
infinite; as the infinite, again, is the constitutive, integrating, 
principle o f the finite: ‘ T h e  intellectual love o f the m ind towards 
G od is that very love o f G od  w hereby G od  loves himself, not in so 
far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through 
the essence o f the hum an mind considered under the form  o f 
eternity; in other w ords, the intellectual love o f the m ind towards 
G od is part o f the infinite love wherew ith G od loves him self’ ;3 
and again, ‘ the love o f G od  towards men, and the intellectual love 
of the mind towards G od, are one and the sam e.’4
T h e  reality o f the parts implies and is im plied by the concrete­
ness o f the w hole; abstract infinite extension, whether in­
stantaneous or recurrent in tim e, could have no parts, for they 
would all be alike, and thus indistinguishable, and hence not parts.
1 ‘Ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum per- 
fectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, . . . ipsius naturae leges 
adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu 
concipi possunt, producenda.’ (Eth. I, App.)
2 ‘Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae 
sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.’ (Eth. I, xvi.)
3 ‘Mentis Amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei Amor, quo Deus se 
ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per essentiam humanae 
Mentis, sub specie aeternitatis consideratam, explicari potest, hoc est, Mentis 
erga Deum Amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum 
amat.’ (Eth. V, xxxvi.)
4 ‘Amor Dei erga homines, et Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis unum, 
et idem.’ (Eth. V, xxxvi, Cor.)
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A gain, absolutely eternal and infinite Extension abstractly con­
ceived as res extensa naturans could for the same reason have no 
parts (though it is full w hile mere extension is em pty). T h e  
structure o f the Real can therefore be neither the one nor the o th er; 
and the repeated use o f the term  ‘quatenus’ represents Spinoza’s 
earnest attem pt to state the case satisfactorily. It is, as every 
student o f Spinoza m ust recognize, intim ately associated w ith the 
distinction drawn within the divine nature between Natura  
naturata and Natura naturans. T hese are not, o f course, two 
separate beings, but tw o asym m etrically related aspects o f the 
same reality. It is in the interpretations o f these aspects that the 
special difficulties o f Spinoza’s application o f this scholastic dis­
tinction have been found, difficulties w hich even sym pathetic 
interpreters o f Spinoza have said to be insuperable. But the 
difficulties have m ainly arisen because it has been too readily 
assum ed that Spinoza regards modal being as a whole, or in  its 
parts, as illusory. I f  that were so, i f  to be a m ode were necessarily 
to be unreal, then w e should have to deny the reality o f Natura 
naturata, w hich is by Spinoza h im self defined as m odal: ‘ By 
Natura naturans, that w hich is in itself and is conceived through 
itself m ust be understood, that is, those A ttributes o f Substance 
w hich express eternal and infinite essence, in other words, G od, 
in so far as he is considered as a free cause. B y Natura naturata I 
understand all that w hich follows from  the necessity o f the nature 
o f G od , or o f any o f the Attributes o f G od, that is, all the modes of 
the Attributes o f G od , in so far as they are considered as things 
w hich are in G od , and w hich w ithout G o d  cannot be or be con­
ceived.’1 H ow , then, can it have been inferred that modes are 
necessarily illusory ? T h e y  follow  from  the necessity o f the divine 
nature, and thus, though they are logically posterior,to Substance, 
they m ust be equally real w ith Substance. T h ere can be no doubt 
whatsoever that Spinoza intends us to understand that Natura  
naturata is a reality in w hich unity and infinite variety are re­
conciled. T h e y  are reconciled because Natura naturata is not an
1 ‘Per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est, et per 
se concipitur, sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam, et infinitam 
essentiam exprimunt, hoc est, Deus, quatenus, ut causa libera, consideratur. 
Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex necessitate D ei naturae, sive 
uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum 
modos, quatenus considerantur, ut res, quae in Deo sunt, et quae sine Deo nec 
esse, nec concipi possunt.’ (Eth. I, xxix, Sch.)
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aggregate like a flock o f sheep, in w hich the parts are individuals, 
but the whole a mere collection; nor is it a whole o f parts as a 
machine is a whole o f parts, i .e .  o f parts w hich are all different 
from it, but are nicely formed and adjusted to constitute the single 
whole. U ltim ate reality cannot be a whole on that plan, not 
because a m achine is not in a sense an individual, but because it is 
not a self-dependent individual, it could not produce itself, m ain­
tain itself, adjust itself. A n  infinite and eternal m achine w ould 
require an infinite and eternal m echanic. N or again, can Natura 
be an organic unity, for that im plies a reciprocating environment 
to w hich the organism responds. T h e  infinite and eternal whole 
must require neither external cause, nor external source o f stim ulus, 
nor external object o f response; it m ust be all-inclusive. A nd  for 
the same reason it m ust be self-dependent and self-constituting. 
Again, it m ust be infinite, not m erely in extent, but also in the 
variety o f its parts, for otherwise it w ould lack som ething w hich is 
available; its own parts m ust be its content. It is a whole, therefore, 
constituted by infinite parts in w hich each part, in its degree, 
reproduces the whole, and thus responds to it, and to all its other 
parts. T o  that degree it is real. A n d  it is precisely because this 
conception is circular: because the whole Real is constituted by 
parts w hich in turn gain their reality from  their reproduction of 
the whole, that Natura naturata cannot be Substance (which is 
conceived solely through itself) but m ust be logically posterior to 
Natura naturans-, and thus, though it is real, it is regarded as but 
one aspect o f reality, incom plete w ithout that active aspect or 
Natura naturans w hich is logically prior.1
N o student o f im portance has understood this to mean chrono­
logical priority, but m any have concluded that logical priority 
involves m etaphysical priority, so that Natura naturata is less real 
than Natura naturans. T h a t by no means fo llo w s: they are equally 
real and m etaphysically ultim ate, but in their due logical order 
(which is asymmetrical) and, therefore, distinct w ithin the Real.
It follows, further, from  these considerations that Natura naturans 
is not prior to Natura naturata in the sense that it can be conceived 
without relation to Natura naturata: it is conceived per se only in 
the sense that it depends on no external cause, it cannot be 
deduced from  anything more ultim ate. I do not mean that it can 
be conceived as active essence but yet as doing nothing; as a ‘ free 
1 These points are further elaborated below.
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cause’ but as causing n oth in g: it cannot be conceived except as the 
eternal creative cause o f Natura naturata.1 T h e  conception of 
Substance reciprocates w ith that o f m ode; and the reality o f 
eternal Substance im plies the reality o f the eternal modes, both 
finite and infinite (though as logically posterior).
B ut from  the reality o f Natura naturata that o f its sections 
cannot be deduced (for it has no sections), or even o f its real parts 
in isolation (for in isolation they cease to be real). M an is only 
real and eternal as a part o f Natura naturata, and therefore as 
follow ing from  the divine nature. For he is real only as a partial 
reproduction o f the whole, and thus as a responsive individual 
w ithin the whole. H e cannot stand alone even in the sense in 
w hich we m ight (though erroneously) regard Natura naturata, 
including as it does all m odal being, as capable o f standing alone 
as a w hole. H e is a part o f Natura naturata, but a real p a rt; Natura  
naturata is, indeed, com posed o f such parts, but not as an engine is 
com posed o f cylinder, piston, rod, flywheel, &c. T h e  w hole re­
produces itself in every part o f itself in proportion to the partialitas
1 This is the true solution of the apparent contradiction in Professor Joachim’s 
account of the matter: ‘ Natura Naturans is logically prior to Natura Naturata, 
or could be conceived without it, though not vice versa . . .  Natura Naturans has its 
fulfilment in Natura Naturata; and it is only the full understanding of the eternal 
system of G od’s modes which would render possible a complete knowledge of 
God and his Attributes’ (A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 65, note 1). Nor, 
I think, is the contradiction merely apparent: it is true that we can have an 
adequate knowledge of God without having a fu ll and complete knowledge of 
h im ; just as we may have an adequate knowledge of the ‘triangle’ in its definition, 
without understanding all its propria. But this is not to say that Natura naturans 
could be conceived adequately without any knowledge of Natura naturata. 
Professor Joachim draws the line in the wrong place. However abstract may be 
the nature of the knower, and in consequence his idea of God, that idea, if  it 
is to be even adequate, must still conceive God as Natura naturans expressing 
itself in some abstract essence of Natura naturata. I may, perhaps, be allowed 
to add that the analogy between G od’s Attributes and ‘lines of force’, which 
Professor Joachim uses in this place, seems infelicitous; though I admit that it is 
less mischievous than Camerer’s description of God (also in part adopted by 
Professor Joachim) as ‘die innere Lebenskraft der W elt und nichts weiter’ (Die 
Lehre Spinoza's, I, i). Professor Joachim adds, expressly repudiating Camerer’s 
phrase ‘und nichts weiter’, ‘but he is more, for he is also that which the force 
animates’ (A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 66). Similar descriptions and 
analogies are rightly condemned by M r. Alexander as ‘undefined ideas, trans­
ferred from our experience to describe metaphorically the being of G od’ 
(Spinoza and Time, p. 33). It is the merest justice to add that Professor 
Joachim only uses the analogy o f ‘lines o f force’ in passing, and without serious 
emphasis. It does not appear in his main exposition of the nature o f an 
Attribute (Loc. cit., pp. 17-27).
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of the part, and thus constitutes it; or rather, since neither the 
modal whole nor the parts can be thought o f as active, we m ust say 
that Natura naturans (i. e. Substance as cause) reproduces the 
whole Natura naturata (i.e . its com plete expression, or infinite and 
eternal mode) in each o f the infinite parts o f Natura naturata (i.e . 
men, &c.) in their measure, and thus constitutes both them 
and it.
Such is the result o f the demand for the final m etaphysical in­
telligibility o f the Real as opposed to mere epistemological 
intelligibility. T h e  intelligible is the system atic; intelligibility 
demands synthesis o f differences, the explanation o f the partial 
through the com plete, the integration o f the premisses in the 
conclusion, and the differentiation of the conclusion through the 
m iddle; but the ultim ate intelligibility o f the Real demands more 
than mere system; it m ust explain not only the coherence of the parts 
in the w hole, but also the existence o f the whole of parts. N othing in 
the constitution o f the system  m ay be assumed. W ith  incom plete 
systems, or w ith the com plete system  inadequately conceived, 
we assume an existing matter w hich accepts a form ; w ith the 
ultimate system  also w e m ust do so form ally, but w e m ust not 
forget at the proper tim e that we have done so; for here the 
ultimate matter is non-being, and the ultim ate form  is the very 
Real we are to explain. T h at is the truth at the back of Em piricism . 
W e m ust begin som ewhere, and where more naturally than w ith 
our immediate w orld o f extended and conscious being ? But what 
we begin w ith m ust not be w holly illusory i f  through it we are to 
reach the Real (and that is the sense in w hich, as I have indicated, 
Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity o f the m ind is connected with 
Descartes’s doctrine o f the philosophical prim acy o f the cogito). 
Since we are finite and incom plete em bodied minds, the demand 
for intelligibility leads us on to the idea o f a com plete and infinite 
being, both extended and thinking: i .e .  a system atic whole o f 
extended and thinking reality like ourselves (for how  else should 
we know it, or be real parts o f it ?) but com plete and infinite (for 
how else should we be finite and incom plete?). But w e m ay not 
rest there: reality, as I have said, cannot be ultim ately or m eta­
physically intelligible m erely as system . O ur finitude im plies also 
our incapacity to produce the datum from  w hich w e began, and 
hence we m ust find a cause for it. But that cause cannot be the 
system so far reached, because that system  itself is constituted by its
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parts, and equally with them  needs production. Such a producing 
cause can be found, then, neither in the parts nor in  the w hole, 
considered strictly as parts o f a whole, and as a whole o f parts, 
respectively. N or can it be found outside o f the whole, for the 
whole is infinite. It m ust be found, therefore, in the very nature of 
the Substance o f the whole as active essence, i. e. as possessing 
existence by right, rather than enjoying it as a gift. ‘W e cannot 
affirm that G o d  enjoys existence, for the existence of G o d  is G od  
him self.’1 T h u s the very demand for the ultim ate intelligibility 
o f the Real carries us beyond mere system ; for it involves two 
th in gs: form ally, inclusiveness and coherence o f ‘objective content’ 
in our id eas; and materially, and not less im portant for m etaphysics, 
the reality o f knowledge itself, i.e. the real existence o f the inclusive 
and coherent ideatum. Real existence, whether corporeal or m ental, 
cannot be conjured out o f ideal coherence, except on the assum p­
tion (which, though necessary, m ust, none the less, not be made 
tacitly, but openly recognized) o f the possibility o f real know ledge; 
i. e. the necessity that the inclusive and coherent ‘idea’ corresponds 
w ith a real inclusive and coherent ‘ ideatum ’ . In  that sense, truth 
cannot be established w ithout a positive datum ; and however truth 
m ay be developed from that basis (or within it), it m ust in the end, 
for m etaphysics, return to it, and make it intelligible, not m erely in 
content or essence, but also as datum, i.e. im plying real existence. 
T h e  knower m ay in some sense ‘m ake’ the ‘objective content’ o f 
his own ideas, but in  no sense norm ally does he make his own 
‘ideata’ or real known things. T h e  one-sided insistence on in ­
clusiveness and coherence as the epistemological m eaning of 
intelligibility (which is undoubted) has too often been regarded as 
settling the metaphysical m eaning o f the term . But epistem ology is 
a special science, assum ing a special subject matter (viz. knowledge), 
the laws o f w hich it investigates. T h u s, very naturally, it takes 
knowledge for granted; it is its datum. B ut the metaphysician 
m ust inquire also into the nature and significance o f knowledge, 
and what is im plied when it is taken (as it m ust be taken) as datum. 
For the positive datum w hich is essential for the establishm ent of 
truth  is no mere em pirical fa ct, but the form  o f  knowledge itself, or, 
i f  you w ill, the whole w hich is the perfect object o f knowledge (for 
the pure form  o f knowledge is only fu lly  actual in the knowledge of
1 ‘Deus vero non potest dici frui existentia, nam existentia Dei est Deus ipse’ 
(Cog. Met. II, i).
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perfect being). T h at datum implies a dator, and m etaphysics must 
make this intelligible also, as far as it can. T o  be m etaphysically 
intelligible means m ore than to be epistem ologically intelligible; 
and Natura naturata can only be intelligible in this ultim ate sense, 
as the eternal expression o f Natura naturans. Natura  m ust in the 
end be both dator and datum.
I have said that each m ind knows Natura in so far as it is the 
essentia objectiva o f its own body, w hich in its degree reproduces 
Natura as a whole. But it is also true that Natura, w hich each 
individual knows, itself includes that individual as one o f its parts. 
But, it m ay be asked, how  can that w hich includes Natura, also be 
included by N atural For this m ust be the case both corporeally 
and m entally, though m ore obviously on the latter side: Natura  
cogitans is cognitively included in the finite knower (in the degree 
of his w holeness); and the knower is him self (so far as he is real) 
included in Natura cogitans. T h e  answer m ust be that this is the 
very nature o f true partialitas w ithin an infinite w h o le ; a formal 
definition both o f actual infinity and o f true partialitas m ight be 
directly fram ed upon it .1 T h u s I have spoken again and again of 
man, both body and m ind, as a real part o f infinite Natura', I m ust 
now explain in greater detail, in what sense man is, in his degree, a 
part o f Natura, that is, what is the character o f his success and 
failure in reproducing the w hole; and what is meant by ‘in  his 
degree’ ; and how  the precise quality o f his being is thus deter­
mined, and the special direction o f his im potence or unreality.
I distinguished between being a part and being a section, and 
the main point was that a real part differs from  a section in that 
it reproduces the whole while rem aining distinct w ithin the whole. 
Only thus can it survive in the whole, and thus it m ust survive i f  
the whole is to have content. N ow  the whole is, as I have indicated, 
infinite externality, diversity, or m ultiplicity, w ith its nisus to u n ity ; 
thus its parts m ay vary either in the w idth of the range o f diversity 
which they synthesize, or in the degree o f unification w h ich  they 
achieve (the two types o f variation being ultim ately connected). 
T h e human m ind is capable o f a certain perfection, and suffers a 
certain im perfection, in both respects. It is capable o f adequate 
knowledge o f the nature o f ultim ate reality in so far as some 
‘notions’ are common to all m inds, i .e .  there arepropria  com mon 
to all parts o f Natura, viz., T h ough t, Extension, ideation, motion 
1 See Excursus V  (pp. 160-3).
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and rest, & c. T h u s we have an adequate knowledge o f the essence 
o f G od , though necessarily knowledge that is largely abstract or 
selective in the sense that the full content o f these ‘notions’ o f 
propria is not fu lly  developed. A gain , the m ind is capable o f a 
detailed acquaintance w ith certain individual things, especially o f 
its own body as that is affected b y  its environment. T h u s it has a 
detailed knowledge o f a narrow range o f things, though this know ­
ledge is very largely confused and imaginative.
T h u s the pow er o f the m ind is, on the one side, its capacity 
to understand certain broad ultim ate truths about the Real, and, 
on the other side, its acquaintance w ith its own character as an 
individual. Its im potence consists in  the abstract1 nature o f its 
adequate knowledge, and the im aginative character o f its con­
ception o f the individual. T hese two factors m eet in the knowledge 
o f the body itself w hich is at once the narrowest o f the propria 
communia and the richest o f our singulars.
In  scientia intuitiva the m ind fills in  the concrete content o f the 
propria communia (if such a gross description m ay be allowed) so as 
to present the ranges o f  the Real adequately conceived, as wholes 
or individuals, approxim ating to the perfectly individual whole. 
E ven here, therefore, the m ind remains but a partial reproduction 
o f the infinita idea D ei, and it is im portant to notice in w hat exactly 
the partialitas consists. It has been a problem  to m any students 
o f Spinoza, otherwise sym pathetic, to understand how  the finite 
can know  the infinite, and share the eternity o f Natura. T h a t is a 
problem , m ainly, because a m isleading m ental im age o f the rela­
tions o f man and G o d  too easily occupies the m ind.
H um an knowledge is, at the best, an ‘intuitive’ grasp o f a partial 
hierarchy: on the one side, o f ranges of universality beginning from 
Natura naturata and passing down to its own narrow ran ge; and, on 
the other side, o f ranges o f individuality passing from  its own 
degree to the abstract character o f the corpora simplicissima animata. 
T h e  highest human knowledge is thus o f the whole o f Natura as an 
individual at once extended and thinking, but as partly external 
to man, and so far opaque to thought, and in that sense abstract.
1 By ‘abstract’ I must not be understood to mean that it is knowledge o f some­
thing unreal, i. e. o f ens rationis or o f fiction. A ll knowledge is o f the real, i.e. of 
the existing; but abstract knowledge is knowledge o f universal individuals in 
which the full content, owing to the unresponsiveness of the mind, is undeveloped. 
This repetition is justified by the great importance of this point in the Spinozistic 
epistemology.
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Natura in itself m ust be perfectly individual and universal (as the 
corpora simplicissima animata are approxim ately em pty and abstract). 
T h e  knowledge o f man at its best is infected by a certain emptiness 
and abstraction w hich is one w ith his partialitas on the side of 
mind. W e cannot apprehend the whole o f Natura naturata as 
flowing transparently from  creative Natura naturans. T h ere are 
ranges o f being to w hich our m inds and bodies are unresponsive, 
and our failure to apprehend the whole is thus failure to apprehend 
the w ider ranges o f individuality as individual (i.e. as real). It is 
thus that our knowledge o f G od  is incom plete while rem aining 
adequate so far as it goes. O ur knowledge o f G od  is really our 
knowledge o f our bodies, but broadened out and delim ited b y  the 
unity o f the body w ith  Natura  as a whole, but not w ith the m ore 
ineffable ranges o f individuality.1
O ur partialitas, therefore, is not prim arily our minuteness in con­
trast w ith  nature as a whole, but the low  degree o f our responsive­
ness to higher grades o f individuality, or m ore com plete syntheses 
of externality. H ow  relative size is related to organization I need 
not attem pt to determ ine, for the body as we imagine it, i.e . as 
measurable, is not the body as it really is for th ou g h t; and further, 
the undivided character o f Extension im plies the incom m ensura­
bility o f extent and organization, because the latter (to use a 
mathematical analogy) proceeds along a new dimension.
Far more im portant is the consideration that the partialitas o f 
man implies no breach w ithin the R e a l; for each man in adequately 
knowing his own body, also knows G od  adequately, though not 
fully. W e m ust no longer picture Natura  to ourselves as an Arbor 
Porphyriana or an ascending scale from  mere individuals up through 
ever em ptier universals to Substance as a summum genus emptiest 
o f all. F or Spinoza the true and original Individual is Natura  
naturata as it eternally issues from  Natura naturans, and other 
things are individuals only as reproducing Natura  w ith ever 
increasing abstractness as the low er ranges o f individuality are 
approached. T h e  corpus simplicissimum animatum is abstraction at 
its worst, short o f non-being.
It is thus that m an’s knowledge o f Natura  is at once adequate and 
partial. T h ere  is no gap between hum an individuality and the 
divine; for m an is not outside o f Natura, but is a subordinate 
part o f it. H is individuality is a partial transcript from  Natura,
1 For a discussion of these ranges of being see Chapters X I and X II.
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and his knowledge, so far as it is true, is a subordinate part o f the 
infinite idea o f G od. Such knowledge is always o f the infinite O ne, 
though only o f selected features of i t ; and it m ay be true in spite 
o f its incom pleteness, because those features constitute genuine, 
though partial, wholes. It  is knowledge o f the One only as this 
is the ground o f the degree o f individuality enjoyed b y  the body 
itself, and not as it is the perfectly infinite and eternal Natura. 
G o d  him self knows him self and loves him self in  the eternal ex­
pression o f Natura naturans as Natura naturata; and m an’s adequate 
knowledge is the expression o f Natura naturans (in so far as it is 
possible) as a hum an nature, viz. a real, i.e . responsive, part of 
Natura naturata. I f  knowledge is possible to the part at all, then, 
in  some degree, the part m ust reproduce the w h o le : the degree in 
w hich it does so, represents the degree o f reality possessed b y  the 
part in the whole and for itself. W hether it is rightly called 
‘adjectival’ , and i f  so, in w hat sense, I  shall have occasion to 
discuss la te r ;1 but certainly it is a part, for it selectively repro­
duces the w h o le ; and it reproduces the whole selectively because 
it is only a part.
T h u s man touches G od, because he involves both m ultiplicity or 
externality and also the nisus to u n ity; that is, he does so as a real 
existence w hich is an eternal expression, rather than a passive 
content. F or it is in  our active, positive being that w e are eternal, 
that is, as real but finite individuals expressing an abstracted 
individual essence o f Natura. A n d  thus w e m ay be eternal even as 
finite m odes, for our failing from  infinity is not our individuality, 
but the lack o f individuality, the abstractness, the inability to 
probe and rest in the fu ll riches o f the divine nature, that arises 
from  our incom plete responsiveness to that nature. W e are 
relatively e m p ty ; Natura  is fu ll. W e are finite m odes o f Substan ce; 
it is infinite Substance expressing itself in infinite m odal nature 
(for as I have said, the Real is not Substance as excluding the 
m odes, but as expressing itself in them ). A n d  our failing, there­
fore, does not sever us from  the Real, w e are real selections from  
the Real, from  Natura naturata; and the m ore individual w e are, 
the less we are a m ere selection, and the m ore w e are real, the more 
self-sufficing; for real individuality lies in  the direction o f Natura, 
and not in that o f the corpora simplicissima animata. H ere as 
elsewhere it is ‘ im aginative’ pictures that lead us astray; content- 
1 Below, pp. 316 et seqq.
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ment w ith the picture o f individuation as a mere process of 
division, instead o f conceiving such m odal division as unreal 
except as the result, and ‘im aginative’ expression, o f finite in­
dividuation.
O n the side o f Extension, therefore, each part belongs to the 
whole, and, as it w ere, runs right through it. T h e  partialitas o f 
the part is m aintained b y  its real content, i.e . b y  its degree o f 
adequate responsiveness to the whole content o f the Real. O nly 
thus can the infinite m ultiplicity or externality o f Extension be 
sustained against its nisus to unity. M ere abstract instantaneous 
extension cannot be real; it w ould collapse by reason of its vacuity. 
It is the eternity o f Extension that is the basis o f the individuation 
of its essence; a ‘tim eless’ extension has no content to individuate. 
It can only be divided.
Again on the side o f T h ou gh t, each part belongs to the whole 
and reciprocates w ith  it. T h e  partialitas o f the part is its real 
content w hich results from  the degree o f adequacy of its know ­
ledge. A s Intellect it is partial; as Im agination it is other than 
itself; as Intellect and Im agination together it reciprocates w ith the 
whole (though incom pletely). T h e  infixiita idea D ei is not a whole 
without parts, for so it could not be called an ‘idea’ , it is a whole 
of infinitely m any real parts duly organized as the eternal appre­
hension o f itself, and o f res extensa aeterna. I t  is the positive nature 
o f the part w hich is truly itself (and this it derives from  the w h o le): 
its Intellect, its responsive organization; and only in a looser sense 
is it Intellect plus enlightened im aginative co n ten t; responsive 
organization plus responding environm ent; and that ‘ p lu s ’ , as I 
shall show, in the Real is transform ed into non-additive quality.
T h e  contradiction between Extension as infinite, one, and in ­
divisible, and as com posed o f infinite real parts, is thus resolved, 
and can only be resolved, by understanding it not as a ‘ quiescent 
mass’, or as abstract form , but as a real existence, w hich is in­
finitely full o f content. E very part o f that content is, in the degree 
of its partialitas, constituted by the w hole; so that the w hole, as 
active essence, remains infinite, one, and indivisible. I shall not 
use the too magnificent phrase o f Giordano B ru n o :1 ‘w holly in the
1 ‘ In toto et in omni parte totum’ (Bruno, De Immenso et Innumerabilibus, II , 
xiii). T he conception is, o f course, much older than Bruno, or even than Plotinus 
through whom, presumably, it was derived. Cf. Enn. V, viii, 4: Kal yap Ixei 
7ras 7rávTa  ev avroo, Kal av ¿pa ev uAAoj iravTa, o jare 7Tavrayov uavra Kal ttclv irdv /cat 
'¿Kamov m v  Kal ám ip o s r¡ ar/Xr¡. According to Bruno, it is true of ‘divinitas,
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whole and w holly in every part o f the w hole’ ; more soberly I  shall 
say: ‘w holly in the whole and partly in every part o f the w hole’ , 
more soberly, but not m ore parsim oniously, for thus the whole 
escapes the dilemma o f  non-being, and becomes real and in fin ite: 
‘matter was not lacking . . .  for the creation o f every degree of 
perfection’ .1
A gain, it is precisely because res externa is infinite, one, and 
indivisible, that its modification necessarily im plies its eternity. I f  
it can express itself in modes (and its reality, as w e have seen, 
demands that it shall) then it m ust have content w hich  in its very 
organization involves both real variety and unity. T h at content is 
eternity itself, w hich belongs prim arily to the absolute whole (the 
existence o f w hich thus ‘ follows solely from  its essence’) ; and, in a 
derived sense, to the real parts o f the whole w hich selectively 
reproduce it. Res extensa is not d ivided; it is m odified or in ­
dividuated. A n d  it is modified because it is eternal Substance; 
it is individuated because it is the suprem e Individual, and not a 
summum genus or em pty form.
T h e  same principles that establish the unity and distinctness 
o f Extension and its modes establish also the distinctness o f the 
m odes from  one another. T h ere is a sense in w hich each body 
extends throughout the whole, and another sense in  w hich  it 
occupies only a lim ited region o f the whole. But neither assertion 
is true unconditionally. T h ere  w ould be no separate bodies i f  
each w ere om nipresent; and there could be no res extensa i f  bodies 
w ere ultim ately confined to regions. In  abstract extension there 
can be no absolute regions; nor can there be such in Extensio 
naturans as such. D istinctions o f regions are relative to variety of 
content in  Extensio naturata or the facies totius Universi. Bodies, 
I  have said, are not distinguished by their exclusive occupation of 
finite spaces, but those spaces are distinguished as occupied by 
different bodies. Real partialitas is prior to spatial distinction in 
Natura naturata. Body means balance or proportion o f motus et 
quies: bodies differ m odally, not substantially. B ut not to differ 
substantially does not mean that the differences are superadded to 
the general identity o f abstract substance. N o t because Substance
intellectus universi, bonitas absoluta atque veritas’ ; but a lower perfection 
belongs to the ‘ corporeum immensum simulacrum’ o f divinity, because it is 
only ‘in toto totum’.
1 Eth. I, Append.
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is em pty and abstract, but because it is full and concrete, do all 
bodies agree in it. T h ey  are one in substance because the nature 
o f Substance is so full as to require the whole variety o f the w orld, 
in its parts and as a whole, to express it.
Bodies differ m odally, but they are substantially the same, i.e. 
their distinctions do not make them  absolute sections or ‘ chunks’, 
but rather, a hierarchy o f constellations. W hat is from  one point 
o f view  a single body, from  another point o f view  is m any bodies, 
or infinite bodies. T h e  universe is in one sense a single body (if 
the unsuitable expression m ay be allow ed):1 in another sense it is 
infinitely m any bodies o f infinitely m any kinds.2 T h e  same is true 
of every real body (except the corpus simplicissimum) but this does 
not im ply that bodies o f all degrees o f individuality can freely 
overlap one another. In so far as they are individual they cannot 
overlap. O verlapping means partialitas, lack o f individuality. 
T here can be but one com plete Individual. W hat is from  one 
point o f view  a part o f one thing, m ay from  another point o f view  
be a part o f some other, but only in so far as the two things are 
not com plete individuals. T h e y  overlap as mere sections having a 
common region.3 A gain, one individual m ay fall w holly within 
another (as man within the universe), but only because that w hich 
falls w ithin is incom pletely individual. M an falls within the 
universe because he is a part o f the universe; or rather the two 
facts are the same. Individuals o f the same degree o f wholeness 
cannot be so related; nor can they overlap, or have a common 
region in so far as they are individuals. T h eir com m unity im plies 
partialitas and incom pleteness, as their responsiveness implies 
wholeness and relative completeness. A ll tiffs is obviously purely 
analytic and explicative; the main point is that distinction and 
partialitas in res extensa is the same as individuality and responsive­
ness as between the whole and its infinite parts.
It follows that the extent o f individuality is in some degree
1 ‘Per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem, longam, latam, et pro­
fundara, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente 
scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest’ (Eth. I, xv, Sch.). Certainly in that sense 
the universe is not a body.
2 ‘Facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, 
hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui 
mutatione’ (Eth. II , hem. vii, Sch.). Cf. Eth. I , xvi: ‘Ex necessitate divinae 
naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum 
cadere possunt) sequi debent.’
3 Thus a house may be in two or more roads at the same time.
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arbitrary in all cases except the universe as a w hole; for it is the 
nature o f each part to reproduce the whole, in part adequately, in 
part inadequately. But to reproduce inadequately is still to re­
produce : it is not identical w ith pure passivity and inertia. H ence 
it becomes a question at w hat point to draw the lin e : w hat is from  
one point o f view  A ’s body or m ind, is from  another point o f view  
a part o f some external body or m ind. B ut this gives no ground at 
all for m aking the distinctions wholly arbitrary: for thus there 
w ould remain no distinctions in the w hole; and hence no whole. 
T o  seek for individuality alone either in the ultim ate instantaneous 
puncta, or in  the facies totius Universi, could only deprive the Real 
both o f individuality and o f content, i.e. o f reality. T h ere  m ust, 
therefore, be finite individuality at each o f the infinite stages, but 
individuality in every case appropriate to the stage. T h e  in­
dividuality, indeed, constitutes the stage.
Res extensa, then, cannot be a collection o f exclusive individuals; 
nor can it be m erely a single in d ividual; nor again is it sufficient 
to say that it is a system o f ind ividuals; for such a system  need not 
have that degree o f individuality w hich alone is adequate to the 
whole. It is only to be defined as Spinoza him self defines it:  as an 
individual com posed o f individuals, w hich again are them selves 
com posed o f individuals, . . .  ad infinitum. Such is the reality o f 
res extensa naturata. A bstract extension is m erely the place o f 
instantaneous puncta\ real Extension, like real T h o u gh t,1 is the
1 Corresponding assertions may be made with respect to Thought as constituted 
by the infinite variety of reciprocal nisus between ‘objective’ diversity and unity. 
In both Extension and Thought this nisus involves not merely summation, but 
also constellation. T o  express this relation I have, from time to time, made use 
of the phrase ‘ transformation without succession': the phrase is dramatically, rather 
than logically, satisfying, but I find it impossible to improve upon it while 
retaining a suitable brevity (cf. p. 55, note 1). W hat I mean to emphasize by its 
use is the fundamentally important fact that a logical system is neither serial nor 
one-dimensional. W e are accustomed to correct the vulgar notion o f an inference 
as being in time (premisses preceding conclusion); in so doing we come to think 
of it as system timelessly grasped as a whole. But there is mortal danger in so 
doing: for even as timeless system the distinction of logically prior and posterior 
remains, constituting an asymmetrical order. There is logical ‘movement’ or 
rather ‘transformation’. But not in time, i.e. it does not involve temporal ‘succes­
sion’, but only logical ‘depth’. T h e least sympathetic o f m y readers will, I hope, 
recognize how essential this is to m y whole thesis. Failure to make this distinction 
is the source of the too common identification of timelessness with eternity, and 
also of the failure to understand how time emanates from eternity, and m y main 
object in this essay is: to give an adequate definition of eternity, and to prove its 
adequacy by the deduction of time.
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eternal and infinite essence o f G od. F or it is at once infinite 
m ultiplicity or externality (i.e. ‘form al’ diversity) w ith its infinite 
variety o f tiisus to unity, and unity w ith its infinite variety o f nisus 
to infinite m ultiplicity, externality, or ‘form al’ diversity. T h is  
ultim ate essence can only be adequately conceived, and can only 
really exist, as the im manent cause o f all the variety o f natu re: 
yielding, prim arily, the infinite m ode o f motus et quies, w hich is the 
reciprocal nisus conceived in abstraction from  concrete E xten sion ; 
and ultim ately, the universe itself as the variety of individuals o f 
all grades o f completeness w hich express the infinite types and 
complications o f harm onized m obility.
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T H E  A C T U A L  I N F I N I T E
I t  has often been asserted that real wholeness, and therefore real 
infinity, implies a limit; and again that an infinite multiplicity cannot be 
completed, and cannot therefore be actual; so that the conception of an 
infinite whole, which is both infinitely many and also unica, is incoherent. 
I reply that this is to confuse the infinitely many with the indefinitely 
plural. Mathematical readers will be familiar with the conception of a 
determinate infinite multiplicity, as distinct from an indefinitely large 
multitude numerically greater than any assigned number, from the 
researches of Dedekind, Cantor, and others, and I may leave them with 
their acknowledged masters. Philosophical readers, however, will 
probably recur to the discussion of the conception by Royce in his 
volumes of Gifford Lectures on The World and the Individual, especially 
in the Supplementary Essay on ‘The One, the Many, and the Infinite’, 
at the end of vol. i. As I cannot but regard some central features of that 
discussion with the greatest suspicion, and its main conclusions as 
allacious, I am not content to leave my readers to this acknowledged 
master without some warning. But the merest reference to his long 
discussion must suffice.
Royce is directly occupied in his Essay with the question of the 
validity of F . H. Bradley’s arguments in Appearance and Reality, that 
we cannot construe to ourselves the way in which the multiplicity of 
‘appearances’ are unified in the Absolute, because every effort after such 
a unity involves us in an ‘infinite process’. This result Bradley held to 
be logically vicious, in that it implies that there is an actual infinite multi­
plicity, a notion which he believed to be self-contradictory. Royce 
attempts to meet such objections on Bradley’s own ground by showing 
that thought itself presents a diversity in unity which, though infinite, is 
‘self-evident’ , i.e. one in which the infinite multiplicity issues from the 
proprius motus of the unity. Here we have an existing determinate 
infinite, which, if it is admitted by Bradley himself as real (and we must 
remember that Bradley regards the finite self as ‘appearance’), con­
stitutes a refutation of his general argument. In this part of the discus­
sion it seems to me that Royce fails to penetrate the exceptionally fine 
armour of Bradley, though I think he comes nearer to doing so when he 
asserts that ‘the “ endless fission”  of M r. Bradley’s analysis expresses 
not mere Appearance but Being’;1 it is the evidence of the actuality of the 
infinite which constitutes the Real. That Thought is an actual infinite 
1 The World and the Individual, i, p. 554.
is a doctrine that I myself advance and defend, but not from the pre­
misses used by Royce. His argument that ‘Thought does develope its 
own varieties of internal meaning’1 seems to me either radically unsound, 
or, on the best interpretation, incapable of showing how the concrete 
details of finite thought could be provided even in formal outline from 
within thought itself. As Bradley says, the intellect fails because it ‘can­
not do without differences, but on the other hand it cannot make them’ .2 
Royce replies that thought makes its own multiplicity by ‘Reflection’ :3 
the application of any operation of thought to any special matter may 
itself become the matter to which a further operation of thought is 
applied, and so on to infinity (e.g. I may know A ; know that I know A ; 
know that I know that I know A ; and so on). Thus, he argues, since 
self-consciousness is itself actual, and involves the ‘infinite process’, it 
is an actual infinite. For my part I am confident that no such ‘infinite 
process’ belongs to self-consciousness, for we do not immediately know 
our own conscious states by contemplation at a ll: we consciously enjoy 
them, for we are they. This, as I have said elsewhere, is what Spinoza 
means when he says that the idea and the idea ideae are one and the same 
thing in one and the same Attribute. Doubtless, a subsequent idea, by 
contemplating the ‘same’ object, may reproduce the former idea with 
increased detail and extent due to memory and comparison; and this is 
perhaps Royce’s meaning. But if so, the ‘Reflection’ belongs, not to the 
original content, but at each stage to the existing content with its filling 
from memory and comparison. Thus the actual infinity of any in­
tellectual element is not serial, but systematic or implicative. I f  we 
began with a truly simple element, the multiplicity would be the result 
of memory and comparison, and would thus not be actual but only 
accumulative; if  we begin (as empirically we must) with a finite in­
tellectual whole, then its multiplicity is partly accumulative and partly 
actual (as in true inference); only with the absolute whole of intellect 
is the infinity truly actual.
I will venture a comment also upon Royce’s attempt to deal with the 
possibility of an actual infinite of a ‘realistic’ kind, i.e. of being out of 
relations with a knower. This is singularly unconvincing. Diversity is 
introduced into such a unity because we must be able to say at least that 
it has the potency of either being, or not being, in the presence of a 
knowing mind. Hence issues an ‘endless fission’. This is held by Royce 
to be a sufficient reason for denying that a purely ‘realistic’ being can 
exist; the circuius in probando is, however, so obvious that I can only 
suppose that idealistic presuppositions of an important kind concealed 
it from the acute mind of Royce himself. His belief that there are con-
1 The World and the Individual, i, p. 490.
2 Appearance and Reality, p. 562.
3 The World and the Individual, i, p. 493.
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tradictions involved in an ‘actual extended infinite’ that do not occur in 
an ‘actual conscious infinite’ seems explicable only as due to the idea that 
mind is additional to ‘extended being’ as a fact of the same order (and 
M r. Alexander does something very similar). M ind, so introduced into 
the extended world, undoubtedly may, if  discretion is not exercised, be 
the cuckoo that pushes out the true brood and occupies the whole nest. 
Ideas, as Reid assured us, are unfriendly things. But however he 
arrives at it, Royce’s conclusion is that ‘any world of self-representative 
Being must be of such a nature as to partake of the constitution of a 
Self, either because it is a Self, or because it is dependent for its form 
upon the Self whose work or image it is’ .1 But he is also clear that the 
‘corruption and destruction’ of ‘realistic’ fact by ‘fission’ does not result 
from ‘the mere infinity of the relational process’, but from the fact that 
the relata (owing to the absence of knowledge) are wholly disconnected 
from each other. Thus, ‘the real that is in any final sense independent 
of knowledge can[not] be either One or Many or both One and M any’.2 
And what ‘independent from knowledge’ means seems to be indicated 
in the next sentence, which speaks of a ‘real’ which is ‘ linked with’ 
knowledge, and not of a ‘knowable real’. I f  extended being is essentially 
knowable, as with Spinoza, then surely it may be a ‘chain’ (kette) 
equally with intellect; it must, indeed, be so if it is true that within 
knowledge we discover such ketten.
With Royce’s dual criticism of the idealism of Bradley on the one hand, 
and of realism on the other, I have, after all, only secondary concern; 
what is of prime interest is his application to the Real of the conception 
of a kette as it was defined and analysed by Dedekind. By the use of this 
conception he holds that the actual infinite ceases to be self-contradictory 
in that the multiplicity of members results not from ‘wearisome repeti­
tion’ which can never end (and can thus never be fully actual), but from 
the nature of the whole or One, which by its single form determines the 
unlimited series, and thus by its own actuality ensures and determines 
the actual infinitude of its parts. W e may thus ignore the reference to 
self-consciousness (which is not constitutive but merely exemplificative), 
but not the conception of the actual infinite which I regard as one of the 
ultimate and inescapable categories of the Real. In a later chapter I 
shall explain in greater detail how this conception may be applied in the 
deduction of the infinitely many from the self-creative One. The 
general character of a real existent must be its individuality, its whole­
ness, the unity of its manifold. The many must receive the form of 
unity, and the one must receive the matter of multiplicity. T h e real is 
the individual or formed matter— a venerable doctrine in its most 
general character. Where the individual is finite the form imposes itself
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1 The World and the Individual, i, p. 542. 2 Loc cit., p. 543.
on a resistant matter which it lim its: here there is no actual infinite; but 
where, in the limit, the individual is all-embracing, the multiplicity must 
be infinite and thus non-resistant. Thus the isolated definition of ‘man’ 
does not determine how many men there will be in nature: it cannot even 
determine a single individual embodiment. The isolated concrete 
universal ‘man’ , on the other hand, will determine infinite individual 
embodiments differing from each other within the range of subordinate' 
variations admitted by the universal. But within the system of nature 
the concrete universal ‘man’ meets resistant material: man can only 
appear in nature where the conditions permit. And the matter resists 
because it is otherwise ‘formed’ with nature as a whole. It is in this 
sense that the concrete universal ‘has power, in the context of the real 
world to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of 
its individual embodiment’.1 With the whole, there can be no resistant 
matter, for all forms within it are, in their way, and in its way also, 
expressions of it; and they are therefore infinite in number.
Thus the essence of the actual infinite is the dictation by the actual 
One of the unlimited character of the many, which thus become actual. 
A  number greater than any assignable number cannot be actual unless 
its multiplicity is derived from a single formula.
Finally, these principles apply equally to Thought and to Extension. 
Each is actually both one and infinite. Their multiplicity is not 
adequately represented as involving their division (hence Royce’s asser­
tion that ‘Spinoza expressly makes extended substance indivisible, so 
as to avoid making it a self-representative system’2 entirely misses the 
point) but as involving hierarchical individuation.3 Further, as I shall 
show,4 the infinita Attributa are also dictated by unica Substantia which 
thus characteristically expresses its essence in infinite different, but 
equally adequate, ways, and thus constitutes itself as an actual infinitude 
of Attributes each of which expresses the nature of the whole by a 
character which in itself focuses the total being of all the rest. Thought 
as it is for us ‘objectifies’ Extension; Extension ‘embodies’ Thought. 
But Thought, and again Extension, as they are in Substance, focus but 
do not merely collect the being of all the other Attributes, and Substance 
is the ineffable unity of them all. In such a real kette an infinite multi­
plicity of ketten are timelessly actual, though it may involve subordinate 
temporal perspectives for the apprehension (or, again, for the extended 
being) of any of its finite members.
1 Bosanquet, Logic, i, p. 227.
2 The World and the Individual, i, p. 544, note 1.
3 Cf. Eth. II , Lem. vii; V, xxxiii, Sch.
4 In Chapter X I.
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QUALITY AND SYNTHESIS
I H A V E  sought in the character o f duration itself for the clue to the concrete nature o f eternity. M y  m ethod has been in that, 
and no other, sense empirical. W e cannot rest content w ith the 
w orld o f enduring facts, for it is the very duration o f empirical 
existences w hich at once constitutes their being, and confirms their 
ultim ate unreality. T h e y  are dissipated b y  tim e. T h is , indeed, is 
the source o f that double valuation o f duration w hich has some­
tim es been deplored as an im perfection in the philosophy of 
Spinoza, but w hich no true Spinozist w ill endeavour to reduce 
to unity. For the am biguity arises from  the double character o f 
duration itself, as essentially successive, and therefore as the result 
o f the co-operation o f the tw o elements o f externality and trans­
form ation o f quality. W ithout the latter, duration w ill not m ov e; 
it remains a neutral form  w ithin w hich passage m ust be arbitrarily 
im puted.
But the double character o f duration and succession at once 
com plicates our problem  and renders it w orthy o f solution. T h e  
rejection o f succession from  the Real m ust now  be m ore dis­
crim inating; w e m ust not reject too m uch, or m ore than the 
principles involved m ay demand. T h e  im perfection o f duration 
m ay lie either in the elem ent o f externality, or in the qualitative 
element, or again in the w ay in w hich these are integrated in 
succession. I have shown that the elem ent o f externality that is 
involved in duration though in itself no m ore vicious than that 
w hich belongs to Extension (which, rightly ordered and conceived, 
remains as an A ttribute o f the Real) is yet only durational at all in 
virtue o f its union w ith, or derivation from , those transformations 
and limitations o f quality w hich constitute the second essential 
element o f duration and succession; and that these elements are 
not, therefore, m etaphysically co-ordinate. It follows that while 
intellectual criticism excludes succession from  the Real, it  m ay yet 
retain, in a more appropriate and satisfactory form , both the 
element o f qualitative transform ation and also the elem ent of 
externality. T h e  qualitative transform ation w ill then appear as
itself quality, and all quality as ‘transformation w ithout succession’ . 
T h e  externality, again, w ill appear as a perspective o f concrete 
eternal Extension as it m ust express itself, not for a neutral ob­
server, and not for T h ou gh t, but for a finite part o f Extension, 
which is no m ere section, w hich is by no means neutral, w hich is 
yet not total, but w hich responds to the whole in its measure, and 
in its measure constitutes the whole. T h e  integrations o f selective 
qualities and transformations w ith the ranges o f externality appro­
priate to their fragm entary character, constitute the w orld o f en­
during facts. T h is is a perspective o f the whole as it appears for a 
real part w hich only in part reproduces the whole, and w hich, 
therefore, in part is for itself ‘im aginatively’ reproduced by the 
whole. O f necessity it im agines, but is not necessarily deluded.
Some attem pt m ust be made in this chapter to illustrate the 
general principle thus suggested and w hich underlies both the 
Spinozistic conception o f eternity, and also the alternate com ­
mendatory and depreciatory uses o f the term  ‘duration’ in  the 
writings o f Spinoza. T h a t he m ore often uses the term  depre­
ciatingly is due to his great concern to distinguish the conceptions 
of eternity and duration, in view  o f their general confusion in con­
temporary philosophy and in popular thought in all ages. But the 
dual nature o f duration corresponds exactly w ith that o f Im agina­
tion, w hich, as I have already noticed, is at once the sole source of 
error, but is also capable o f being true. ‘ K now ledge o f the first 
kind is the only source o f falsity.’ 1 ‘Error does not lie solely in . . . 
Imagination, but in the fact that, w hile w e . . . im agine, we do not 
know . . . the cause o f the im agination.’2 ‘T h ere are no ideas con­
fused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular m ind.’3 N ot 
partialitas, but unrecognized partialitas, or partialitas m asquerad­
ing as totalitas, is the source o f error. N o positive content is 
excluded from  the Real, and whatever is truly positive in the w orld 
of empirical existence, m ust find a place in the eternal Real. ‘ T h ere 
is nothing positive in ideas w hich causes them  to be called false.’4 
Nor is the connexion o f duration and Im agination m erely ana­
logical, it is essential; for duration is the m ode under w hich we
1 ‘Cognitio primi generis unica est falsltatis causa’ (Eth. I I ,  xli).
2 ‘Error in . . . sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum . . . 
imaginamur . . . imaginationis causam ignoramus’ {Eth. II , xxxv, Sch.).
3 ‘Nullae [ideae] inadaequatae, nec confusae sunt; nisi quatenus ad singularem 
alicujus Mentem referuntur’ {Eth. II , xxxvi, Dem.).
4 ‘Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur’ {Eth. II , xxxiii).
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im agine empirical existences; and we im agine because w e are only 
parts o f nature in  connexion w ith the w hole, w hich thus, so far, 
remains opaque to us. W e project the picture o f ourselves as 
affected by the whole, and w e call the picture ‘nature’ , m istaking 
appearance for reality. But it is not all illusion, for our capacity 
so to project is itself founded upon our real nature and the nature 
o f the whole. It is because we are m odes o f extended and thinking 
Substance that ‘projicience’ is possible; it is because w e are parts 
o f Natura that we have content to p ro ject; it is our nisus to w hole­
ness that necessitates the supplem enting o f our finite eternal being 
b y  that w hich is, but w hich we are not (but are on ly,in  Augustinian 
phrase, towards), and w hich could only be known adequately, and 
as it eternally is in the being o f Natura, by the infinite whole. For 
us it is a sem piternally enduring nature, so immense and so awful 
that the tiny spark o f being that belongs to this or that observer 
seems lost in the vast abyss o f being w hich constitutes or inform s 
Space-T im e. D oubtless the awe that w e feel as w e vainly attem pt 
to plum b the ghastly gulfs o f sky, w ith their hanging m onsters, their 
deep wells o f nothingness,1 is bene fundatum, but its true source 
is not the m agnitude and persistence o f its o b je ct: not that w e are 
sm all and evanescent, and nature vast and sempiternal, but that we 
are so poor and em pty and passive, and Natura  so rich and full and 
active. For there is no tim e w ith w hich w e can com pare our brief 
m om ent, nor any space w ith w hich we can com pare our handful 
o f dust, that we do not so far, and at least in a passive sense, our­
selves possess. W hat we lack and Natura  possesses is fullness of 
active content w oven into that fabric o f infinite intellectual love 
w hich is the stuff o f the eternal Real.
T h at fabric is not hidden from  us, it is ours in our m easure; and 
in the measure in  w hich it is beyond us, it is revealed to us sub 
specie durationis; and the sempiternal and infinite universe is a 
perspective o f eternal Natura naturata, and hence a phenomenon 
bene fundatum. O ur search for the true nature o f the Real must
1 Web Enorme,
Whose furthest hem and selvage may extend 
T o  where the roars and plashings of the flames 
O f earth-invisible suns swell noisily,
And onwards into ghastly gulfs of sky,
Where hideous presences churn through the dark—
Monsters of magnitude without a shape,
Hanging amid deep wells o f nothingness.
(T . Hardy, The Dynasts, After Scene.)
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therefore begin from  these bases, for it m ust begin from  the given, 
and these alone are given: our own eternal being w hich is finite, 
and the sempiternal universe w hich is infinite. W e know  ourselves 
as eternal existences; w e know  the universe, including ourselves, 
as a com plex o f durational existences; and we m ust proceed from  
these together. I f  we perm it ourselves to ignore our eternity, and 
regard ourselves solely as sections o f the universe, finite in tim e 
and space, then w e shall inevitably come to make o f duration an 
absolute existence, when the very nature o f duration cries aloud 
its relativity. A n d  thus duration w ill becom e not m erely a mode o f 
imagining em pirical existences, but tim e itself, the sole value of 
which lies in perfecting the illusory features o f duration, w ill be 
taken as real, and eternity w ill becom e a mere dream. O n the other 
hand, i f  w e take our own eternal existence as our sole effective 
datum, then the universe itself, w hich gives its elements and 
sections their duration (and presently confounds its gift) becomes 
a dream, and an inexplicable dream. For it is thus not a dream 
which really endures, since ex hypothesi duration is itself a d ream ; 
it is a dream that we have dreamed o f dream ing; and that again a 
dream that we have dreamed that w e have dreamed o f dream ing; 
et sic ad infinitum. O ur ultim ate view  o f the nature o f the Real 
must, therefore, take due account both o f our own eternal existence, 
and o f the durational existence o f em pirical things; but it m ust 
proceed, not to interpret the Real in terms of the appearance, 
but to discover the reality that strives to manifest itself through 
the appearance. W e m ust seek the total Real w hich is w holly 
eternal.
Duration, then, is a mode o f im agining the existence o f empirical 
things. It is not w holly illusory; in its positive features it is real, 
but these alone do not constitute it as duration. Increasingly it 
involves negation as we attem pt to grasp and determine it. W hen 
we apply tem poral measures to it we pulverize it. T im e w hich is 
‘an aid to Im agination’ , in perfecting the ‘im aginative’ object, 
reduces it to absurdity. But Im agination stands in need o f no 
such ‘aid ’ ; it is already by nature fragm entary and confused: it 
stands in1 need rather o f the integrating activity o f Intellect. 
By Intellect alone can the Real be kn o w n ; ‘for since there are m any 
things w hich we can by no means grasp by Im agination, but 
only by Intellect, such as Substance, eternity, and others, i f  
any one tries to explain such things by notions o f this kind [viz.
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measure, tim e, and number] w hich strictly speaking are aids to 
Im agination, he does nothing more than take pains to rave w ith his 
Im agination.’ 1 A n d  it is because w e assume, partly justifiably and 
partly not, that a real existence m ust bear some resem blance to 
that w hich w e ascribe to the objects o f sense-perception, and w hich 
w e think that we understand until we try  to explain it,2 that we 
rebel against the conception o f existence that we are asked to 
ascribe to the objects o f Intellect, i.e . to real things. B ut the notion 
o f existence w hich prima facie  w e derive from  sense-perception, 
viz. the occupation o f spatio-tem poral position, is really negative; 
we learn nothing therefrom  but that what is here-now is other than 
what was there-then. But the very slightest exercise o f reasoning 
or thought leads us from  the here-now to the there-then, and their 
difference is recognized as a difference in unity, and not a mere 
negation. N or is their unity a m ere association or aggregation or a 
purely quantitative relation (for Reason all the parts o f space-time 
are alike), it is a unity o f principle w hich w ith all its differences 
(and not only those given) constitutes a concrete universal deter­
m ining events in space-tim e, but not itself an event o f the same 
order. So, and only so, an enduring w orld is constituted, and not 
o f event-blocks or located ‘now s’ . A n d  perception itself, therefore, 
is only possible so far as its prima facie  principles have been 
transcended, and mere exclusion overcome. Further, I m ust again 
recall the fact that it is the clear teaching o f Spinoza that Im agina­
tion itself is not necessarily w holly false; when, and so far as, it  is 
taken for what it really is, it is tru e; and I m ust add that without 
some transcendence o f partialitas and fragmentariness, some real 
duration as distinct from  the dust o f tim e, there w ould be no 
perception, for there w ould be no content to perceive. N o one 
has ever perceived an ‘event’ , i.e . a point-instant, or even an event- 
block, or continuum  o f point-instants. W hat we perceive is some­
thing that endures as well as occupies a com plex o f point-instants.
T h is is not the place to attem pt a serious analysis o f perception,
1 ‘Nam cum multa sint, quae nequaquam imaginatione, sed solo intellectu 
assequi possumus, qualia sunt Substantia, Aetemitas, et alia; si quis talia 
ejusmodi Notionibus, quae duntaxat auxilia Imaginationis sunt, explicare co- 
natur, nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam, ut sua imaginatione insaniat.’ 
(Ep. xii.)
2 ‘Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio’ (Augustine, 
Confessiones, X I , xiv). Though Augustine here speaks o f time, the close rela­
tions of time and sense-perception render the reference significant.
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but some o f the features that are revealed b y  a casual analysis 
have an im portant bearing on m y thesis, and m ay, therefore, be 
used to accentuate the discussion.
It is im portant to rem em ber that a particular thing or quality is 
never perceived in isolation, but always in a concrete situation of 
which the observer’s organism is a central and essential element. 
Perception is always o f a whole situation, though the perceiver’s 
attention m ay be unequally distributed over the situation. From  
such sim ple roots springs that vast jungle o f epistem ological dis­
putation concerning idealism and realism w hich appears for m any 
recent writers to constitute the main content of philosophy. I 
must not here sow seeds for further dispute, but I cannot very 
well proceed w ithout stating as succinctly as possible the attitude 
of Spinoza to such questions. For though in the tim e o f Spinoza 
the realistic and idealistic solutions o f the problem  o f knowledge 
had not been elaborated effuse et ad nauseam, or even attentively 
and clearly, the problem  itself was by no means hidden from  h im ; 
and it was, perhaps, the sim pler for the absence o f two or three 
centuries o f disputation, confusion, and sophistication.
Epistem ological idealists, rightly impressed by the inform ation 
derived from  the study o f physiology and psycho-physics, have 
asserted that the object as known is in some w ay affected or even 
constituted, w holly or in part, by the knower, prim arily b y  his 
organism, but also and necessarily by his knowing m ind, since his 
organism is itself a perceived object, falling under the same 
criticism as other bodies, and again, because sense-contents are not 
things capable o f independent existence. Epistem ological realists, 
on the other hand, im pressed b y  the legitimate, nay essential, 
distinction between know ing a thing and creating it, have asserted 
that the knower does not, in his capacity as knower, affect the object.
N  ow Spinoza is able in the main to accept both o f these assertions, 
because he recognizes that knowledge is an activity w hich is the 
very essence o f the m ind, and is not a transient causal relation at 
all. A n  idea is the essentia objectiva o f a thing; there is no other 
commerce between ideas and th in gs; and the m ind is the essentia 
objectiva o f the body. T h u s ultim ately the m ind knows only the 
body, but by reason o f the responsive organization o f the body, in 
knowing this, it  also knows other things, and in its measure it knows 
the whole. K now ledge is at once of the body, and also only o f the 
body as affected by things. T h e  transiency thus concerns the
3 7 1 3  7
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relations o f bodies w ith bodies, and again o f ideas w ith ideas. 
T h ere  is no transiency as between bodies and ideas, or ideas and 
bodies.
T h u s although w e m ust distinguish clearly between knowing a 
thing and being that thing, it is as im portant not to forget that the 
mental being o f an individual is its kn ow led ge: for G od , knowledge 
o f h im self; for finite m odes, knowledge o f them selves as reproduc­
tions o f other things, and in their measure o f the whole. H ere being 
is knowledge, and knowledge is being. In  sense-perception the 
external object is known only in so far as it is ‘ im aginatively’ repro­
duced by the perceiver; and in adequate thought it is known 
truly only in so far as it is correctly reproduced. B ut the repro­
duction is not o f qualities or things b y  m inds, or o f ideas or minds 
by things. T h e  body reproduces extended nature in its degree as 
the pianoforte, sotto voce, reproduces the striking o f the clock and 
other sounds to w hich it is resonant; and the m ind reproduces 
the ‘infinite idea o f G o d ’ as the present w ork reproduces (in some 
measure, it  is to be hoped) the thought o f Spinoza.1
W hat we know, therefore, is never an isolated and external 
thing. T h a t w e could never know, both because there are no such 
things, and also from  the very nature o f knowledge. W e know  that 
to w hich the body is resonant; and that is always a whole situation 
or w orld, owing its integration, in part at least, to the presence and 
inclusion o f the observer’s sense-organism. F or that sense- 
organism is part o f the total situation or w orld, and it is not the 
‘ body’ as w e im agine it in sense-perception. F or the ‘b o d y ’ o f 
com m on knowledge is no m ore (and no less) the real body, than 
are external things the real things as they are for perfect knowledge. 
But though the perception o f the body as a ‘ qualitied’ thing, 
possessing lim bs and sense-organs and nervous system ,is ‘ imagina­
tive ’ , the real body is, nevertheless, a genuine part o f Natura, 
responding to the other parts constituting its environm ent and,
1 O f course ultimately the analogy halts, because the body does not merely 
reproduce the universe, but it is the partial reproduction of Natura externa; 
similarly the mind is the partial reproduction of Natura cogitans, and nothing 
more. This is, indeed, the ground of the more obvious failing of the analogies, 
in that though the mind and the body cannot do more than reproduce Natura, 
and in fact fall far short of that, the pianoforte may, by its independent structure, 
actually provide organization and content for the piecemeal sounds which it 
echoes; and the thought o f an expositor may, and will, synthesize the ideas of the 
author (and even consciously or unconsciously add to them), for one man is 
never the mere echo of another.
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in its measure, responding to the whole. In  its reality it does not 
become the whole w hich it reproduces; nor does the m ind in its 
reality (w hich is its partially active or adequate knowledge o f the 
whole) becom e one w ith the whole w hich it knows. It tru ly  or 
adequately knows the whole in so far as in its own structure and 
content it reproduces the whole (and, thus far only, as one o f its 
real, though subordinate, elements, constitutes it).
As I have indicated, it is the nature o f the infinite whole to 
reproduce itself in infinite degrees in its infinite p a rts; to be a real 
part is to reproduce the w h o le ; to be an organism is to be in some 
degree resonant to the whole and to the parts o f extended nature. 
There is nothing finite w hich is not in  its degree organic in this 
sense: a m olecule, an atom, an electron, a point o f space, nay, even 
an historical date is, in its minimal measure, an organism. A n d  when 
we turn to the m ind, to knowledge, we find that the same principle 
must hold, but now  amplified by the ‘objective’ character o f ideas. 
For in knowledge there is a double interest: there is the interest 
in the constitution o f thought itself as in some degree reproducing 
the whole; and there is the cognitive interest in the reality w hich is 
revealed by thought. A n d  only in perfect thought can these two 
interests be com pletely united where there is knowledge o f the 
whole o f reality.
It is from  the com plex situation w hich I have described that 
there arises the peculiar liability o f sense-perception to fall into 
error. T h e  body is affected by things and it responds to them  
selectively. W e know  it, therefore, not com pletely, or as it is in 
itself, but only as it is affected by other th in g s; and we know  other 
things only in  so far as the body can reproduce them .1 T h u s in 
sense-perception the object o f knowledge is liable to confusion. 
N ot that in  perception w e invent any positive content w hich does 
not belong to reality ‘som ewhere’ : it  is confused in form , but all 
its positive elements are real, and truth is achieved by placing the 
elements in their right order, b y  rem oving them  from  ‘the common 
order o f nature’ , and arranging them  in ‘the intellectual order’ ;
1 Nor must it be thought that our knowledge is inadequate because we know 
things only in their relations with each other: for they only so exist, and to know 
them in isolation would not be to know them truly. But our perceptual know­
ledge is unsatisfactory because the relations are overlooked or wrongly inter­
preted. Rightly interpreted, all things do not merely merge into one without 
relation; but neither are they indefinitely plural and isolated from each other 
(and hence, once more, without relation).
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nothing positive m ust be rejected. W e perceive a whole o f some 
kind, but we misread it. W hat belongs to the body in relation to 
things is taken as belonging to things out o f relation to the b o d y ; 
w hat belongs to things in relation to the body, we take as belonging 
to the body out o f relation to things. ‘T h e  untutored regard the 
green o f a leaf as an attribute o f the leaf. T h e  physicist, how ­
ever, knows that colour depends upon the light reflected from  
the leaf and calls the reflected light green. T h e  physiologist knows 
that the leaf, w hich appears green when looked at directly m ay 
appear yellow  or grey when its im age falls upon the peripheral 
part o f the retina. H e is therefore inclined to regard the colour 
as an attribute o f the eye itself. F inally, to the psychologist the 
green is neither an attribute o f the leaf, nor o f the light, nor o f the 
eye, but a psychical phenom enon, a definite qualitative entity in 
consciousness. Colours therefore are visual qualities, and w e are 
only justified in  speaking o f red or green objects, red or green rays 
and so on, in the broad sense that the objects or rays appear red 
or green respectively under the ordinary conditions o f vision.’ 1 
T h e  moral is c lear: what the m ind knows in sense-perception is 
always its body in effective relation w ith an environm ent to w hich 
it is resonant. T h e  mere act o f know ing does not affect the whole 
situation w hich is the real object o f knowledge, but in sense- 
perception the body is an essential factor in that w hole situation, 
and indeed very largely constitutes it b y  integrating its elements 
physiologically and neurologically. In  Im agination w e interpret 
our apprehension o f the whole situation as i f  w e knew  an object 
distinct from  the body and independent o f it. W e forget the 
‘ m echanism ’ o f perception. Epistem ological idealism  rem inds us 
that there is a ‘m echanism ’, but it does so m isleadingly as i f  the 
m echanism w ere mental instead o f neuro-physical. It  is truer to 
say, as Spinoza does at the outset, that w e know  only the body, for 
w e can know  nothing that the fu lly  organized body is not capable 
o f integrating, and thereby constituting. B ut that w hich it inte­
grates is itself the result o f integration. T h e  body w hich is the sole 
object o f our knowledge is not the body as it appears for Im agina­
tion : it is a real part o f the whole, responding in its degree to the 
w hole. A n d  its response is at once its reality, and also the ground 
o f our knowledge o f the Real.
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1 J. H. Parsons, An Introduction to the Study of Colour Vision, p. 22.
It remains to consider shortly some o f the m odes of integration 
exercised b y  the body in sense-perception. N orm ally and pri­
marily w e becom e aware in  sense-perception o f ‘qualitied’ things; 
our perception o f qualities is reflective and secondary. A n d  per­
ception is always o f individual th in gs; even our acquired perception 
of qualities is o f individual qualities, and not o f universals per se. 
W e attend abstractingly to the quality and overlook the in­
dividualizing infinitude o f circumstances. I have asserted that the 
main feature o f perception is always, from  the phenom enological 
point o f view , integration o f a differentiated w h o le : in the percep­
tion o f ‘qualified’ things, it is the integration o f qualities and 
relations w ithin spatio-tem poral contours; in the perception o f 
qualities, it is integration in a sense yet to be determined.
The Integration o f ‘Qualitied’ Things
I have spoken of our perception of ‘qualitied ’ things as original 
and prim ary, as opposed to that o f individual qualities w hich is 
secondary and acquired. T h is reverses the order in w hich Thom as 
Reid set forth the distinction between original and acquired per­
ceptions.1 ‘W hen I perceive that this is the taste o f cyder, that o f 
bran dy; that this is the smell o f an apple, that o f an orange; that 
this is the noise o f thunder, that the ringing o f bells; this the 
sound o f a coach passing, that the voice o f such a friend: these 
perceptions, and others o f the same kind, are not original— they 
are acquired. But the perception w hich I have, by touch, o f the 
hardness and softness o f bodies, o f their extension, figure, and 
motion, is not acquired— it is original.’2 I need not stay to deter­
mine, or even to discuss, the suitability o f these diverse statem ents; 
I shall even agree that R eid ’s expression is suitable in its place, 
and w ith appropriate qualification, for in any case the distinction 
remains. Reid admits that w e im m ediately perceive the integrated 
th in g ; we do not on each occasion o f an acquired perception begin 
with the particular qualities, and then actively and consciously 
integrate them ; w hat is given in  perception, w hether original or 
acquired, is the integral thing, and reflection reveals the con­
stituents. Further I shall agree that Reid is right in his assum ption 
that in some sense the constituents are prior to their integration;
1 These questions are again discussed, slightly but freshly, in M r. Whitehead’s 
little book on Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, i.
2 T . Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, V I, xx.
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w e do not invent them . W e directly perceive the apple, but w e also 
perceive its roundness,hardness,greenness, smoothness, & c. T h is, 
indeed, becomes clearer in such examples as Reid him self cites: 
‘ T h e  shepherd knows every sheep o f his flock, as we do our 
acquaintance, and can pick them  out o f another flock one b y  one. 
T h e  butcher knows b y  sight the w eight and quality o f his beeves 
and sheep before they are killed. T h e  farmer perceives by his eye, 
very nearly, the quantity o f hay in a rick, or o f  corn in  a heap. 
T h e  sailor sees the burthen, the build, and the distance o f a ship 
at sea, w hile she is a great w ay off. E very  m an accustom ed to 
w riting, distinguishes his acquaintance b y  their handwriting, as he 
does b y  their faces. A n d  the painter distinguishes, in the works 
o f his art, the style o f all the great m asters.’ 1 In  such instances the 
resultant perception is undoubtedly acquired in the course of 
experience, through custom , reflection, and som etimes by overt 
inference. But though the same m ay be true o f all our perceptions 
o f  ‘qualitied ’ objects, except that w e cannot recall the process, or 
the period, o f acquiring them , yet it m ust also be recalled that 
experience itself can only give rise to such perceptions in  so far as 
its objects are already in them selves integrated. I  need not now  
speak o f the more reflective o f these ‘acquired’ perceptions, w hich 
are really the result o f incipient mental construction or integration; 
attention m ust be concentrated upon the sim ple perception o f 
‘qualitied ’ things w here, I shall contend, the integration is b y  no 
means reflective, but is itself, in  some sense, given. T h e  question, 
therefore, is, assum ing that it is understood how  the constituents 
are given, how  is their integration also given? Further, is the 
given integration intrinsic to them , or is it superim posed upon 
them  by some other thing ?
In  reply to the form er o f these questions, I shall assert that the 
integration o f qualities and relations in the ‘ qualitied’ object o f 
perception is an extension of, and is thus one w ith, the integration 
o f the sense-organism o f the perceiver. It is because all his sense- 
organs belong to a single body, that the percipient can perceive the 
apple as a single thing w hich is round, hard, sm ooth, green, sour, 
& c. I do not for the present assert that the body integrates these 
elements, but only that because the body is one, these elements can 
be perceived as belonging to one thing. T h is  is very  clearly the 
case w ith the visual object, w hich is norm ally single in  spite of 
1 T . Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, V I, xx.
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the use o f two eyes. But it is true m ore generally, since even 
a single sense-organ, such as the eye or ear, is plural in structure, 
is in fact a com plex o f minimal sense-organs. Each rod or cone of 
the retina (it m ay legitim ately be supposed) does its own w ork in 
vision, and m ight be conceived as operating in the absence o f all 
the others, if, that is, their absence made no lesion in its com plete 
structure and connexions.
T h e  further question as to the validity of the integration thus 
established does not arise because, as I have said, the integration 
o f the perceived thing is an extension o f that o f the body. T h a t is 
the significance o f Spinoza’s assertion that the m ind knows only 
the body, or rather that it knows only the modifications o f the 
body as they are produced b y  things acting upon it.1 F or the 
world o f nature as we perceive it, or, let m e say, the worlds of 
nature that w e perceive from  tim e to tim e (for they change from  
moment to m om ent, and differ from  observer to observer), these 
are selections from  the Real, and as selections, constructs. Because, 
and in so far as, we are real parts o f the whole, reproducing it 
in our measure, our selective constructs are not mere illusions, 
but are, in their degree, bene fundata. But their wholeness is but 
an extension o f our wholeness, and in so far as our wholeness is 
adequate, their integration is not im posed upon them  but belongs 
to their reality. T h e  nature that we know  fails to be real, where it 
fails, because, and in so far as, w e fail to reproduce the Real by 
reason o f our partialitas and fragm entariness.2
The Integration o f Qualities
For the purpose o f the present discussion I shall overlook what has 
already been em phasized, viz. the concrete setting o f the qualities 
we perceive, and shall concentrate m y attention on the specific 
content o f the quality. It is noteworthy that the main arguments
1 ‘Objectum ideae, humanam Mentem constituentis, est Corpus, sive certus 
Extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud.’ (Eth. II , xiii.) ‘Mens humana 
ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas 
affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.’ (Eth. II , xix.)
2 Any attempt to retain all the worlds of nature by describing them as per­
spectives of the whole from different point-instants is defeated by the complete 
unreality of each of the infinitely numerous momentary worlds. An instantaneous 
world is unreal through the absence of duration. T he solution of this impasse by 
the use of the conception of the continuity of duration is rendered nugatory by 
the collapse of duration under intellectual criticism. An enduring world is unreal 
through the presence of duration.
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used by Spinoza against the validity o f our sense-experience are 
aim ed, not at the secondary qualities, w hich through the influence 
o f Descartes and English Em piricism  w e have com e to regard as 
specially open to cavil, but at the prim ary qualities, im plying as 
they do the division o f the indivisible, the num erability o f the 
non-num erable, the wholeness o f the m ere section. T h is  m ay be 
due to his desire to go right to the root o f the m atter; and it may 
be that he failed to realize the suggestions and im plications o f 
his own theory o f the affects, acquiescentia, and blessedness. But 
however that m ay be, this is precisely one o f the points at w hich 
speculative amplification o f the theory o f Spinoza is specially 
apposite. I have taken the view  that the general form ula for 
quality, and therefore for Reality, is ‘transform ation w ithout 
succession’ , non-transient activity, integration w ithout loss o f 
asym metry. I f  that form ula is in essence satisfactory it m ust be 
exem plified in the sense-qualities o f thin gs.1
1 I may anticipate the further discussion so far as to explain very shortly that 
the main problem which metaphysicians must meet is the dilemma that in the 
whole there can be no unrealized possibility, whereas unrealized possibilities 
are among the most obvious features of our immediate experience. In in­
stantaneous extension, and even in space-time (unless time be taken as total, 
i. e. as non-temporal), not all things are compossible; thus it is that Imagination 
demands infinitely extended time in which incompossible content may, without 
obstruction, distribute itself by means of dated succession. But as I have shown, 
Intellect will not rest content with time. As Reason it overrides duration, con­
fining itself to propria communia and their relations, i. e. to existences perceived 
sub quadam specie aetemitatis. But scientia intuitiva which has for its object 
the eternal whole in its infinite singularity cannot thus avoid the difficulty. And 
it must meet it not as Imagination does, by dating and succession, but by 
transformation or creative synthesis. This method is exemplified by Spinoza, as 
also I have indicated, in the theory o f the affects and of acquiescentia and 
blessedness or intellectual love. Thus, just as Imagination makes room for the 
incompossible by transformation in succession (and thus generates durations 
appropriate to the various ranges of finite individuality together with their 
qualities which at each stage are known by ‘intuition’), so, ultimately, scientia 
intuitiva must have its ideal expression in an infinite ‘transformation’ or creative 
synthesis without either relative or absolute succession. Each quality, in so far 
as it is the synthesis of finite elements within the Real, itself endures and provides 
content for further synthesis and a new quality. And so to infinity. Thus there 
are infinite grades of being each as the synthesis and consummation of a lower, 
and each being consummated and synthesized in a higher. T he Real is the 
consummation of them all in an infinite ‘transformation without succession’. 
In so saying I am viewing things from the finite end; to speak with metaphysical 
propriety I must say, not that the finite is transformed, transmuted, expanded, 
in the Real, but that the Real is deformed, degraded, and contracted in the 
finite. There is nothing positive in the finite that has not its place in the Real. 
M any have found difficulty in imagining how our triumph over limitation, our
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It has com m only been supposed (and the theory is m uch older 
than Locke) that it is possible to believe that there is at one and 
the same tim e a sense-quality (e. g. red) in the m ind, or in the head, 
or in the sense-organ (or somewhere other than in the ‘ red th ing ’), 
and also, in the external thing, certain m inute m ovem ents, or 
primary qualities o f its m inute parts, corresponding to the colour. 
Thus the real quality o f the thing is supposed to be com present 
with the secondary quality w hich is caused b y  it, or sym bolizes it, 
or represents it. N o such idea can be sustained. W hile the 
observer is perceiving the colour he can only be thinking or 
im agining the ‘real’ quality o f the th in g; contrariwise, i f  he could 
perceive the latter he w ould at most be able to imagine or think 
of the colour. I t  is im possible to perceive both the red colour and 
also the m ovem ents o f the m inute parts o f the thing at one and the 
same tim e, w ith one and the same organ. N o r  is this m erely a 
case o f being unable to see the wood for the trees, or the trees for 
the wood (the trees and the w ood being identical): the colour and 
the m ovem ents cannot be coherently conceived as com present or 
conjunctive existences. T h eir relation both for perception and for 
science m ust be disjunctive and not conjunctive: either green or 
vibrations o f frequency 19 x 10- 1 6 ; never both at once for an 
observer unam biguously single. I f  we make the im possible sup­
position o f a m icroscope with lenses o f a ‘ celestial ’ crystal, u lti­
mately non-granular or o f m uch finer texture than ordinary glass, 
and eyes sensitive to a light that never was on sea or land (for none 
less occult w ould render the experim ent coherently imaginable), we 
may suppose that by such means it m ight be possible to examine
satisfaction in reunion or discovery, the thrill of sacrifice, the relief after the 
terror of imagined evil (and these and similar experiences seem for us too in­
sistent wholly to lack reality or significance), can find a place in an unlimited, 
undivided, single, all-comprehending, Real. In the same way it might be supposed 
that a philosophical submicroscopical animalcule would wonder how the two- 
way motion of the vibrations of heat or of light could be conserved in the universe 
as a whole. We know they are conserved by consummation as quality (heat or 
light): so disunion and reunion, loss and gain, gift and theft, horror and relief, 
are real but subordinate momenta in the eternal all-transforming, all-conserving, 
Real. O f such, indeed, is the Real constituted, but not as their sum or differ­
ence ; they are synthesized as ever-higher quality; they are transformed without 
loss, because without succession, and eternally. M y contention is that an ana­
logous function is at the foundation of all reality whether this appears sub specie 
durationis or is more adequately known as eternal. Our very sense-organism is 
mainly engaged in such synthesizing functions, and it is in virtue of this fact 
that the term ‘intuition’, which is applied by Spinoza to the highest kind of 
knowledge, is defensibly applied also to the processes of sense-perception.
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a lum inous or coloured object, and actually to observe the m ove­
m ents o f its m inute parts, setting up or ordering vibrations in  the 
ether. But the object as thus seen w ould no longer appear to emit 
ordinary light or possess ordinary colour. It w ould be invisible to 
ordinary eyes (hence the supposition o f a further ‘celestial’ light by 
w hich to see in our m icroscope). A n  hypothetical eye that could see 
electrons, atoms, and m olecules oscillating in  their orbits, could 
not see also the light and colour w hich is the result o f the integra­
tion o f these m ovem ents. O n the other hand, no coloured thing 
is seen as possessing ‘ infinitesimal’ motions; the brightest colour 
in  spite o f its origin is a steady content. But w hen I say that the 
relation o f colour and m otion is disjunctive for perception and for 
science, I  m ust not be taken to assert that they are disjoined in 
existence. F or it is because they are existentially (but hierarchically) 
conjoined, and are, indeed, one and the same contour o f content 
variously integrated, that they m ust be disjoined for perception 
and for science.1 I f  they were two separate things, a single observer 
m ight perceive them  as com present. T h eir  real conjunction or 
‘ identity’ is the ground o f their perceptive and scientific disjunction.2
T h e  colour and the motions, then, i f  motions they are, are not 
tw o com present entities, but one, now  perceived b y  sense, and 
again im agined or scientifically thought. Science differentiates the 
sense-quality into motions. Sense integrates motions into qualities. 
I have supposed an im possible observation in the case o f colour 
and light, but an adm ittedly inconclusive experim ent, in  some 
degree analogous, is not im possible w ith sound. T h e  low er thres­
hold o f hearing varies from  person to person, and certainly from 
species to species o f animal, but for any one individual there is a 
region near the threshold w ithin w hich it is difficult to determine 
the precise m anner in w hich he becom es aware o f recurrent aerial
1 Thus, if  the reader looks for an analogy, they are not identical in the sense 
that gold is the same as its small change, i. e. equal in value but different in 
material; or in the sense that the wood is the same as the trees, i. e. the same in 
value and in material; but perhaps as the syllogism with its unsyllogized ‘pre­
misses’ , i. e. identical neither in value nor in material, but solely in the fact that 
the one is the synthesis, integration, consummation (as distinct from the mere 
summation) of the other.
2 In the same way we cannot be aware of the vibrations of the string and also 
the sound with the same sense organ (or part thereof). W e may see the vibrations 
and hear the sound, and thus think of both as belonging at once and in the 
same sense to the string. But we can do so only because we are capable of two 
modes of perception of different sensitivity at the same tim e: the eye is more 
minutely sensitive than the ear.
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vibrations: w hether b y  affection o f the body in general (as the 
pedal notes o f an organ m ay shake the whole resonant building 
together w ith  the listener’s body), or by the sense o f hearing 
operating through the specialized auditory ‘m echanism ’ . I f  the 
frequency is gradually raised from  below the threshold o f hearing 
to a point a little above it, there is a gradual transform ation o f a 
tremor o f kinaesthetic throbs into a continuous note w hich is 
auditory. It is almost as i f  at a selected intermediate point a deep 
note is heard, not w ith the ear in  particular, but w ith the whole 
body in general, and that above that point, only the ear is suffi­
ciently sensitive or sufficiently organized, to integrate the throbs 
into notes.1 It is im portant perhaps to notice that what is inte­
grated is not the aerial undulations but the kinaesthetic throbs, 
but just as those throbs are our perception o f the motions o f our 
sense-organism at large set up b y  the undulating m edium , so our 
sense o f sound is the essentia ohjectiva o f a real integration o f m o­
tions within the situation w hich is the total object o f perception.2
T h e  enduring w orld o f perceptual nature or sensible fact, un­
modified b y  science or reflection, constituted as it is o f things 
possessing prim ary and secondary qualities, is thus itself made 
possible b y  synthesis or integration, by a m ovem ent from  mere 
exclusion and otherness (which alone can constitute nothing, since 
the exclusion o f nonentities is not exclusion at all) towards inclusion 
and identity. I have spoken o f the integrations w hich constitute the 
being o f secondary qualities, and again of the integrations w hich 
constitute the ‘ q u alified ’ things o f sense; integration, further, so 
clearly lies at the root o f the prim ary qualities o f perceived things
1 M y use of the term ‘throb’ may suggest that it is the ‘beats’ of discordant 
sounds that are felt, and that the real explanation is that with very low notes 
the threshold of audibility may occasionally happen to synchronize with the 
resolution of discords. I do not deny the possibility of this, but the phenomena 
to which I refer are different. I have, however, admitted, that they provide no 
more than a doubtful analogy or illustration, and thus I base nothing of im­
portance upon either them or m y interpretation of them.
2 One of the most important functions of our sense-organs is often not merely 
to summate, but also to constellate selected happenings in the extra-organic 
world. This is, perhaps, the truth at the back of the subjectivistic contention 
that sense-qualities are in the mind: they are the result of constellation performed 
by the vigilant sense-organs, and they belong, therefore, not merely to the 
extra-organic thing, but to that in its relations with the sense-organ with which 
a relative whole is constituted. Here again, therefore, as Spinoza says, we 
perceive only our own body as acted upon by external things.
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(in so far as they are concerned w ith their extension, num ber, and 
duration) that it has been possible to avoid an extended examination 
o f its m odes. N or can w e, in this connexion, differentiate between 
the prim ary and secondary qualities in  respect o f ultim ate truth: 
those who w ould depreciate the secondary qualities and retain the 
prim ary m ust be rem inded that the prim ary qualities as they 
appear m erely for sense-perception are m ainly unreal, since 
they im ply that Extension is plural, finite, and divided; contrari­
wise, those who w ould on this basis depreciate the primary 
qualities and allow a large measure o f truth to the secondary (and 
m y own argum ent m ight well produce a bias in that direction) 
m ust be rem inded that secondary qualities alone cannot constitute 
an em pirical existence, and cannot therefore enjoy any advantages 
resulting from  a prejudice in  favour o f ‘facts’ . N either prim ary nor 
secondary qualities, nor the ‘ qualified ’ things o f sense-perception, 
are, in the form  in w hich they appear in mere experience, ultim ately 
real; but neither are they in  them selves ultim ately and w holly 
unreal, for they endure. It  is pure tim e and not duration that is 
w holly u n real; for tim e divides duration and does not itself endure. 
A n d  it is not the positive content o f the prim ary qualities w hich is 
fa lse : that content does not divide, but expresses, the Real. W hat 
is false is the negation that is assumed in uncriticized perception. 
E very m ovem ent o f thought m ust negate that negation. T h e  geo­
m eter does not reject the finite determinations o f space: in a very 
im portant sense these are his immediate subject-m atter; but he 
puts them  in their context as m odes o f space. F or him  the triangle 
is not sim ply three lines connecting three points, or even a finite 
space enclosed by such lin es: the sim plest theorem  demands that 
the lines and their enclosed space shall be regarded as belonging 
to infinite space, or to space w ithout lim it. T h a t is the plain and 
admitted significance o f ‘construction’ w hich is always in some 
form  essential to geom etrical proof. T h e  triangle m ust be regarded 
not as a section o f space, but as an expression o f space. T h e  same 
is true o f a line and o f a point. T h e  whole o f space is in travail to 
bring forth a point, and therefore space is not com posed o f infinite 
points but is prior to them . A ll finite determinations o f space, 
from  the simplest to the m ost com plex (and who shall say w hat is 
sim ple and what com plex?) are the offspring o f space, and issue 
eternally from  her ‘o ’erteem ed loins’ .
T h e  same principles m ust govern our estimate o f the reality of
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the secondary qualities: not what they posit but their rejections 
and exclusions are unreal. It is not the sim ple fact that we often 
w rongly arrange the colours and sounds and tastes o f things, that 
the distant copse looks blue but is really green, that the fruit tastes 
sour but is really sweet, that the water feels cold but is really w a rm : 
we are familiar w ith such errors. N or need I at this point discuss 
with any care the exact meaning o f phrases such as ‘the real colour 
o f X ’ , ‘the real taste o f Y ’ , and so forth. F or these qualities do not 
belong to X  and Y  simpliciter, but to these in appropriate relations 
with their media and an integrating and partly integral sense- 
organism. T h e  precise ownership o f the quality is not now  in 
question, but its reality, and I m ust hold that the positive content 
of the quality, constituted as it is by integration o f the partly 
integrated features o f a contour o f space-tim e,1 is real in so far 
and only in so far, as it is whole. T h e  degree in w hich it is whole 
has already been estim ated: it belongs not to an external and 
independent thing, not to som ething w holly divorced from  a sense- 
organism, but to a situation in w hich such an organism is an 
essential and active part. It is a monster begotten o f partition, but 
still in its degree an expression o f the unity o f the eternal whole. 
Further, its m onstrosity concerns not so m uch its content as its 
sectionalized distribution (and its content only as so modified). 
In a sense in w hich the real part is other than a mere section, it is 
real as an element in the w hole; but its reality is not divided, though 
neither is it self-sufficing, it is a ‘m iddle term ’ or a ‘ species inter­
mediate between the O ne and the Infinite’ ,2 w hich Spinoza 
being perhaps, as I  have already adm itted, like the sophists o f 
Plato’s tim e, som ewhat too quick in passing to unity or infinity, 
was thus prone to forget. But the same m etaphysical principles 
that establish the reality o f the whole and o f the eternal part o f 
man, unlike the epistem ological principles w hich support the 
latter,3 m ust convince us o f the reality o f all positive content in 
the Real.
1 Metaphysically, of course, it is constituted by the dispersion of eternal 
Extension for its real but finite eternal parts which thus operate as ‘screens’. T he 
dispersion is due to the partialitas of the part, and the duration of the constituted 
thing issues from the same source.
2 Philebus, 16 E. (See above, pp. 45-6.)
3 The reality of the knower must be epistemologically prior to the reality of the 
known, and therefore the part which knows must be real with the whole which 
is known by the part. Cogito ergo sum.
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N or, as I have contended, does Spinoza w holly overlook these 
interm ediaries: his doctrine o f the affectus provides us w ith ana­
logical ground for our further speculative account o f the sense- 
qualities o f empirical things, and indeed o f all intermediate modes 
o f unity. W ithout doubt there is in  this region a serious and un­
explained hiatus in the theory o f Spinoza; for it is a genuine 
hiatus, and even in the Appendix to Part I  o f the Ethics and in  the 
Principia Cartesii,1 there is no more than the vaguest suggestion 
o f a sceptical or Em piricist treatm ent o f the secondary qualities. 
Just as w ith the prim ary qualities the argument concerns their 
limitations and divisions and not their positive character, so here 
again the argum ent concerns the distribution o f the secondary 
qualities rather than their positive content.
T h e  w ay is thus left open for u s; and when the intellectual 
criticism  o f the w orld o f perception carries us to a w orld w hich 
w e essentially perceive sub quadam specie aeternitatis, w e are only 
m oving farther along the road that led to perception from  im - 
percipience. W e m ay freely resign ourselves to an intellectual 
criticism  w hich is not only accepted in our corrections o f the 
details o f perception (with w hich w e are never w holly satisfied), 
but is also already at w ork in the constitution o f perceptual things. 
N or m ust the criticism  be lim ited ; i f  it applies to the details o f 
perception it m ust apply also to its main principles and p rod u cts: 
things are as they are correctly, coherently thought. A nd  the 
existence enjoyed by the Real is to be interpreted not b y  the 
exclusion and otherness that m ore obviously characterize existence 
in  the w orld o f perception (but could never constitute even that), 
but b y  the inclusion and identity discovered by Intellect, and 
already enjoyed in  their degree by the partial objects o f perception, 
and the m ore fu lly  enjoyed as inclusion and identity becom e more 
com plete and intimate in the infinite existence w hich is eternity.
1 Perhaps more strangely in view of Descartes’s own discussions, which, as 
Reid pointed out, lie at the root of the sceptical tendencies of English Empiricism.
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E X C U R S U S  V I
T H E  P L A C E  O F  S E N S E -Q U A L I T I E S  A N D  
P E R S P E C T IV E S
I t  may, perhaps, help to illuminate the argument of the last chapter, as 
well as some parts of Chapter V, if I insert a short discussion of the 
difficulties connected with the location of sense-qualities and perspec­
tives. I shall at the same time be considering some of the main sources 
of crude popular subjectivism, and perhaps even of phenomenalism in 
its more responsible forms. Let me say at once that the questions: 
‘Where is the ellipticity of the inclined hoop ?’ ‘Where is the colour of 
the rose?’ are not fairly met by the reply: ‘in the mind’ ; for unless to 
be ‘ in the mind ’ is not to exist at all, the question would still remain: 
‘where among all the other extended existents in the mind are the 
colour and the ellipticity?’
Take for example the red colour of the rose; where is it? It seems 
natural to suppose that the colour of the rose belongs to the rose itself, 
and I think that no answer would really satisfy us that did not in effect 
mean this. We call the red ‘the colour of the rose’ because we suppose 
that the rose has the colour. It seems to be on the rose; it is of exactly the 
same shape and size as the rose itself; there are no misfits in the luminous 
garb of nature. I f  we confine ourselves to visual perception, we cannot 
even conceive what a misfit would look like, for we only perceive the 
shapes of things by the contours of their colours. If we bring in the sense 
of touch we can certainly imagine a seeming misfit in which we feel the 
surface of a thing with a finger which we see as at a distance from the 
visual surface. In such a case we should not naturally imagine that the 
colour did not fit the thing, but that the thing was cased in glass, or 
that we were suffering from some defect of sight, or touch, or judgement. 
The colour fits the rose so snugly that we feel that it must belong to it. 
We cannot separate them; there are no roses without colour, and no 
colours without roses (or their substitutes). Still we must remember that 
a rose is not self-luminous: it does not glow in the dark; its colour 
disappears when all light is excluded from it. The colour disappears, 
but does it cease to exist?. I speak, of course, of the colour itself; 
Thomas Reid distinguished between the colour as it is in the rose, and 
the appearance of colour as we see it. For him real colour is not coloured: 
it is only a certain superficial texture in the rose-petals. That distinction 
seems to me verbally unsuitable; and by ‘colour’ I understand what 
Reid called the ‘appearance of colour’, viz. the actual sense-content.
In this sense of the term it is evident that the rose is not independently 
red; it reflects red light, but it does not produce it. Thus in a dark room 
the rose has no colour, unless we say that it is black and thus indistin­
guishable among all the other black objects in the vicinity. If  we so 
argue, we must equally assert that when we expose the flower to a blue 
or a green light, its new colour, the purple or the grey, is also in the 
rose. It fits it as snugly as the red with which it glowed in the garden, 
and there appears to be no argument for assigning the colour to the 
rose in the one case that is not equally valid for the other.
Now when we begin to inquire into the conditions of these changes 
in the colour of the rose, we are immediately led to the belief that there 
is some interaction between the colour as it is in the rose simpliciter (or 
ceteris paribus) and the illumination under which it becomes visible to 
us. W e are apt to say that the real colour of the rose is red, even when 
its apparent colour is black or grey or purple. We say that the light 
which passes from the petals to our eyes is modified by the conditions 
present in the medium through which it passes (and, since the rose is 
not self-luminous, we must add, by the nature of the source of light, 
and the conditions present in the medium through which it passed in 
illuminating the rose). In fact that the colour we see, and call the 
apparent colour of the rose (as distinct from its real colour), belongs 
not so much to the rose, as to the light that is reflected from the petals 
under the special conditions of the particular act of perception. The 
flower is really red, but it appears to be purple or grey or black because 
the light reflected from its petals has been modified by its source, or by 
its medium, or by both.
The compromise is attractive but delusive, for the so-called ‘real’ 
colour of the rose also has its conditions: it belongs to the rose, not 
simpliciter but only ceteris paribus. It too is conditioned by its source 
of illumination and by its medium; without white light and transparency 
of medium, the rose would not appear to be red. But we normally 
regard these conditions as normal, and normally neglect them. In no 
case, therefore, does the colour belong to the rose considered as an 
independent thing, but only in a certain set of conditions; indeed, if  we 
are to make any distinction at all, it belongs to the conditions, or some 
of them, rather than to the rose. W e perceive the flower as red because, 
and only in so far as, the light reflected from its petals is red; and it is 
the light that is red rather than the rose. The most that we seem to be 
able to say of the rose as the owner of the colour, is that its petals 
possess a certain superficial structure through which they absorb all 
kinds of light-rays except those which are red, leaving these alone to be 
reflected. So that it is the light rejected by the rose which is said to be 
that which it possesses; that which it absorbs, and thus most truly 
possesses, remains occult. The real colour of the rose (if we may call
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it ‘colour’ when it remains occult) is green, and of the grass, red; in the 
same way soot is white, and virgin snow is black. But the red-hot 
poker is ‘really’ red.
T he colour that we call ‘the colour of the rose’ belongs, therefore, not 
to the rose, but to the light reflected from it. But what can we mean 
when we say that the colour belongs to the light ? Where is the light ? 
It is in the space outside of the rose; it travels through that space in all 
directions towards and away from the rose which reflects it. But is the 
colour in the space round the rose (as it must be if it is in the light) ? 
It is not there in the way in which we thought of it as in the rose; 
for the red of the rose filled its contours, whereas the space round the 
rose is not a rose-red space, unless it is rendered partly opaque by vapour 
or dust (but even so it is not the space or the light in it that is red, but 
the particles of dust or vapour which become coloured things like the 
rose itself). Light is thus not coloured in the same sense as the rose 
appears to be coloured; light-rays are not visible in elevation, but at 
most in cross-section. It is, of course, open to any one to believe that 
every ray of light possesses colour at each of its infinite cross-sections, 
but there are some facts that make it more natural to suppose that the 
presence of an active retina with its appropriate ‘mechanisms’ and 
systems of nerves, at any given cross-section of a light-ray, is also an 
essential condition for the presence of colour. The fact that only cross- 
sections of light-rays seem to be coloured, is in itself a ground for 
suspicion; and the further fact that when a ray of light is deflected 
from the central regions of the retina to the periphery, its colour 
changes to grey or yellow, gives us reason to ask with some sceptical 
intent what may be its colour when the retina is altogether removed. 
Our scepticism becomes unmitigated when we recall that colour is not 
apparent only when light-rays impinge upon the retina, for other 
stimuli, both intra-organic and extra-organic may produce it when they 
are brought into effective relation with the retina or optic nerve. 
Chemical agents in the blood, a congestion in the capillary vessels of 
the optic nerve, a blow on the eyeball, a wound in the retina, these all 
may produce the appearance of colour, and therefore either produce 
the colour, or reveal its presence.
Thus it seems that the colour of the rose is not in the light reflected 
from its petals, but that this light is of such a nature (like certain other 
agents) as to produce colour, either where it impinges upon the retina, 
or at some other point in the optic nerve or its connexions. The colour 
of the rose is somewhere in the optical system of the percipient.
But in what way, in what sense, is it there ? It is not there in the way 
in which we thought of it as in the rose. True, there may correspond 
to the physical rose, a small area on the retina which is red in the same 
manner as the rose. It may be seen there by the oculist peering in
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through the pupil of the eye. But the perceiver himself does not see 
by peering in through his own pupils. He does not look at his retina 
at all; nor does he look through it and see the play of images thereon 
as a photographer looks through the ground glass at the back of his 
camera. He looks not at it, nor through it, but from it; and he sees, not 
the rosy spot on the retina, but the red rose (or thinks he sees it). For 
the rose itself is not a part of the retina, but is an object compresent 
with it; and the colour of the rose, if  it is truly an attribute of the retina, 
as the argument seems to indicate, is only seen as in the rose by some 
sort of projection. The rose is out there; the colour is in here.
The retina is thus in no more favoured position, as the possible seat 
of the colour of the rose, than any other less exposed part of the visual 
organism. The argument has led us to the extraordinary theory that 
while the rose is outside of the head of its perceiver, the so-called ‘colour 
of the rose’ is inside of his head; and in perception, it would seem to 
follow, the mind, or some part of the nervous system, either performs 
the curious feat of transferring or projecting something from the inside 
of the skull to the distant rose, presumably through the eyes; or else it 
tints the figure of the rose as coloured spectacles tint the objects seen 
through them. O f the two alternatives the former is optically preferable 
since coloured spectacles only tint a world already otherwise illuminated: 
the tinting being not an addition of coloured light but rather a sub­
traction of certain constituents from the existing light. I f  something 
in the head supplies the colours of the world, that same something 
illuminates the world. W e have been accustomed to regard with ad­
miration, not unmixed with envy, the ability of the cat and other 
nocturnal animals to see in the dark; upon the present hypothesis no 
one has ever seen in anything else. Descartes suggested1 that the eyes 
of the cat exercise some kind of ‘action’ through which objects become 
visible to them in the dark, whereas our eyes, not possessing this valuable 
property in the same degree, can only see through the operation of an 
‘action’ proceeding from the object to them; the present hypothesis 
suggests that from the heretofore supposed darkness of the interior of 
the skull there issues all the light and colour of the universe. Common- 
sense will agree with all science and sound knowledge in refusing to 
believe that it so issues in the ordinary sense of the verb ‘to issue’, and 
hence we must disbelieve the suggestion that the colour of the rose is 
really in the head of the perceiver. Wherever else it may be, the colour 
is not in the head in the sense that it is the attribute of any existing thing 
within the skull. The inside of the cranium is wholly dark.
M ust we then allow ourselves to believe that the colour which is 
neither in the rose, nor in the light-rays, nor on the retinal surface, nor 
in the skull, is nowhere at all? Or that it is ‘in the mind’ in the dis- 
1 Cf. La Dioptrique, Discours I.
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paraging sense according to which real things such as rose, light, retina, 
and skull, are not in the mind? Is colour a delusive dream, and 
therefore precisely nowhere? If so, we must be prepared to lose all the 
sense-qualities of all things, as well as their precise apparent shapes 
and sizes and movements so far at the least as these differ from their 
real shapes and sizes and motions. Thus the main content of the world 
of perception will become a mere dream. For my own part I am un­
willing to accept such a conclusion; I believe that colour has some 
reality: that it is not wholly and in every sense illusory. When I per­
ceive the red rose, something has the colour red; I do not invent or 
create it in the act of perception. I cannot change the colour at will 
and without physical means. Blindness is not a defect of the faculty of 
imagination, but of the sense-organs. I conclude, therefore, that there 
has been some error in the inferences which have led us to our present 
impasse, and that it behoves us to review the argument in order to 
discover its latent flaw.
I argued that the colour is not in the rose, because the colour changes 
without any relevant change in the rose (e.g. with illumination): hence 
it must be in the light reflected from the rose. But 1 did not explore 
the alternative explanation that the colour is in the rose as illuminated, 
though neither in the rose simpliciter, nor in the light simpliciter. The 
same or an analogous omission characterized the argument at each stage 
of its disastrous career. The colour is not in the light, because it changes 
without any relevant change in the light (e.g. when it falls on a different 
region of the retina). But I did not explore the alternative explanation 
that the colour is in the light as brought into effective relation with the 
retina, and neither in the light simpliciter, nor in the retina simpliciter. 
Again, the colour was not in the retina, because colours are visible when 
the retina is not affected as it is in normal vision (e.g. when the optic 
nerve is intra-organically affected). But I did not explore the alternative 
possibility that it is in the retina as appropriately connected with the optic 
nerve atid its central ramificatiofis. And although, even if  I had carefully 
examined all these further possibilities, they would undoubtedly have 
proved unsatisfactory taken distributively, may it not be the case that 
taken collectively, or rather systematically, they do give a satisfactory 
answer to the question: Where is the colour of the rose ? Is it not the 
case that though the colour is not in the rose simpliciter, nor in the light 
simpliciter, nor in the rose as illuminated simpliciter, nor in the retina 
simpliciter, nor in the retina as affected by the light simpliciter, nor in the 
head simpliciter, and so on; that although it is in none of these simple 
or conditioned situations, yet it is in the total situation with all its 
conditions: that is, it is in the rose as illuminated and reflecting rays of 
light upon a retina which is in effective union with an optic nerve and 
central nervous system ?
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But it may be objected that such a statement by no means gives a 
precise answer to the original question, or if  it does so in any degree it 
is only because of its accidental grammatical form, beginning with ‘the 
rose’ and then adding the conditions. But why should we not begin 
with ‘the light’, or ‘the retina’, and make the rose one of the conditions? 
Where, indeed, within the complex system is the colour; for colour 
seems to demand a definite place for its definite shape and magnitude. 
We cannot say that it is in all the elements of our complex system, that 
it fills the volume determined by the contours of rose, ether, retina, 
head, &c. Nor, as has been shown, can we say that it is in any one 
of them alone, or even in any one of them under the stated conditions. 
This last alternative is perhaps worth a further examination. I said at 
the outset that no answer which did not mean that the colour of the rose 
belongs to the rose itself would really satisfy u s; supposing we say there­
fore that the colour belongs to the rose under the conditions stated. 
In spite of the sceptical treatment of this simple hypothesis it may be 
possible to discover in it a truth that will survive all our reasoning. 
After all, I said, the colour does fit the rose itself in a way in which it 
fits no other thing in the world. But in what way does it fit the rose? 
The flower itself is a solid thing possessing three spatial dimensions, 
and even its surface to which the colour seems to cling, though it may 
have no thickness (or so we may suppose) can only be defined in terms 
of three dimensions. But the colour itself certainly has only two 
dimensions as we perceive it; or, if  it is held that we are capable of 
actually seeing depth or distance (as I myself believe), we can at least 
say that the contours of the colour that is visible from a given point are 
not identical with the real contours of the rose itself as a physical thing. 
We do not, for example, see the colour on the far side of the rose.
T he fact is, o f course, that the colour only fits the rose in projection; 
and that is so in spite of the fact that for each of its infinitely many 
projections there is a precisely fitting patch or mask of colour. The 
colour of the rose, therefore, fits not the total rose but one perspective 
of the flower at a time for each perceiver (i.e. from each standpoint, for 
‘perception’ does not make or supply the colour). It does not seem 
possible to say that the colour of the rose is all the colour that fits all 
the perspectives, for that is an infinite multiplicity of shades and patches 
of colour of different sizes and shapes, neither overlapping each other, 
nor conterminous with each another, nor unambiguously excluding 
each other.
I shall say, therefore, that the colour of the rose belongs to the 
perspective of the rose from any one of infinite points of view, and not 
to the rose as a three-dimensional physical thing. It is the perspectives 
of the rose that the colour fits so snugly. W e need not, indeed we must 
not, take the perspectives as independent existences occupying positions
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in or around the rose; nor may we say that the colour is in this or 
that perspective simpliciter. There are no isolated perspectives. The 
colour of the rose is in the perspective of the rose on the occasion of the 
illumination of the rose by light which is reflected towards a functioning 
visual sense-organ situated at the place from which the perspective is 
determined. And the colour fills and qualifies, not this or that element of 
this system, nor the system as a whole, but that perspective of the rose.
Shall I ask, where are the perspectives of the rose ? It is much easier 
to say where they are frotn, and what they are of, than where they are. 
Where is the ellipticity of the inclined circular hoop? Where is the 
apparent flatness of the sun’s disk, the minuteness of the distant star ? 
To say that they are ‘in the mind’ will serve us no better than with the 
colour of the rose. For they are not purely imaginary. There is a certain 
fitness in such appearances, and hence a certain reality which we must 
not deny. The circular hoop ought to appear elliptical when viewed 
from a position outside of its axis or plane; and it does. An immense 
star viewed from a very great distance ought to appear minute; and it 
does. The receding parallel lines ought to appear to converge; and they 
do. These are not, therefore, mere appearances as when a mouse looks 
like a bird, or a philosopher like a fool.
Thomas Reid who, realist as he counted himself, was ready, as I am 
not, to concede that the ‘appearances of colour’ are mental in character, 
explicitly denied that this is true also of their apparent figures and 
magnitudes. These, according to him, are real even though they do not 
reproduce the figure and magnitude of the physical things of which they 
are the appearances. But he makes no attempt, so far as I know, to state 
where these real apparent figures and magnitudes reside. And perhaps 
he was wise. They are two-dimensional projections of three-dimen­
sional shapes, which they represent. The visible figure of a body is 
the position of its several parts with regard to the eye.1 He declines 
even to tell us to what category these real existences belong; they are 
not mere ideas, nor even impressions of sense; nor presumably are 
they physical things on their own account. And though it is by means 
of them that we come to know the real shapes and magnitudes of 
physical things, yet we need not, and normally we do not, first examine 
them, and then infer the realities which they represent. In sense- 
perception we can see the inclined circular hoop as a circular object 
in spite of the ellipticity of its shape in projection, and in spite of 
the fact that nothing is given us in vision but the elliptical patch of 
colour (with, as I should say, the ambiguity due to binocular vision). 
We can do so, and normally we do so ; we elide the process. From Reid, 
therefore, I derive some authority, but no direct help.
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1 An Inquiry into the Human Mind, VI,  viii.
In recent philosophy these perspectives with their filling of quality have 
come to be called ‘sense-objects’, or more simply ‘ sensa’ . ‘Whenever’, 
says Professor Broad, ‘I judge that something appears to me to have the 
quality q there must be an object with which I am acquainted which 
really does have the quality q. This object is the sensum.’1 Effort has 
been expended in the attempt to determine the precise situation of our 
sensa in the real world. M r. B. Russell once advanced the view that each 
sensum is a substance having a small duration, and that a physical object 
is composed of such atomic substances, being the class or sum-total of 
all the sensa that anybody could perceive (from any position and with 
any sort of organic body) as occupying a given contour. If that is so, 
then the colour of the rose is not merely in the perspectives of the 
flower, but is where these are, viz. in the rose itself. For M r. Alexander, 
too, the perspective is a part of the physical thing; all perspectives are, 
he says, selected portions of the thing presented to sight. The real 
thing ‘is the totality of its perspectives, which are contained in it. 
It is not,’ he proceeds, ‘ “ the class of its perspectives” in the language 
of M r. Russell, but it is that from which its perspectives are selected 
by the finite observer according to his position.’2 Thus for Mr. 
Alexander, too, the colour of the rose is in the rose.
It is to M r. Whitehead, however, that we must look for the most 
resolute attempt to resolve the difficulties connected with perspectives. 
His main point with regard to the situation of sense-qualities in general 
is that normally the question is not rightly put. T o  ask where is the 
colour of the rose, is to assume that colour must be the Aristotelian 
adjective of some subject; that if  it is not this, it is nothing real. But, 
he says, the category of substance and accident, or subject and adjective, 
is not the only category under which real existence may fall, and sense- 
qualities are not related to their situations as physical objects are related 
to theirs: they do not unambiguously occupy them. The relation of an 
object to its so-called ‘situation’ depends on the nature of the 
object, and, as M r. Whitehead expresses it, upon its mode of ‘in- 
gression’ into nature. When we say that the rose is red, that the red 
is situated in the rose, we must not mean that the red occupies the rose 
as the rose occupies its situation; what we mean is that there is a relation 
between the rose, the red, the perceiver’s situation, and the situations 
of various other things such as lights, mirrors, spectacles, See. The re­
lation of the red to the rose is not dyadic, but polyadic. Normally we 
think of it as dyadic because the other factors are relatively constant; 
it is the abnormal case that brings home to us the real complexity of the 
situation (e.g. the presence of a mirror, or of a magnifying or distorting 
glass).
1 ‘The External W orld’, Mind, N .S . X X X ,  p. 388.
2 Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 196.
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I do not doubt that M r. Whitehead here makes substantial progress 
towards a definition of the difficulty, but it seems to me that much 
remains to be done satisfactorily to clear up the matter. W e must not, 
for example, speak as if the problem were peculiar to the perspectives, 
and might be explained by reference to indubitable separate things 
such as the physical rose, light, spectacles, mirrors, &c.; for the same 
problem recurs in connexion with every element in the natures of these 
things. Where, after all, and what, is the rose itself? Its position and 
nature is as ambiguous as that of the colour and the perspectives. We 
do not determine the position of the colour by saying that it is ‘ in the 
rose’, unless we also determine the position and connexions and extent 
of the rose itself. That point was discussed in the course of Chapter V, 
where I indicated that the limits of any corporeal thing are relative to 
the special interest of the definition. Every body in some sense occupies 
all space, and draws upon all corporeal essence for its reality. And, in 
that sense, all things are perspectives of the whole, and are so without 
losing their individual reality. The rose is thus an extension of the per- 
ceiver’s body, and that body is part of the realizing environment of the 
rose: it perfects it, integrates it, completes it. It does so without 
superseding it or absorbing it. The rose has no colour when its elements 
are unintegrated, nor is it a rose; and if its integration can result only 
from the compresence of a sense-organism (an assumption that it would 
be unwise to make), then, without an organism of this kind, it has no 
colour at all, but only the disintegrated elements of colour (vibrations, 
or whatever they may be). The rose is realized by integration, and only 
thus exists in the eternal Real. And the integration there must trans­
cend colour, and rose, and the beauty in which we bathe. But in time 
it wavers in and out of being as the accidental conditions of temporal 
existence may determine; and the doctrine of perspectives only in a 
new manner implies the essential simultaneous unity and infinite 
multiplicity of all corporeal nature. There are not things and perspec­
tives ; but Res extensa with its infinite real parts, represented ‘imagina­
tively’ as sections of the whole, yet each co-extensive with the whole, 
and thus including the perspectives of all the others imagined as sections. 
And the qualities of these ‘imaginative’ sections are the integrations of 
more elementary ‘imaginative’ sections, down to the corpora simplicissima. 
But they are not mental or psychical, though they are ‘subjective’, or 
microcosmic, in the corporeal sense: that is, they arise from the cor­
poreal partialitas of the perceiver, and would be there even if, per 
impossibile, the perceiver became unconscious while his sense-organism 
continued to function effectively as in normal perception.
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CHAPTER V i l i
IT  is a com monplace o f Spinoza-study that in the period between the com position o f the Short Treatise on G od, M a n , and His 
Well-being ( if indeed that w ork was directly com posed by Spinoza 
him self) or o f the Cogitata Metaphysica, and that o f the Ethics, 
Spinoza’s view s about the relations o f man and G o d  developed and 
became increasingly coherent and concrete. In  the Short Treatise 
an attem pt is made to establish human im m ortality (onsterfelykheid) 
as possible through the union o f the soul w ith G od , w hereby the 
decease o f the body becom es a mere incident in the soul’s unending 
life. ‘ T h e  soul can becom e united either w ith the body o f w hich 
it is the idea, or w ith G od  w ithout w hom  it can neither be nor be 
conceived.’ ‘ I f  once w e get to know  G od, at least w ith a knowledge 
as clear as that w ith w hich w e also know  our body, then we m ust 
becom e united w ith him  even m ore closely than w e are w ith our 
b o d y.’ ‘ From  this, then, it can easily be se en : ( i)  that i f  the soul is 
united w ith the body alone, and that body happens to perish, then 
it m ust perish a lso ; for when it is deprived o f the body, w hich is 
the foundation o f its love, it m ust perish w ith it. But (2), i f  it 
becomes united w ith som e other thing w hich is and remains un­
changeable then, on the contrary, it also must remain unchangeable. 
F or through what agency could it possibly perish?’1 H ere there
1 ‘D e Ziele kan vereenigt worden, of met het lighaam van het welke zy de Idea 
is, o f met God, zonder de welke zy nog bestaan nog verstaan kan worden’ 
(cap. xxiii). ‘ Indien w y eens G od komen te kennen, ten minsten met een zoo 
klaar een kennisse als daar w y ons lighaam mede kennen, dat w y als dan 00k 
naauwer met hem als met ons lighaam moeten vereenigt worden, en als van het 
lighaam ontslagen zyn’ (cap. xix). ‘Waar uyt men dan ligtelyk kan zien 1. dat 
by aldien zy met het lighaam alleen vereenigt word, en dat lighaam komt te 
vergaan, zy als dan 00k moet vergaan want het lighaam, zynde het fondament van 
haar liefde, ontbeerende, moet zy mede to niet gaan. Maar (ten 2e) by aldien 
zy met een andere zaake die onveranderlyk is en blyft, vereenigt word, zoo zal 
zy in het tegendeel 00k onveranderlyk moeten blyven. W ant waar door zoude 
het als dan mogelyk zyn datze zouw konnen te niet gaan’ (cap. xxiii). (Korte 
Verhandeling, II). Maimonides had spoken of the possession o f true knowledge 
o f God as conferring immortality and eternity on the human mind: ‘ Quarta 
species, vera Hominis est Perfectio, quando videlicet Homo veras consequitur 
Virtutes intellectuales, et ex illis veras scientias ac opiniones addiscit in rebus 
Divinis. Atque hie ultimus est finis Hominis, Hominem perfectione vera 
perfectum reddens, eique soli propria; per illam Homo dignus fit Aeternitate 
et Immortalitate; per illam Homo est Homo’ (Doct. Perplex., I l l ,  liv).
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appears to be no thought o f the eternity o f the soul in any sense 
distinct from  its im m ortality; 1 nor is any such doctrine to be found 
in the Cogitata Metaphysica (1663) w hich is com m only regarded 
as only a year or two subsequent to the Short Treatise, and that 
in spite o f the fact that the general doctrine o f eternity is, as I have 
said,2 fu lly  developed in the earlier chapters. T h e  human mind 
is still held to be im mortal (Deo volenté) because it is a substance; 
but it is not said to be eternal, since the eternity o f creatures is 
expressly denied, even when their duration is limitless in both past 
and future.3 ‘W hen we consider the structure o f the human body 
we can conceive clearly that it is capable o f being destroyed; but 
when w e consider its substance we cannot conceive that to be de­
structible . . . Since it follows clearly, as I  have already, i f  I am not 
mistaken, proved abundantly, that a substance cannot be destroyed 
either by itself or by any other created substance, we are com pelled 
to conclude, from  the laws o f nature, that the m ind is im m ortal.’4
1 ‘ Immortality’ in the literal sense of ‘imperishability’ belongs to an eternal 
thing as well as to a being existing through endless time, but my point here is 
that no distinction is made between these two senses of ‘ imperishability’ with 
reference to the soul. That was a further step which Spinoza took before he 
wrote the Cogitata Metaphysica. But there, as I have indicated, real eternity is 
confined to God, and the finite soul is immortal in the lower sense. In the Ethics 
the finite soul also is eternal, at least in part. (Cf. also below, p. 307, note 1).
2 T he critical question as to how far the statements of the Cogitata Metaphysica 
on the immortality o f the soul are to be taken as the genuine opinions of Spinoza, 
ought perhaps to receive a slight comment, though I am basing nothing of im­
portance on them. T he principle on which I have proceeded with respect to the 
use of this treatise (see Excursus II, pp. 64-71) is that in spite of the statements of 
the Preface to the Principia Cartesii of which it is the Appendix, it may be taken 
to amplify and particularize the teaching of the Ethics, Epistolae, &c., on any 
topic where formal agreement in the main outline can be independently estab­
lished. Thus m y conclusion with respect to the doctrines of time and of eternity 
was in the main affirmative; here, on the contrary, the evidence seems to point 
in the other direction: for though it is true that there is no such radical disharmony 
between the Cogitata Metaphysica and the Ethics as to rule out the possibility 
of a development from the position of the former to that of the latter, still it must be 
admitted that the relevant doctrine of the Appendix is Cartesian, and no positive 
evidence of such a development is forthcoming from any other source. On this 
subject it seems to me that the Short Treatise is more obviously a stage towards 
the Ethics than are the Cogitata Metaphysica. (Cf. also above, p. 143, note 1).
3 ‘Hanc infinitam existentiam Aeternitatem voco, quae soli Deo tribuenda, 
non vero ulli rei creatae; non, inquam, quamvis earum duratio utroque careat 
fine’ (Cog. Met. II, i).
4 ‘Clare enim concipimus, ubi ad corporis humani fabricam attendimus, talem 
fabricam posse destrui; et non aeque, ubi ad substantiam corpoream attendimus, 
concipimus ipsam annihilari posse. . . . Cum autem ex [naturae legibus] clare 
sequatur substantiam, nec per se, nec per aliam substantiam creatam destrui
3 7 1 3  c  c
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In  Part V  o f the Ethics, how ever, Spinoza has at last reached his 
characteristic position, and the human m ind is shown to be in part 
eternal as such, and in part an enduring, but perishing, existence. 
T h e  thought has thus becom e both m ature and coherent. N or 
has it done so as the result o f any recession from  the original 
interest in the value and destiny o f the individual m ind, for already 
in the earlier Parts o f the Ethics Spinoza had established the 
eternity o f the im mediate and mediate infinite modes w hich con­
stitute Natura naturata. In  Part V  he takes what is clearly intended 
to be a further step,and asserts the eternity even o f the fin ite1 m ode, 
such as the m ind o f ‘ this or th at’ individual man, as it stands in its 
appropriate place and order in the Real. I  have already dealt w ith 
the principles involved in  this doctrine so far as it relates to the 
nature and destiny o f the hum an m ind; in the present chapter I 
shall discuss them  in  a m ore generalized manner as applied to the 
nature o f the eternal and infinite whole, constituted and expressed 
in  its infinite p arts; for, as I have argued (and it is, o f course, no 
novelty), a w hole w hich is not a w hole o f parts, a one w hich is not 
a one o f m any, is em pty, and m ust therefore be unreal.
E very real existence, and I m ay add every em pirical existence 
in so far as it  is independent (and therefore real), m ust be a m any- 
in-one. But unified plurality takes m any form s: that o f a mere 
collection, that o f sim ple parts in a m echanism, o f mechanisms in 
a m achine or engine, o f factors in a living cell, o f cells in  an organ, 
o f cells and organs in a m ulticellular organism , o f organisms in a 
contour o f animate nature, o f persons in  a society, & c .; and to each 
belongs a special type o f unity. M y  object here is to indicate in 
outline and speculatively the generalized relations o f such diverse 
modes o f wholeness, and the characters o f their reciprocal parts; 
and to show how  they m ay them selves be unified as essential 
characters o f a single reality. O nly thus can w e decide w hich 
existences are eternal, and in what sense, and w hich are not. In 
carrying out this part o f the inquiry I shall follow  m y selected 
m ethod, and perm it the argument not only to be urged forward in
posse, ut jam antehac, ni fallor, abunde demonstravimus, mentem esse im- 
mortalem statuere cogimur ex legibus naturae.’ (Cog. Met. II , xii.) The 
Cartesian form of the argument is connected with the general purpose of 
the book.
1 ‘ Finite’, in a most obvious and important sense; yet, as I have indicated, also 
in a sense less obvious but not less important, an infinite and eternal mode. 
(See Excursus III, pp. 99-104.)
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accordance w ith the main clues provided by Spinoza, but also by 
the logical and speculative demands o f the developing subject- 
matter.
C O L L E C T I V E  U N I T Y
T h e  mode o f unity w hich is most readily accepted (I do not 
say understood) by an uncritical intelligence is that w hich is 
exemplified by any sim ple collection o f things: a bag o f m iscel­
laneous coins, a batch o f pictures put up for sale, the membership 
of a philosophical congress. W ith  this type o f unity I need not for 
long detain the reader: the cashier who counts the m oney, the 
connoisseur w ho decorates his rooms w ith the pictures, and the 
speakers at the congress, soon becom e conscious o f the im perfect 
character of the wholes constituted b y  this mode o f unity. I t  is 
true that there have been philosophers who have attempted to 
construe the universe in such terms, but even these, when they 
have been thorough, because they have not been content w ith the 
miscellaneous character o f their collective whole, have demanded 
in place o f the w ell-knit unity o f a com plete system  a unity running 
through the infinite plurality o f existents. But they could find no­
thing but the em pty unity o f likeness in  the ultim ate p arts: the 
infinite m any, the ultim ate granules o f existence, are one because 
each is nothing in particular.1 M any scientists have shown a dis­
position to m ove in the same direction. T h e  search for an under­
lying reality or ultim ate form  o f matter by a process o f division and 
sub-division into particles, m olecules, atoms, electrons, & c., and 
the consequent progressive elimination o f quality at each stage, in 
the vain hope that in the end the w orld o f nature m ight be resolved 
into grains w hich are alike in possessing no quality at all, or that 
m inimum o f quality w hich is quantity— this m ust result not in the 
explanation but in the dissipation o f the Real. T h e  principle divide 
et impera is o f lim ited va lid ity : men m ay be ruled by dividing them  
into factions, but i f  you divide them  into lim bs and organs there 
will be no m en to rule. I f  the tyrant’s wish that all his subjects had 
but one neck between them  had been realized he m ight better have 
understood that even a tyrant has a certain dependence on his su b­
jects or slaves. T h e  pathway to the Real m ust lie in the direction 
o f further integration and not further dissipation.
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M E C H A N I C A L  U N I T Y
A m on g empirical existences we are fam iliar w ith collections o f 
parts w hich co-operate to produce a single result or set o f results. 
T h e  cylinder, piston, connecting-rod, crank, and flywheel o f an 
engine co-operate to produce the practically uniform  rotation of 
the shaft. E vidently in such a whole o f parts a higher type o f unity 
is exem plified than in any mere collection: the attention o f the 
designer and o f the craftsman is concentrated on giving all the 
parts the exact size, conform ation, and arrangement that are de­
manded i f  the required result is to be achieved. N om inally such 
a unity m ay be distinguished from  the collective unity already 
touched upon by calling it a ‘m echanical’ u n ity ; the real distinction 
lies in the nature o f its m embers, their relations to one another, and 
to the mechanical w hole. F or here the differences in the elements 
are essential, and therefore cannot, as w ith a collective unity, be 
ig n o red ;1 each part is so designed as to take a special place in 
the assemblage o f parts that constitutes the whole. T h ese re­
lations m ay, provisionally, be sum m ed up in the form ula: the 
parts are designed for the whole, and are thus in  some measure 
intrinsically determ ined by the w hole; and each part reciprocates 
directly or indirectly, and in some measure, w ith all the other parts, 
and is in that degree extrinsically determ ined by them .
U pon closer examination, how ever, such a description is seen 
to be m ore readily applicable to the complex machines or engines 
w hich com e m ost readily to m ind when the term  ‘m echanism ’ is 
used. But it m ust be rem embered that every such com plex 
arrangement is ultim ately divisible into a narrow variety o f simple 
mechanisms (e.g. the lever, the inclined plane or screw, cylinder and 
piston, & c.), and to these the description is less obviously suitable: 
for they are wholes the parts o f w hich are not, as such, ‘m echanism s’ 
at all, but specially conform ed masses o f material. T h ere  is a 
sim pler and more intimate degree o f unity between the sections of 
a simple m echanism than among the parts o f a com plex machine.
N evertheless it is universally recognized that the unity is emptier
1 T he statement is convenient, but not precisely accurate: in a collective whole, 
abstract characteristics are the basis of the collection, and the remainder, however 
important to the parts themselves, are ignored. In a mechanical whole the 
characters in the parts which reciprocate with the design of the whole are more 
concrete, and what can be ignored is relatively less important even to the parts 
themselves.
and poorer, so that those who regard the whole universe as ‘sim ply 
a m achine’, are least w illing to assert that it is ‘a sim ple m achine’. 
M echanistic philosophers always place great emphasis upon the 
complexity o f the system  o f nature, and under cover o f this ex­
traordinary, nay indefinite, com plication, some difficult problems 
are allowed to remain concealed.
I turn, then, from  the patently inadequate notion o f the Real 
as a sim ple mechanism, to the com mon attem pt to read it as a 
com plex mechanism. T h ose who are familiar with such situations 
will, o f course, recognize this transition from  the sim ple towards 
mere com plication as a sufficient indication that the notion o f a 
mechanical unity m ust ultim ately prove inadequate as applied to 
the total Real. For thus w e enter upon the road towards the 
indefinite, w hich signifies the necessity to proceed to a new con­
ception o f unity, capable o f including all the indefinite com plexity 
thus adum brated, but o f doing so genuinely, i.e. indivisibly. T h u s 
we proceed, not to the indefinite, but to the infinite, that is to the 
complete.
In order to explain and illustrate the im mediate application of 
these familiar general principles, it w ill be well to examine w ith 
some care the special defects o f m echanical unity, both sim ple and 
complex. I  shall thus not only demonstrate the ultim ate inadequacy 
of the conception, but also in some degree indicate its place and 
value within the Real.
T h e  characteristic im perfections o f all forms o f mechanical 
unity are that they are not self-contained or complete, and that they 
are not self-maintaining: they are incapable o f growth, self-repair, 
and reproduction.
Empirical mechanisms are not self-contained
M achines in general require guidance, adjustment, and repair by 
a mechanic who is not a m achine: they do not manage them selves, 
or repair them selves, or they do so only incom pletely. W here 
they are supplied w ith self-governing, self-repairing, and self­
feeding m echanism s, these supplem entary parts themselves stand 
in need o f similar attention. T h is involves an infinite process 
which cannot be com pleted on the level o f mere m echanism.
Further, every m achine depends upon its environm ent for the 
supply o f energy, w hich it can only store, transm it, or transform 
in various ways. It cannot create energy. In  this defect it does not,
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as I shall show, stand alone among empirical u n ities; but w ith this 
is associated a m ore proper defect w hich m ay be considered under 
the second heading.
Empirical mechanisms are not self-maintaining
N ot only can a m achine or engine not create energy, it cannot 
but dissipate it (though, o f course, no energy is destroyed). In 
all m echanical transferences o f energy there is always loss to the 
system  by friction in  one form  or another. It m ight, perhaps, be 
supposed that, as this is m erely a loss to the system  and not ultimate 
destruction o f energy, it is a defect peculiar to finite mechanisms, 
and that ju st as such mechanisms m ay be rendered more and more 
com plete, autom atic, self-repairing, self-feeding, and self-govern­
ing, so a com plete m achine, including in its own pattern all the 
elements and conditions w hich com m only operate from  the out­
side, w ould dissipate no energy, but w ould retrieve the frictional 
loss in this or that part, putting the heat, & c., thus produced to 
essential w ork within the whole. A  m achine such as the solar 
system  m ight be taken as a partial analogy: here, owing to its 
relative isolation, the loss b y  friction is proportionately less than 
w ith terrestrial m achines, but it is not absent; it is an essential 
element in the operation o f the mechanism.
But the defect o f m echanism  is not m erely the loss o f energy to 
the environm ent; it runs deeper. E ven i f  it w ere possible b y  the 
com pletion o f a process in infinitum to have a com plete mechanism 
in  w hich there is no actual loss o f energy, there w ould still be what 
is an even more serious defect, v iz . the loss o f the organization 
o f the energy so conserved (and it is, o f course, through the 
organization alone that the energy is available for the production of 
m echanical effects). T h u s, i f  the solar system  is a pure mechanical 
whole, it m ust be running dow n, not m erely in the sense that its 
motion is being retarded,-but also in the sense that the heat-energy 
o f  the sun is being dissipated in accordance w ith  the second law of 
therm odynam ics. T h is  is a law  w hich is treated w ith very  great 
respect b y  those who have been m ost prone to a b elief in  a purely 
mechanical universe,1 as a law w hich no mechanical system 
can avoid. ‘Mechanicalism ’ can therefore he judged out o f its own 
mouth. N o mechanical system  can be ultim ately self-m aintaining:
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1 See Excursus V II  (pp. 216-18).
it m ust sooner or later run down unless it is a part or perspective of 
some wider system  from  w hich it derives energy in a suitable form. 
A nd so to infinity. T h u s even if  the available energy from  every 
source w ithin the system is included in the reckoning, the solar 
system in isolation is no more than a storehouse o f energy w hich is 
in process o f being transform ed into an unavailable fo rm ; it is a 
mechanism that is slowly running d ow n ; it cannot maintain itself 
indefinitely. Its original energy, therefore, m ust have been derived 
from some other system  associated w ith it, or some w ider system  
of w hich it is a subordinate part. I f  the other or wider system s are 
always machines, then w e m ust proceed to infinity before a satis­
factory explanation o f any single m echanical fact is forthcom ing. 
I f  by ‘infinity’ is meant ‘indefinity’, all hope both o f explanation 
and also of finding a self-m aintaining mechanism m ust be resigned. 
I f  by ‘ infinity’ is meant ‘ com pleteness’ then there m ust be a 
complete system  capable not only o f storing, transm itting, and 
transforming energy, but also o f creating it, or at least restoring 
it to organization and availability. Such a system  can be no mere 
mechanical unity in the ordinary, unam biguous sense o f the term ; 
and, while adm itting the validity o f the conception o f m echanical 
order as a subordinate principle under the Real, w e m ust continue 
our pursuit after a more adequate conception o f the unity w hich 
is directly characteristic o f the Real.
O R G A N I C  U N I T Y
In searching for such a type o f wholeness it is natural to look 
first o f all to those empirical unities within our experience w hich 
are strikingly contrasted w ith artificial machines in their power of 
self-maintenance and relative completeness, viz. living organisms. 
U nfortunately the notion o f organic unity has so often been used 
vaguely and rhetorically, or to conceal loose thinking, that the 
conception stands in real need o f clarification and definition. 
M ost things have at one tim e or another been described as ‘organic’ , 
from the atom or electron up to society and the universe; and the 
term is now used by M r. W hitehead in what seems to be a perfectly 
general sense covering m any forms of unity w hich are not prima 
facie organic at a ll.1 I shall use the term  in a sense as close as
1 ‘T h e  doctrine w h ich  I am m aintaining is that the whole concept o f  m aterial­
ism only applies to very abstract entities, the products o f  logical discernm ent. 
T h e concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan o f the whole
M O D E S  O F  U N I T Y  199
possible to its natural and prim ary significance as applied to 
em pirical living beings.
O rganic unities are characterized by self-m aintenance in spite 
o f changes o f material and transformations o f energy, b y  develop­
ment or grow th through gradual internal changes, and norm ally by 
the power to reproduce or give rise to new  individuals o f the same 
species. T h ese characters are evidently dependent upon the 
existence o f a certain relation o f the parts in the organic being 
through w hich the whole is maintained, developed, and repro­
duced. T h e  precise nature o f these relations need not, at the 
m om ent, be determ ined, nor is it possible to do so until I  have 
more carefully distinguished different forms o f living and organic 
being. In  particular I m ust distinguish between the processes of 
life, and organic form ; and also between sim ple and com plex 
organisms. It  w ill be sim pler to deal w ith the second o f these 
distinctions first.
(a) A  living being is either a single cell or it is a ‘collection’ o f 
cells derived from  a single cell by division w ithout immediate 
separation. In the latter case there is a tendency towards a 
specialization o f form  and function among the constituent cells or 
groups o f such cells, resulting, finally, w ith very com plex organ­
isms, in a distinction not only o f cells but also o f ‘organs’ w ithin the 
organism. T h ese organs becom e relatively independent, both 
physiologically and anatom ically, though they remain generally 
subordinate to the requirem ents o f the whole organism. T h is 
relative independence does not begin where anatom ically separate 
organs are developed, but each constituent cell o f every com plex 
or m ulticellular organism has its degree o f independence.
T h e  rationale o f this tendency to com plex developm ent is only
influences the very characters o f the various subordinate organisms which enter 
into it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total 
organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms 
until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an 
electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason 
of the plan of the body’ (pp. 115-16). ‘ Science . . .  is becoming the study of 
organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the 
study of the smaller organisms. . . . T h e organisms of biology include as in­
gredients the smaller organisms of physics; but there is at present no evidence 
that the smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed into component 
organisms. It may be so. . . . It seems very unlikely that there should be any 
infinite regress in nature’ (pp. 150-1). (A. N . Whitehead, Science and the 
Modem World.)
200 A E T E R N I T A S
revealed by an examination o f the other distinction w hich I 
suggested, viz. that between living processes and organic forms.
(b) T h is is a distinction in a different sense from  that between 
simple and com plex organic form ; for living processes are never 
actually discovered except as taking place in organic form s, simple 
or m ultiple. L iv in g  matter is always organic or cellular. But a 
distinction m ust be drawn between the m etabolic processes w hich 
constitute life, i.e. the reciprocal streams o f anabolic and katabolic 
processes w hich, by their im mediate balance, give rise to irrita­
bility or capacity for response, and w hich, by the adjustment and 
organization o f their differences give rise to growth, reproduction, 
or decay; between these on the one hand, and the special contours 
within w hich such processes operate, on the other. For this m ay 
be done w ithout overlooking the fact that response, grow th, repro­
duction, decay, are all functions o f the form , rather than functions 
o f the processes, though form  and process cannot be separated.
T h is principle o f the inseparability o f the form  and the process 
is o f great im portance, for it points im m ediately to the im possi­
bility o f assigning life to the universe at large except on the assum p­
tion of a suitable organic structure in the Real. F or there is clearly 
some peculiar advantage connected w ith the cellular structure o f 
the organism ; it is no accident that vital processes always take 
place within the cell or cellular whole. T h ere is nothing in the 
mere concurrence o f reciprocal processes to give rise to any special 
conformation o f the elements involved. H eating and cooling, for 
example, m ay concur in masses o f water w idely varying in contour 
and size w ithout a tendency to special division or texture. T h e  
boiling of water in the kettle, and again in the locomotive, is equally 
in each case the result o f the dual process of heating by fire and 
cooling at a slower speed by conduction, radiation, and convection. 
But metabolism is a self-m aintaining set o f processes only within 
a contour, viz. the c e ll: thus it adapts itself to the general conditions 
of physical existence; and this, indeed, is the earliest and most 
elementary form  o f the adaptation to environment w hich is the 
characteristic o f all living matter, and w hich results in all the vast 
variety o f living forms w hich constitute the w orld o f animate 
nature. Proceeding from  this prim itive and general basis, there is 
a progressive adaptation o f organic form  to ever more and more 
particular features o f physical nature, followed, far behind, b y  an 
adaptation of these to the requirem ents o f the organic forms.
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N ow  we know from  observation that cellular adaptation is not 
m erely general, the cell is not a m ere bag o f perfectly homogeneous 
living matter, but it has a definite structure, and it can, w ithin 
lim its, adapt itself to some o f the less general features o f physical 
existence. Protozoa, for example, can becom e differentiated in 
function, and even in external shape and activity (form ing organs 
o f m ovem ent, absorption, and excretion) to a relatively high degree 
while remaining unicellular; but, in general, the higher and more 
com plex forms o f adaptation demand a m ultiplicity o f cells, and a 
high degree o f specialization in the adapted organs. Speaking very 
generally it m ay be said that the highest organisms are the m ost 
com plex, since thus only can the obvious defects o f the simple 
organism be successfully rem edied on the level o f organic unity. 
T h u s the m ulticellular human body is by no means a m ere collec­
tion o f cells resulting from  an even process o f fission, and all 
perform ing the same fu n ctio n s; on the contrary, there is the very 
greatest variety o f cellular form  and function, certain cells becom ing 
so highly specialized as to be totally given up to particular activities, 
losing in m any cases the capacity to produce cells o f a less specialized 
kind, losing often all capacity for grow th or renewal. B ut the 
functions for w hich they are adapted are now  carried out w ith 
relatively great detail and precision.
T h u s by an argument com parable w ith that em ployed in the 
valuation o f mechanical unity I  m ust contend that the development 
o f organism towards com plexity and special adaptation, that is 
towards efficiency in the struggle for existence, is an index to 
the insufficiency o f organic unity as an ultim ate character o f the 
R ea l; the organism is essentially finite. T h e  single cell, w hich can­
not but be a better representative o f organic unity than the com plex 
organism or the species, is capable o f grow th and differentiation 
up to a lim it; further progress demands division and m ultiplicity, 
qualified, it is true, b y  specialization among the resulting plurality, 
but the developm ent is towards the indefinite and the partial, 
rather than towards unity, wholeness, infinity, com pleteness. O nly 
so can the organism m agnify its status in the R e a l; but not thus 
can it constitute a w orld and also remain an organism. A  principle 
is evidently at w ork here w hich is analogous to that o f the 
second law o f therm o-dynam ics in the sphere o f m echanism : every 
organism is urged by its own inherent nature towards grow th and 
adaptation to a range o f environm ent; but that grow th necessarily
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implies division and m ultiplicity. But thus the parts o f the com ­
plex organism assume a relative im portance w hich is not possessed 
by the parts o f the single c e ll; they achieve an increasing indepen­
dence, so that the original balance is jeopardized, and the unity 
o f the whole is weakened.1 T h u s the single cell presents a closer 
type of unity than the m ulticellular organism, and m uch closer 
than the species; and yet it cannot but lead on to these looser 
unities by the sim ple process of living its own life efficiently. T here 
is thus a constant increase of disorganization (or ‘ organic entropy’) 
due to the natural developm ent o f organic life, and it is thus that 
organicism, like mechanicalism, reveals its ultim ate inadequacy as 
an account o f the R e a l; it shows itself both in the relative poverty 
o f the highly unified single cell, and the relative m ultiplicity o f the 
highly varied and adapted m ulticellular organism.
S E L F - R E F L E C T I N G  U N I T Y  
Nevertheless the search for a satisfactory type o f unity from  
which to begin a metaphysical deduction has not been in vain. T h e  
organism is infinitely nearer to such a unity than is the mechanism, 
though still infinitely remote from  it; for the organism is an 
infinite or complete mechanism, and ordinary mechanisms are but 
perspectives, ‘ filam ents’, or cross-sections o f organism. In  the 
same w ay I m ust assert that organisms are perspectives o f a higher 
unity or infinite organism : not an indefinitely m ultiplex and 
specialized animal, but an infinite, i.e. complete organism. N ow  the 
special defect o f the m ulticellular organism is its lack o f wholeness. 
Not that this is totally lacking, for, as I have already said, the 
parts (i.e . single cells and organs) are specialized, i.e . they perform 
special functions for the benefit o f the whole. But in so doing they 
are them selves curtailed and m aim ed.2 Further, because the whole
1 But not destroyed, since there is special adaptation in the parts for functions 
essential or beneficial to the whole.
2 Compare the unsatisfactory and partial character of the craftsmen and 
soldiers in the Platonic republic: the perfection of the whole state demanding 
the imperfection of the majority of the citizens, not as citizens but as men. Thus 
the state, like the organism, is an imperfect unity, containing a large element 
of mere makeshift. It would be a profitable (even if  inconclusive) inquiry from 
time to time to discover how much social and political friction is due to the 
incurable nature o f the social organism as a finite, abstract expression of ulti­
mate wholeness and unity; and how much to curable defects. For though there 
may be a best possible social order for any given set of conditions, there is no such 
thing as a perfect State; that is a contradiction in terms, as Solon is reported to 
have suggested.
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is essentially finite, lives in a wider w orld, and has an environment, 
its parts, in becom ing specialized, also becom e relatively isolated 
from  the whole. For the elements o f the environment w ith w hich 
they reciprocate are not capable o f precise totality. T h e  w hole is 
divided, and the parts are thus but fragm en ts; and these fragments 
are the respective stim uli o f the specialized parts o f the m ulticellular 
organism, w hich thus shares the fragm entary and divided character 
o f its environment. T h u s the part becom es at once both weak 
and iso lated ;1 and the whole is, in the same measure, disin­
tegrated.
N ow  a com plete or infinite organism w ould not suffer from  
these special defects. F or, as com plete, it w ould have no external 
environm ent: it w ould be its own environment, i f  I  m ay so speak. 
T h u s each o f its parts, responding to it, w ould remain in appro­
priate harm ony w ith it as its partial reflection. B ut in responding 
to the whole, each part w ould be responding to all the other parts 
w hich, w ith it, constitute the whole, and thus each part w ould 
feel itself responsive to an external nature, and w ould thus image 
itself as an organism. A s a mere part it w ould be an organism ; but 
as a real part, reflecting the w hole, it w ould be more.
A  com plete organism, therefore, is a unity o f a new  and higher 
type, in that, having no external environm ent, yet being infinite 
in  content or essence, w ithout lim itation or negation, each part of 
it in its measure reflects the w hole, so that the whole is reflected in 
infinite w ays and degrees, and is, in som e sense,2 constituted by 
these infinite reflections o f itself. T h is  is the conception o f a self- 
reflecting unity. T h e  descent from  it to organic unity is from  in­
finity, as the descent from  organic unity to mechanical unity is 
from  infinity. In  a self-reflecting unity the parts are not mere 
sections, for each is a reflection o f the whole. In  the m ulticellular 
organism, on the contrary, there is partial division, m itigated by 
that specialization o f function w hich is the ‘ghost’ o f  wholeness. 
In  the sim ple organism  again, there are no separate sections, but 
each part permeates the w hole: a fact w hich is illustrated even 
when the unity is breaking down into duality, for in fission each
1 This combination of weakness and isolation, as it develops in social life, is the 
basis o f our feeling of relative independence. In relation to society it is plausibly 
so described (since society is a dissipated unity), but in relation to Natura, 
weakness and isolation are not independence, but dependence of the most 
slavish kind.
2 I have yet to indicate in what sense.
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part takes its share of all the factors.1 Analogous principles apply 
with respect to com plex and sim ple mechanisms.
A gain, ju st as the organism in  every cross-section and ‘filam ent’ 
is a precise m echanism, so the self-reflecting unity is organic 
and purposive in every perspective, and in every subordinate part 
(though not in its sections or fragments). Purpose and duration 
are thus tw in products o f abstraction from  the concrete unity and 
eternity o f Natura naturata as a self-reflecting unity.
T h e  whole cannot be a m echanism  because it is self-m aintaining 
and self-dependent; it cannot be an organism because it is self- 
com plete and w holly active: it has no external environm ent by 
the demands o f w hich it is lim ited, and to w hich it m ust adapt 
itself (thus introducing unharm onized m ultiplicity w ithin its 
unity). But neither can it be a sim ple un ity; that w ould be to 
fall back through organic unity, and m echanical unity, and the 
unity o f the sim ple aggregation o f atomic parts, to mere sim plicity, 
that is to non-being. It m ust be a unity o f parts, but one in w hich 
the parts, not m erely in a formal sense but concretely and really, 
reflect the unity o f the whole. T h e  unity, therefore, m ust be 
a unity that reflects itself in the parts, and is in turn constituted by 
those parts taken as a w hole.2 T h is, indeed, follows from  the 
absolute completeness o f the w hole; for the infinite parts o f the 
infinite whole, Natura naturata, are the reflection o f the whole in 
every possible degree. I m ust not say o f each part that it is in every 
respect equal to the w h o le; for so the infinite parts w ould, in every 
respect, be indistinguishable, and the whole w ould be void of 
content, and hence nothing. T h e  ultim ate parts o f the whole m ust 
reflect the independent unity o f the whole in every possible degree. 
It is not that these ultim ate parts m ust include unities o f every 
grade: organisms, mechanisms, collections, & c., for some o f these 
subordinate unities can only belong eminenter to the ultim ate parts 
o f Natura. Formaliter, the ultim ate parts m ust all in their infinite 
degrees, ‘from  the highest down to the low est’ ,3 be individuals 
affected b y  co-ordinate individuals, determ ining other individuals
1 i.e. of the cytoplasm, and of the various constituents of the nucleus: sap, 
linin, and chromatin.
2 I need not again emphasize the crucial distinction between the ‘part’ and the 
‘section’. Only the instantaneous undivided whole can have no parts. An 
enduring whole may have temporal and enduring parts; and an eternal whole 
has parts which are at once eternal (as relative wholes) and (as parts) enduring.
3 Etli. I , Appendix.
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o f subordinate rank, and w holly dependent on their creator, 
Natura naturans.
C R E A T I V E  U N I T Y
Such a conception o f the constitution o f Natura  as a whole of 
individual parts, reflecting itself in  infinite degrees, obviously 
raises some difficulties. In particular it raises the difficulty as to 
how  a being so constituted can remain a genuine and intimate 
unity. T h a t it m ust do so, has already been shown, for i f  Natura  
itself is dissected, so also ex hypothesi m ust all its real parts be 
dissected, and thus all unity w ould be lost, and w e should be left 
with a m ere dust o f point-instants. A gain and contrariwise, i f  all the 
parts equally and perfectly reflected the whole there w ould be but 
one part, and that the w hole, and hence no part at all, nor any whole. 
Natura  w ould be neither one nor m any, but sim ply nothing.
T h is  particular problem  affords a convenient opportunity of 
turning from  the abstract consideration o f the various m odes of 
unity to the precise application w hich they receive, or m ay be con­
ceived as receiving, in the m etaphysical system  o f Spinoza. T h e  
special problem  o f the unity o f Natura  as a whole is m et b y  Spinoza 
by use o f the distinction between Natura naturata and Natura 
naturans. T h e  exact significance o f his application o f this class­
ical distinction has not always been understood because it has 
been supposed that at some period after w riting the Short Treatise 
on God, M an, and H is Well-being and the Cogitata Metaphysica, 
and before preparing the final draft o f the Ethics, he definitely put 
aside the notion o f creation w hich had figured largely in those 
earlier works. A s opposed to this view , I shall assert, how ever, that 
this distinction between the tw o aspects o f Natura, the active and 
the passive, is his final solution o f the problem  o f creation. It  is also 
his solution o f the problem  as to how  Natura  can be a single whole 
com posed o f individuals w hich are at once real and finite. T h is is 
so because the distinction o f Natura naturans and Natura naturata 
is not a mere distinction o f reason, but a real distinction im plying 
an eternal act. Substance as Natura naturans, in expressing itself 
in the com plete modal system , or Natura naturata, in the same 
eternal act recreates itself w ith infinite degrees o f perfection, and 
thereby creates the nature w hich it expresses, and w hich expresses 
it. Natura naturans and Natura naturata cannot be separated: it is 
not the teaching o f Spinoza, as so m any superficial students o f his
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philosophy have supposed, that Substance is real and the modes 
o f Substance illusory. T h ere  is a real modal w orld standing in 
eternal relation w ith the genetic unity o f Substance by w hich it is 
created and from  w hich, therefore, it cannot be separated, and 
which constitutes the Real on its derivative side. It is amazing that 
these principles should have been so generally overlooked. Spinoza 
signifies his meaning clearly and vigorously in the closing para­
graph o f the Appendix to Part I  o f the Ethics: ‘T o  those who ask 
w hy G od  did not so create all men that they should be governed 
only b y  Reason’ (i.e. w hy each is not a perfect reproduction of 
G od), ‘ I give no answer but th is: because matter was not lacking 
to him  for the creation o f every degree o f perfection from  highest 
to low est; or, more strictly, because the laws o f his nature are so 
vast as to suffice for the production o f everything conceivable by 
infinite Intellect’ 1 (i.e. for the reproduction of himself).
T h e  ultim ately Real is thus an eternal creative or self-producing 
unity, and this explains how  infinite Natura naturata can be an 
eternal self-reflecting unity o f real but finite parts, and of parts, 
therefore, w hich in their degree share the freedom  o f the whole. 
For each finite part issues eternally from  the undivided creative 
nature o f Substance, and is thereby united to it b y  love.2 T h u s the 
infinite love w hich eternally unites Natura naturata w ith Natura 
naturans at once constitutes and expresses the infinite perfection of 
G od. It is in this and in no trifling sense (pace M artineau and all 
who echo his gibe) that G od is causa sui,3 for activity is the very 
essence o f Reality (a doctrine w hich, in spite of commentators and 
popularizers, is absolutely essential to Spinozism , and was no in­
vention o f L eib n iz in m odern philosophy). A nd activity, further, 
is one w ith real existence as it follows from  the essence o f the
1 Tis autem, qui quaerunt, cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo 
rationis ductu gubernarentur ? nihil aliud respondeo, quam quia ei non defuit 
materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; 
vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut suffi- 
cerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda.’
3 This relation is, indeed, foreshadowed, but not exemplified, even in the com­
plex or multicellular organism in which all the cells are the result of the division 
of a single original. That is the source of the ‘ghost’ of wholeness that unites 
the parts and organs of such a being. But production by fission is not creation!
3 It is not for nothing that a new definition of a phrase, the vulgar interpreta­
tion of which had been derided by Spinoza in the Short Treatise and in the 
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (as Martineau himself points out), stands at 
the head of the earliest Definitions in the Ethics. Clearly, Spinoza’s view was 
that the phrase as he defines it is by no means trifling or absurd.
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existing th in g; so that, as Spinoza says, ‘essence in G od  is not 
different from  existence, indeed the one cannot be conceived w ith­
out the other’ .1 Creation, as the ultim ate unity o f creating and 
created, is thus the very essence o f the Real, and is, therefore, 
one w ith  eternity w hich is ‘ the very essence o f G o d ’ .2 A gain it 
is one w ith ‘the infinite love wherew ith G od  loves him self’ , and 
hence w ith freedom  and true blessedness. In  all these, therefore, 
the finite parts o f the infinite whole necessarily and in their degree 
participate: ‘T h e  intellectual love o f the m ind towards G od  is part 
o f the infinite love wherew ith G od  loves him self ;’ 3 ‘the love o f G od 
towards m en and the intellectual love o f the m ind towards G od are 
one and the sam e’ .4 A gain, ‘our salvation, or blessedness, or free­
dom consists . . .  in  the constant and eternal love towards G o d  or 
in G o d ’s love towards m en’ .5
T h e  general lines o f exposition w hich I have traced are cor­
roborated by the account w hich Spinoza gives o f the creation of 
Natura naturata. H e explains that it is m ediated b y  the creation 
o f the im mediate infinite and eternal m od es: motus et quies in the 
A ttribute o f Extension, and intellectus absolute infinitus in the 
A ttribute o f T hought. A n d , perhaps under Christian influences 
(though this is uncertain), these are described in the Short Treatise 
on God, M an, and H is Well-being as ‘ Sons o f G o d ’ ‘ created [im­
mediately] by him  from  all eternity and rem aining im m utable 
to all eternity’,6 expressions w hich are in  effect pointedly, but
1 ‘Ad primam [questionem: an essentia distinguatur ab existentia] respon- 
demus, quod essentia in Deo non distinguatur ab existentia; quandoquidem 
sine hac ilia non potest concipi’ (Cog. Met. I, ii).
2 ‘Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit exi- 
stentiam’ (Eth. V, xxx, Dern.).
3 ‘Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectuals pars est infxniti amoris, quo Deus se 
ipsum amat’ (Eth. V, xxxvi).
4 ‘Amor Dei erga homines, et Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis unum, 
et idem’ (Eth. V, xxxvi, Cor.).
5 ‘Nostra salus, seu beatitudo, seu Libertas, consistit . . .  in constanti, et 
aeterno erga Deum Amore, sive in Amore Dei erga homines’ (Eth. V, xxxvi, Sch.).
6 ‘Van alle eeuwigheid van hem geschapen, en in alle eeuwigheid blyvende 
onveranderlyk’ (Korte Verhand., I, ix). It has been said that ‘the expression 
“ created from all eternity”  amounts to a denial of “ creation”  in its usual sense’ 
(Wolf, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being, p. 201). Un­
doubtedly it does so; but the correction which Spinoza makes (Cog. Met, II, x) 
applies not to the term ‘creation’ but to the phrase ‘ab aeterno’. There is no 
contradiction in the phrase ‘eternal creation’ if the term ‘eternal’ is rightly in­
terpreted. On the contrary, the phrase is pleonastic, for eternity and creation are 
one and the same.
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curiously, corrected in the Cogitata Metaphysical ‘W hen we say 
that the Father had begotten the Son from  eternity we only mean 
that the Father has always shared his eternity w ith the S o n .’ 1 T h e  
‘creation’ w hich is accepted by Spinoza is thus not an action or set 
o f actions initiated in tim e through w hich what was previously 
non-existent came into being. G od is not the causa transiens o f 
the world but its causa immanens, and creation is the infinite self­
manifestation o f a being whose essence it is to express himself. 
Creation is eternal. A n d  the distinction in the Real between that 
which is created and that w hich is increate is the same as that 
within an ‘expression’ between the expression o f the expressed, 
and the expressed expression. But though in general an ‘expression’ 
may be considered w ithout reference to its being actually expressed, 
an eternal ‘expression’ cannot be conceived except as really exist­
ing, i.e. as ‘expression’ in both senses, so that the dilemma resolves 
itself as system . ‘ T h at thing is created whose essence is clearly con­
ceived w ithout any existence, and yet is conceived per se’;2 finite, 
enduring, created things can be thought of in abstraction from  their 
existence, as m ere essences, but the infinite and eternal creative 
unity cannot be so conceived: ‘ B y that w hich is causa sui I mean 
that o f w hich . . . the nature is only conceivable as existent.’3
Symbolic Deduction
Such being the relations existing w ithin the creative unity of 
Deus sive Natura, let me next attem pt to indicate sym bolically the 
place and significance o f the lower types o f unity among the sub­
ordinate parts o f Natura, and their relation to the eternal whole.
I begin from  the constitution o f Natura naturata. T h is m ust be 
represented as an infinite whole com posed o f infinitely m any parts 
ranging from  highest to lowest, each in its special degree reflecting 
the whole.
L et these parts be P 1, P 2, P 3, . . . .  P n, . . . .  P ° ° .
1 ‘Cum itaque dicimus patrem filium ab aeterno genuisse, nihil aliud volumus, 
quam patrem suam aeternitatem filio semper communicasse’ (Cog. Met. II, x). 
Cf. Augustine, Confessiones, X I, xiii: ‘Hodiernus [dies] tuus aeternitas: ideo 
coaeternum genuisti, cui dixisti: ego hodie genui te. Omnia tempora tu fecisti 
et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus.’
2 ‘Respondemus, id omne creatum esse, cujus essentia clare concipitur sine ulla 
existentia, et tamen per se concipitur.’ (Cog. Met. II, .v).
3 ‘Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, 
cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens.’ (Eth. I, Def. i). This, of course, 
is the essence of the Ontological Proof as it is accepted by Spinoza.
3713 E e
M O D E S OF U N IT Y  209
N o one o f these w ill com pletely reflect1 Natura naturata, but each 
w ill do so in some degree. T h e y  w ill vary, therefore, in activity 
from  a m axim um  to a m inim um , and hence in passivity from  a 
m inim um  to a m axim um. In other words, there w ill be not only 
reflection o f the whole b y  each, but also that failure to reflect the 
whole w hich im plies interaction or transiency as between the parts. 
T h e  m ost perfect o f these im m ediate parts o f  Natura naturata w ill 
suffer least from  transiency; the least perfect w ill suffer it most. 
T h u s each part w ill be constituted on a general plan w hich m ay 
thus be sym bolized:
( i)  P n includes P np \  P np \  P np \  P np n,  P ”p°°,
where P ”p2 is that part o f P n w hich is due to the im m anency of 
P 2 in Pn.
T h is  series represents the activity o f P n, or its adequate re­
flection o f the whole.
But the passivity corresponding to the interaction o f all the other 
parts o f Natura naturata m ay also be sym bolized ; for these other 
parts are inadequately reflected in  the im perfect nature o f P ” . It 
is im portant to rem em ber that the im perfection o f any part is its 
partialitas, and is therefore essential to it, and m ediately essential 
to the whole.
T h u s: (2) P n includes Pnb1, P nb2, P nb3, . . . .  P nbn, . . . .  P ”6°°, 
where P nb2 is that part o f P n w hich is due to the transiency o f P 2 
on P n.
T h is series represents the passivity o f P n, or its inadequate 
reflection o f the whole.
Com bining the two sets o f parts w e have:
Pn  =  Pn  (p i, bl), Pn (p \  b2), P« (p3, bs),
. . . . P » ( p « ,  b n ) , . . . . P n  (p 00,^ 00). 
Sim ilar expressions m ay be used to sym bolize the constitution of 
all the infinite im mediate parts o f Natura naturata.
I m ay notice here that i f  it  were assumed that all the im mediate 
parts o f Natura naturata exactly reflected the whole, the single 
general expression for such parts w ould b e :
p n  = =  p n  p i ,  p n  p 2 , p n p 3}  P «  P « ,  P n  p 0 0 ,
1 The term ‘reflect’ is now used in preference to ‘reproduce’ (which has else­
where been employed, and is in many ways a more suitable term, especially 
where transiency is involved), in order to avoid confusion between real pro­
duction (i.e. expression or creation), and its mere reflection in finite existence.
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which is the arrangement supposed by M cT aggart under a system 
of ‘determ ining correspondence’.1 T h e  objection to such a system 
is its tacit assumption that all the parts can equally reproduce 
or reflect the whole, and yet maintain their partialitas. N ow  
Spinoza saw quite clearly that such an arrangement is im possible. 
I f  the whole is to have parts, those parts m ust be distinguishable. 
T heir distinctness and their partialitas are one and the same. 
Further, the whole m ust have parts i f  it  is to possess content, and 
thus be a w hole.2 H is conclusion therefore is, as I have indicated, 
that there are infinite parts o f all degrees o f perfection ‘from  
highest to low est’ , each in its degree reflecting the whole, and each 
in proportion to its partialitas being subject to the transiency of 
all the other parts. From  this arises, as I  have contended, the dis­
tinction and confusion o f eternity and duration.
According to the analysis set forth, each im mediate part of 
Natura naturata is partly an adequate reflection of the whole 
through the im m anency o f the whole in  the part, and partly an 
inadequate reflection o f it. T h a t inadequacy is the obverse o f the 
transiency o f the other parts in so far as they are not fu lly  reflected, 
for the spirit o f the whole urges to that fu ll and infinite expression 
of w hich it m ust distributively deprive itself in order to maintain 
its fullness o f content. Failing to achieve full expression in the part 
while maintaining its perfection in the whole, there is o f necessity 
that pressing-in upon the part by all the other parts in so far as they 
have failed to find adequate expression in it. T h u s the eternal 
icevcocns gives birth to time, and im perfection to transiency; and 
thus also for each part the whole is partly transparent and partly 
opaque; it is partly understood and partly im agined; it is partly 
eternal and partly durational, i.e. sempiternal. So the stability o f 
the eternal whole is maintained, and its unity is expressed in, and 
constituted by, its infinite m ultiplicity.
I have argued that Deus sive Natura  is an eternal creative u n ity ; 
that Natura naturata conceived per se is a unity w hich, since each 
part in its measure reflects the whole but cannot w holly reproduce 
it, may be called, in that restricted sense, a self-reflecting unity.3
1 Cf. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, IV , xxiv.
2 Nor is the necessity merely verbal, but real and constitutive.
3 The phrase is McTaggart’s, and although he uses the conception too loosely, 
he explicitly recognizes the possibility of the restriction I have introduced (Loc. 
cit., IV, xxxi, §  2&4).
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In the prim ary parts o f Natura naturata there is found an 
example o f a lower type o f unity w hich to some extent corresponds 
with that o f a specially com plete m ultiple organism. For here 
there is not self-production, and not self-reflection, but only the 
partial reflection in the single part o f Natura  o f all its other p arts; 
thus it possesses, as I have shown, som ething o f the unity o f mere 
aggregation.
T h e  parts o f P n are the reflections within P n o f all the other im ­
mediate parts o f Natura naturata. H ere there is m ultiple refer­
ence beyond the part itself demanding an internal structure re­
sponsive to an environm ent. B ut even here the part is not solely 
constituted b y  w hat is other than its e lf; it  is not a mere whole of 
partial reflections. F or as the sym bolic formulae indicate, one part 
at least o f every such im mediate part corresponds not w ith some 
other part but w ith itself. O ne part o f P 1 is P 1 (p1, b1); one part 
o f P 2 is P 2 (p2, b2); and so on. W ithin each mediate part o f Natura 
naturata there is a reflection o f the whole in  its single integrity, 
though not in its absolute completeness. T h e  characteristic o f an 
organic whole, it w ould seem therefore, m ust be a set o f parts, one 
at least o f w hich reflects the whole, while the others reflect external 
things partly adequately and partly inadequately. T h e  adequate 
reflection o f external things w ill be their propria communia, and all 
else but im aginative or confused reflection.
T h e  same principles apply in the analysis at each succeeding 
stage, w ith an increasing range o f inadequate im aginative re­
flection and a decreasing (but never absent) range o f adequate 
understanding. For though no part o f Natura  fu lly  and clearly 
understands or reproduces the whole, yet each part that is genuine 
possesses a part w hich survives integration or intellectual criticism , 
as a real part o f the whole.
In  our typical analysis o f an im mediate part o f Natura naturata 
into its parts (i.e. into the mediate parts o f Natura naturata):
P” =  Pn (pi, b1), Pn (p2, b2), Pn (j>\ P),
....Pn(pn, bn),....Pn(p̂ ,bx),
the mediate part P n (pn, bn) reflects P n as it is in  the integrity of 
Natura naturata. It reflects it but does not w holly reproduce it. 
A n d  each o f its parts again contains one part that reflects it but 
does not w holly reproduce it, w hile all its other parts reflect the 
rem aining parts that constitute it as a mediate whole.
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T h u s the parts o f the part P n (pn, bn) w ill b e :
[Pn (Pn, bn)} [pn (p \ P ), bn (p \  ¿1)],
[Pn (pn, bn)] [pn (p \  P ), M (p \  ¿*)], . . . .  
[Pn (pn, bn)] [pn (pn, bn), bn (pn, bn)],
. . . . [Pn (pn, bn)] [pn (p<* , ft« ), b« (*>” , 6°° )],
of w hich the part [.P n (pn, bn)] [pn (pn, bn), bn (pn, bn)] is the re­
flection in itself o f P n (pn, bn). It is a stage further rem oved from  
concreteness, but it is not confused by transiency. It is not com ­
plete but it is real in its place in Natura naturata. Formaliter it 
survives integration; objective it survives intellectual criticism .
It follows from  this analysis that all the immediate parts o f 
Natura naturata are ‘organic’ wholes eminenter, for they reflect, 
not m erely themselves (and thus also the whole per speculum in 
aenigmate), but further, they reflect the other parts o f the whole 
through transiency, i.e. confusedly. It does not follow, however, 
that all em pirical, im perfect, formal organisms are immediate parts 
of the whole, though it is not impossible that certain o f them  are 
parts, either im mediate or mediate. F or all the parts o f the 
immediate parts o f the whole are wholes containing parts w hich re­
flect themselves and all the other parts w ithin their series. A nd  they 
do so even where they them selves are parts w hich as such find no 
place in the ultim ate whole (though all their determinants find a 
place therein).1 It w ill be thus that enduring existences follow  from 
the necessity o f the divine nature and yet are ‘ortal’ and mortal. 
T h ey  follow  b y  necessity as mediate parts o f N atura ; as such they 
have duration: but in so far as they are parts w hich, in reflecting 
themselves, reflect no immediate part o f the whole, they are not 
eternal but m erely endure.2 T h ou gh  such mediate parts are within 
Natura they are not parts o f Natura  as a w h o le; they are parts o f 
parts w hich are but sections of the whole, and w hich in the whole 
are resolved into their determinants. Those ultim ate determinants 
are necessarily parts o f Natura and are eternal, but they contain 
their infinite determinates not as sections but as reciprocating
1 Clearly this applies to parts such as P n (pm, bm), and all the parts of P n other 
than P ” {pn, bn) ; to [P" (pn, &")] [pn {pm, b”‘), bn {pm, J>»)]; and to all their 
subordinate parts, ad infinitum.
2 Nor, however long their duration may be, are they sempiternal. For sempi- 
ternity belongs to Natura as the whole to which all parts, both mediate and im­
mediate, belong, and to homologous wholes. To their parts these cannot but 
appear as sempiternal. In and for itself Natura is eternal; its sempiternity is a 
phenomenon bene fundatum.
parts: that is, they contain them  each and all not formaliter but 
eminenter. Each mediate determinate or part o f a part reiterates 
the rhythm  o f the whole sub specie durationis, w hich thus becomes 
‘a m oving picture o f eternity’ . D oom ed to duration, suspended 
between tim e and eternity, between non-being and being, it is as 
‘ an instrum ent in the hand o f the workman, w hich serves unw it­
tingly, and b y  serving is consum ed’ .1
T h e  sym bolic deduction need be carried no further; its utility 
depends solely upon its sim plicity and clearness (as w ell as its 
special appeal to a certain type o f m in d ); in itself it  is not specially 
effective as a m ethod o f discovery, and in the steps so far taken it 
has perhaps more than served its purpose. T o  carry it further w ould 
thus be no more than an exhibition o f agility in the use o f com plex 
sym bolic expression. M echanical unity, it m ay be supposed, 
w ould belong to various subordinate sections or com plications of 
sections o f the mediate parts o f Natura, and their unity w ould be 
not intrinsic (and certainly not complete) but derived im mediately 
from  finite determ inants,2 and only m ediately or rem otely from  the 
spirit o f the whole.
T h e  lim it towards w hich the general analysis m ust asym ptotically 
approxim ate is an infinite assemblage o f point-instants w holly 
w ithout quality (or even continuity) and therefore w holly without 
being. Such an assemblage can constitute n oth in g: it cannot even 
constitute Space-T im e w hich has sometimes been m ade the starting- 
point o f phenom enological developm ent. T h a t w hich ex hypo- 
thesi is w ithout essence can have no existence and can be nothing. 
But all real stages o f the analysis are ‘qualitied’ (i.e. are integrated), 
and therefore in their own w ay they exist, though their existence 
m ay be, only or largely, duration. A n d  it is their quality or unified 
diversity that exists, and not some prim eval stuff, or form ally 
unified m ultiplicity, to w hich the quality is superadded. T h eir 
ultim ate stuff is the whole as creative eternity, and the quality o f 
a finite thing indicates its partialitas w ithin the whole. Q uality 
does not ‘em erge’ , it  is reality ; but the qualities o f finite things are 
always a ‘ falling from  ’ reality, a ‘ vanishing’ . ‘ From  the necessity of 
the divine nature m ust follow  an infinitude o f things in infinite 
ways, that is, everything w hich can fall w ithin the sphere o f infinite
1 ‘Non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu Artificis, quod inscium servit, et 
serviendo consumitur.’ (Ep. xix.)
2 Though not necessarily from human determination.
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Intellect,’ 1 for as I have shown the determinants of all things lie 
within the divine nature, though o f their determinates som e also 
lie w ithin that nature as immediate parts o f Natura naturata, while 
some are precipitated only by the dissolution that belongs to 
partialitas, and are therefore resolved by integration in the whole. 
A nd thus what for us are lurking flaws or ‘warpings past the aim ’ , 
for the whole are elements in that eternal ‘strain o ’ the stuff’ w hich 
is real activity, w hich is eternity, w hich is creation, w hich is love.
1 ‘Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae 
sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.’ {Eth. I, xvi.)
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E X C U R SU S V II
T H E  S U P R E M A C Y  O F  T H E  S E C O N D  L A W  O F  
T H E R M O -D Y N A M I C S
‘ T h e  law that entropy always increases . . . holds, I think, the supreme 
position among the laws of Nature. I f  someone points out to you that 
your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s 
equations— then so much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. I f  it is 
found to be contradicted by observation— well, these experimentalists 
do bungle things sometimes. But if  your theory is found to be against 
the second law of thermo-dynamics I can give you no hope; there is 
nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.’1 But there are 
theories of the universe which, though they do not contradict the law 
of the increase of entropy, are yet unable to accept the supremacy which 
is claimed for it in this passage. M r. Eddington does not describe the 
appropriate attitude for a thinker whose less ‘provincial’ theory of 
the universe demands that applications of, and inferences from, this law 
shall be confined to its proper sphere, viz. the transactions of purely 
mechanical systems or series; or, more widely and more precisely, of 
all systems qua mechanical. M r. Eddington might, perhaps, take refuge 
behind the title of his book, where he would often be safer; and doubtless 
scientists generally are excusably amused when an unwary philosopher 
suggests the possibility of suspending the operation of the second law 
of thermo-dynamics; and yet, though I hope I am not unwary, I venture 
to ask, what is it that the living bodies of the scientist and the philosopher, 
together with all other organic bodies down to the most primitive 
protozoa, are doing throughout the whole course of their lives, if  it is 
not partly suspending that law by organizing energy within their contours 
(and even in their immediate environment) ? Indeed, the same is true 
even of machines whether produced by living beings or not, where the 
disorganization of energy is never complete. The rate of increase of 
entropy, whether in a machine or in a living body is, after all, finite. 
Thus if  we define entropy as the disorganization of energy, or ‘the 
practical measure’ of its disorganization,2 life is, if  not its organi­
zation de novo, at least its re-organization, or the neutralization of the 
tendency towards disorganization. In other words, if  the law of the 
increase of entropy says nothing of its rate, it is, like other laws, only 
a law of tendency, and therefore it can be suspended or counteracted 
if the source of the tendency can be excluded, neutralized, or reduced.
1 A. S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, p. 74. 3 Loc. at.
Now if an organic body could be regarded as complete in itself, we 
should then have within its contours the suspension, i.e. the neutraliza­
tion of the second law of thermo-dynamics; the condition is, of course, 
as I have asserted in the text, essentially impossible, so that the scientist 
may safely continue to smile, though perhaps more reflectively; for he 
will do well now to consider whether, when we take nature as a whole 
(if we do not prejudge the issue by regarding it as an exclusively serial 
mechanistic order), it does, after all, remain impossible to believe that 
the law of the increase of entropy may be suspended, i.e. whether it is 
applicable to tota Natura. The inescapability of the second law of 
thermo-dynamics is, I venture to suggest, only an alternative expression 
of the inadequacy of merely mechanistic concepts in the theory of the 
ultimate nature of the Real. For though we cannot by any organization 
of the parts of external nature make the whole universe live, or even, 
so far, make any of its subordinate parts live (except by the ordinary 
processes of organic generation), it does not follow that nature is a life­
less mechanism or mechanistic series; on the contrary, there is reason 
to believe that Natura alone is completely alive, and that its parts have 
their quasi-life only as partial reproductions of the living whole. In our 
operations on external nature, e.g. in an engine (and the conditions 
would not, in this connexion, be essentially different if we succeeded 
in making a living cell), we can at best ‘throw two half-shuffled packs 
[of cards] into a hat and draw out one pack in its original order and one 
pack fully shuffled’.1 The analogy, however, must be pursued a step 
further if  it is to serve the present purpose: for we do not, even in the 
laboratory, make an engine which will do no more than shuffle half of 
our cards and leave the others precisely as they were. We get the second 
pack out of the hat equally shuffled, perhaps, but shuffled differently, 
we put in petrol (say) and get out rotation. Even with the lever, the 
inclined plane, the spring, we get a change of place, direction, time, 
respectively. So again, in the intra-organic operations of the living body, 
though we do not, even locally, reverse the law of increasing entropy, we 
do locally neutralize it in so far as our processes are efficient; and if we 
only neutralize, and do not completely suspend, the law, it is because 
we are finite, and thus entropy is increased in the course of our struggle 
against the forces of external nature. Thus we must not suppose that 
the universe as a whole either shuffles or unshuffles its cards: here the 
analogy breaks down, for the order of nature is the order of the cards. 
In other words the whole of nature is no mere organism maintaining 
itself against a partly obstructive environment. Organic unity, I have 
argued in the text, is but a perspective, only less inadequate than the 
mechanistic order, of the eternal unity of Natura extensa, which in-
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eludes, but transcends, these abstract, finite, imperfect modes of being. 
Our life indeed, our power of retarding the increase of entropy within 
our own contours, and even in our context, is an imperfect reproduc­
tion, within corporeal nature, of the eternal self-creation of the whole. 
It involves the irruption of no psychical or quasi-psychical entity 
within extended reality. When we regard tota Natura extensa abstractly, 
as a vast mechanical unity or series, we confine our attention to its 
mechanical attributes, and thus imagine it to be in process of running 
down, either continuously, or with incidental halts, but no re-windings. 
True, its supposed infinity of extent and power restrains our certainty; 
but it is only when its infinity is rightly interpreted as its concrete 
wholeness that we are able to understand that while there is increase of 
entropy in all colligations within the whole, yet wholeness (whether in 
tota Natura or in the res singulares) involves not summation but self­
maintenance, which, in the limited form proper to us as organisms 
trading with time, having commerce with circumstance, and sharing in 
our own evolution,1 is life, but which must take ever more and more 
potent form in the ascending hierarchy of the worlds, and in the Real 
is eternal creation.
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PREFACE
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
TH E  fundamental am biguity o f the term  ‘phenom enology’ in recent tim es, as w ell as the im portant variations in its m ean­
ing in earlier philosophy, im pel me to offer a brief explanation and 
com ment to guide the reader towards a correct understanding o f 
the use w hich I have made o f it in the following chapters and 
throughout the book.
I need hardly say that in em ploying it I have had no thought o f 
the ‘Pure Phenom enology’ w hich, in G erm any at least, is associated 
with the name o f D r. Edm und H usserl. In  this country, so far as 
I know, the older sense or senses o f the term  have not yet becom e 
obsolete or even antiquated, though the researches o f D r. Husserl 
and his school have been by no means uninfluential. T h e  pheno­
m enology o f w hich I speak in this essay is thus not the fundamental 
critical science o f ‘pure consciousness’ or ‘ essences’, w hich for 
D r. H usserl takes precedence even o f m etaphysics, the science o f 
real being, but, on the contrary, m y persistent, and, indeed, 
obvious, intention throughout is to show that all phenom enology 
is subject to more ultim ate metaphysical criticism. In  m y use of 
the term , ‘phenom enology’ is the study or theory o f ‘phenom ena’ ; 
not phenom ena ‘reduced’ to essences, but as finite, temporal 
appearances or expressions o f the eternal, undivided Real. T h e  
distinction thus em phasized is, I think, not remote from  that 
drawn by the G reeks between t o  <f)o.Lv6i±£vov and t o  o v t o , especially 
i f  that distinction is rightly interpreted as a distinction within the 
Real, so that the phenomena do not constitute an order of 
existences radically different and separate from  real things. 
Such a division and isolation o f noumena or things-in-them selves 
from phenomena was em phasized in m odern tim es by K an t, and 
is generally recognized as one o f the weak points o f his Critical 
Philosophy. T h ere  is not the slightest trace o f this in the writings 
o f Spinoza; indeed, it is expressly excluded b y  the doctrine o f 
Eth. I I ,  x x x iii: ‘N ih il in ideis positivum  est, propter quod falsae 
dicuntur’ ; and certainly I should be the last to im pute such a dis­
tinction to him . M y  view  o f the Spinozistic theory in this connexion 
must by this tim e be sufficiently clear: it implies that temporal
phenomena are the appropriate appearances o f the eternal Real 
for finite individual parts o f that Real. T h e y  are real appearances 
or expressions o f the whole under the conditions o f finite existence 
and experience; and, as so understood, they are not illusory or false, 
but are real perspectives o f a whole w hich is no m ere indefinite 
aggregate o f such view s, but their transcendent perfection.
T h u s, in m y view , phenom ena are genuine, objective existences; 
but they are none the less not the ultim ate Real w hich transcends, 
includes, and integrates them , but its appearances or finite ex­
pressions; or rather, phenom ena are differentiations within the 
Real. T h u s though I have used the term  ‘subjective’1 in a sense 
w hich allows me to say that phenomena are ‘subjective’ , yet i f  that 
term  is to be understood (as it norm ally is) to mean that ‘physical’ 
phenom ena are really mental ‘projects’ , I  should most strenuously 
deny the assertion. Corporeal phenomena are ‘ subjective’ only as 
conditioned by, and conditioning, the body o f  the kn ow er; mental 
phenom ena are ‘subjective’ only as conditioned by, and con­
ditioning, his mind; but this does not mean, in either case, that the 
phenom ena are illusory, for the hum an body and m ind are 
certainly real in some form  or sense. T h e  knower cannot doubt his 
own mental existence, nor, therefore, the existence o f his ‘b o d y ’ or 
ideatum. T h u s the source o f phenom ena is partialitas; and this 
again, as I have shown, has a place in the Real, flowing from  its 
very nature as an actual infinite.
It follows that for the finite knower there w ill be knowledge o f the 
phenomena o f the Real, as well as knowledge o f the Real w hich, in 
the measure o f their perfection, appears in phenom ena. H ence 
the distinction w hich I draw between phenom enology and m eta­
physics. T h is  distinction is fundam ental, in that m etaphysics is 
the science o f  the eternal Real as it is in and to itse lf; w hile pheno­
m enology is the science o f the appearances o f the Real in  and to its 
own parts. I f  it is asked, how  can the eternal Real as it is in and to 
itself also be known to its parts ? I have answered, firstly, that such 
knowledge in com plete fullness is not possible; secondly, that 
because the genuine part is also a partial whole, and thus eternal, 
it can possess adequate knowledge o f the eternal being o f the 
W h o le : for thus the W hole is, so far adequately, expressed in the 
part. It  follows also from  the premisses that I  have thus sketched, 
that both phenom enology and metaphysics are possible and valid
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sciences in their place. N othing that I have said in this book implies 
that phenom enology is necessarily fallacious, or even unim portant. 
It is the form  o f philosophy w hich is natural to the special scientist, 
and so far as it is coherent, it forms an approxim ation to ultim ate 
truth. T h u s i f  mechanistic philosophy were put forward for what 
it is, viz. a phenom enology using the categories o f m echanism, it 
w ould not be fallacious, for the Real is in some m inor and abstract 
sense a m echanism. A  ‘ conscious’ mechanism i f  such w ere possible 
w ould ‘know ’ the Real as a m echanical ‘w hole’ . Even in living 
organisms m echanistic categories are not so m uch rejected as 
transcended and infinitely included. So, again, the biological inter­
pretation o f the w orld is not untrue i f  it is recognized as a pheno­
m enology, for the w orld  is, in a rather less abstract and minor sense, 
an organic ‘w hole’ ; and a conscious living organism as such w ould 
‘know ’ the Real as an organic ‘w hole’ . T h e  real objection to such 
philosophies arises only when they m isapply their categories by 
attem pting to explain the m echanism, or again the life, in the 
universe as i f  the universe were confined to these, when in fact 
they cry aloud their ultim ate inadequacy. Such thin, abstract 
phenomenologies can give no com plete account o f the Real, as it 
is in and to itself, for they do not satisfy even the eternal intellect 
of man. I f  they are put forward as com plete accounts, they w ill 
be found to explain the higher and more com plete types o f unity 
in terms o f the lower and less com plete, or they w ill ignore 
them altogether. W hat I  condem n, therefore, is always pheno­
m enology m asquerading as m etaphysics, and not phenom enology 
in itself.
Further, it is the contention o f this essay that the ultim ate 
quintessence o f phenom enology is found in the attem pt to read the 
universe as a process in tim e. A s enduring beings w e ‘know ’ the 
Real as an enduring ‘w hole’ . T h u s w hen m echanism, ‘chem ism ’ , 
vitalism , ‘psychologism ’, have all been put aside, there remains 
as the ultim ate refuge o f unrecognized finitude the belief in the 
temporal character o f the Real. T h is , as I say, is the very 
quintessence o f phenom enality, for tim e is the efflux o f eternal 
Kevcoois or partialitas in the eternal W hole. T h u s I have in 
general spoken o f phenom enology as essentially distinguished from  
m etaphysics b y  its insistence on the ultim ate irreducibility o f 
tim e : here again it is not that a theory o f the Real as temporal 
is essentially false. For the partial and tem poral percipient the Real
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is in tim e. But what I have objected to is the assum ption that such 
a theory is ultim ately valid, and gives a clear view  o f the nature of 
the Real as it is in and to itself, i.e. as it is for adequate knowledge. 
F or a real or com plete ‘know er’ is essentially eternal, and ultim ate 
problem s are only resolved (so far as w e can resolve them) when 
w e take the point o f view  o f the eternal, that is to say w hen we 
carry our intellectual criticism  to its final issue in a m etaphysical 
account o f Being-as-such-and-for-itself. M etaphysics, as James 
said, means only an unusually obstinate attem pt to think clearly.
T h is  account does not at all im ply that m etaphysics has for 
its object mere Being, or ens absolute indeterminatum in  the sense 
in w hich that is one w ith  non-being. Such a m isunderstanding 
could result only from  failure to realize the priority o f  Perfect 
Being and the derived character o f tem poral phenom ena. T h e  
Real is w ithout lim itation only because it possesses all perfections: 
none o f them  are cut off. T h is  is true both for each A ttribute, and 
for the infinite whole o f A ttributes, w hich is Substance. Each 
A ttribute is eternal, and hence its nature is perfect in its k in d ; and 
Substance includes all kinds. T o  be w ithout lim itation is not, 
therefore, to be indefinite: the actual infinite, as I  have said, is 
unlim ited w ithout being indefinite. It is thus that Spinoza meets 
the difficulty o f those who have been driven to defend a ‘negative 
theology’ . G od  has an actual infinitude o f A ttributes, each o f w hich 
is an actual infinitude o f m odes. T h a t is to say, all perfections 
belong to him , but no limitations o f perfection (which is the root 
o f the O ntological Proof). Finite perfections belong to him  only in 
his subordinate constellations; infinite perfections in Natura 
naturata as it eternally flows from  the creative urgency o f Natura 
naturans. ‘N egative theology’ results from  a failure to grasp the 
character o f the actual infin ite;1 this again results in  a failure to 
make the fundam ental distinction between perfections and lim ita­
tions o f being. F or perfection demands no lim itation in  itself, 
though finite perfections belong to lim ited beings in  the hierarchy 
o f the Real. But even a finite perfection is in relation to itself 
unlim ited. Perfection in  the whole thus lim its its subordinate 
constellations, but the lim itation o f these does not necessarily 
result in perfection— a point w hich has been overlooked b y  those 
who have argued against Spinoza (as they thought) that ‘negatio 
est determ inatio’ . Perfection in the whole demands no lim itation 
* See Excursus V  (pp. 160-3).
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in the whole ; and it is prior to lim itation in the part. H ence, the 
absolutely perfect m ust be w ithout limitation.
T h u s it is not the case that Natura  has an indefinite num ber of 
Attributes each o f w hich is com posed o f an indefinite num ber of 
modes ; nor has it a finite num ber o f Attributes each composed of 
a finite num ber o f modes. For Natura as a whole has none o f the 
limitations o f the modes, and none o f the abstractness o f the 
isolated Attributes. It possesses these in its ranges and in its grades 
w hich are infinite in num ber because they are com pletely derived 
from  the O ne. T h u s Natura  is ens perfectissimum et realissimum, 
not ens inanissimum et deficientissimum (sive non-ens).
T h e term  ‘ens absolute indeterm inatum ’ , as is well known, does 
not appear in the formal definition o f Part I  o f the Ethics, w hich 
uses ‘ens absolute infinitum ’,1 and the Explanation w hich follows 
emphasizes the all-inclusive perfection o f Infinite Substance: 
‘D ico absolute infinitum , non autem in suo genere ; quicquid enim 
in suo genere tantum  infinitum  est, infinita de eo attributa negare 
possumus ; quod autem absolute infinitum  est, ad ejus essentiam 
pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprim it, et negationem nullam 
involvit’ . T h e  phrase w hich has so often given offence is actually 
found in one o f the letters to John H udde, but in such a context 
as to leave no room for misunderstanding. It is always conjoined 
with the assertion o f perfection in such a w ay as to point un­
m istakably to the sense in w hich ‘indeterm inatum ’ is to be con­
strued : ‘ D ico ergo, quantum  ad sextam attinet, si ponamus aliquid, 
quod in suo genere solummodo indeterminatum, et perfectum  
est, sua sufficientia existere, quod etiam existentia entis absolute 
indeterminati, ac perfecti concedenda erit; quod Ens ego D eum  
nuncupabo. Si ex. gr. statuere volum us, extensionem, aut cogita- 
tionem (quae quaelibet in suo genere, hoc est, in certo genere 
entis, perfectae esse queunt) sua sufficientia existere ; etiam existentia 
D ei, qui absolute perfectus est, hoc est, entis absolute indeterminati 
erit concedenda. . . .  E t quandoquidem  D ei natura in certo entis 
genere non consistit; sed in Ente, quod absolute indeterminatum  
est, ejus etiam natura exigit id  omne, quod t o  esse perfecte exprim it ; 
eo quod ejus natura alias determinata, et deficiens esset.’2
I m ay add that the often quoted assertion o f Ep. I, that ‘ deter-
1 Eth. I, Def. vi.
2 Ep. xxxvi. (The italics are mine. On this whole question cf. L. Robinson 
Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik, Exkurs II, pp. 239-48.)
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minatio negatio est’ refers directly and clearly to the lim itation which 
characterizes a finite thing view ed as a subordinate ‘individual’ 
w ithin some whole, and m ight have been so understood by 
num berless critics (who have indicated the H egelian source o f their 
‘know ledge’ o f Spinoza b y  the unanim ity o f their too emphatic 
m isquotation o f the dictum) i f  they had gone to its author direct. 
Ep. xxxv i is perfectly clear, and the form al Definition in the Ethics 
places the final seal on the positive and concrete significance o f the 
real infinite in the theory o f Spinoza.
A ll phénoménologies, then, are approximations to the ultim ate 
truth; but only approxim ations. In  them selves they are useful, or 
at w orst innocuous, but they have a w ay o f claim ing to be ultim ate. 
T h eir  universal scope emphasizes this danger i f  we forget their 
thin and abstract character. H ence arises that ‘spectacle des 
philosophies, “ dont aucune n ’apporte de certitude”  et qui ne font 
que s ’écrouler les unes sur les autres en clamant vers le ciel leurs 
absolus contradictoires’ .1 M . Benda has brought into prom inence 
the ‘treason’ o f the teachers o f the m odern w orld who fail to lay due 
emphasis upon the eternal, the ‘ transcendental’ , the ideal, a failure 
so abject that they even emphasize the claims o f the tem poral, the 
national, the ‘ real’, in accordance w ith  the passions o f the masses 
and their w orldly and national leaders. I  have elsewhere in this 
book argued that M . Benda has placed an unbalanced emphasis 
upon the separation o f the eternal values from  tem poral interests 
(‘M ais si je  crois mauvais que la religion du clerc possédât le 
m onde laïque, je  crois autrem ent redoutable q u ’elle ne lui soit plus 
prêchée . . ,’),2 but i f  I  m ight adapt his rhetorical phrase, I should 
say that it is the acceptance o f phenom enology as the sufficient 
end o f our intellectual nature that is ‘ la grande trahison’ ; and this 
is undoubtedly a leading characteristic o f recent philosophical 
developm ents. Individual philosophers o f great influence m ay have 
been guilty o f ‘ la petite trahison’ o f elaborating a metaphysics 
w hich finds no genuine reality in phenomena, w hich thus stand 
side b y  side w ith  the Real as an ultim ate inexplicability. Bradley, 
w ith  his incapacity to explain the appearance o f ‘finite centres’ 
in the Absolute, and M . Benda w ith his emphasis on the need 
for preaching the eternal values and his simultaneous disbelief in 
their practicability— each in  his w ay is an example o f this more
1 J. Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, p. 217.
2 Loc. cit., p. 234.
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pardonable fault. M uch worse, indeed, is the philosopher or ‘ clerc’ 
who looks,for ultim ate m etaphysical satisfaction, and thinks that 
he has found it, in some phenom enological construction ; for thus 
to substitute for the ‘queen o f the sciences’ what can be no more 
than a subject science, to make the tem poral efflux o f partialitas 
the character o f the eternal whole, is veritable ‘haute trahison’ .
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C H A P T E R  I X
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  A N D  T I M E
T IM E  is the phenomenon o f eternity; eternity the infinite existence that determines and com prehends all existence in 
tim e, and partly expresses itself in the duration o f things. Eternity 
at once transcends and pervades its finite tem poral expressions. 
A ll philosophers are, o f course, agreed that it is necessary, in 
M r. A lexander’s often quoted phrase, to ‘take T im e seriously’ ; 
and this is a cardinal feature o f the theory and m ethod that I  have 
defended in the preceding chapters. For, as I said at the outset, 
to take tim e seriously is not the same thing as uncritically to 
accept it  as m etaphysically u ltim ate: that is rather to trifle w ith  it, 
or at least it can only be called serious in  a derogatory sense. 
T h e  only w ay genuinely to take tim e seriously is to be prepared 
i f  necessary to deal w ith it faithfully, accepting both its relative 
value and its absolute lim itations as essential clues to the nature of 
the Real.
Substantial philosophical advance can undoubtedly be made 
w ithout com ing to grips w ith the problem  o f tim e, as several 
recent philosophers have proved, but it is a speculative adventure 
w hich presents some danger where the necessary lim itations of 
the results are not clearly recognized. Philosophers who have 
been ready to detect the lim itations o f a scientific account o f reality 
have not always recognized the operation o f the same set o f 
principles w ithin the realm o f philosophy itself. T h e  shortcom ings 
o f scientific explanation arise from  the initial assumptions o f the 
sciences, and their necessary acceptance o f principles and categories 
as ultim ate uncriticized data, together w ith those data o f experi­
ence w hich are to be subjected to criticism  and construction. But 
philosophy itself in  several o f its branches is subject to similar 
lim itation: in ethics, aesthetics, politics, & c., and m ost notably 
for our present purpose in general phenom enology, where a study 
is m ade, not o f infinitely perfect being w ithout lim itation, but of 
being in passage and o f the process o f things. H ere speculation is 
subject to lim itation arising from  an uncriticized datum, viz. time 
or duration, and the resulting conclusions are in  that degree 
rendered opaque to thought, and hence fall short o f metaphysical
adequacy. But this defect is often unrecognized precisely because 
the study o f enduring things seems to approach more closely to 
the Real than any study o f perfect being as such, and hence 
phenom enology, assumed to be the science o f real being, is made to 
do duty for m etaphysics, thought o f as the study o f mere being or 
ens absolute indeterminatum. T h is , however, is the very error w hich 
it is the concern o f m y whole discussion to expose: the existence 
o f the eternal Real is real existence, more real than that w hich 
belongs to enduring things. Perfect being is not devoid o f reality 
or genuine content because none o f the limitations w hich the 
im potence o f its finite parts involves belong to i t ; it is not a realm 
of pure essences conceived as a ghostly apparatus o f thought- 
objects devoid o f the solidity and reality o f enduring being. It is 
this fatal m isunderstanding that is the source o f the fundam ental 
defect o f those contem porary phenomenologies that masquerade as 
‘empirical m etaphysics’ . T h is  is indeed a ‘prejudice in favour 
o f facts’ .
T h u s  when recent philosophers have perm itted themselves to 
accept tim e at its face value, as a m ere em pirical fact, ultim ate and 
inescapable, they have thereby (consciously or not) doom ed their 
theories to m etaphysical inadequacy. A s phenom enology, in m any 
cases, these philosophies m ay be excellent, but they are incapable 
of sustaining a claim  to the title o f m etaphysics.1
It was thus no accident or arbitrary emphasis that led K an t to 
concentrate his attention upon the tem poral aspect o f phenomena 
when dealing w ith  the schematism o f the pure concepts o f the 
understanding. A rbitrary it m ay have been from  the standpoint o f 
the K antian theory itself w ith space and tim e as co-ordinate forms 
o f sensuous intuition, but from  the broader standpoint o f philo­
sophical construction it was in accordance w ith genuine insight, and 
it is notew orthy that, as his thought developed, K ant laid increasing 
emphasis upon the central im portance o f time in the critical 
account o f phenom ena.2 Phenomena are essentially tem poral; as
1 The situation is not essentially changed by Mr. Whitehead’s substitution of 
‘passage’ or ‘process’ for time. Though ‘passage’ is prior to time it is still 
conceived as a ‘moving on’ or succession; and if the unwary are apt to read this 
as temporal (or spatio-temporal) it is because no alternative significance (e.g. 
eternal creativity) is provided by the author (for the term ‘creative passage’ does 
no more than .emphasize the reality of the passing). Passage is, therefore, a mere 
datum the opacity of which to critical thought darkens the whole issue.
2 Cf. Kemp Smith, A  Commentary to Kant’s ‘ Critique of Pure Reason’, p. 242.
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Professor K em p Sm ith expresses it :  ‘ Consciousness o f tim e is the 
factual experience, as conditions o f  whose possibility the a priori 
factors are transcendentally proved. In  so far as they can be shown 
to be its indispensable conditions, its mere existence proves their 
reality. A n d  such in effect is the ultim ate character o f K a n t’s 
proof o f the objective validity o f the categories.’1 K an t himself, 
indeed, seems to have been ready to go even further and to assert 
that phenomena are form ally, i.e. essentially, constituted b y  tim e; 
that at least seems to be the obscure significance o f his very re­
m arkable statem ent that ‘as tim e is only the form  o f intuition, 
consequently o f objects as phenomena, that w hich in objects 
corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter o f all objects 
as things-in-them selves’ .2 Certainly for K an t the phenom enal 
w orld is (if not a w orld o f  time) essentially a tem poral w orld the 
parts o f w hich are ordered in accordance w ith  the schemata or 
categories; and it is significant that w hen he comes to discuss the 
m etaphysical presuppositions o f m orality, and in particular the 
senses in w hich m an as a moral agent m ust be both autonomous 
and also subject to the heteronom y o f nature, he finds that freedom  
belongs only to beings who are not m ere parts o f nature (and hence 
subject to the transient causality o f the other parts, and thus to 
determ ination by im pulse and inclination), but are also members 
o f the noümenal kingdom  o f ends. H e thus rightly  emphasizes the 
double nature o f the moral agent as a partial whole, i.e. as at once 
phenom enal and noümenal, so that the ‘m ust’ o f nature and the 
‘w ould ’ o f reason becom e the ‘ought’ o f m orality; but he fails to 
see w hat was, I think, clear to Spinoza, that these principles im ply 
that the distinction o f phenom ena and noümena applies only to the 
parts and not to the w hole, so that though there m ay be wholes of 
phenom ena, there can be no phenom enon o f the W h o le ; and that 
therefore every phenom enology m ust necessarily be inadequate 
w hen it is m ade to do duty for ultim ate m etaphysics. For the 
perfect whole, as such, m ust be free; it cannot be subject to the 
categories, w hich govern only the relations between its parts. T h e 
parts o f nature endure and suffer vio len ce; the whole is eternal and
1 Kemp Smith, A  Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, pp. 241-2.
2 ‘Da die Zeit nur die Form der Anschauung mithin der Gegenstände als 
Erscheinungen ist, so ist das, was an diesen der Empfindung entspricht, die 
transcendentale Materie aller Gegenstände als Dinge an sich (die Sachheit, 
Realität)’ (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, Berlin, 1903, IV, p. 102).
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fre e ; and the parts themselves only endure in spite o f the violence 
that they suffer because they are also partial wholes capable of 
lim ited self-m aintenance. T h u s for K an t m etaphysics is m uch 
narrower in scope and im portance than it is for Spinoza, and 
phenom enology the more central and all-em bracing; and that m eta­
physics retained even the place that it did in the thought o f K ant 
is a tribute rather to his faith and feeling for m orality than to 
his speculative insight. Further, the scope o f m etaphysics is the 
wider for Spinoza because he finds that space or Extension i s ' 
not a mere form  of sensuous intuition but, qua eternal and hence 
infinitely creative, is a fundam ental character o f the Real. For 
the essential difficulty about the K antian things-in-them selves, as 
has so often been said, is that w e both know  too m uch and also too 
little about them. W e ought to know nothing at all o f their content, 
but our ignorance is qualified by the revelations o f our moral and 
aesthetic, not to say sensitive, experience. It is true that we assume 
all too naturally that though things-in-them selves are unextended 
they are characterized b y  some sort o f thought (for moral beings 
are at once noümena, members o f the kingdom  o f ends, and 
rational beings), yet even this attribute ought, on the theory 
advanced, to be unknown. T h e  suggestion o f the passage already 
quoted, that the matter of things-in-them selves is ‘ sensation’, or 
what corresponds to sensation in phenomenal objects, could fare 
no better. T h u s the members o f the intelligible w orld are the most 
unintelligible o f all things, and the w orld o f understanding the 
least understood. N or is this m erely ignotus nobis, it is ignotus 
natura, and no possible extension of our knowledge could be con­
ceived as providing a genuine éclaircissement; for b y  no means can 
we even explain how  reason is practical in human con d u ct; all that 
can be done is to show that it is practical, or rather that it is not 
impossible for it to be practical, that it must be, and hence that 
it is. But how reason is practical cannot be explained, prim arily 
because noümenal reason is different in nature both from  pheno­
menal understanding, and from  that unconscious sense o f values 
that actuates phenomenal beings in appetite and desire; it there­
fore acts w ithin the time-series inexplicably, and not, as w ith Spin­
oza, because it reveals the very essence of all genuine activity in 
whatever grade o f existence it m ay be discovered, and of the reality 
that is enjoyed both by finite and by infinite things. For although 
K ant tells us, w ith the emphasis o f italics, that ‘the w orld o f under-
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standing contains the foundation o f the w orld o f sense, and 
consequently o f its laws also’,1 the real emphasis remains on the 
other side, since though the whole tem poral series o f phenomena 
(whatever that m ay m ean!) m ay be so determ ined, there seems to 
be no m ethod w hereby any part o f the phenom enal w orld m ay 
freely determine itself in accordance w ith values or self-im posed 
laws. T h u s the freedom  o f the human moral agent becom es a 
miracle because his phenom enal nature is alien to his noümenal 
nature, and can be governed by it neither by force majeure nor by 
invasion, but only b y  an im possible ‘transcreation’ . Further, ‘the 
w orld o f understanding’ as the foundation o f phenomenal existences 
is not identical w ith  the ‘kingdom  o f ends’ or w orld o f reason 
w hich is concerned w ith  noümenal values, and hence there is 
required even for the determination o f the whole w orld o f nature 
a sim ilar transcreation (though not now  im possible in  the same 
sense). T h is  bifurcation o f reality, therefore, destroys all possibility 
o f m aking it through and through intelligible; and the source of 
the whole trouble is clearly a phenom enology incapable o f resolu­
tion b y  further m etaphysical analysis. F or w e are not presented 
w ith tw o reducible interpretations o f a single reality, but two 
realities: one o f tem poral facts and the other o f eternal va lu es; 
and not only so, but also the necessity o f relating them  in such 
a w ay as to explain the nature o f the moral person w ho m ysteriously 
(and necessarily) belongs to both realms, and w ithout radical 
bifurcation.
T h e  solution is im possible so long as a divorce o f fact and value 
is m aintained. A s Spinoza saw, and as Plato also had seen, to exist 
in any degree is in  that degree to have value, for reality and per­
fection are one and the same. T h u s not only is noümenal reason 
concerned w ith  values, but so also is the phenom enal understanding 
as it constitutes the w orld of nature, and, as I have already suggested, 
even the inclination o f the natural man as it is expressed in his 
appetites and desires already involves an unconscious ‘judgem ent’ 
o f value. A  thing is real, is free, embodies values, in  proportion to 
its w holeness; and though only the absolute whole is w holly real 
and free and perfect, yet every real part o f the infinite whole is 
itself a partial whole, and is to that degree real and free and
1 ‘Die Verstandeswelt den Grund der Sinnenwelt, mithin auch der Gesetze 
derselben enthalt’ (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Werke, Berlin, 1903, 
IV, p. 453)-
232 A E T E R N I T A S
valuable. H ence there is no need for transcreation when a finite 
being acts in accordance w ith values ; only so can it act. E very 
genuine action is an expression o f real power, and therefore o f a 
relative perfection, as passion or the failure to act is the expression 
of im potence and therefore o f im perfection and relative unreality.
In  man, therefore, there is tru ly a double nature, but not a 
bifurcated nature : this or that man is both a relative part o f nature 
and also a relative whole within nature, and hence the moral 
struggle between the determination to be free, and the subjection 
to the power o f external things. So also he endures as a part of 
nature and is eternal as a reflection of Natura. For phenom enology 
he is m erely a being that endures and is subject to the deter­
mination o f external causes, but for m etaphysics he is also an eternal 
part o f the eternal whole, and free in proportion to his wholeness.
T h e  unfriendly and even parricidal character o f phenomena is 
notorious : it arises, as I have indicated, from  the uncritical accept­
ance o f the ultim acy o f tim e, and nothing is m ore common in 
recent philosophy than phenom enology thus m asquerading as 
metaphysics, precisely because it is the character o f our era, not 
perhaps to be too m uch im pressed by the reality o f tim e, but to be 
too little affected b y  its insufficiency. It has already been remarked 
how M . Bergson, after boldly advancing in the direction o f a more 
adequate view , having put aside the spatialized version o f time 
which is only appropriate to the m etric sciences, and substituted 
a qualitative duration more suited to the biological and psycho­
logical sciences, failed to com plete the work so happily begun, and 
which he was so well qualified to carry through, because apparently 
he feared that all reality m ight be lost i f  duration itself under 
intellectual criticism  should collapse either in the direction of 
m ultiplicity or that o f unity. N ever was philosopher more entirely 
entangled in the w eb o f tim e : creation itself was conceivable only 
as a creation in tim e, and therefore as a miracle. It w ould, o f 
course, have been surprising i f  M . Bergson had not here and there 
approached to a m ore adequate view  than that to w hich he ulti­
m ately settled down. T h e  distinction w hich he draws, for example, 
between a conceptual eternity and an intuitive eternity, an eternity 
o f death and an eternity o f life ,1 only fails to release him , because
1 ‘ Introduction à la Métaphysique’ (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 
ig°3, pp. 23-5).
3 7 1 3  H  h
P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  A N D  T IM E  233
he thinks o f duration as the norm  and eternity as a m ere ideal lim it 
either on the side o f the abstract unm oving unity in duration, or 
on that o f the ideal concentration o f all durations. N either al­
ternative alone can satisfy the m oving spirit o f the philosopher ; 
for w e are told  that it is between the two lim its o f hom ogeneity, 
repetition and m ateriality on the one hand, and pure living eternity 
on the other, that ‘intuition m oves, and [that] this m ovem ent is 
the very essence o f m etaphysics’ .1 B ut w hy, I  ask, should m eta­
physics be represented m erely as the m onkey running up and down 
the ladder between being and non-being, unless ‘the living eternity’ 
is still regarded as lacking content w hich m ust be collected from  
partly dispersed durations? It is phenom enology w hich is thus 
described, and the m etaphysician finds, and m ust find, all that he 
requires, and in the form  in w hich he requires it, in the intuitive 
eternity w hich, rightly understood, com prehends and supersedes 
all durations, and therefore does not itself endure. M . Bergson 
regards such an eternity as a mere ideal lim it sim ply because he 
fails to recognize what is, I think, im plicit, though unacknow­
ledged, in his own theory, viz. that all finite durations are still 
successive in nature as well as ‘intensive’ , and are only thus rightly 
called ‘ durations’ ; but the existence o f a perfect and all-inclusive 
being is purely ‘ intensive’ in the sense that it is w ithout succession. 
N or does it thus becom e em pty or neutral: in its eternal being 
successive transformations have given place to ‘transformation 
w ithout succession’ , i.e. to quality in its absolute form , viz. eternity. 
T o  use analogies w hich are to be found here and there in M .B erg­
son’s own discussions: just as light includes its vibrations, the 
quality being in fact their synthesis or integration ; just as the song
1 ‘L ’intuition de notre durée . . . nous met en contact avec toute une continuité 
de durées que nous devons essayer de suivre soit vers le bas, soit vers le haut: 
. . . dans les deux cas nous nous transcendons nous-mêmes. Dans le premier, 
nous marchons à une durée de plus en plus éparpillée, dont les palpitations plus 
rapides que les nôtres, divisant notre sensation simple, en diluent la qualité en 
quantité : à la limite serait le pur homogène, la pure répétition par laquelle nous 
définirons la matérialité. En marchant dans l’autre sens, nous allons à une durée 
qui se tend, se resserre, s’intensifie de plus en plus : à la limite serait l’éternité. 
Non plus l’éternité conceptuelle, qui est une éternité de mort, mais une éternité 
de vie. Éternité vivante et par conséquent mouvante encore, où notre durée à 
nous se retrouverait comme les vibrations dans la lumière, et qui serait la con­
crétion de toute durée comme la matérialité en est l’éparpillement. Entre ces 
deux limites extrêmes l’intuition se meut, et ce mouvement est la métaphysique 
même.’ (‘ Introduçtion à la Métaphysique’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 
1903, p. 25.)
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includes its separate notes, and is indeed their m elody; and as the 
duration o f the light, or o f the m elody, is m ore self-perm eating 
and ‘ intensive’ , and less successive and ‘extensive’ , than that o f 
the separate vibrations and notes respectively, so eternity is exist­
ence so ‘intensively’ , so genuinely, synthesized as to eliminate all 
succession. Such  an eternity is no mere ideal lim it o f self-inclusive 
duration: it com prehends all durations, and in so doing, duly 
subordinates them , as the musical phrase comprehends and organizes 
and duly subordinates its several parts, and thus crowns them  with 
a supervenient value :
each survives for the melodist,
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.
It is a truism  that M . Bergson’s whole philosophy is directed 
against the ultim acy o f an intellectual conception o f the Real, and 
thus labours under the peculiar disadvantage o f being an intellectual 
presentation founded upon the denial o f the validity o f any in­
tellectual account. It shares this defect w ith all other anti- 
intellectualistic theories. W holly  to escape self-contradiction such 
philosophers should remain dum b; but this is not so easy as it 
seems, nor do I deny that there is som ething to be said for their 
attempt to use the intellectual tools w hich, valid or invalid in an 
ultim ate sense, are useful common property, i f  only as a pis aller. 
Science, M . Bergson tells us, ‘ cannot do otherwise’ .1 It then 
becomes possible, when the intellect has done its work as w ell as 
it can, to appeal directly from  its results to the faculty o f intuition. 
T h u s the intellect w ill ‘build the house’, and intuition w ill ‘put on 
the architecture’ ! In  some such w ay the anti-intellectualistic 
philosopher is able to make the best o f both worlds ; he can begin 
by speaking o f  duration as a synthesis o f successive elements, and 
then add the correction that there are really no successive elements, 
and hence no synthesis. T h u s he m ay avoid both com plete dum b­
ness (or a trifling m ysticism ), and also the disadvantages o f a de­
vitalized conceptual atomism. But it seems to m e that the accept­
ance o f such a pis aller is really an im plied acknowledgem ent that 
the true ‘intellectual order’ is not the atomism that is imagined 
by the anti-intellectualist. I need not revert more explicitly to
1 ‘La science moderne, comme la science antique, procède selon la méthode 
cinématographique. Elle ne peut faire autrement; toute science est assujettie à 
cette loi’ (L ’Évolution Créatrice, p. 356).
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a subject already sufficiently discussed, but I w ill pass to the further 
and connected reflection that M . Bergson also, b y  an unbalanced 
emphasis on what is adm ittedly a genuine feature o f duration, in 
effect misinterprets its total character. For it cannot seriously 
be doubted, as I shall shortly show, that the empirical durations 
o f finite things not m erely precede, accom pany, succeed and over­
lap each other, but further that they are in them selves essentially 
successive as well as self-perm eating. T h e  em pirical nature o f an 
enduring thing is determ ined b y  such relations o f succession and 
self-perm eation. T h u s though succession is not the whole story, 
it is an essential part o f it  that m ust not be overlooked or explained 
aw ay; and it is only in so far as a duration is falsely im agined as 
either all-inclusive or else ‘unique’ , that successiveness can be 
supposed to be eliminated from  it w ithout loss o f positive reality. 
So far as the form er alternative is concerned, I have shown that 
there can be no com plete or all-inclusive duration (nor is such 
posited b y  M . B ergson); but the successiveness o f duration cannot 
otherwise be denied w ithout either im plying that the durations of 
finite things are illusory, and duration itself ‘unique’ and succes- 
sionless (I m ust not say ‘one’ or ‘single’ because it is non-num erable), 
or else b y  asserting that the distinct successionless durations 
o f finite things are ultim ately isolated from  each other, so that the 
Real is atom istically and indefinitely m ultiple (if even that cate­
gory is applicable). B ut neither hypothesis w ill either cohere 
w ith our experience, or explain the origin o f its non-cohering ele­
ments, or o f the intellectualistic ‘ fallacy’ itself. A ll such attempts 
to resolve the riddles o f finite duration w ithout laying bare its source 
in the very nature o f the eternal Real are but new  instances o f 
the sophist’s fallacy o f advancing too quickly from  the M any 
to the O n e ; thus the eternal w hole is read as i f  it  w ere an endur­
ing part, and the enduring part as i f  it w ere the successionless 
whole.
N ow  M . Bergson was undoubtedly right in em phasizing the 
‘intensive’ , self-perm eating, homogeneous character o f the finite 
individual’s real duration w hich is not fu lly  determ ined as a 
mere section o f an indefinitely extended, uniform  tim e, character­
ized solely by succession and irreversibility. Such a tim e is 
necessarily the object o f Im agination and not o f In tuition : it is 
the inadequate im age o f the successionless eternity o f the whole 
from  the point o f view  o f its parts. T h e  ‘duration’ o f the whole is
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certainly not spatialized and successive, but self-perm eating and 
‘intensive’ , for it is eternity. But it does not follow  that for the 
finite individual also real duration is unam biguously successionless. 
In point o f fact it is neither successionless, nor is it constituted by 
succession; it is an ‘intermediate species’ . A n d  it is the am biguity 
in the nature o f the finite individual as a partial whole that is the 
real source o f the am biguity o f his duration with its conjoined 
self-permeation and successiveness, its ‘ intensiveness’ and ‘ex­
tensiveness’ . But to deny the self-perm eation is to read the part 
as a mere section; and to deny the successiveness is to read the 
part as if  it were the whole.
T h u s, though it is true that we experience our duration as within 
the duration o f nature, and as succeeding, accom panying, preced­
ing, or overlapping the durations o f other things and individuals; 
and these again as sim ilarly related, on the one hand to us, and 
on the other hand to the durations o f their qualities and elem ents; 
yet it is equally im portant to rem ember that, taken concretely, these 
durations are not homogeneous sections o f a single, uniform, 
successive, irreversible duration, but are essentially heterogeneous, 
so that each individual thing lives and develops at its own rate ; 
it takes its own time. T h e  individual is not m erely ‘in ’ an extraneous 
tim e, but the tw o are som ehow united. T h is  has been emphasized, 
and rightly em phasized, by M . Bergson; but it does not, as he 
supposes, exclude the truth o f the other aspect, and it only appears 
to do so because the real source o f duration has not been laid bare. 
T im e has been taken as a mere datum, and not subjected to 
criticism up to the ultimate point o f being deduced from  the 
nature and existence o f the eternal Real. W hen this is done, it 
becomes clear that it is possible, indeed necessary, both to dis­
tinguish between the two aspects o f the duration o f finite things, 
and also to do justice to both.
A t any level o f observation the extended duration w ithin w hich 
an individual occurs m ay be distinguished from  the m anner in 
which this duration is ‘occupied’ (or to speak m ore precisely, 
‘generated’) b y  the individual. T h e  form er is condem ned by 
M . Bergson as spatialized tim e w hich according to him  is an 
illegitim ate intellectualized derivative of the latter, w hich is real 
duration, reciprocating w ith the essence o f the individual. T h u s 
we can say, on the one hand, that the various grades o f individual 
are phenom enologically constituted by tim e, since all quality may
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be represented as the integration (as distinct from  the summation) 
o f elements w hich ultim ately resolve them selves, under differentia­
tion (as distinct from  division), into pure tim e or non-being; and 
on the other hand, that m etaphysically, the actual essence o f the 
finite individual o f any grade m ust be represented as appearing in 
the form  o f an enduring conatus, w hich thus constitutes the real 
duration o f the individual (being his partial eternity as it is imagined 
sub specie durationis as a result o f his uninterrupted awareness of 
partialitas). W e can thus reconcile the hom ogeneity o f durations 
w ith  their heterogeneity as being the result o f a double point o f 
view , w hich is an essential feature o f the Real, but w hich is con­
cealed so long as duration is taken as a m ere datum, and its 
origin and nature not elucidated. V iew ed in itself as a genuine 
part o f Natura  each thing is a real conatus or active essence, 
w hich is not, as such, a stretch o f tim e, though under analysis it 
breaks up into subordinate elements occupying such a stretch; 
and though also when it is regarded as a part o f some more 
integrated whole, it  is necessarily itself the occupant o f a stretch 
o f tim e w ithin the im agined w ider stretch o f its enclosing whole.
T h u s the durations o f finite individual things are homogeneous 
considered as parts o f the single im agined duration o f an enveloping 
whole, but are heterogeneous when considered as wholes w ithin 
w hich further subordinate parts appear at once to succeed and 
permeate each other. T h e  truth is neither sim ply that the whole 
is in a stretch o f successive, irreversible tim e, o f w hich the parts 
occupy sections; nor sim ply that the part is a non-successive 
purely intensive existence. T h e  form er view  m isinterprets w hole­
ness ; the latter m isinterprets partialitas, and raises the difficulties 
already indicated about the relations o f the durations o f finite 
things, and thus also about the concrete ‘duration’ o f the whole.
T h e  special difficulties, therefore, w hich have proved to be 
com mon stum bling-blocks in the philosophy o f M . Bergson, are 
shown to be due to his failure to pass beyond a phenom enological 
account of the Real, and to achieve a m etaphysical deduction of 
tim e. A nd the peculiar defect o f M . Bergson’s phenom enology is 
that he has introduced into it factors w hich ought to have been 
reached only in  a more ultim ate analysis. T h e  assertion o f the 
successionlessness and self-perm eationofreal duration is in  essence 
an unconscious passage beyond duration to etern ity; and the result 
can thus only be that what m ight have remained a perfectly harm ­
238 A E T E R N I T A S
less skeleton in the cupboard for a phenom enology recognized as 
subject, becomes for the treasonous usurper the spectre at the 
feast.
T h e  principles w hich I am em phasizing are exem plified also, 
though differently, in the theory o f M r. W hitehead, as m ight, 
indeed, have been anticipated from  his virtual, though not verbal, 
agreement w ith the Bergsonian conception o f real tim e.1 A s I  have 
already suggested,2 M r. W hitehead substitutes for this the concep­
tion o f ‘ creative passage’ , w hich he finds to be the prim itive 
character not only of nature, but also o f sense-awareness and 
thought. T h is  ‘passage’ is not a measurable quantity ‘except as 
it occurs in nature in connexion w ith extension’ .3 Further, the 
original passage of nature is exhibited not only in tem poral but 
also in spatial transitions. N ature is prim arily a congeries or 
system  of distinguishable, overlapping, and more or less concrete 
happenings or even ts; and from  this point o f view  it is character­
ized by pure change, or rather, since events never change,4 the 
event ‘nature’ and its constituent events sim ply ‘pass’ .
But diversification into events o f varying concreteness and 
extension is only one m ode in w hich nature m ay be rendered; 
it m ay also be regarded as a congeries or system  o f sense-con- 
tents. In  themselves these neither change nor ‘pass’ ; ‘A  colour 
is eternal. It haunts tim e like a spirit. It comes and it goes. But 
where it comes, it is the same colour. It neither survives nor does 
it live. It appears when it is w anted’ .5 It is only in their appear­
ances that they both ‘pass’ and also endure, and the vision o f nature 
as the drama o f such appearances is alternative to that o f pure 
‘passage’ . M an y other diversifications are possible w ithin the same 
nature: that o f more or less perm anent perceptual ob jects; that o f 
scientific objects (electrons, & c .) ; and so forth. T h ere is, in fact, 
an indefinite num ber o f such renderings, disclosing an indefinite 
num ber o f types o f entity. So, analogously, it m ay perhaps be
1 ‘I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson, though he 
uses “ time” for the fundamental fact which I call the “ passage of nature”  ’ 
(The Concept of Nature, p. 54).
2 Above, p. 229, note 1. 3 Loc. cit., p. 55.
4 ‘Events never change . . . events pass but do not change. The passage of an
event is its passing into some other event which is not it’ (An Enquiry concerning 
the Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 62).
5 Science and the Modern World, p. 126.
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supposed, a pastel drawing m ight be considered alternatively as 
a surface o f paper or canvas having a certain textu re; or as a num ber 
o f spots o f chalk adhering to the prom inences o f that su rface; or 
again as a distribution o f a num ber o f different coloured p igm en ts; 
as a representation o f such and such ob jects; as the expression of 
an emotion or sentim ent; and so on. A n d  each o f these charac­
terizations w ill be im portant for appropriate circumstances and 
conditions: for preparing a block or a colour-reproduction, for the 
scientist, or antiquarian, or connoisseur. But the painting itself is 
not the sum o f these diverse renderings: the mere series o f alterna­
tive readings is only a step, or series o f steps, in the w ork of 
description or explanation; and so also w ith the diverse renderings 
o f nature. N o one has protested more vigorously than M r. W h ite­
head against the bifurcation o f nature into two systems o f reality : 
the electrons, & c., o f speculative physics over against the sense- 
perceptions o f psychologistic philosophy ; ‘thus’ , he says, ‘there 
w ould be tw o natures, one is the conjecture and the other is the 
dream .’1 Y e t though only a serious m isunderstanding o f M r. 
W hitehead’s theory could lead us to assert that this very bifurca­
tion o f nature, purged o f its subjectivistic error, is only carried to its 
ideal lim it in the distinctions w hich he draws between the various 
renderings o f nature, e.g. between the w orld o f pure ‘passage’ and 
that o f sense-perception, yet the suggestion is not w holly devoid 
o f foundation. Indeed, but for the attem pt w hich is undoubtedly 
made to relate these diverse diversifications2 o f nature in the theory 
o f the ‘digression’ o f objects into events, w e m ight have to com plain 
not o f a bifurcation o f nature but o f its ‘m ultifurcation’. F or the 
variety o f diversifications is indefinitely great. But it m ust be 
adm itted that in the main M r. W hitehead makes it clear that the 
alternative renderings are not m eant to result in separate realities, 
but are ways o f reading the same reality. Y e t  this principle is by 
no means seriously pursued to its m etaphysical conclusions; for 
although it is obvious that sense-contents are not in themselves 
sufficient to constitute concrete nature, sineeper se they are ‘eternal 
objects’ w hich are m erely and indefinitely ‘available’ for the filling 
o f events, and only endure in so far as they are related to the
1 The Concept of Nature, p. 30.
2 Mr. Whitehead hesitates between the two senses o f ‘diversification’ : (a) that 
produced by the many renderings (Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 6o, 11. 
1-2); and (6) the multiplicity laid bare by each analysis {hoc. cit., p. 59).
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system o f events; and again, that mere passage is insufficient 
without content; and although M r. W hitehead’s own theory as­
sumes these insufficiencies, yet we are told that all such render­
ings o f nature are equally adequate or inadequate. N ot that they 
are all true o f nature conjunctively, but, shall I say ? nature is these 
disjunctively: it is either a com plex o f events, or a congeries o f sense- 
contents, or a collection of physical things, and so on. But, I ask, 
w hich o f these is the one real nature ? W hen that question is con­
sidered it im m ediately becomes obvious that the disjunction I have 
suggested is not after all M r. W hitehead’s real m eaning: though 
‘one m ode of diversification is not necessarily more abstract than 
another’ yet, he adds in the next sentence, ‘objects can be looked 
on as qualities o f events, and events as relations between objects, 
or— more usefully— we can drop the metaphysical and difficult 
notion o f inherent qualities and consider the elements of different 
types as bearing to each other relations’ .1 T h u s the diversifications 
are within nature, or o f  nature, and nature includes them a ll ; they 
are related to one another within nature, and nature is the appro­
priate synthesis o f its infinite diversifications. T h at is a possible 
view ; but M r. W hitehead neither holds to it firm ly, nor accepts 
its im plications. H e tells us e.g. that there is in nature nothing 
else but events ;2 he adds that ‘a reference to objects is only a way 
o f specifying the character o f an event’ , thus indicating that an 
event is not a mere happening, but that it is something happening.3 
It m ust be capable o f being discriminated, and the passage o f 
nature is, therefore, not continuous (though abstract space and 
time, and o f course ‘pure passage’ , are continuous). But what is 
the ‘ som ething’ w hich passes, and is capable o f being discriminated 
as ‘passing’ ? It m ust be objects as qualifying events, or, as 
M r. W hitehead prefers it, as related to events. ‘T h ere is no appre­
hension o f external events apart from  recognitions o f sense-objects 
as related to them , and there is no recognition o f sense-objects 
except as in relation to external events.’4 A n d  apart from  this 
relation these objects are the ‘eternal objects’ (which m ight better 
have been called timeless logical essences). T h u s are perceptual
1 Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 60.
2 ‘The conditions which determine the nature of events can only be furnished 
by other events, for there is nothing else in nature’ (Loc. cit., p. 73).
3 The ambiguous character of an event, as both abstract and concrete, both 
empty and qualitied, is a real difficulty in the philosophy of Mr. Whitehead.
4 Loc. cit., p. 83. Mr. Whitehead is, I believe, an epistemological realist.
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and scientific objects constituted; and hence the natural tendency 
to read the theory as im plying that nature is created by the dis­
tribution o f the ‘eternal objects’ w ithin a space-time fram ew ork: 
‘there is a structure o f events and this structure provides the 
fram ework o f the externality o f nature w ithin w hich objects are 
located.’ 1 But how  distributed, and on what principles? Putting 
aside the phenom enological construction o f perceptual and scien­
tific objects, on w hat principles are ‘eternal objects’ distributed in 
the event-continuum  ?2
M r. W hitehead discusses this question in  the m etaphysical part 
o f his book on Science and the Modern W orld: it  is not m y intention 
to expound his view s in detail, but I m ust examine their main trend. 
H e distinguishes between the realm o f possibility (i.e. o f ‘ eternal 
objects’) and that o f actuality (i.e. o f events and spatio-tem poral 
objects). T h e  tw o realms together constitute, or are ‘ intrinsically 
inherent in the total m etaphysical situation’.3 T h e  relation be­
tween these two realms im m ediately becomes a vital question. 
A m on g possible relations four o f importance m ay be n am ed :
(1) T h e  tw o m ay be w holly  unconnected, so that there is an 
ultim ate bifurcation in the Real. T h is  m ay be put aside since 
according to M r. W hitehead there is adm ittedly ‘digression’ o f 
the ‘eternal objects’ into nature. T h e y  are am ong its ingredients.
(2) Both m ay be abstractions from  the Real w hich is the 
synthesis o f the ‘eternal objects’ and the web o f ‘passage’ . T h is  is 
excluded by statements to the effect that ‘actual occasions are 
selections from  the realm o f possibilities’ .4
(3) T h is  suggests the alternative that the possible m ay contain 
the actual eminenter, and that the actual is thus a passage o f per­
spectives w ithin the possible. T h is, however, w ould im ply the 
introduction w ithin the realm o f ‘eternal objects’ o f the foreign 
element o f ‘passage’ and event, w hich is com m only supposed to 
render the actual more real than the m erely possible. I f  this last 
supposal were true then we should h a v e :
(4) T h e  possible contained eminenter (in whole or in part) within 
the actual. I f  only in part, then the problem  recurs w ith  respect 
to that part o f the possible w hich is not actualized. N ow  M r. W hite-
1 Principles of Natural Knowledge, p. 80.
2 It is not unimportant to remember that for Mr. Whitehead ‘objects’ are not 
‘emergent’ from events (cf. Science and the Modern World, p. 151).
3 Science and the Modern World, p. 228.
4 Loc. cit., p. 235.
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head definitely excludes this fourth suggestion: ‘ It is the foundation 
of the m etaphysical position w hich I am m aintaining that the 
understanding o f actuality requires a reference to ideality.’ 1 ‘E very 
actual occasion is set w ithin a realm o f alternative interconnected 
entities. T h is  realm is disclosed by all the untrue propositions 
which can be predicated significantly o f that occasion.’ 1
I am thus driven to the view  that M r. W hitehead holds that the 
possible includes the actual eminenter; for their identity seems to 
be excluded by his insistence on the positive character o f ‘passage’ . 
But i f  ‘passage’ is thus a positive character, how can the actual 
(which possesses it) be contained in the possible, w hich is ‘eternal’ , 
and in w hich, therefore, nothing can happen or ‘pass’ ? M r. W hite­
head m ust thus either interpret ‘passage’ in such a w ay as to make 
it subordinate to and coherent w ith the ‘eternity’ o f the realm o f 
possibility, or else he m ust make the actual in some sense external 
to the possible.
Between these two views he seems finally to hesitate: in  any 
case the possible is vastly richer in content than the actual; but 
the actual is either, on the one hand, a real passage to w hich nothing 
corresponds in the possible, and w hich constitutes the very differ­
entia o f actuality: in  w hich case ‘eternal objects’ have no direct 
ontological significance, but are mere ‘subsisting’ entia rationis, 
and the R eal is identical with the actual. O r, on the other hand, 
passage already belongs, in some form , to the possible, a suggestion 
which is by no means absent from  M r. W hitehead’s exposition: 
‘the spatio-tem poral relationship, in terms o f w hich the actual 
course o f events is to be expressed, is nothing else than a selective 
limitation w ithin the general system atic relationships among eternal 
objects.’2 In  that case the passing existence o f nature is a dim inu­
tion of the eternal existence o f possibility, the Real and the eternal 
possible are identical, and the passing actual w orld but a m oving, 
changing selection w ithin the possible.
In  either case the urgent problem  w ould then concern the 
empirical passage o f the actual, and its metaphysical u ltim acy; and 
if  it could be shown that real existence contains passing existence 
eminenter, sub specie aeternitatis, then a real explanatory (and not 
a m erely descriptive) metaphysics w ould be in sight.
M r. W hitehead’s attempts to explain the precise relations 
between events and the various sorts o f intermediate objects are 
1 Science and the Modern World, p. 228. 2 Loc. cit., p. 232.
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acute and most instructive, and had the same m ethod been carried 
through to the m etaphysical issue the difficulties w hich I have 
raised m ight have been m et, though the system  w ould then, I 
think, have been som ewhat modified. F or m y requirem ent is not 
that a philosopher shall explain the nature o f being and w hy it is 
precisely what it is, but rather that he shall exhibit the relations 
existing between the various elements into w hich he has analysed 
the Real.
N ow , as I have said, M r. W hitehead distinguishes, in the Real, 
between the actual and the possible, the actual being the result o f 
the ‘ ingression’ o f the possible into actual occasions or even ts; thus 
there are tw o main questions dem anding clarification: (i) granted 
that the distinction o f the possible and the actual is in  itself valid 
in general, to w hat extent is it possible for them  to be separated 
from  each other in the Real and its various diversifications?
(ii) w hat are the relations o f the objects o f various kinds to the 
actual occasions or events in w hich they are ‘situated’ ?
T h e  tw o questions are, o f course, fundam entally related to each 
other, though the first is m etaphysical and the second phenom eno­
logical. I deal w ith the phenom enological question first.
A  great part o f M r. W hitehead’s philosophy is occupied w ith the 
question o f the relations o f objects and events. W ith  the very 
precise details I have no im mediate concern,1 but in the general 
principles I  am vitally interested. F or M r. W hitehead, an object 
is not a com plex o f events or a com plex event simpliciter: it  is 
situated in and pertains to its actual com plex event. T h u s events, 
for exam ple, are divisible, w hile objects are essentially organic and 
thus cannot be d iv id ed : not spatially, for they function as u n ities; 
not tem porally, for they require their ‘whole period in  w hich to 
m anifest [themselves]’.2 T h e  object is thus not a m ere conven­
tional fiction w hich, for some extrinsic purpose, we substitute 
for the events on w hich it is patterned. R ather, as it seems to 
m e, if  w e can distinguish them  from  the objects, it is the events 
that are the fiction; for the picture o f nature as an event- 
framework, even w hen it is elevated above m ere non-being b y  a 
form al decking o f sense-contents, is less adequate than that o f a 
w orld  o f objects characterized by unity and perm anence rather than
1 Not that they are unimportant. Intricate and difficult as they are, I believe 
them to hold the solutions of some long-standing problems in phenomenology.
2 Science and the Modern World, p. 54.
by diversity and passage, and therefore not in themselves events, 
but containing spatio-temporal relations, and bearing such relations 
to each o th er; and this again is less adequate than that o f a world 
of nature as a total object, not itself in, but containing space-time. 
For at each stage in the progressive synthesis the diversity gives 
place to u n ity ; the reputed organic character of events belongs to 
the objects situated in them , or capable of being so situated, rather 
than to the pure events. T h e  fact is that the continuum  o f mere 
events, or even space-tim e, is too flim sy to serve the purpose to 
which phenomenologists are w ont to put it .1 T h e  merest object 
already distorts it by substituting unity and permanence for 
m ultiplicity and ‘passage’ . O nly so are objects constituted: their 
creation or ‘ingression’ is founded upon the distortion or even 
destruction o f space-time or passage. A t each stage in the ‘in ­
gression’ o f objects, the continuum  of passage becomes more 
distorted and contracted, until in the lim it when totality is reached 
it m ust disappear. It is, in fact, only the em pty form  o f occurrence 
w ithout content, and therefore nothing re a l; it is a mere fictitious 
lower lim it o f abstraction. A ctual space-time is essentially occupied, 
and thus m ore concretely called ‘enduring th in g’ ; while real space­
tim e, carrying this correction to an ideal lim it, is the eternal 
Extension o f Spinoza in w hich passage is w holly transform ed into 
quality.
T h u s in order to understand the relations o f objects and events 
it is necessary not only to watch the ‘ingression’ o f objects into a 
ready-made event-fram ework, but also to notice how the framework 
fares as a result o f its occupation. W hat, for example, becomes o f 
‘passage’ when it falls w ithin the permanent object ? It is no answer 
to say that w hile the object as a whole is permanent its ultim ate 
parts suffer ‘passage’ , for as an object it is not divisible into p arts; 
nor can the object and its parts be separated as co-ordinate entities 
(for thus there w ould be reduplication w ithout lim it). Still less 
reasonable w ould it be to regard the object and the events as 
separate existences.
T h e  relation o f the objects to the events w hich they are said to 
occupy is, therefore, from  the side o f the events an ‘ingression’, 
but it is also a ‘ condensation’ o f the event-fram ework. T h e
1 And, recurring to the ambiguity in the notion of an event, if we once begin 
to make the events (or space-time, either) qualitied or concrete, we shall have to 
proceed further than any mere phenomenology is willing to go.
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pure transiency o f ‘passage’ gives place to the duration o f a 
relatively permanent object. B ut the ‘ingression’ and the ‘con­
densation’ are not real processes but only the m ythical momenta 
o f phenom enological genetics. A s  the actuality o f a pure event is 
its ‘passage’, and its possibility is its indefinite ‘patience’ , so the 
actuality o f a finite thing is its conatus or ‘real duration’, and its 
possibility the ‘patience’ o f a concrete w orld for its ‘ingression’ , or 
in the reversed form  in w hich it is natural for M r. W hitehead to 
prefer to express the same relation: ‘the m eaning o f the term 
“ possibility”  as applied to A  is sim ply that there stands in the 
essence o f A  a patience for relationships to actual occasions.’1
But i f  possibility means the m utual patience o f an ‘eternal 
object’ and actual situations or occasions, no m eaning can be 
attached to a realm o f possibility transcending the lim its o f the 
total actual. T h at brings m e to the form er o f m y two questions. 
W hat could be meant b y  the possibility o f an ‘eternal object’ for 
w hich no actual occasion is or could be ‘patient’ , w hich can never 
be situated in an event, or be an ‘ingredient’ in  nature? Surely 
this is precisely w hat is meant b y  an absolute impossibility!
T h u s it is in the abstract event-fram ework that actuality is 
minimal and possibility a m axim um . It is pure vXn] w ithout form . 
Am on g the partial phenom enal objects w hich endure and ‘pass’ , 
actuality is conatus or ‘ real duration’ , and possibility is the mutual 
‘patience’ o f the parts w ithin an appropriate whole. B ut w ith 
the absolute totality o f nature actuality m ust be, not minimal, 
and not duration (which is never com plete, and in principle never 
can be com plete), but eternity as infinite existence, and possibility 
is the ‘patience’ o f the Real for itself, w hich is com plete and is 
hence identical w ith actuality.
T h a t M r. W hitehead draws no such conclusions is the result o f 
his failure thoroughly to clear up the questions relating to the 
relative status o f objects and events. T h e y  are never unam bigu­
ously either separate realities, or identical, nor do they possess 
differing degrees o f reality or ultim acy. T h e  double account of 
the nature o f events tells the same story: they are at once pure 
‘ passage’ and also ‘ organic’. But they cannot be b oth ;2 and, as 
I have suggested, the im puted ‘organic’ character o f events is but
1 Science and the Modern World, p. 230.
2 Events which essentially ‘extend’ and are capable of overlapping are clearly 
not characterized solely by ‘passage’.
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the reflection in the events o f their possible filling by organized 
objects. D oubtless w ithout such reflected content the event- 
framework becomes a mere transparency devoid o f ontological 
status; and in that case the question o f the relation o f objects and 
events is reduced (or rather elevated) to that o f objects and their 
actual spatio-tem poral context, and ultim ately to that o f the 
character o f the eternal Real.
Hence what is really needed is a metaphysics w hich is the criti­
cism and com pletion o f all the possible phenom enological accounts 
o f nature and not a superadded description o f a new  type o f reality. 
T h e  different grades o f objects distinguished by M r. W hitehead 
would then be regarded as the elements o f successive and in­
creasingly satisfactory phenom enologies, in w hich m ere ‘passage’ , 
m ultiplicity and repetition progressively give place to duration, 
unity and change. A nd  the critical examination o f this series 
and o f the relative values o f its m em bers, as these bear upon the 
estimation o f the ultim ate character o f the Real, w ould render 
metaphysics only the final step o f an assured logical process, but 
a step w hich w ould transform  the whole field o f inquiry.1
1 The term ‘phenomenology’ cannot be applied to the theory of pure events; 
for, as I have said, a pure event is not, strictly speaking, an event at all: where 
nothing happens there is no happening. Not that this part of Mr. Whitehead’s 
theory is valueless; on the contrary it is of great interest as an abstract analysis 
of the forms of unity within the Real. This part of doctrine might be styled 
Analytic-, it tells its own story of the interplay of ‘passage’ and ‘extension’. 
Phenomenology begins when we pass from the mere form of events to occurrences 
having quality or content, and hence duration. And the whole structure should 
be crowned by a Metaphysics which, taking the cue from the hierarchy of pheno­
mena, shall determine the nature of being-as-such without abstraction, or 
partition, or limitation: the nature, as Spinoza would say, of ens realissimum sive 
perfectissimum, i.e. the Real.
The reader will, perhaps, permit me to add that the discussion in this chapter 
of Mr. Whitehead’s doctrine was written before his latest work, Process and 
Reality, was accessible to the general public. Rumours were, indeed, abroad 
indicating that some of the points which I have raised had been illuminated or 
reconsidered in the Gifford lectures to which a favoured few in Edinburgh had 
listened during the previous session, but the new light reached remoter regions 
of the republic of letters only in jack-o’-lantern flashes; and having no mind to 
‘follow wandering fires, lost in the quagmire’ I confined my attention to the 
works then available. By the time that Process and Reality was published my 
book was already in the hands of the printers, and it is, of course, impossible 
to deal, even inadequately, with Mr. Whitehead’s impressive cosmology in a 
stop-press addendum to a footnote. Nor do I think that my discussion of the 
earlier doctrine is thus rendered nugatory: in relation to my own argument its 
value remains unchanged; and in relation to Mr. Whitehead’s teaching its 
value may even be enhanced, both as a criticism of the old, and as an intro­
duction to the new.
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TH E  assimilation o f the problem s o f space and tim e that dis­tinguishes M r. W hitehead’s general attitude from  that of 
M . Bergson is characteristic also o f the philosophical system  of 
M r. Alexander. T h is  connexion o f space and tim e is, o f course, 
ultim ately derived from  speculative physics, w hich in this respect 
at least is an uncritical developm ent o f com mon-sense assumptions; 
and though in these systems the union becom es more profound and 
intim ate (especially in the theory o f M r. Alexander, as I  shall 
indicate im m ediately), in  so far as it remains as an unresolved 
assum ption, it  has its baneful effect in  both. W hether the repre­
sentation o f space and tim e as a single four-dim ensional con­
tinuum  is satisfactory as a schema within, and for all the purposes 
o f  mathem atical physics, and i f  so how  far, I need not discuss.1 
Presum ably, the main interest o f physics being in m easurement, it 
follows that space and tim e can, for that science, only be extant 
in so far as they can be represented, adequately or not, as measure- 
able quantities. H ence tim e m ust be conceived extensively as 
clock-tim e; and as w e, in com mon w ith all conscious finite beings, 
are w ell accustom ed to this conception, w hich has, as I  have said, 
a certain phenom enological validity, we come to accept it as satis­
factory in the further sense o f being ultim ately and m etaphysically 
adequate.2 But in so far as such measurements o f tim e themselves 
involve m ovem ents (and thus also reference to space-measurements) 
it is not surprising that the association o f space and tim e (so 
determined) should also appear quite natural, dem anding no
1 Though even for this science the time-dimension and the three dimensions 
of space appear not to be universally interchangeable.
2 Artificial clocks are not the only sort to which we are accustomed. Anything 
which moves is capable of functioning as a clock, and especially those things 
which move in cycles which by reference to those of human activity (themselves 
also clocks) appear to be regularly recurrent. Thus not only the motions of the 
sun and moon, the variations of the seasons, the habits of animals, and the 
growth of plants, but also our internal functions, the pulsations of the heart, 
the movements of breathing, the recurrence of hunger and sleepiness, are all 
natural clocks which provide us with the sense of extensive passage in time. The 
question as to what would happen to time if all clocks were removed affords an 
interesting subject for dialectical debate.
special critique. But philosophy m ust probe beneath this set o f 
sym bols in its attem pt to lay bare the veritable nature o f space and 
tim e, or space-time.
M r. A lexander is under no misapprehension about the meta­
physical inadequacy o f the representation o f Space-Tim e as a four­
dimensional continuum . For him  there is no space w hich is not 
essentially tem poral : even a one-dimensional space demands as a 
minim um  the tem poral character o f successiveness if  it  is to be 
spatial. For w ithout the distinction of parts w hich is the result o f 
temporal succession among the points o f space, the single dimension 
would remain an undifferentiated, and therefore non-spatial unity. 
Sim ilarly a two-dim ensional space is strictly inconceivable except 
as characterized also b y  the additional tem poral attribute of 
irreversibility, w hereby the second dimension is, as it were, spread 
out and maintained. In  addition to the temporal characters of 
successiveness and irreversibility, a three-dimensional space m ust 
receive the further quality o f uniform ity o f tem poral direction (or 
‘betweenness’), and w ithout these appropriate tem poral characters 
our space w ould be, not m erely incom plete, but incapable o f being 
fully spatial. It w ould collapse or evaporate, and either analogy 
w ill serve indiscrim inately. T h u s, ‘T im e does w ith its one­
dimensional order cover and em brace the three dimensions of 
Space, and is not additional to them . . . . M etaphysically, (though 
perhaps mathematically) [m'c], it is not therefore a fourth dimension 
in the universe, but repeats the other three.’ 1
M r. Alexander is thus led (as is very well known) to one of his 
most characteristic speculative transitions, according to w hich time 
is not so m uch a homogeneous addition to space as it is a hetero­
geneous constituent: ‘T im e is the m ind o f Space’ .2 Equally 
characteristically this aperçu is not thrown out as a rhetorical 
substitute for critical exposition : it is explained, lim ited, defended, 
and finally elaborated, w ith some care. It is not for me to attem pt 
to expound in any detail either the explanation or the defence, but 
I must, for m y purpose, note the lim itations introduced, and (what 
is the same thing view ed from  the opposite side) the elaboration 
o f this relation o f space and tim e as an ontological category. For 
M r. Alexander follow ing Spinoza w ill not make the human con­
stitution the standard and exem plar o f things ; it is truer to say not 
that ‘T im e is the m ind o f Space’ , but that ‘we are examples o f a
1 Space, Time, and Deity, i, p. 59. 2 Doc. cit., ii, p. 38.
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pattern w hich is universal and is follow ed not only by things but 
b y  Space-Tim e itself’ .1 ‘Rather than hold that T im e is a form  o f 
m ind we m ust say that m ind is a form  o f T im e. T h is  second pro­
position is strictly true.’2 T h e  relation o f m ind and body (i.e. 
brain or neural process) in man is m uch m ore com plex than that 
o f tim e and space in  Space-T im e, and hence it is sim pler to under­
stand the latter than the form er. But the general pattern is the 
same throughout. In  the human body, as I shall point out shortly, 
the sim ple relation is com plicated b y  the fact that the neural 
processes are part o f a general body w hich ‘exists as it w ere o f its 
own righ t’ , i.e. w e have here another example o f the same pattern 
in w hich for ‘m ind’ m ust be substituted ‘life ’ . From  this com ­
plication arises the distinction between ‘enjoym ent’ and ‘con­
tem plation’ in  mental life, since the living bodily organism is, as a 
whole, external to m ind (as also are the other parts o f the external 
world). T h u s w e ‘ contem plate’ ourselves and other things as non­
m ental entities, and ‘enjoy’ ourselves as conscious bodies, thus 
w e enjoy our consciousness, that is, our contem plating minds. 
But this com plication cannot arise in the relations o f space to 
tim e in S p a ce -T im e: for there is in space nothing existing o f its 
own right, and external to tim e, in relation to w hich tim e could 
be som ething additional. For space w ithout tim e is nothing. T h u s 
qualities only ‘em erge’ at levels above that o f Space-T im e, where 
there is the additional com plication arising from , or concom itant 
w ith partition; for in Space-T im e, ‘the m atrix o f all empirical 
existence’ , partition m ay give rise to parturition.
T h is  is a point o f determ ining im portance. T im e is not a quality 
o f space, but an essential elem ent in  its constitution. Spaceless 
tim e and timeless space are alike non-existent and inconceivable. 
T h e  only quality possessed im m ediately b y  Space-T im e is motion, 
and this is it. H ere quality and stuff are identical. W ith  mind 
the case is different; for m ind is distinguishable (and, in a sense, 
separable) from  body: there are bodies w ithout m inds, though not 
perhaps m inds w ithout bodies; and thus the quality o f m entality 
is distinct3 from  the body, brain, or neural process w hich is so 
qualitied. A n d  M r. Alexander, taking his cue from  these4 empirical
1 Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 39. 2 Loc. cit., ii, p. 44.
3 But not epiphenomenal (cf. loc. cit., ii, p. 8).
4 ‘The case which we are using as a clue is the emergence of the quality of 
consciousness from a lower level of complexity which is vital.’ (Loc. cit., ii, 
P- 45-)
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lim its, puts forward his th eoiy  o f the tem porally hierarchical or 
evolutionary constitution o f the Real. T h e  ultim acy o f Space- 
T im e as the m atrix o f em pirical things im plies the temporal 
character o f the hierarchy: ‘ N ew  orders o f finites com e into 
existence in T im e ; the w orld actually or historically develops 
from  its first or elem entary condition o f Space-Tim e. . . .  A s in 
the course o f T im e new com plexity o f motions comes into existence, 
a new quality em erges.’ 1 T h e  speculation is familiar, and need not 
for m y present purpose be elaborated. Some years ago M r. 
Alexander surprised and delighted students o f Spinoza b y  pub­
lishing w hat he described as ‘a gloss upon Spinoza’s teaching’ ,2 in 
which he set forth the relations o f his own philosophy to that o f 
Spinoza, and indicated some o f the im portant changes w hich the 
latter w ould suffer if  certain positions, fundam ental to his own 
theory w ere incorporated into it. W hat w ould be of interest at this 
point o f our discussion, i f  I had the ability or the vanity to attempt 
it, would be just such a gloss upon the philosophy o f M r. Alexander 
as Spinoza m ight have offered if  he had enjoyed, among the other 
advantages of an English writer o f the twentieth century, fam iliarity 
with the theory w hich, perhaps, among recent philosophies makes 
the nearest approach to his own. T o  attem pt to supply even a 
rough estimate o f a part o f such a gloss w ould be an undertaking 
beyond m y com petence, and the most that I can offer, therefore, 
is a few  suggestions as to the directions in w hich difficulties are to 
be found in M r. Alexander’s general theory, and the lines along 
w hich a Spinozist m ight look for their solutions.
One of the main suggestions of M r. Alexander in his ‘ little 
piece’ was that tim e should take the place o f T h ou gh t as an 
Attribute o f the Real w hich w ould thus becom e Space-Tim e 
instead of Extension and T h ough t, & c. T h u s, as I have explained, 
time w ould diversify space and make it concrete, i.e. make 
it genuinely spatial; and space w ould unify tim e, make it con­
tinuous, i.e. make it genuinely temporal. Real T im e is Space- 
T im e, w hich again is real Space. M ere space and mere tim e in 
isolation are mere unity and mere diversity, i.e. non-being.
W ith  this general argument, so far as it goes, no Spinozist need 
find fault. T h e  Extension o f Spinoza is not, as M r. Alexander very 
naturally tends to suppose (since most o f the commentators give
1 Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 45.
2 Spinoza and Time, p. 36.
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that impression, or at least do not refute it), the em pty conception 
o f extension, or even an instantaneous, recurrent, or representative 
extension. It is an eternal A ttribute expressing the concrete nature 
o f Substance in its fullness. T h u s the difficulty is not so m uch 
what M r. Alexander affirms w ith respect to Space-T im e as what 
he refrains from  affirm ing: for on the one hand, though tim e 
diversifies space it only does so in a piecem eal fashion, little by 
little, and not com pletely and eternally; and on the other hand, 
space only renders tim e continuous, i.e. makes it duration, but 
does not, or rather is not b y  M r. A lexander allowed to unify  it in 
any ultim ately satisfactory sense. T h e  result is that the ultim ate 
Space-T im e is essentially incom plete, not m erely at any epoch, 
but at ‘a ll’ epochs; ‘for the very nature o f duration is such that it 
is always possible to conceive a duration greater or less than any 
given duration’ .1 M y  criticism  o f the conception o f Space-T im e 
so far as it includes duration w ill b y  this tim e be fam iliar: at any 
given point o f tim e there is always m ore to com e in a continuous 
duration, and though it is true that S pace-T im e itself does not 
stand at any one such point, but com prehends them  all, it is pre­
cisely because it claim s to include all periods w hile itself never 
resting, because it thus claim s to be all-inclusive w hile ever de­
m anding m ore, that Space-T im e does not satisfy. Professor 
T ay lo r has rem inded us that ‘ “ passage”  does not “ pass”  ’ ,2 just 
as others have assured us that duration does not endure. A nd 
since tim e per se is not in tim e, it m ay verbally be agreed that ‘all’ 
Space-T im e m ust be spatio-tem porally self-contained. B ut the 
term  ‘all S p ace-T im e’ begs the question, for a genuine duration 
cannot be com plete, but m ust always be passing. ‘ Its soul’s wings 
are never fu rled ’ .3 T h u s S p ace-T im e is not m erely now unfinished, 
it is essentially incapable o f  being finished, it belongs to the indefinite 
rather than to the infinite and com plete. N o r can the unsatis­
factoriness be confined to the tim e-elem ent in Space-T im e, for, 
according to M r. Alexander (and I have not disputed his conten­
tion), tim e reciprocates w ith every dim ension o f space, and is thus 
not a distinguishable dim ension. Space w hich in itself, rightly 
conceived, is innocent, b y  its inadequate tem poral diversification 
becom es fu ll o f vice. T h e  partners in this m arriage are thus un­
1 ‘Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit con- 
cipi.’ (Cog. Met. II, x.)
2 A  Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, p. 691. 3 Spinoza and Time, p. 42.
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equally yoked together, and though they can never be sim ply 
divorced, neither can they settle dow n in harm ony and fruitfu l­
ness, and their reputed offspring can be none o f theirs, but only, 
for them , abiogenetic monsters accepted w ith ‘natural p iety ’ .
T h u s Space-T im e m ust be spatio-tem porally self-contained 
without being spatio-tem porally com plete; from  w hich premisses 
the plain conclusion surely m ust be that Space-T im e is not the 
ultim ate reality. F or though, ex hypothesi, it contains everything, 
it yet remains essentially incom plete. But what then is com plete­
ness? Further, there is a fundam ental self-contradiction in the 
conception o f an ultim ate reality w hich cannot in any given respect 
be com pleted. F or the ground o f the incompleteness m ust lie 
either w ithin the nature o f the Real, or in som ething else partly or 
w holly unreal. I f  the latter, then w hat is not fu lly  real is m ore 
powerful than the Real and lim its its existence. I f  the form er, 
then the Real deprives itself o f existence w hich it m ight, without 
equivalent loss, possess. But this is absurd.1
I have said that the vice is introduced into Space-T im e through 
the agency o f tim e; also that it is tim e that realizes space. T h u s 
the dilemma cannot be avoided by a retreat into a timeless space 
simpliciter. T h a t was in essence the Cartesian solution w hich was 
bluntly rejected by Spinoza,2 and, indeed, was only rendered 
possible for Im agination by the introduction o f the w ill o f G od  as 
operative w ithin extension.3 T h e  only w ay o f escape m ust be 
through a m ore com plete diversification of space, resulting in an 
ultimate Real not open to the objections I have urged. For space, 
as M r. Alexander has said, is prim arily a principle of unity, and 
when its enduring character is ignored (as for example w ith in­
stantaneous or recurrent extension) its unity is patent. T h e  mere 
principle o f the relativity o f position and motion in space guarantees 
its formal unity ;4 but the attem pt to rest in the abstract conception 
of a space diversified only by tim e cannot be successful: time,
1 Cf. Eth. I, vii et xi.
2 Cf. Epp. Ixxxi et Ixxxiii.
3 And if Spinoza would accept no filling for extension by miraculous agency, 
neither could he look to thought for it. It must stand or fall by its own power 
and nature.
4 Mere space is, as Mr. Alexander says, not spatial. But it is a unity, and 
therefore real space, which is qualitied or occupied, is necessarily a unifying 
principle in the diversity of its contents; and in the end it becomes an infinite 
whole of content: Extensio aeterna. I must here once again emphasize the 
distinction which Spinoza draws (Ep. Ixxxiii) between the ‘conception’ of ex-
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w hich is rightly introduced to ‘inflate’ m ere space, m ust in the end, 
i f  it  is not controlled by some superior principle o f wholeness, 
burst it and scatter it to dust. T h u s both the theory o f Space- 
T im e and the stuff itself m ay be exploded.
H ow , then, is Space-T im e to be am ended? I reply, by the con­
tinuation and com pletion o f the dialectic so prom isingly begun by 
M r. Alexander him self. M ere space is, so far as content is con­
cerned, nothing; it is real m erely as form al unity. M ere tim e is, 
so far as form  is concerned, nothing; it is m erely diversity o f 
content. From  these incom plete elements there is forged the 
m inim ally concrete reality: Space-T im e. Being (i.e. space =  
form al bein g; tim e =  being as content) and Non-being (i.e. tim e =  
form al non-being; space =  non-being in  content) are synthesized 
as Becoming (i.e. Space-T im e =  M otion or form al becom ing); but 
this is only the beginning o f the d ialectic; real being m ust lie at 
the end o f a long series o f constellations, in the procession through 
w hich duration becom es more and more com plete, i.e. concrete and 
definite (as opposed to the indefinity o f the mere duration w hich 
belongs to space-time). T h is  is a point o f great im portance w hich 
in essence has been elaborated already, and I need do no m ore than 
em phasize the m ain assertion, viz. that every individual part of, 
or under, Natura naturata has its own conatus, ‘real duration’ or 
q u a lity ; it does not merely occupy a section o f a longer or indefinite 
duration, though as a part o f a w ider constellation it  certainly 
occupies a part o f the duration o f that higher individual as it 
appears, or is im agined, from  the standpoint o f the part. Natura 
naturata does not for itself endure, but is eternal; but from  the 
standpoint o f any o f its parts it appears as sempiternal, and thus as 
enduring indefinitely longer than the single part. T h u s the dura­
tion o f the part as such (and it is tru ly  such) is a part o f the sempi- 
ternity o f n atu re; but as an individual it has its own duration: it 
endures at its own rate, and if  not, among the higher orders of 
individuals, ‘unhasting, unresting’, at least hastening and resting 
under the necessity o f its ow n content. T h u s the duration o f each
tension and the Attribute ‘which expresses infinite and eternal essence’ ; from 
the latter alone is the variety of the universe deducible. The abstract conception 
of space is not real space with its content omitted (which would be nothing at 
all), but real space with its content ignored. Mr. Alexander’s pure Space-Time, 
as ‘the matrix of all empirical things’, is again different: it is space provided, not 
with real, but with formal content, up to its minimal demand for formal diversifi­
cation. Evolved Space-Time moves further towards the concrete.
is one w ith its own constellation, individual quality, or conatus. 
I f  it were com plete, duration w ould, for it, be consummated into 
eternity, or rather, since Imagination w ould not arise, its absolute 
essence w ould not endure, but w ould be identical w ith the infinite 
existence w hich is eternity. A s it is not com plete it im agines, and 
its partial eternity appears as its real duration or conatus, including 
the durations o f its subordinate parts and suburbs, and beginning, 
included, and cut off, in the im agined indefinite duration o f the 
enveloping whole within w hich it lies. W ith  lower types o f con­
stellation there m ay be no eternal part, and the whole existence 
of the ‘individual’ m ay be durational. But, even so, i f  it is in  any 
sense an ‘individual’ , it has a duration, w hich resists sim ple solution 
in an endless general duration o f Space-Tim e.
A nd this is the plain evidence of our experience, as M . Bergson 
has so well illustrated. T h e  real duration o f a finite individual has 
its own native speed w hich cannot be quickened or retarded at 
w ill; w hich cannot be varied w ithout such a change in its conditions 
as would, in  effect, constitute also a change in  the ‘contour’ o f the 
process and its pattern. T h u s though it is true that ‘T im e is an 
object given to us em pirically’,1 yet it is given us in  so varied and 
m ultiplex a form , that in  effect we are given also w ith it the 
principles w hich m ust in  the Real transform  it into non-successive 
quality. Em pirical tim e already exhibits in varying measure such 
a transform ation; M r. A lexander’s Space-Tim e exhibits it in 
minimal measure, for there the ‘quality ’ o f motion is the formal 
condensation b y  means o f space o f the ‘vapour’ o f instants w hich 
is pure t im e ; thus, to change the m etaphor, the broken instants 
are welded into spatio-tem poral tracks, currents, or reciprocal 
strains. It is true that M r. Alexander w ill not call motion a quality2 
supervening on Space-T im e since it is Space-Tim e, but he w ill 
agree that m otion is som ething new over and above mere space 
and mere tim e, for at this level Space-Tim e alone is real, and 
therefore new. T h e  same principles m ust apply at every stage in
1 ‘ It was not open to us to say that since the successiveness of Time and its 
continuity are contradictory Time is therefore not real but only appearance. 
Time is an object given to us empirically.’ (Space, Time, and Deity, i, p. 46.) 
This at least suggests that to be given empirically is also to be inescapable 
in the metaphysical determination of the ultimate reality, which is a truth only 
when it is suitably qualified. Taken at its face value the principle implies the 
impossibility of error. (Cf. Etk. II, xxxii-xxxvi.)
2 But cf. Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 45.
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creation.1 A  constellation o f tracks, currents, or reciprocal strains 
means further condensation or integration as m aterial things, 
w hereby the successive or repetitive and exclusive tem porality o f 
the elements is transform ed into the m ore self-perm eating, but 
still in its measure successive, duration o f the w hole, w ith a conse­
quent partial disappearance o f the mere difFused diversity w hich 
is found at a lower stage o f analysis. M ateriality is thus not a new 
‘em ergent’ quality super added to the constellation, and to be accepted 
as an inexplicable datum : it  is the constellatio w hich includes its 
constellata, and b y  integration transcends and perfects them . So with 
the secondary qualities: they are not supervenient on the motions 
w hich are said to correspond to them ; they are those m otions in 
their appropriate synthesis and integration, and stand to them , as 
I have said, as the m usical phrase or m elody stands to the notes 
w hich are its elements or m em bers. A n d  at each stage in the m ove­
m ent upwards through the hierarchy o f being, there is a further 
condensation o f the mere repetitive character o f tim e, to give 
som ething accum ulative and synthetic, and thus nearer to the unity 
o f the Real w hich is eternal. T h u s in the lim it the transiency of 
tim e m ust be overcom e, and w ithout loss o f its positive character 
as the source, or indeed the content,2 o f all m odal diversifica­
tion w ithin the Real, and consequently w ithout resolving space 
into a m ere unity. F or as the externality o f tim e is progressively 
overcome in  this m ythical phenom enological process, there arises 
the equivalent integration w hich  is quality, and this, in  the issue, 
in its perfect form , becomes the very content o f the extended Real, 
nam ely eternity under the A ttribute o f Extension.
M y  contention is, therefore, that M r. A lexander’s attem pt to 
exalt tim e to the status o f an A ttribute o f the Real m ust fail because 
tim e cannot sustain the part thus assigned to it. But M r. Alexander 
was not content thus to exalt tim e, he w ished also to depose Th ou gh t 
from  the dignity o f an A ttribute, and to make it a m ere relation 
between certain types o f m odal being, to make it indeed a special
1 The term is here used neutrally to avoid prejudgement of the nature of the 
process by which mere being is transformed into the Real, or by which the Real 
exhausts itself into the dust of mere being ( = non-being), for ‘the way up and 
the way down are one and the same’.
2 Whence, as I have said, eternity itself is neither timelessness nor the mere sum 
of all durations (an impossible conception since durations are not homogeneous, 
and cannot be completely summed). It is the ultimate constellation of all dura­
tions : their integration and perfection.
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form  of the sim ple general relation o f ‘com presence’ w hich holds 
between all spatio-tem poral facts. T h ou gh t is ‘ the distinguishing 
quality o f the highest level o f em pirical things’ .1
It is true that M r. Alexander also has his own interpretation of 
the omnia animata o f Spinoza, but this need not deflect attention 
from  his m ain denial.2 W hen Spinoza says that all things are 
animated or conscious he means that to every extended constella­
tion there corresponds a psychical constellation w hich is the know ­
ledge or contem plation o f that extended individual. M an y com ­
mentators o f Spinoza (indeed most o f them) have feigned to dis­
cover am biguity in his use o f the term  ‘ idea’ , but, as I shall in due 
course show, there is no real evidence that the am biguity exists 
outside o f the m inds o f those who detect it. T h e  ‘idea corporis’ is 
the knowledge or contem plation o f the body; the ‘idea P etri’ is the 
knowledge or contem plation o f Peter. True,. Spinoza asserts that 
what is called Paul’s idea of Peter w ould more correctly be described 
as an idea o f P aul’s body as affected by Peter’s body, but that is 
m erely the assertion that the idea is false unless it is taken for what 
it really is.3 It is equally true that the idea o f the body is such only 
under the proviso that it is the idea o f the body as affected by 
things, i.e. either as responding more or less adequately to Natura 
as a whole, or as responding inadequately and confusedly to this or 
that section o f nature or external body. It is thus that the mind 
knows only its own body.
In all these and sim ilar statements, therefore, there is not 
the least am biguity about the doctrine that ideas and extended 
modes belong to precisely correlated (but not concatenated) 
systems, and that ideas are contemplations or cognitions o f things.4
1 Spinoza and Time, p. 46.
2 ‘We arrive also at a conclusion which seems to repeat Spinoza’s view that 
thought is a universal feature of things, only with a difference. All things for him 
are in a sense animated, they are all in their degree thinking things. For us 
things which are not minds, which are merely alive or are inanimate, are no 
longer minds, but they do bear an aspect, or contain in themselves an element, 
which corresponds to the aspect or element of mind in a thinking thing. That 
aspect or element is Time.’ (Spinoza and Time, p. 46.)
3 And I may add that the idea is inadequate even then. On these points the 
reader should consult in particular Eth. II, xvi-xvii, Sch.
4 This is important: ideas are not little pictures or images or reproductions of 
things in a rarified psychical material, or in the brain. They are acts of the mind. 
‘Veram . . . habere ideam, nihil aliud significat, quam perfecte, sive optime rem 
cognoscere; nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest, nisi putet, ideam quid 
mutum instar picturae in tabula, et non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum 
intelligere.’ {Eth. II, xliii, Sch.)
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T h u s each w orld, the extended and the conscious, is in itself 
com plete w ithout the other: there are extended constellations in 
infinite detail and integration; correspondingly there are psychical 
constellations as detailed and as integrated. T h e  hum an body, for 
example, in so far as it is a com plete individual is com plete in itself 
without reference to the hum an m in d : the m ind does not com plete 
the body, it contemplates it. K now ledge as such does nothing 
within the bodily order; but it is not, therefore, ineffective, for it 
does everything within the psychical order, because in a sense it 
is everything there.1 So also the m ind is com plete in its degree as 
a m ind, it does not need the body to com plete it:  it  needs no 
physical basis from  w hich to ‘em erge’ , or to ‘ qualify’ ; it  needs the 
body only in  so far as it is the contemplation o f the body. Spinoza’s 
theory, therefore, is w holly opposed to that o f M r. Alexander in 
so far as for him  thought is a self-dependent system , whereas for 
M r. Alexander it is a quality o f certain com plex constellations of 
living material, and as such is w holly absent from  lower constella­
tions (though som ething rem otely analogous is to be found in these 
also, viz. T im e). Spinoza does not adm it that psychical being is 
w holly  absent from  any region o f modal or substantial existence. 
T ru e , not all individual things have minds in the full sense; only 
the infinite whole can be said to think perfectly, for perfect thought 
demands a perfect object.2 N o finite thing can be perfectly intel­
ligent, and vast ranges o f finite being lack even the im perfect 
mental character enjoyed b y  hum an beings.
1 ‘Mens, et Corpus una, eademque res [est] quae jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub 
Extensionis attributo concipitur. . . . At, quamvis haec ita se habeant, ut nulla 
dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo, nisi rem experientia comprobavero, 
homines induci posse ad haec aequo animo perpendendum, adeo firmiter 
persuasi sunt, Corpus ex solo Mentis nutu jam moveri, jam quiescere, pluri- 
maque agere, quae a sola Mentis voluntate, et excogitandi arte pendent. 
Etenim, quid Corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem 
hucusque experientia docuit, quid Corpus ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus 
corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a Mente 
determinetur.' (Eth. I l l ,  ii, Sch.)
2 ‘Et cum per se clarum sit, mentem eo melius se intelligere, quo plura de 
Natura intelligit, inde constat, hanc Methodi partem eo perfectiorem fore, quo 
mens plura intelligit, et turn fore perfectissimam, cum mens ad cognitionem 
Entis perfectissimi attendit sive reflectin' (De Intell. Emend., Op. Post., p. 368.) 
Thus, further, it follows that Spinoza is not involved in the curious difficulty 
experienced by absolute idealists as to how perfect knowledge can be dis­
tinguished from its object. It is distinguished by the fact that it is knowledge 
whereas its object is not. Where this distinction does not hold (e.g. in reflective 
knowledge or idea ideae) perfect knowledge (i.e. the enjoyment of contemplation) 
is not existentially different from its object (i.e. the contemplation itself).
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T h e  general distribution of perfection among the modes has 
already been explained in some detail. T h e  thought o f a finite 
being qua finite is selective and in part im aginative or even false. 
Prim ary parts o f nature do, in part, think adequately, and their 
primary parts to infinity m ay do so a lso ; for all these can have 
knowledge o f the Real (ens perfectissimum) and their knowledge 
of this object cannot but be adequate, i.e. perfect so far as it goes. 
But every finite m ode is necessarily involved in abstraction and 
transiency: to that extent its thought is im perfect; and the more 
limited such a being is, the more it will be infected b y  transiency 
without integration, and the m ore im perfect w ill be its thought. 
T h e  thought o f a finite being is only possible at all as the reflection 
of Natura cogitans, arising from, and originating its response to the 
activity of the whole. T h at this responsiveness cannot be complete 
in an incom plete being constitutes the im perfection o f its thought. 
T h u s, though in man there is a glim m er o f thought at its best, or 
at least as adequate, in the rem oter constellations o f the hierarchy 
of being there are quasi-system s so loose and so fragm entary 
and so slight as to be incapable of reflecting w ith clearness and 
distinctness any ultim ate feature o f the ens perfectissimum. Such 
broken souls w ill thus possess thought only in the sense o f im agina­
tions w hich, in  that form  or constellation, are almost w holly in­
fected w ith falsity. But no genuine individual existence can be 
w holly false, for thus, except as a false part o f the thought o f some 
other individual, it w ould not exist.
T h u s for Spinoza though thought varies in perfection in the 
various types o f constellation, it is correlated w ith every extended 
constellation whatsoever. I f  an individual extended m ode is in 
any degree a genuine existent, however low m ay be its degree o f 
integration, there is contem plation or cognition o f it as its 
essentia objectiva. I t  is known. A n d  all psychical existence is o f 
the nature o f contem plation or know ledge; it is never the quality 
o f its extended correlate; it is its cognition, not in the sense that 
the extended thing knows, but in the sense that it is thus truly 
known.
T h is is indeed the very crux o f the disagreement o f M r. Alexander 
with this part o f the theory of S p in oza: for he regards conscious­
ness definitely as the quality o f certain neural processes. T hese 
processes thus becom e not m erely material things, not m erely 
living things, but conscious things. Consciousness is ‘the enjoyed
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innervation o f the appropriate neural process’.1 Consciousness, if  
it exists,2 is related to the constellations w hich are brain-processes 
‘just as a certain frequency o f sound vibrations is qualified as A , 
and one o f slightly less frequency has a lower pitch ’ .3
A ccording to M r. Alexander this part o f his theory corresponds 
to Spinoza’s references to the m ind as the ‘idea corporis’,4 the 
m ind is the enjoyment o f the neural processes; but it is also the con­
templation o f a w orld o f objects, and this, he says, corresponds to 
Spinoza’s use o f the phrase ‘idea P etri’ .5 I have already said enough 
about this im puted am biguity in Spinoza’s use o f the term  ‘idea’ 
to indicate m y view  that M r. Alexander has been too ready to 
accept the authority o f  the special commentators o f Spinoza in 
this m atter,6 but whatever m ay be said about such details o f inter-
1 Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 107.
2 ‘The real question raised in my mind is whether the physiological process, 
I mean as described physiologically, is not enough, and whether I have done 
rightly, as I  still feel I  have, in making consciousness a “ quality”  of the brain- 
process. Enjoyment for me was always identical with the brain process and its 
connections. Now I find it not so easy to recover my mind of seven years ago, 
and I may have expressed myself and perhaps really thought in a way which led 
to misapprehension. But all that I mean now by various enjoyments is brain- 
processes with their quality of consciousness, a quality which they do not have 
unless the process is of a certain sort, which is therefore intrinsic to them.’ (Loc. 
cit. (Second Impression), i, p. xvii.) Cf. also p. xv where Mr. Alexander states 
one important reason why he does not adopt a behaviouristic metaphysics.
3 Loc. cit. (Second Impression), i, p. xviii.
4 Loc. cit. (Second Impression), i, p. xvi.
5 I must take this opportunity of noting a very curious remark of Mr. Alexander 
in the new preface to Space, Time, and Deity: ‘Where I still dare to differ from 
Spinoza is that for him there is an idea of the mind, which is united to it as the 
mind to the body, and an idea of that idea, and so on. I should say that the mind 
is an idea, and that an idea of it is merely repetition’ (p. xvi). Nowit is remarkable 
that Mr. Alexander has not realized that Spinoza expressly denies that there is a 
vicious infinite regress: ‘Ostendimus Corporis ideam, et Corpus, hoc estMentem, 
et Corpus unum, et idem esse Individuum, quod jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub 
Extensionis attributo concipitur; quare Mentis idea, et ipsa Mens una eademque 
est res, quae sub uno, eodemque attributo, nempe Cogitationis, concipitur.’ (Eth. II, 
xxi, Sch.) But if they are the same thing in the same Attribute they are identical. 
And this is what he goes on to emphasize: ‘Nam revera idea Mentis, hoc est, 
idea ideae nihil aliud est, quam forma ideae, quatenus haec, ut modus cogitandi, 
absque relatione ad objectum consideratur; simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo 
ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, quod scit, et sic in infinitum.’ I cannot 
but suppose that Mr. Alexander put the emphasis in the wrong place and ignored 
the words I have italicized. The idea ideae is thus the idea itself as known in the 
only way in which an idea can be known, viz. as consciously enjoyed. Our con­
templations are not lifeless pictures, but actions which we cannot have and yet 
be unaware of them. To know is to be aware of (i.e. to enjoy) knowing. It is 
also to be aware of (i.e. to contemplate) an object.
6 Cf. Spinoza and Time, pp. 19-20.
pretation (I do not mean that they are unimportant) M r. Alexander 
is, as I have said, at one w ith Spinoza in recognizing that human 
cognition is com plicated by the fact that the body is only a part o f 
a larger whole. For M r. Alexander the neural processes w hich 
have the quality o f consciousness are only parts o f a larger body 
existing in its own right, w hich is not conscious, but only living or 
physical, and this again is related in various ways w ith a w orld of 
external things o f various orders o f com plexity. T h e  result is that we 
do not m erely enjoy ourselves as conscious neural processes, but 
we also contem plate our bodies and things as non-m ental entities.1
But our total consciousness is not to be im agined as an enjoyment 
of certain processes plus a contem plation o f certain objects, for our 
enjoyment o f the processes takes the form  o f the contemplation of 
the objects; thus the deliverance o f immediate experience is that 
we enjoy the contem plation o f the objects. It is only an outside 
observer (or the m ind itself in thought)2 who says that what we 
enjoy is the neural process. ‘ In  being aware o f a certain object the 
man is in a certain neural condition w hich enters into his experi­
ence as consciousness’3 o f that object, or, m ore com pletely, as the 
enjoyed contem plation o f the object. T h e  neural condition itself 
is a response to a stim ulus from  the object, so that cognition is only 
a specially com plex case o f the sim ple relation o f ‘ com presence’ : it 
is the com presence o f (i) a neural system possessing the quality o f 
consciousness o f an object, w ith (ii) that object qua exciting the 
neural innervation w hich is the response o f the neural system  to 
the object. ‘ In  and through this practical response the object is 
revealed to him  as being there.’4
T h is theory o f the relation o f body and m ind is, as M r. Alexander 
says, ‘a species o f the identity doctrine’,5 for the mental process 
and the neural process are really the same. A s mental it is enjoyed 
by the experient; as neural it is contem plated by an outside 
observer; the m ode o f apprehension is different, but the thing 
apprehended is the same.
1 What our enjoyment of ourselves would be like in the absence of the outside 
world which stimulates the neural processes to the innervation which is enjoyed, 
I need not ask, as the supposition is idle. Idle for Mr. Alexander, because his 
theory excludes the possibility; idle for Spinoza, because contemplation does not 
depend upon stimulus and response (though the nature of the object is affected 
by that). It thus becomes clear how theory of knowledge and metaphysics 
reciprocate in both of these theories.
2 Space, Time, and Deity, ii, p. 9. 3 Loc. cit. (Second Impression), i, p. xviii.
4 Loc. cit. (Second Impression), i, p. xvi. 5 Loc. cit., ii, p. 9.
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It  m ay be well at this stage to state as precisely as possible, in the 
m erest outline and w ithout superfluous refinements, what it is that 
I understand M r. Alexander to assert: when tw o things, A  and B, 
are cognitively com present, one o f them  (say A ) is o f the order of 
com plexity to w hich the quality o f consciousness or m ind belongs. 
A  then has (or is) a neural system  w hich is innervated in response 
to stim ulus from  B w hich is mediated b y  ordinary physical or 
organic processes. T h is  innervation is enjoyed b y  A , but not as 
a neural innervation; it is enjoyed as the contemplation o f B .  T h u s 
A  contem plates B , and enjoys the contem plation. T h e  totality of 
such enjoyments is the m ind o f A . T h e  neural innervation is also 
capable o f being contem plated by another being (or by A  him self 
in thought), but as contem plated it is not a contem plation (i.e. a 
contemplating) but an object contemplated.
L e t m e first o f all ask w hat is the precise meaning o f  the state­
m ent that ‘A  enjoys the neural innervation as the contem plation 
o f B ’ ? Consider the im mediate experience o f A :  he directly enjoys 
the action o f contem plating B . In  thought, it m ay now  be supposed, 
he also contemplates the innervation o f his neural process, and 
recognizes that his consciousness is the quality o f that, w hich there­
fore he m ust also, in that sense, be en joyin g; how  is he to rationalize 
the situation ? H ow  can he sim ply identify the neural enjoyment 
and the cognitive enjoym ent? F or he enjoys both, yet has not two 
enjoym ents: a physical one and a mental one; for enjoym ent is 
essentially m ental. H e enjoys the contem plating because it is the 
very nature o f consciousness to contem plate: he enjoys the neural 
process because the consciousness w hich he enjoys is the quality 
o f that process; he enjoys the process in enjoying its quality. He 
also ‘ lives through’ the process as a vital process, and so on. W e 
m ay call this ‘ living through’ the process ‘enjoying it organically’ 
i f  we like, but it is not conscious enjoym ent, w hich is, I suggest, the 
only proper m eaning o f the term.
E vidently the whole difficulty arises from  M r. A lexander’s deter­
mination to call the enjoyed consciousness the quality o f the neural 
process; and yet w e m ust adm it that it does prima facie  seem to 
belong to it in some such manner!
N ow  it m ight be thought that an analogy could be taken from 
the next lower quality, viz. life, w hich is at once, as I have said, 
som ething that the living being ‘lives through’ (unconsciously but 
vitally ‘ enjoys’), and is also a com plex constellation o f metabolic
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processes. W hat is the precise relation between the life ‘ enjoyed’ 
by the unconscious plant,1 and that w hich the external observer 
cognizes in scientific terms (i.e . contemplates)?
It can, perhaps, be said that the plant ‘ enjoys’ its m etabolic pro­
cesses not as such but as a more or less com plete responsive 
adaptation to its environm ent; and it is possible to understand how 
the two things, the contemplation and the enjoyment, belong to 
and reciprocate w ith one another, and are even, in a sense, the 
same. T h e  one emphasizes the inner details o f the process, the 
other the outward-tending sum m ary o f them , and the whole story 
demands both. But when we try  to fit the analogy to the case of 
consciousness, we com e upon some curious difficulties w hich 
cannot be traced to the fact that consciousness is a higher2 quality, 
but only to the fact that it is not a quality at all but a correlate. 
T here are the vigilant neural processes analogous to the m etabolic 
processes in the case o f life; but as the analogy to the vital re­
sponsive adaptation there is the conscious contemplation o f objects. 
But what ought to be taken is the partial responsiveness to external 
objects o f the neural processes, w ith their consequent m ore or less 
inadequate neural reflection (not contemplation) o f these objects. 
T h at is to say we have just w hat Spinoza em phasizes: the human 
body receiving ‘ im ages’ w hich represent partly the nature o f the 
external thing, and partly the nature o f the human body itself.3 
And what is pointedly suggested by these facts is that the ‘conscious’
1 I say ‘plant’ in order to avoid the confusion of the issue which arises when 
we think of life in ourselves, which is not only ‘lived through’, and also con­
templated as a system of metabolic processes, but further, is contemplated 
through organic and kinaesthetic sensations. (Cf. Space, Time, and Deity, 
ii, p. 174 et seqq.)
2 Mr. Alexander is, perhaps, too ready to believe that the special difficulties 
of the case of consciousness are due to our place in the evolutionary hierarchy.
3 ‘Objectum ideae, humanam Mentem constituentis, est Corpus, sive certus 
Extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil alind. . . .  Ex his non tantum intelligi- 
mus, Mentem humanam unitam esse Corpori, sed etiam, quid per Mentis, et 
Corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adaequate, sive distincte 
intelligere nemo poterit, nisi prius nostri Corporis naturam adaequate cognoscat. ’ 
{Eth. II, xiii, et Sch.) ‘ Idea cujuscunque modi, quo Corpus humanum a corpori- 
bus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam Corporis humani, et simul 
naturam corporis externi. . . . Hinc sequitur primo Mentem humanam pluri- 
morum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere. Sequitur 
secundo, quod ideae, quas corporum externorum habemus, magis nostri cor­
poris constitutionem, quam corporum externorum naturam indicant.’ {Eth. II, 
xvi, et Corr.) ‘Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum 
existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.’ {Eth. II, xix.)
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body is only a peculiarly vigilant specim en o f the living organism, 
so that the organism is not conscious but only vigilant. I have 
already said that M r. Alexander him self toys w ith this notion ;1 
and I m ust also rem ind the reader that it is in agreement w ith m y 
own analysis o f the modes o f unity, since the highest type o f unity 
indicated among the parts o f Natura naturata was the organic 
unity, Natura naturata itself only surpassing this b y  its perfection 
as the infinite whole in w hich organic unity gives place to self- 
reflecting unity.
W hat I  suggest, therefore, is that M r. Alexander has erred in 
nam ing enjoyed consciousness as a quality o f certain finite spatio- 
tem poral com plexes, and that he m ust not introduce this error into 
his reform ed Spinozism . T h e  highest o f such qualities m ust be 
life itself,2 though varying in  completeness from  the plant up 
through the animal to man and possibly even higher beings. 
Enjoyed consciousness cannot be conceived as a quality at all: 
w hen w e think o f such consciousness it is o f an activity through 
w hich, not this or that thing is qualified, but on the contrary all 
things are contemplated. It is not a quality o f the body, it is a con­
tem plation o f a w orld w hich is the body as affected by Natura 
extensa. T ru e, the body has its quality o f vigilant responsiveness, 
w hich some m ight be prepared (though I am not) to call ‘uncon­
scious consciousness’ , but the ‘living through’ (or unconscious 
‘ enjoym ent’ of) this cannot be the same thing as the experience 
o f know ing it (and certainly not o f know ing anything else). T h u s 
M r. A lexander’s use o f the term  ‘enjoym ent’ , as standing not only 
for th e ‘ living through’ o fthen eural process but also for the psychical 
enjoym ent o f the action o f contem plating an object,is homonym ous. 
W e enjoy or experience or psychically are mental activities; w e live 
through or vitally are living activities; w e physically are material 
things. H ence the hypothetical angel’s contem plation o f our 
conscious enjoym ent as an object, to w hich M r. A lexander’s specu­
lative flight directs him , m ust be interpreted as a contem plation of 
the extended correlate o f our consciousness, however that is best 
described. N ow  this is precisely what w e already do contemplate, 
and the angel’s view  could only be a more concentrated or unified
1 Space, Time, and Deity (Second Impression), i, p. xvii.
2 In which case it may be expected that Mr. Alexander’s doctrine of ‘deity’, 
which has appeared one of the least satisfactory (and least attractive) parts of his 
theory, will collapse.
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transcript o f such an experience. B ut as so transform ed and 
integrated and glorified it m ight well be that our neural innervation 
with all its universal ramifications through Natura naturata w ould 
be contem plated as possessing a quality far transcending anything 
in our experience, and thus w ould be the correlate o f the angel’s 
enjoyed contem plation. Yet it would not he enjoyed consciousness, 
but the object o f angelic contemplation. A n d  the angel w ould 
enjoy the contem plation; he w ould not contem plate the enjoyment.
I have distinguished between the vigilance o f the fu lly  function­
ing hum an organism and the consciousness o f the human m ind; 
the form er is a quality o f the body, the latter a quality o f the 
m ind: and I m ay perhaps, as I have already suggested in passing, 
identify the form er w ith the m uch discussed ‘unconscious m ind’ 
affected b y  recent psychology. It  m ust, o f course, be recognized 
that this hypothesis was m ainly framed to meet another set o f 
difficulties; w hether it meets them  I w ill not discuss, but that it 
is not w holly w ithout significance is both obvious and certain.1 It 
is well known that Spinoza him self emphasized the wonderful 
powers o f the organic body in operating w ithout even the seem ­
ing agency o f m ind. ‘ N o one has hitherto determ ined what the 
body can do, that is, no one has yet learned by experience what the 
body can accomplish solely by the laws o f nature, in so far as it is 
regarded as a body. N o one has hitherto gained such an accurate 
knowledge o f the bodily structure, that he can explain all its 
functions; nor need I call attention to the fact that m any actions 
are observed in  the lower animals, w hich far transcend human 
sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep 
which they w ould not venture to do when aw ake: these instances 
are enough to show that the body can by the laws o f its nature 
alone do m any things w hich the m ind wonders at. . . .  I w ould 
further call attention to the structure o f the human body, w hich 
far surpasses in artifice all that has been put together by human 
ingenuity, not to repeat what I have already shown, nam ely, that 
from  Natura, under whatever A ttribute it m ay be considered, 
infinite things fo llow .’2 Consciousness, therefore, though it does
1 No one has denied all the ‘facts’ : many have questioned the interpretation. 
But to advance a rival interpretation is to admit the facts.
2 ‘Quid Corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hu- 
cusque experientia docuit, quid Corpus ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus 
corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a Mente 
determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque Corporis fabricam tam accura novit, ut
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nothing in the w orld o f Extension, does everything in the w orld of 
T h o u g h t; and bodily vigilance w hich does nothing in the world 
o f T h ou gh t, does everything in  the w orld o f Extension.
So far I have thought m ainly o f the hum an individuality as the 
natural example o f the relations o f m ind and b ody; but i f  con­
sciousness as enjoyed is distinct from  the vigilance o f the higher 
centres, there is no reason for m aking it solely their correlate. 
W e are free, in the first place, to extend our consciousness to wider 
ranges in accordance w ith the requirem ents o f that consciousness 
itself. F or our consciousness includes the consciousness o f other 
individuals: not o f those w hich lie outside o f our own nature, but 
o f the subordinate parts and m ixed suburbs o f our nature, including 
our relations w ith external things and their parts. W e know  that 
w e contem plate not only our own body as a w h o le ; in some form 
or another w e contem plate every part o f our body as vigilant in its 
degree. Secondly, w e contem plate also the external w orld and its 
parts as they stand related to our bodies, but w e do so confusedly: 
w e imagine them . Em pirically, therefore, consciousness is extant 
in  correlation w ith things other than the neural processes o f the 
individual human thinker. W e are conscious not m erely in our 
preciser thought or intuition o f the w orld as a w hole as it is reflected 
in  the body in its highest processes o f synthesis, in  the higher nerve 
centres; w e are conscious also in Im agination o f a w orld o f sense- 
perception as it is reflected in the relatively low er processes of 
synthesis associated w ith the special sense-organs and their inte­
grating centres. A n d  here too w e have genuine knowledge, but 
o f lower orders o f synthesis in things. For consciousness does not 
make the sense-qualities o f things (whether special, as mediating 
the m ateriality o f th in gs; or organic and kinaesthetic, as mediating 
their v ita lity); it contemplates them  as the syntheses o f elements 
either within the human body or in the system  com posed of
omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare, ut jam taceam, quod in Brutis plura 
observentur, quae humanam sagacitatem longe superant, et quod somnambuli 
in somnis plurima agant, quae vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit, 
ipsum Corpus ex solis suae naturae legibus multa posse, quae ipsius Mens 
admiratur. . . . Addo hie ipsam Corporis humani fabricam, quae artificio 
longissime superat omnes, quae humana arte fabricatae sunt, ut jam taceam, 
quod supra ostenderim, ex natura, sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita 
sequi.’ {Eth. I l l ,  ii, Sch.) If, then, the theory of Spinoza is correct, the wonder 
is not that the body can act of itself, but that consciousness should seem to be 
non-existent in these special cases, while all the extended factors are present in 
the bodily correlate. Some form of dissociation appears to be suggested.
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external things in suitably effective com presence w ith the human 
body.
O ur m ind or consciousness, then, is ‘o f ’ our body both apposi- 
tionally and in referen ce: w e know only our own bodies and their 
parts, but these relate us to outside things in such a w ay that 
subordinate individuation im plies no division o f the unity of 
Natura naturata. T h e  division is in or under, but not o f Natura. 
It follows therefore that though w e cannot enter into and possess 
the com plete consciousness o f any external individual o f any grade, 
but only at best our own, we can and do discover som ething of 
their conscious nature in our own experience, because w e are 
constituted b y, and contem plate the same objects, though not in 
the same degrees o f integration. W hat for us is confused and 
partial Im agination m ay, for them , be consciousness more distinct 
and clear. W e perceive them  in their relation to us as perceptual 
things, i.e . as loosely integrated ranges o f qualities o f various 
degrees. So they also m ay perceive us. But they perceive them ­
selves in their relation to us, and w e perceive ourselves in our 
relation to them , as m ore highly integrated ranges o f quality.1 
And when I speak o f perceiving ourselves, I do mean perceiving our 
bodies, for w e never perceive (i.e. contemplate) anything else, though 
we perceive them  as affected by things. W hen a man perceives 
his body, it is not necessarily the ‘tw o-legged animal w ithout 
feathers’ w hich is the body for sense-perception; he m ay perceive 
it as it is for Intellectus: a partial and inadequate reflection of 
Natura naturata extensa. In  this sense a m an’s body is what he 
reproduces o f Natura naturata extensa, it is what he (and only he) 
mistakes for nature. F or the w orld w hich we perceive by sense is 
not Natura naturata extensa as it is in itself, but only a partly con­
fused perspective o f it, largely com posed o f ‘ im aginations’ w hich, 
though essential to the man in question, and genuinely a section 
of his nature, find no place, in that form , in Natura  itself. A  m an’s 
body, therefore, as I said in an earlier chapter, is o f varying con tour: 
for some purposes it is the nervous system ; for some the organism 
as a w h o le; again for some it is Natura  itself as it is im agined by the 
man him self: he paints nature w ith the affections w hich things
1 Through these relations we may, perhaps, be said to have a ‘direct’ know­
ledge of other minds. This alone, in essence, can be what is meant by the 
saying that we know other minds directly as the concomitant of ‘sociality’. 
Sociality must here be a function of consciousness, and not mere physical or 
organic reciprocity or adaptation. (Cf. Space, Time, and Deity, ii, pp. 31-7.)
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outside o f him  produce in him  (i.e. in  relation and integration with 
him). W ell, indeed, then, did Spinoza emphasize the difficulty of 
understanding what the body is, as well as the necessity o f doing 
so i f  his theory were to be understood.1 F or here the commentators 
almost uniform ly have m isunderstood the theory, finding, as I have 
said, an am biguity in the use o f the term  ‘idea’ . In  the term  ‘idea 
corporis’, says M r. Alexander, follow ing the lead o f Sir Frederick 
Pollock and others, the genitive is used in the sense o f apposition 
or enjoym ent; but in the term  ‘idea P etri’ it is used in  the sense 
o f reference or contem plation. N o w  I assert on the contrary that 
in each case the genitive is both o f apposition and o f referen ce: it 
is the genitive o f apposition or enjoym ent because the idea is the 
correlate o f the body or o f Peter, and is also enjoyed; it is the 
genitive o f contem plation and reference because it is a cognition 
or m ental action. T h e  ‘idea corporis’ is at once both the contem pla­
tion o f the body, and also the correlate o f the body; for the body 
as it is for m an’s com pletest thought is not a section o f Natura 
extensa, but a real part o f it, running through it as a selection of 
all things in varying degrees o f integration and adequacy. T hus 
w e get our nearest approach to a com plete view  o f the hum an body 
as a part o f Natura extensa; and in knowing our own bodies we 
also know  all things in the degree in w hich it is possible for such 
finite parts as w e are to know  them . A n d  though the hum an body 
that w e perceive in mera experientia is broken and sectional, it 
is not w holly  unreal, and it has its range o f consciousness as a 
relatively integrated system  o f ‘ im aginations’ . It  is thus capable 
o f a certain duration and self-m aintenance within the w orld of 
such things.
Sim ilarly w ith the ‘ idea P etri’ w hich form s a section o f Paul’s 
m in d : it is at once the contem plation o f Peter’s body, and also the 
psychical correlate o f that body. T h a t it is also a section o f the 
correlate o f P au l’s body is no difficulty, for Peter and Paul are parts 
o f Natura, and therefore not w holly  isolated from  each other. 
T h e y  are both in some degree and fashion real parts o f Natura, but 
Peter’s idea o f h im self is more com plete and more highly integrated 
than is Paul’s idea o f Peter (which is only a relatively disintegrated 
and ‘ im aginational’ selection from  the outlying suburbs o f the 
being o f Peter).
O nce m ore, I cannot but regard it as am azing that writers who 
1 Eth. II, xiii, Sch.
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have otherwise shown themselves to be sym pathetic towards the 
doctrine o f Spinoza can so uniform ly have failed to discover the 
real significance o f this part o f his theory. It is due, undoubtedly, 
to their failure to understand how  Natura can have parts without 
being divided. But this, as I have insisted, is possible because 
Natura is a constellation o f constellations to infinity, and not a 
one-dimensional system  of corpora simplicia and ideae simplices 
(which cry aloud their incoherence). It is genuinely, and not 
m erely tem porally, hierarchical in form , and it is so because the 
eternity o f Natura naturata is, in its parts, and parts o f parts to 
infinity, progressively dissipated into duration, and vanishes in the 
lim it (i.e. in the instantaneous and isolatedpuncta,and their ‘ ideas’) 
as pure tim e, w hich is non-being.
T here is therefore a harm onized com plexity in the body corre­
sponding to consciousness w ith the m in d ; and as the one is the 
spatial character o f the individual so constituted, so the other is 
his mental character. Consciousness is thus not the same thing as 
physical vigilance or responsiveness; it is not a quality o f certain 
spatio-temporal system s; it implies a new rendering o f the R eal; 
it is ideal vigilance as distinct from  corporeal or spatial vigilance.1 
A nd w herever there is the one there is also in like measure the 
other. Omnia animata; but thought and precise knowledge by any 
individual mean a high degree o f responsiveness or reflection in 
the order o f ideas, correspondent w ith a high degree o f responsive­
ness or reproduction in the order o f things. ‘ T h e  hum an m ind is 
adapted to the perception o f m any things, and its aptitude increases 
in proportion to the num ber o f ways in w hich its body can be 
disposed.’2 ‘T h at w hich so disposes the body that it can be 
affected in m any w ays, or w hich renders it capable o f affecting 
external bodies in m any ways, is profitable to m a n ’3 as an ex­
1 It is this vigilance that constitutes our bodily individuality, as it is our 
consciousness that makes us psychical individuals. Again it is not mere com­
presence, but conscious and vigilant compresence that is important for know­
ledge and physical community respectively. Where the vigilance and the con­
sciousness are intimate and highly varied, there we have an individual of a high 
degree of reality, and knowledge which is true and adequate; where they are vague 
and general and superficial, a mere thing, and perceptual imaginative knowledge.
2 ‘Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo ejus 
Corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.’ {Eth. II, xiv.)
3 ‘ Id, quod Corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel 
quod idem aptum reddit ad Corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, 
homini est utile.’ {Eth. IV , xxxviii.)
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tended being; and the same is true in the world of consciousness 
since ‘we do not certainly know that anything is good . .. excepting 
that which actually conduces to understanding.’1 ‘He who possesses 
a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greatest 
part is eternal.’2
My view then is that Mr. Alexander has himself been guilty of 
a subtle confusion in making consciousness a special quality of 
a class of spatio-temporal constellations; that he has thus illegiti­
mately passed from the contemplated external world of Space- 
Time and its qualities and relations, to an enjoyed conscious world 
which in its own way (viz. objective) corresponds with Space-Time 
through and through. Thus time is not rightly called the mind of 
space, though it might, perhaps, be called the responsiveness of 
the parts of space to each other, if this is conceived as at once the 
source both of their distinctions and of their relations.3 Time con­
stitutes space, as it constitutes all individuals in space, and as 
eternity constitutes the individual which is real Space, viz. the 
eternal Real under the Attribute of Extension. But no less does 
time constitute consciousness, and eternity the Real under the 
Attribute of Thought; for, to use one of Kant’s most famous 
sayings, ‘Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without 
perceptions blind’;4 that principle applies universally: not only to 
thoughts and perceptions, but also to intuitions or ‘sense-data’ in 
so far as these involve distinctly apprehended content.5
We are thus committed to what appears prima fa cie as a dualism, 
and has seemed to many to become, in the hands of Spinoza, an 
infinite reduplication of being; for the attribution of these forms of 
being to the one Substance has too often appeared as a mere 
assertion, without rationalization. ‘The otherness of God’s Attri­
butes and their identity are postulated. God is a Substance “con­
sisting of” an infinite diversity of Attributes. God is the union of 
contrasts; i.e. the receptacle in which they are statically combined,
1 ‘ N ih il  certo scim us bonum  . . .  n is i id, quod ad intelligendum  revera conducit.’ 
(Eth. I V ,  xxvii.)
2 ‘ Q u i C o rp u s ad p lu rim a aptum  habet, is  M entem  habet, cujus m axim a pars 
est aeterna.’ (Eth. V, xxxix.)
3 B u t this responsiveness seems even m ore suitably identified, not w ith  T im e , 
but w ith  the m o b ility  o f S p a ce-T im e  ( = M o tio n ), w herein it  achieves its first 
p rim itive  reality.
4 ‘ Gedanken ohne In h a lt sin d leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe s in d  b lin d .’ 
(K r it ik  der reinen Vernunft, W erke, B e rlin , 1903, IV ,  p. 48.)
5 A  point w h ich  seems to have eluded K an t.
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not the life which fulfils itself in the making and overcoming of 
oppositions.’1 And although Mr. Alexander has himself put 
forward an explanation (not a defence) of Spinoza’s meaning, he 
regards his own theory of Space-Time as an improvement upon 
Spinoza, by reason (among other things) of its completeness: time 
and space reciprocating with and mutually realizing each other. 
Of course in a similar way, if Spinoza had inclined towards 
idealism (which he did not), Thought and Extension in his system 
might have reciprocated in an indivisible unity: Thought being 
essentially o f Extension, and Extension being solely the object of 
Thought. The possibility has not passed unnoticed, either by 
Spinoza’s commentators, or even by more independent philo­
sophers. Happily, for Spinoza that door still remained closed. 
The necessary duality of the empirical Attributes of existence as 
necessarily pointed the way to the affirmation of infinite Attributes 
in Infinite Substance.
I conclude that however attractive may be the hypothesis sug­
gested by Mr. Alexander, Spinoza would not, for the reasons I 
have stated, have been able to accept it; his own theory in the end, 
as I shall indicate in the next chapter, presents a far more lofty 
flight of rational speculation, and one that does not suffer from 
the metaphysical otiosity, or even contradictoriness, which have 
usually been ascribed to it.
I must now bring the criticism of Mr. Alexander’s speculation 
to an end. His philosophy has, as the reader will perceive, much 
in it that commends it to the Spinozist: I may mention in particular 
his insistence upon the ultimate character of real Space or Ex­
tension, as against the common condemnation by the idealists of 
both space and time. The opposition between Mr. Alexander and 
the idealists, however, on this special point is not so extreme as it 
might appear, for in the main, what the idealists deny is what I 
take it Mr. Alexander has no desire to affirm, viz. that space and 
time can be without content or relation. Bradley held, for example, 
that ‘empty space— space without some quality (visual or muscular) 
which in itself is more than spatial— is an unreal abstraction. It 
cannot be said to exist, for the reason that it cannot by itself have 
any meaning’.2 The principle is perhaps correct, but the limita­
tion of quality to ‘visual or muscular’ is indefensible. Why should 
the content of Extension be sense-content universally? Mere 
1 Joachim , The Nature of Truth, p. 174. 2 Appearance and Reality, p. 38.
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empty space is, of course, inconceivable; but it is equally true 
(and is admitted) that mere unextended quality is inconceivable. 
Nor, as I have said, is it sufficient, qua extended, to constitute a 
world in which there are distinct individuals of various orders from 
corpora simplicissima up to corpora humana. Further, the existence 
of responsive parts within the Real is most readily grasped in the 
first instance when this is conceived as extended, and it is not 
impossible that the difficulties relating to the status of finite 
individuals within the Absolute arise mainly, if not entirely, as 
the result of epistemological idealistic presuppositions which have 
no genuine foundation.1
In the belief in a real space or Extension existing in addition 
to Thought, Spinoza and Mr. Alexander would be very largely at 
one; but the precise way in which this principle is worked out and 
used by the latter would, as I have contended, certainly have seemed 
unsatisfactory to Spinoza. For in the theory of Mr. Alexander 
space is only in a formal sense realized by time: its unity is thus 
formally diversified without being destroyed. But only formally: 
you cannot begin with Space-Time and deduce the variety of the 
universe therefrom; that is, perhaps, the point of Mr. Alexander’s 
assertions about the empirical character of philosophy.2 Space- 
Time is the simplest thing in the universe, but for us (and in 
itself too) it is filled with complexity in the form of emergent 
qualities, from mobility up to deity.3 This complex content is
1 T h o u g h , o f course, a complete conception o f conscious existence w ould 
correspond w ith  the conception o f extended existence. T h e re  is, however, the 
fatal tendency to attempt to contemplate thought as an abstraction, instead of 
in tu itin g  it on the analogy o f o u r ow n enjoyed concrete in d iv id u a lity . T h is  
ineffective contem plation o f thought results o nly  in  a thin, desubstantialized, 
image o f extended existence as it  is the object o f this or that m ind . T h o u g h t 
thus comes to be taken as desubstantialized logical content, w h ich  soon be­
comes a single one-dim ensional u n ity  w h ich  contains all thought, or even 
disappears into the R eal w hen it  is  fu lly  perfected and unified. H o w  it  can dis­
appear into the R eal when, ex hypothesi, it  is the Real, is a m ystery w h ich  has been 
dealt w ith  b y  idealists in  various ways. B u t a ll thought is, in  its measure, con­
crete and in d iv id u a l; and its in d iv id u a lity  is  m easured by its tru th  and adequacy. 
T h u s  the w hole tru th  is the perfect being or in d iv id u a l as enjoying the knowledge 
and love o f itself. T h e re  is, however, no such  th ing  as tru th  or an idea w h ich  is 
not active enjoyed know ing. A n d  the ve ry  nature o f thought, therefore, itself 
im p lies the h ierarch y o f in d ivid u a ls. I t  rem ains true, nevertheless, that this 
is  m ost readily brought hom e to the unreflective m in d  in  the w o rld  o f E xte n sio n : 
m ost readily, bu t not necessarily m ore clearly and tru ly.
2 Space, Time, and Deity, i, p. 4.
3 Loc. cit., i, p. 1.
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given to us, and we have to make what we can of it. If, then, we 
begin with Space-Time as a formal reality, all its qualitative con­
tent has to be accepted piecemeal as additional with ‘natural piety’. 
But just as spiritual piety is not attested by a belief in miracles, so 
‘natural piety’ should not be associated with a belief in ‘natural 
miracles’. For the presence of quality in nature is only a miracle 
to be hailed ‘with glad surprise’,1 because it has been left out of 
account at the beginning, and has been powerful enough to re­
assert itself: for it will not be ignored or denied. If Space-Time 
had been allowed to take its proper place in the inquiry as a result 
of the analysis of the world as given (i.e. as not only formally 
extensive and temporal but also as concretely ‘qualitied’), and not 
as the formal starting-point of phenomenological development, it 
would then have been found that it is essentially ‘qualitied’, and 
the problem would have been to discover some principle whereby 
the relations of qualities and spatio-temporal contours and transi­
tions might have been explained. It would thus have been possible 
to go back to the beginning with a Space-Time that would not 
merely receive qualities with open-mouthed astonishment, but 
would be able to incorporate and assimilate them, and so construct 
a phenomenal nature for itself, culminating in Extensio aeterna as 
a metaphysical goal. In philosophy we must begin by taking reality 
as we find it; if we are to swim we must take the plunge into the 
water: as we have so often been told, he who learns on a stool is 
likely to find the water a little distressing. Are not the qualities 
a little distressing to those who so anxiously accept them ‘with 
natural piety’ ?
It is well, then, from the point of view of right order and 
thoroughness to begin with the simplest of all things (Space-Time) 
and thence proceed to more complex matters; but only if the clue 
to the mode of complication has been discovered by an independent 
investigation. Without that clue the complexities must be simply 
superadded, with the result that not even an effective pheno­
menology will be possible, and certainly no genuine metaphysics. 
In the philosophy of Mr. Alexander the case is, of course, by no 
means so desperate as that; for his theory that the qualities emerge2 
in constellations of Space-Time affords a certain phenomenological
1 L lo y d  M organ, ‘ T h e  Case for Em ergent E vo lu tio n ’ (Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, I V ,  p. 37).
2 E sp ecially  w hen his peculiar use o f the term  ‘ emerge’ is  fu lly  understood.
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propriety to the speculation. But the further development towards 
metaphysics cannot but halt in the absence of a more complete 
éclaircissement of the relations of constellation and quality. For 
Mr. Alexander the qualities emerge, not as mere mental additions 
to be ignored in the philosophy of nature, but as real qualities 
which nevertheless have no intelligible relation with their matrix. 
Quality and constellation are associated de fa cto , and that must 
suffice for the naturally pious. But piety must not be looked for in 
metaphysicians ; they will not long remain incurious about such de 
fa cto associations : they will inquire, as I have done, whether .these 
qualities are in fact additional to their constellations, or whether 
they are not rather alternative to them. There is sensation of 
sound or of cochlear vibration, not both with the same organ or 
element; hearing of sound and sight of vibrating string, perhaps, 
for the two senses reciprocate with different ranges of quality; or 
again, thought of spatio-temporal constellation and also of quality, 
because thought penetrates to many ranges of quality, but it does 
not follow that the Real is the sum of all ranges. The Real is the 
appropriate synthesis and subordination of all ranges. It is always, 
as I have said, a question of the vigilant responsiveness of the 
sense-organ or neural system to its environment: one organ in­
tegrates only the vibrations, another their constellation ; yet another 
the constellation of constellations. And the vibrations themselves 
are already a constellation of more primitive constellations. Thus 
Mr. Alexander may well be right when he speaks of Space-Time 
as the matrix of all things, and even as the stu ff of all empirical 
existence ; but his argument should have carried him even further ; 
for if it is their stuff it must be cut to their measure and fashioned 
to their form. As so fashioned to its qualitative content, it becomes, 
further, in the end, in the finished form of eternal Extension, their 
very Substance.
That Mr. Alexander is unable to reach this conclusion is the 
result of two serious limitations in his theory: (i) He is content 
to accept part only of the empirical characters of time, overlooking 
its integration as the result of constellation, whereby its ‘extensive’, 
repetitive character progressively gives place to an ‘intensive’, self- 
permeating character, which is quality. (2) He fails, further, to 
find a place in the concrete nature of Space-Time for that qualita­
tive element of the Real which, at the same time, he is unwilling 
to put aside as mere appearance or illusion.
These two are only diverse appearances of the one fundamental 
limitation: failure to recognize the fact that qualities do not merely 
‘emerge’ without the modification of their spatio-temporal site: 
they do not merely occupy it, they integrate it. Thus the smooth 
continuity of Space-Time becomes knotted and warped; for its 
concrete filling must always be its subordinate enduring constella­
tions or qualities;1 and the constellation which is the whole 
Natura naturata is no longer temporal but eternal. For Space- 
Time cannot wait to the end of time for its complete filling; 
without its filling it is nothing but the empty form of existence. In 
so far as it is real it is the constellatio constellationum, in which all 
durations find their appropriate subordinate place: as such it is 
not Space-Time but Extensio aeterna, or, if you will, aeternitas 
extensa. For eternity is the content of the Real, whether it appears 
under the Attribute of Extension, or that of Thought, or any other 
of the infinite Attributes of the Real.
It might be conceived as possible that though no explanation is 
forthcoming in the earlier part of Mr. Alexander’s theory as to how 
empirical emergent qualities are related to the constellations of 
Space-Time, yet some suggestion might become available as the 
result of the speculative effort which aims at passing from mind 
(the highest of the qualities actually enjoyed by us) upwards towards 
the next quality, viz. deity. The universe actually possesses 
materiality, life, and mind, and ‘compels us to forecast the next 
empirical quality or deity’.2 But unfortunately the very method of 
the inquiry necessarily precludes Mr. Alexander from putting 
forward a theory of God, from which he might retrace his steps, 
lighting up the way by means of ideas derived from that more 
daring (and less empirical) venture. For clearly we can only apply 
the principles derived from the analysis of our actual data to the 
merely possible further case; for God ‘as actually possessing deity 
does not exist’,3 though we have a clue to the validity of the further 
speculation in that ‘God as the whole universe tending towards 
deity does exist’.4 Thus we explain the nature of God from what we 
know of matter, of life, of mind, and of the general plan of human 
and sub-human existence. Deity is, of course, more complex5
1 D isting uish ing , bu t not separating constellatio and constellata.
2 Space, Time, and Deity, ii,  p. 353.
3 Loc. cit. (Second Im p ressio n), i, p. x x iii.  4 hoc. cit.
5 Space, Time, and Deity, i, p. 1. T h e  whole speculation is, o f course, fo r me
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than these, but it is superadded, or emergent, on the same 
principles. We cannot hope, therefore, to have much light thrown 
on the subordinate ranges of being from the speculations about 
deity: in this matter, at all events, for Mr. Alexander’s theory there 
is no help in God.
*This is one of the points upon which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has 
not (to use his own words) ‘played jackal to Mr. Alexander’s 
lion’;1 and the divergence is, for my argument and in itself, note­
worthy, because it formally reconciles Mr. Lloyd Morgan with 
some of the main contentions of the present chapter. For it is 
important to remember that he has never put forward the theory 
of ‘emergent evolution’ as an ultimate metaphysics,2 but always 
as a ‘philosophy of science’, i.e. as a phenomenology. As such, in 
its main lines, it is from my point of view not merely unobjection­
able, but generally acceptable. Mr. Lloyd Morgan has more 
than once emphasized this limitation: Emergent evolution is ‘a 
generalization founded on observation and experiment'A ‘Given 
your emergent evolution, how do you propose to explain it ? In 
my capacity as a man of science it is no part of my business to 
explain it . . . You are content, then, ... to leave it wholly unex­
somewhat cripp led by m y  denial that consciousness o r m in d  is a quality  of 
spatio-tem poral contours.
1 Journal of Philosophical Studies, I V ,  p. 26. T h e  statement is  far too modest 
i f  it  is  applied to the philosophies o f these two w riters, considered as wholes. 
I t  is  only  in  the m erest skeleton (and o nly  p art o f that) that M r. L lo y d  M o rg a n ’s 
speculation agrees w ith  that o f M r . Alexander. I n  the details, and in  the 
directions in  w h ich  the details are sought, there is  the w idest possible divergence. 
T h e  same is  true o f th eir epistem ological p o sitio n s: fo r here M r . L lo y d  M organ, 
b y a tour de force, b y  m oving  away from  Spinoza (and M r . A lexan der) towards 
an idealistic theory, o r at any rate towards idealistic prem isses, succeeds thereby 
in  m ore nearly approaching Spinoza, than does M r . Alexander, in  his view  of 
the relations o f m in d  and body. T h e  w hole o f this part o f M r . L lo y d  M o rg a n ’s 
theory is  exceedingly interesting and instructive. I t  constitutes, indeed, an 
in q u iry  into the phenom enological im plications o f the doctrine o f A ttributes, 
and lim itations o f space alone prevent me from  considering the theory at length, 
and its relations (recognized by M r . L lo y d  M o rg an) w ith  that o f Spinoza.
2 ‘ M e taphysically  m y m odest scheme w ill not bear com parison w ith  that 
elaborated w ith  adm irable sk ill b y M r . Alexander, bu t it  is  all I  have to offer’ 
(jEmergent Evolution, p. 24). I  agree that M r . A lexan der shows a greater sense 
o f philosophical system, that he is rig h t in  malting m etaphysics the ultim ate 
discipline, but nevertheless M r . L lo y d  M o rg a n  is  too modest in  overlooking the 
m etaphysical im portance o f h is refusal to believe in  m ere S pace-T im e, and in  
the satisfactoriness o f the concept o f the fluency o f tim e (cf. Emergent Evolution, 
p p. 2 3 -4 ). H is  grow ing sense, too, o f the m etaphysical need fo r an ultim ate 
p rin cip le  in  term s o f w h ich  emergent evolution m ay itse lf be explained, is  of 
great im portance. 3 Jo urn al of Philosophical Studies, I V ,  p. 37.
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plained. I confess that I have not been content to do so.’1 But 
Mr. Lloyd Morgan’s explanation is coloured by his assumption 
that in emergent evolution we have an ultimate generalization 
with respect to the nature of empirical reality; hence for him the 
further question is not so much the metaphysical one of the nature 
of the Real Being so manifested, but ‘What gives to events their 
initial go ?’ or ‘What gives to them this or that determinate plan of 
the manner of their going at this or that stage of their evolutionary 
advance?’ or ‘What gives the comprehensive plan of emergent 
evolution?’2 These are the data, who is the Giver? Is there a 
Giver? But these are ways of putting the question which may 
lead, and often have led, the unphilosophical mind to give answers 
which belong to mythology or theology rather than to metaphysics; 
for the question is not so much as to whether the data are ‘given’ 
in any special sense of the term, and if so by whom; but what is 
their status in the Real ? Are they self-sufficient as they stand in 
this ultimate scientific generalization (which Mr. Lloyd Morgan 
denies), or have they some further or more ultimate ground in 
relation to which they are contingent? What is their relation to 
such a ground ? If their being flows contingently from some source 
which lies outside of them, then the question will recur with respect 
to the totum which includes the data and their source; if not, i.e. 
if their source is their immanent ground, then its nature must 
come into question, and the answer will be not theological or 
mythological, but metaphysical. And in no case is it a reply to 
such questions to speak of things as the outcome of Divine Purpose, 
with no adequate explanation of the meaning and place of purpose 
in the universe, for thus the will of God becomes once more, in 
Spinozistic phrase, ‘the asylum of ignorance’. In any case, there­
fore, we are driven on to problems which are metaphysical.
These facts are recognized, of course, by Mr. Lloyd Morgan, 
and he expressly asserts that his theory includes no supernatural 
in the bad sense of an interfering supernatural; ‘from the strictly 
emergent point of view any notion of a so-called “alien influx 
into nature” is barred. And if we acknowledge Divine Activity .. . 
it is to be conceived as omnipresent’.3 ‘There is for me . . . only 
one realm of reality that is both natural and spiritual, in ultimate 
unity of substance, but is not both natural and supernatural if this
1 Journal of Philosophical Studies, I V ,  p. 38. 2 Life, M ind, and S pirit, p. 280.
3 Emergent Evolution, p. 13.
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imply ultimate diversity of orders of being.’1 Again ‘the rational 
order in nature, including human nature, is not other than Divine 
Purpose’.2 But I ask, how are the two one ? ‘What in naturalistic 
regard is “epigenetic” emergence is from first to last the temporal 
unfolding of Divine Purpose in which there is no first nor last 
since it Is.’3 But the ultimate reality cannot be a plan or purpose 
in isolation from its actual filling or detail, and I have, therefore, 
to ask how the timeless plan of things contains its timeful details: 
i.e. not primarily how the spiritual apprehension is related to the 
rational or reflective, but how the objects which are for ordinary 
consciousness in time, find their place in the timeless Real of 
spiritual apprehension. This is a metaphysical problem which 
must be met if we are to avoid a nerveless mysticism, but it is not 
a point to which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has yet turned his attention, 
certainly not in the comprehensive and acute way to which he has 
accustomed us in other inquiries. The magnitude and importance 
of his achievements in these would render it ungracious to com­
plain that he has not faced a question so difficult and so remote 
from the interests of science, even of psychological science. But 
it has been necessary to judge of the ultimate satisfactoriness 
of his theory, i.e. not of its phenomenological adequacy, but of its 
metaphysical ultimacy and validity.
The incompleteness I have detected is most probably due to 
the fact that the problem which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has mainly in 
view is nearer to the commonplace conflict between Religion and 
Science, than to the special difficulties of the pure philosopher. 
But we do not clear up the question of the relations of temporal 
unfolding and timeless purpose by asserting that the spiritual 
attitude of mind is emergent upon the reflective attitude, and that 
what is for the latter a rational natural order, is for the former and 
higher attitude the expression of Divine Purpose; and Mr. Lloyd 
Morgan’s ‘constructive’ philosophy is a generalization from 
empirical data in terms of the single principle of emergent evolu­
tion, followed by an effort of faith in the direction of an ‘acknow­
ledged’ Deity, rather than a genuine attempt to substitute know­
ledge for faith by the persistent application of appropriate rational 
categories throughout the empirical data. Here we have only data 
metaphysica, or at most the apparatus metaphysicus, but no genuine 
cogitata metaphysica.
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1 Life, Mind, and Spirit, p. 302. 2 Loc. cit., p. 303. 3 Loc. cit., p. 308.
PART IV 
TRANSCENDENCE
C H A P T E R  X I
THE INFINITE ATTRIBUTES OF THE REAL
THE ascription by Spinoza of infinite Attributes to Substance, which is thus made to transcend human nature and experience not merely by its infinitude within the Attributes of Extension and 
Thought, but further by its absolute infinitude beyond these 
empirical limits, has often been regarded as a mere husk of super­
fluous metaphysics, intrinsically incoherent, and resulting from a 
combination of scholastic ‘principle-riding’ and an extreme anti­
anthropomorphism; in a word, as an instance of pre-critical 
dogmatism. That the theory is the result of reasoning rightly 
described as metaphysical, and not of a direct appeal to experience, 
is sufficiently obvious, since it is an essential part of Spinoza’s 
doctrine that man is a mode of Extension and Thought exclusively, 
and is thus unable, directly and positively, to know the natures of 
the other Attributes.
The actual reasoning is undoubtedly based upon Spinoza’s per­
ception that an absolute being must wholly transcend the category of 
number: for to have a determinate finite number implies the operation 
of an external cause. ‘No definition implies or expresses a certain 
number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond 
the nature of the thing defined. ... For example, if twenty men 
exist in the universe ... and we want to account for their existence, 
it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in 
general ... a cause must be assigned for the existence of each 
individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual 
nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any 
consideration of the number twenty. Consequently the cause . . . 
must necessarily be sought outside of the individuals. Hence we 
may lay down the absolute rule, that everything the nature of which 
permits of several individual instances, must necessarily have an 
external cause to bring about their existence.’1
1 ‘ S eq u itu r . . . nu lla m  definitionera certum  aliquem  num erum  in d iv id u o ru m  
involvere, neque exprim ere quandoquidem  n ih il a liu d  exprim it, quam  naturam  
rei definitae . . .  S i ex. gr. in  rerum  natura 20 homines e x ista n t. . . non satis erit 
(ut scilicet rationem reddamus, cur 20 homines existant) causam naturae h u- 
manae in  genere ostendere; . . . quandoquidem  u n iuscujusque debet necessa- 
rio dari causa, cu r existat. A t  haec causa non potest in  ipsa natura hum ana
3713 O o
The same principle operates, not merely with reference to the 
uniqueness (as distinct from the unity) of Substance as such, but 
also with reference to the infinitude (as distinct from ‘indefinitude’) 
of the Attributes themselves which are the expressions of Substance. 
In the former case the principle operates in the direction of unity: 
if Substance exists and is not definitely plural (since no external 
cause is available) then neither can it be indefinitely plural, 
it must be, not una inter multas, but unica. With the Attributes 
which constitute Substance the case is more complex, since, as 
Spinoza held, and as I have argued in discussing the theory of 
Mr. Alexander, experience actually presents us with modes of two 
distinct Attributes: Thought and Extension. It follows that their 
non-numerability cannot be expressed by a retreat upon unity, but 
only through the conception of infinity: a conception which, as 
I shall argue, is admissible through the peculiar relation found to 
subsist between Thought and Extension, which do not simply 
stand side by side as two, but which involve each other in an 
intimate and unique manner without loss of distinctness as 
existences.1
This was the root of the theory put forward by Spinoza to the 
effect that ‘an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined 
as consisting in infinite Attributes each of which expresses a certain 
eternal and infinite essence’.2 And the conception thus defined 
certainly did not appear to him, to judge from his expressions,3 to 
involve special difficulty, though the fact remains that it has 
occupied the ingenuity of generations of Spinoza-students,4 and 
remains, according to Mr. Alexander, ‘the standing unresolved 
puzzle of interpretation of Spinoza’.5 Even by Professor Joachim,
contineri, quandoquidem  vera hom inis definitio num erum  vicenarium  non invol- 
v i t ; adeoque causa . . . debet necessario extra unum quem que dari, et propterea 
absolute concludendum , omne id, cujus naturae p lu ra  in d iv id u a  existere possunt, 
debere necessario, ut existant, causam externam  habere.’ (E th . I ,  v iii, Sch. i i .)
1 T h o u g h t being the essentia objectiva o f E xte n sio n ; Extension the objectum or 
ideatum o f T h ou gh t.
2 ‘ N ih il  etiam clarius, quam  quod ens absolute in fin itu m  necessario s it de- 
fin iendum  ens, quod constat in fin itis  attributis, quoru m  u num quodque aeternam, 
et infinitam  certam  essentiam e xp rim it.’ (Eth. I ,  x, Sch.)
3 C f. Ep. Ix v i: ‘A d  haec’ (.i.e. Eth. I I ,  v ii, Sch.; I ,  x )  ‘s i aliq uantulum  attendas, 
n ih il difficultatis superesse v id e b is.’
4 A  fa irly  exhaustive account o f the results o f these speculative in q u irie s  is 
available in  the article b y E g o n  vo n  Petersdorff on ‘ S pinoza’s U nendliche 
A ttrib ute G ottes’ (Chronicon Spinozanum, I I ,  p p. 6 7-9 1 ).
5 Spinoza and Time, p. 50.
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who is otherwise, in the main, a sympathetic (though perhaps a 
sophisticated) interpreter of Spinoza, the theory is, as I have noted, 
thought to be ‘fatally defective’. ‘The substantial identity of 
Thought and the other Attributes is stated dogmatically, but not in 
any sense made intelligible. . . . The one Substance does not fulfil 
its being through a self-diremption and a return upon self-identity 
by the negation of this negative.... God is the union of contrasts; 
i.e. the receptacle in which they are statically combined, not 
the life which fulfils itself in the making and overcoming of 
oppositions.’1 The idealistic interpretation of Spinoza and the 
Space-Time conception of Mr. Alexander are alternative ways of 
meeting Professor Joachim’s requirements, or at least of going out 
to meet them. But neither way was possible for Spinoza himself.
I shall not attempt to set forth the various interpretations which, 
from time to time, have been suggested, or which have been 
foisted upon Spinoza. They are sufficiently explained and dis­
cussed in the article by von Petersdorff, to which I have already 
referred; it provides a truly instructive account of human in­
genuity. Since the date of that article, however, Mr. Alexander, 
with the ample generosity of an appreciative critic, and with equally 
striking ingenuity, has made a new attempt to elucidate this obscure 
region of the philosophy of Spinoza, while at the same time holding 
that his own gloss on the Spinozistic theory renders ‘the whole
1 The Nature of Truth, p. 173. S im ila rly  M r. M acran in  the Introduction to his 
recent translation o f Hegel's Logic of W orld and Idea  expresses the view  that 
ju st as A n se lm ’s ontological argum ent ‘is  not really an argum ent at all, but only 
the reiteration o f the position that tru th  and fact, thought and being, m ust and 
can be brought into u n ity [; the] infinite that serves as the m iddle term  is m erely 
the allegation o f this unity, and the u n ity  is  not effected’ ; so also it  is  ‘precisely 
the same fallacy as this that vitiates a cardinal feature in  the doctrine of Spinoza. 
T o  the question o f the relationship between extension and thinking, Spinoza 
replies that they are at the same tim e separate and identical, as m u tually 
exclusive attributes o r expressions o f the one reality, G od . . . . Extension 
and thinking, then, are one b y reason o f G od . B u t in  S pino za’s system, 
G od is no deduction o f one attribute from  the other, no reasoned recon­
ciliation o f th eir difference, bu t m erely the allegation that they are one. So 
that his whole reasoning comes to this, that thinking  and extension are one 
because they are one’ (p. 15). M r. M a cra n ’s book is not devoted to the study 
o f Spinoza, and it  m ust be admitted that the comment is m ore intellig ible, 
nearer the point, and even truer, than is  usual in  such incidental references 
to Spinoza’s o p in io n s; but the failure  to refer to the doctrine o f the in fin ity  
of the Attributes, together w ith  that of the very precise relationship o f T h o u g h t 
and Extension, vitiates the comment as an adequate indication o f S pinoza’s 
own position.
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edifice of infinite other attributes . . . otiose and unverifiable’.1 
In spite of Mr. Alexander’s disinterested goodwill and sympathy, 
the conditions were not favourable to successful exposition, and 
the attempted elucidation fails because it does not attend with 
sufficient persistency to the fundamental tenet of Spinozism that the 
order and connexion of modes is the same in every Attribute. 
‘Whether we conceive nature under the Attribute of Extension, or 
under the Attribute of Thought, or under any other Attribute, we 
shall find the same order, or one’ and the same connexion of causes 
— that is, the same things following in either case’.2 The essence 
of Mr. Alexander’s suggestion is that the constellations correlated 
with Thought in a third Attribute X may not coincide with those 
correlated with Thought in Extension,3 hence the ideas which are 
of extended things will not correspond with those which are of 
X-ian things. There would thus be infinite sets of ideas within 
the infinite Intellect of God, and whether we think of these as 
merely side by side, or (as we surely must), as mutually involved 
and integrated in the absolute being, there would equally be a 
breach of the common order of connexion within the Attributes,4 
Thought being more concrete than either Extension or X or,
1 Spinoza and Time, p. 56.
2 ‘ Sive naturam  sub attributo Extensionis, sive sub attributo Cogitationis, sive 
sub alio quocunque concipiam us, unum , eundem que ordinem , sive unam, 
eandemque causarum  connexionem , hoc est, easdem res invicem  sequi reperie- 
m u s’ (Eth. I I ,  v ii, Sch.).
3 ‘W e  c a n n o t. . .  be sure that the X -corresp ondent o f m y idea o f the table gives 
me the perception o f the X -tab le . I t  m ight, fo r instance, be possible that in  order 
to have perception o f the X -ta b le  there was needed another body composed 
say o f . . .  m y  body and a stone. T h e  X -co rresp ondent o f m y body in  perceiving 
the table m ay be only  a p art o f the X -m o d e  w h ich  is necessary fo r the per­
ception o f the X -ta b le , w h ich  perception consequently w ould belong to a quite 
different m in d  from  m ine .’ (Spinoza and Time, p. 54.)
4 U nless we suppose w hat M r . A lexan der does no t clearly advance, v iz . that 
the d ive rsity  is made up in  Extensio n (e.g.) b y extensive constellations corre­
sponding to varieties o f com plication w ith in  the other A ttrib u tes; and so on. 
B u t in  that case there m ust be a m in d  corresponding w ith  ‘m y-body-and-the- 
stone’ , and this w ill be ‘ unconscious m in d ’ in  reference to Extension, but con­
scious m in d  in  reference to X ;  ju s t  as the hum an m in d  is  conscious w ith  refer­
ence to Extension, but unconscious w ith  reference to X .  B u t this is  a form  of 
the doctrine o f ‘unconscious m in d ’ o f the very w orst possible de scription: a 
sophisticated, self-contradictory, p rim itive  anim ism .
M r . A lexan der’s theory thus seems to be, not that T h o u g h t infin itely  re­
duplicates the order and connexion o f each other A ttrib ute, b u t that the order 
and connexion u nde r each A ttrib ute  other than T h o u g h t is o nly  selectively 
correlated w ith  T h o u g h t, bu t that these selections together sum  up  (or integrate)
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perhaps more accurately, these being less concrete than Thought. 
Now Spinoza would not have raised any special objection to the 
complication thus supposed within the infinite Intellect of God,1 
but only to the notion of the several systems of ideas being founded 
upon diversity of constellation within the various other Attributes. 
For every possible constellation of modes is adequately expressed 
in each of the infinite Attributes.
In order to show that this notion is really involved in Mr. 
Alexander’s attempted elucidation, let me examine the situation, 
as he represents it, more closely. The suggestion evidently is that 
among the infinite constellations within N atura naturata the human 
body is capable of responding to selected types only, even within 
extended nature; hence since the human mind knows only the 
things to which the body responds (that is only the body as it is 
affected by these things2), its knowledge cannot cover the whole 
nature of reality. Other parts of N atura naturata will have other
to the T h o u g h t total. T h u s  the order and connexion is not the same in  all the 
Attributes.
I  may, perhaps, illustrate the situation in  an elementary w ay th u s :
L e t a, b, c, d, e, f  be modi simplicissimi. T h e n  T h o u g h t as it  relates to E x ­
tension corresponds to integrations o f a, c, and e, but not o f b, d, a n d /.  B u t as it 
relates to X ,  it  corresponds to b, d, and / ,  and not to a, c, and e.
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1 H is  ow n statement in  Ep. Ix v i im plies som ething of the sort, bu t w ithout the 
mistaken com plication involved in  M r. A lexan der’s theory ( if  that is the true 
explanation o f the interpretation) of a differentiation o f constellations w ith in  the 
infinite A ttributes.
2 I t  is, perhaps, M r. A le xan d e r’s failure to recognize unflaggingly that this is a 
strict alternative expression that conceals from  him  the im p o ssib ility  of his 
exposition o f Spinoza’s doctrine.
constellations which respond to them, and hence other minds 
which know them (i.e. know their own constellations as affected by 
them). The only question is whether Mr. Alexander holds that 
these other parts of N atura naturata are only known under 
Attributes other than Extension, or whether they can (indeed, are) 
known under Extension, though by minds other than human. 
Let me attempt to clear this point up: under the Attribute of 
Extension the human mind knows only its own body as it is 
affected by certain classes of extended things. But with the X-ian 
Attribute, according to Mr. Alexander, the case may be different: 
it may be that though the extended table acts upon the extended 
body of a man, the X-ian table does not act upon the X-ian 
mode corresponding to the human body, or not in such a way as 
to be correlated with Thought: ‘Interaction between a thing like 
the table and my body is intelligible only within the infinite mode 
of motion and rest; but we cannot speak of X-modes in such terms’,1 
nor apparently in analogous terms, the implication being that 
though table and body interact to give an image in the brain 
representing the combined or confused natures of the two things, 
and though the idea of the body and of the table are analogously 
connected or confused (as intellectual systems and not as systems 
of motion-and-rest), yet the X-ian table and body are not, or need 
not be, analogously related. In other words, as I formerly asserted, 
the theory implies that the constellations differ from Attribute to 
Attribute, and, if I may so speak for the moment without offence, 
the unit of thought, the unit of body, and the X-ian unit do not 
correspond.2
Thus it is not so much that human knowledge is limited by the 
imperfect responsiveness of the body to extended N atura naturata,
1 Spinoza and Time, p. 54.
2 I  need not deny that there is  a tendency for hum an Im agination to im pute 
a difference between the A ttributes in  respect o f th e ir outstanding or prevalent 
constellations. T h e  so-called ideae simplices and the supposed corpora Simplicia 
o f Im agination do not correspond w ith  each other, fo r the object o f the former 
(e.g. a colour, extension, unity, o r in fin ity ), and the idea o f the latter (e.g. an 
electron or proton) are both really  com plex, and o f different com p lexity and 
status in  the R eal. T h e  same p rin cip le  m ay be extended to the other A ttributes. 
B u t it  does not follow  that the ‘order and connexion’ differs, but o nly  that the 
‘ im aginative’ im portance o f the constellations differs, from  A ttrib ute  to A ttr i­
b u te ; or perhaps that we tend to read one A ttrib u te  analytically and another 
synthetically by tu rn s; fo r a ll real existences are both one and m any, and all 
constellations are present in  every A ttrib ute.
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but that even if its knowledge of this were as complete as the 
nature of the Thought of Extension will permit, it might still be 
incapacitated for knowing the X-ian world, since this is constructed 
on a different plan. Now such a conception, if it had ever entered 
the mind of Spinoza, would promptly have been rejected, and Mr. 
Alexander’s suggestion is, it seems to me, really connected with 
the fashion of his own philosophy, which, as I have indicated, 
proceeds from a formal framework of spatio-temporal elements to­
wards increasingly complex constellations with emergent qualities: 
thus he tends to think of Spinoza’s theory also as involving the 
progressive synthesis of the units in different ways under the 
different Attributes. But Spinoza works, as it were, from the other 
end, so that he thinks rather of the constellations as identical under 
all the Attributes. About the fact, at all events, that this is his 
clear teaching there can be no doubt.
I admit, of course, that Spinoza regarded the human conception 
of N atura as selective (and therefore limited); and in a double 
sense: it is limited with respect to Thought and Extension them­
selves, since its responsiveness to N atura cogitans is essentially 
incomplete; but further, it is limited in that our thought is the 
essentia ohjectiva of the extended body exclusively, and not of the 
modes which must be supposed to correspond with it under any 
other Attribute (except, of course, if it is an exception, Thought 
itself). And it was for this reason (for the two limitations are 
ultimately one), that he regarded the infinite Intellect of God as 
being more than a vast human mind.1 Thus though he would not 
object to the complication under the Attribute of Thought suggested 
by one interpretation of Mr. Alexander’s elucidation, he would 
certainly object very vigorously to any notion which implies that 
the various systems of ideas in the divine Intellect together consti­
tute a single idea of N atura naturata because each is selective, 
taking certain elements from extended N atura naturata, others 
from the X-ian N atura naturata, and so on to infinity. Every 
possible constellation of modes is adequately expressed under each 
of the infinite Attributes, and God’s Intellect, therefore, corre-
1 C f. Ep. Ix v i:  ‘ D ico , quod quam vis unaquaeque res in fm itis m odis expressa 
sit in  infinito D e i intellectu, illae tamen infm itae ideae, q uib u s exp rim itur, unam  
eandemque re i singularis M entem  constituere n e q u e u n t; sed in fin ita s : quando- 
quidem  unaquaeque harum  infin itaru m  idearum  nu lla m  connexionem  cum  in - 
vicem  habent’ (i.e. no proxim ate causal connexion, the im m ediate reference 
being to Eth. I I ,  v ii, Sch., as the next sentence states).
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sponds with every expression of N atura naturata under every 
Attribute. Thus, to use Mr. Alexander’s example, though it may 
be that the mode composed of a human body plus a stone is 
responsive to modes other than those to which the human body 
alone responds, and though the human mind may therefore be 
deflected from the knowledge of certain types of existent which are 
known to the mind of the hypothetical body-stone system, that in 
itself does not imply that the X-ian table cannot be known by the 
human mind,1 and that the mind of the body-stone system must be 
ignorant of the extended table. For what is unknown by the human 
mind is not the X-ian table simpliciter, but the X-ian body-stone 
system as affected by the X-ian table; and similarly, what the mind 
of the body-stone system must be ignorant of is not the extended 
table simpliciter, but the extended body as it is affected by the 
extended table. And in this there is nothing wonderful, since it is 
true of every mind whatsoever that it knows only the affections of 
its own ‘body’, i.e. of its own ideatum or correlate, under which­
ever Attribute may be in question. The limitation of knowledge is 
thus primarily and essentially the result of a different standpoint, 
with consequent differences in perspective; and the further question 
as to whether the difference in Attribute also implies a limitation 
is left wholly undetermined by the argument. By Spinoza it is 
determined by some such considerations as the following: each 
constellation with all its affections is extant under each Attribute, 
and each has its own appropriate mind or, rather, series of minds, 
for there is a different mind for each constellation as it appears in 
each Attribute (other than Thought, where the idea ideae is one with 
the enjoyed idea). This follows from the definition of an idea as the 
essentia objectiva of an ideatum. Ideas such as ours cannot at once be 
the essentia objectiva of a mode under two different Attributes, not 
even of the same mode of Substance. There will thus be infinitely 
many minds corresponding with the expressions of any one con­
stellation under the infinitely many Attributes; that certainly will 
be true of jfinite constellations, however it may be with the all- 
embracing constellation which is N atura naturata. The extended 
body-stone system (if it is such) is affected by the extended table,
1 T h e  argum ent is, o f course, p u re ly  hypothetical, w orking  w ith in  suppositions 
w h ich  I  do not accept. T h u s  I  m ust not be taken to suggest that the X - ia n  table 
is  know n by the hum an m ind. T h e  hum an m in d  is the essentia objectiva o f the 
extended hum an body, and o f nothing outside o f Extension.
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and the resulting affection will have a thought-equivalent, though 
it may not form even a part of the human mind; but the X-ian 
‘body’ is affected by the X-ian table, and its thought-equivalent 
ought on one supposition to form part of the human mind; the 
supposition is that what is true of the infinite Intellect of God is 
true also of finite minds, viz. that the minds correlated with the 
infinite expressions of the same constellation within the infinite 
Attributes must form a single mind, which is thus either infinitely 
reduplicated within itself, or at worst is a mere sum of the essen- 
tiae objectivae of the diverse expressions of the same constella­
tion. I shall have occasion presently to consider this supposition 
more carefully, and to question whether it follows from the precise 
correspondence of all the infinite Attributes of Substance that any 
particular finite mind must be aware o f all the infinite modes with 
which it corresponds.
I conclude, therefore, that Mr. Alexander is in error in so far 
as his explanation implies that Spinoza means that our ignorance 
of modes which do not fall under Thought or Extension is due to, 
or associated with, the selective responsiveness of the human body; 
though it is this which limits our knowledge within the Attributes 
of Thought and Extension (indeed, the same principle applies 
within every Attribute). Different constellations respond to differ­
ent selections under whichever Attribute we conceive them to fall, 
or they are conceived as falling; but knowledge arises where a 
mode of Thought is the essentia objectiva of a mode in some other 
(or indeed any) Attribute, and no human mode of Thought can 
be the essentia objectiva of an extended mode and also of an X-ian 
mode. Nor, according to Spinoza, can the ideas of one and the 
same finite mode of Substance, as it is expressed in infinitely 
many Attributes, be included in a single finite ideal constellation 
or mind. Hence if there are ideas of X-ian tables as well as of 
extended ones (and Spinoza plainly asserts that ‘each thing is 
expressed in infinite ways in the infinite Intellect o f  G od ’1) they must 
belong to different finite minds of our grade. The human mind 
is the essentia objectiva of the human body: the mind which is the 
essentia objectiva of the X-ian mode corresponding to the human 
body (and human mind) is, therefore, a different mind. But, as 
I have more than once suggested, it will be found that these
1 Ep. Ix v i:  ‘U naquaeque res in fin itis  m odis expressa [est] in  infinito D e i in ­
te lle c ts.
3713 P p
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principles apply only to finite modes, and that the situation is 
fundamentally different with the infinite Attributes of Substance.
Thus even Mr. Alexander’s attempted defence of Spinoza must 
be taken as a part of his general gloss upon the theory; it only 
appears to him as an explanation because he has been unable to 
place himself precisely at the point of view of Spinoza. He is still 
thinking of mind as ‘an empirical character of certain complexes of 
. . . motion’,1 rather than as the essentia objectiva of some existing 
thing (extended or otherwise). And the extraordinary thing is that, 
as Mr. Roth has said, ‘Spinoza evidently thought that he had 
meant, and had said, something very simple— unfortunately, no­
body since has been able to show exactly what it is’.2 Many of the 
explanations advanced have been simple only in the derogatory 
sense, and most have been largely or wholly alien to the general 
tenor of Spinoza’s thought. One might well imagine the astonish­
ment with which Spinoza would have read the section in Mr. 
Alexander’s little book from which I have been quoting, not 
because his theory is misunderstood, but because, after having 
begun by suggesting the correct solution, the argument is allowed 
to drift off into the complicated error upon which I have com­
mented. ‘The attribute of Thought is much wider than the other 
Attributes— is in fact coextensive with them all. . . . [This gives] 
Spinoza’s doctrine a kink in the direction of idealism. Yet exactly 
the same kind of reflection might with proper changes be applied 
to Extension, which would then be wider than all the other 
attributes, and Spinoza might thus receive a kink in the direction 
of materialism.’3 Precisely; but what would give the ‘kinks’ would 
not be the theory that Thought, or again Extension, is an attri- 
butum latissimum, or is co-extensive with all the infinite Attributes, 
but that in so being super-eminent it includes all the others as 
they are in themselves, and thus usurps the place of Substance 
itself. But short of this act of suicidal insubordination, whereby 
Substance would be infinitely impoverished, desubstantialized, and 
rendered incapable of explaining even the weak and abstract 
nature of man (which is completely expressed under two Attributes 
only), no fundamental objection could be raised to the conclusions 
implied; for since each Attribute is the essence of undivided 
Substance, it is co-extensive with all the Attributes, since all are
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1 Spinoza and. Time, p. 56. 2 L .  R oth , Spinoza, p. 197.
3 Spinoza and Time, p p. 5 1 -2 .
Attributes of Substance; but co-extensive in a sense which does not 
mean or imply complete identity with them all. Only Substance 
itself is completely identical with all the Attributes, for it is they. 
Substance ‘consists of’, not ‘is qualified by’, infinite Attributes.1
The clue to the co-extensiveness of the Attributes is directly 
derivable from the relations of Thought and Extension. The co­
extensiveness of these is our primary datum; and it need not (and 
for Spinoza cannot) imply their simple identity, and hence neither 
idealism nor materialism.2 If we use the terms ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ in their modern sense we may say that Thought ‘includes’ 
Extension and Extension ‘includes’ Thought only in the sense that 
Extension is the ultimate ‘object’ (= ideatum) of all our thought, and 
Thought the essential ‘subject’ (= essentia objectiva) of Extension; 
omnia animata. But from this it cannot follow that Extension is 
existentially included in Thought, for so Thought would not know 
its object, but would contain it or possess it; not that Thought is 
existentially included in Extension, for so Extension would have no 
‘subject’ or correlative consciousness; and in each case knowledge 
would be impossible. It is knowledge therefore which at once 
unites Thought and Extension cognitively, and also separates them 
existentially. The idealists make knowledge impossible by re­
moving its independent object; the materialists by removing its 
independent subject. Nor can we satisfy the conditions by exalting 
knowledge (or ‘Experience’) as the ultimate reality: it cannot 
sustain the part, because there can be no knowledge or Experience 
but only knowledge-o/ or Experience-o/; they are not self-existent, 
but other-referent in nature. Thus, as Malebranche saw very 
clearly, ‘intelligible Extension’ implies ‘real Extension’, and in
1 ‘P er substantiam  intelligo id , quod in  se est, et per se concipitur, hoc est, 
cujus conceptus non in v o lv it conceptum  alterius rei. Id e m  per attributum  
intelligo, n is i quod attributum  dicatur respectu intellectus, substantiae certam 
talem naturam  trib u e n tis.’ (Ep. ix .)
2 A  suggestion w h ich  m ust certainly be rejected has been made b y more than 
one commentator, v iz . that since ‘in fin ite ’ does not mean an indefinitely large 
num ber, but rather ‘ com plete’, the two A ttributes that we know  are, o r m ay be, 
all the A ttributes, in  that they complete the nature o f Substance. H o w  ‘tw o’ can 
be ‘infinitely m a n y’ passes m y  com prehension. T h e  suggestion could only seem 
superficially satisfactory on an idealistic reading o f Spinoza, according to w hich 
T h ou gh t and Extension complete each other as absolute subject and object in  
the concrete nature o f absolute E xperience. B u t that reading cannot be made to 
cohere w ith the statements and general attitude of S p in o za; or, I  m ay add, w ith 
the facts o f finite experience.
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general the object which is included in knowledge (i.e. the ‘objective 
content’ of the idea) cannot be identical with the object (i.e. the 
thing) which is known through knowledge. Further, as Malebranche 
did not see, real Extension does not, for an acute epistemologist, 
imply the real or independent existence of a second or ‘intelligible’ 
Extension, for thought and its object are in direct relation with 
each other: adequate knowledge is of the Real; inadequate know­
ledge is of phenomena; error arises from the division and mis- 
ordering of thought. In no case is there a third real interpositum 
between the thought (=the knowing of the thing) and the thing 
known through the thought.
Thus the object contained by thought is an abstract ens rationis 
(= objective content of thought) and is no real separate existent,1 
being real only in its relation to the equally abstract act of knowing 
(= subjective content of thought), by which relation concrete 
thought is constituted; it thus falls on the side of the subject. The 
object known by thought, on the other hand, is a concrete ens reale, 
independent of the act and fact of knowledge.
On these grounds, therefore, it must be recognized that Sub­
stance has at least two Attributes, viz. Thought and Extension. 
Hence, as I have said, the process of counting having begun, it 
cannot rest; and the complete character of ultimate reality thus 
demands an infinitude (as opposed both to a finite, and also to an 
indefinitely large, number) of Attributes, related among themselves 
and to Substance, as Thought and Extension are related, or in an 
analogous fashion. For why should any finite number suffice? Or 
how could an indefinite number be actual? No answer can be 
forthcoming which does not conflict with the independence of the 
Attributes, and with the reality and perfection of Substance.2
1 T h e  distinction itself is  rather one o f em phasis than a m atter o f even ‘logical’ 
separation.
2 T h u s  the difficulties o f Professor Joachim , and those who in  this m atter agree 
w ith  him , about S pinoza’s not rendering, and being unable to ‘render intellig ib le  
the being o f the A ttrib utes “ in ”  G o d  . . .  a p lu ra lity  “ in ”  an absolute U n ity ’ 
(A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 137), m ay easily be traced to th e ir idealistic 
presuppositions in  the case actually given to us (viz. the relations o f T h o u g h t 
and Extension). ‘ T h e  m etaphorical “ in ”  leaves the conception totally u nintel­
lig ib le ’, says Professor Jo a ch im ; on the contrary, I  reply, the relation o f subject 
and object in  finite experience is  totally u n in tellig ib le  i f  ‘ E xp erie n ce ’ (whether 
in  an inchoate or developed fo rm ) is the ultim ate reality  and therefore self- 
dependent. I f  E xperience itse lf is  to be possible w e m u st be able to transcend 
its d u ality  in  the sense that its real object, as distinct from  its ‘objective content’ 
(w h ic h  is an ens rationis) m ust have independent existence; and i f  E xperience is
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The same result would follow an acute examination of the single 
Attribute of Thought. Thought is necessarily a duality in unity of 
‘subject’ and ‘object’, i.e. of ‘subjective content’ (=act of knowing) 
and ‘objective content’ ( =intelligible Extension). This ‘objective
to be intellig ib le  we m ust be able to transcend its duality in  the sense that real 
subject and real object m ust be unified. Th ese p rincip les are confused if  the 
duality is  taken as ly in g  within E xperience (a duality o f ‘subjective content’ and 
‘objective content’, the latter being identified w ith  the real object) for thus the 
object falls w ith in  sentience, and the duality is  sufficiently synthesized in  E x ­
perience (fo r it never was a real existential duality at all). B u t to speak w ith 
restraint, it  is  surely  less sophisticated to believe that the real object does not 
necessarily o r ultim ately fall w ith in  sentience. T h e  duality to be made in te l­
lig ib le  is o f Experience on the one side, and the real object experienced on the 
other. I t  is o f the essence o f E xperience to transcend itself, not existentially, 
but as ‘know ing ’. T h e  thing know n, on the contrary, transcends Experience 
existentially, but not as ‘kno w n’.
In  so speaking, I  am not u n m in d fu l o f the very obvious dangers attending the 
effort to pass beyond hum an experience at its best in  the characterization of 
the R e a l; no r indeed that in  a restricted sense it  is  im possible. B u t m an is so 
placed in  the R ea l as to be capable o f reaching tru th  only b y facing great in ­
tellectual dangers. T o  generalize the acrobatic analogy o f R o bert B ro w n in g : 
M an's  reach m ust exceed h is grasp! T h e  perception o f this is not, o f course, 
foreign to Professor Jo a ch im : B radley, w ho in  these m atters is  obviously his 
‘father P arm enides’, again and again emphasized its im portance. ‘H o w  can 
truth be true absolutely, i f  there rem ains a g u lf  between itself and re a lity ?’ 
( Appearance and Reality, p. 544.) T r u t h  is only  com pletely true w hen the 
distinctions o f subject and predicate, o f subject and object, vanish, i.e. when 
truth becomes reality. T h u s  ‘ even absolute tru th  in  the end seems thus to tu rn  
out erroneous’ (Lo c. cit.). T h e  passages have been quoted ad nauseam; I  quote 
them again because it  is  precisely here that the dem and for m ore o f Spinoza, 
and not less, becomes insistent i f  the R eal is to be interpreted adequately as 
transcending the duality o f ‘ consciousness’, and not falling  below it  to the mere 
unity o f ‘sentience’ o r ‘sentient experience’. F o r  I  cannot agree that ‘ dissatis­
faction w ith  the form  o f know ledge’ is  ‘ ch im erical’ (Pringle-Pattison, M a n ’s 
Place in the Cosmos, p. 122), and B radley was in  p rin cip le  rig h t in  attem pting to 
resolve the duality o f knowledge and the thing know n w h ich , existentially but 
not as know n, transcends knowledge. W h y  he should so vigorously have felt the 
necessity is  less clear w hen h is im pression o f the character o f knowledge was so 
slight that his reflection upon it  led h im  to believe that R eality  is  necessarily 
‘ sentience’ or ‘ sentient experience’ ; unless, indeed, the reason is to be found in  
the extreme facility  w ith  w hich, on this theory, the d u ality  m ay be re so lved ; for 
the object o f knowledge, being conceived in  B erkeleian fashion, is already w ith in  
the psychical. T h e  genuine consistent idealist has nothing to lose by B ra d ley ’s 
reduction o f the duality to unified (but not sim plified) sentience.
B ut for those w ho take knowledge seriously, and its object as independently 
real and not necessarily fashioned out o f ‘ experience’ as the ‘ m atter’ o f all 
reality, the im p ulse to u n ity  can only be satisfied b y transcending E xperience, 
and neither by its reduction n o r by its acceptance as ‘ the absolute re latio n’. T h e y  
must proceed to a genuine in fin ity ; and if  this cannot be compassed in  precise 
detail (for we are but m en seeking, rig h tly  bu t perhaps heroically, to avoid 
ultim ate anthropom orphism s), at least it  m ay be sketched in  broad outline,
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content’ is no interpositum between the act of knowing and the real 
object known, but an ens rationis, having existence only in synthesis 
with the act of knowing. And the act of knowing, again, is an ens 
rationis existing only in synthesis with the ‘objective content’. 
This duality of Thought implies the existence of real Extension 
as the object known; thus we have two Attributes, and hence, as 
before, infinitely many Attributes.
That a similar result does not seem to follow from an examina­
tion of the Attribute of Extension taken alone is due to the fact 
that the reasoning in the case of Thought is really an analysis of 
the implications of knowledge ( = Thought), and that Thought is 
here analysing itself. But such conscious self-analysis is not the 
nature of Extension. What corresponds to it in Extension is thus 
not ‘criticism’. This connects itself with Spinoza’s denial that 
there are modes belonging to one Attribute only. There are no 
inanimate bodies, and no disembodied minds; that at least is the 
way in which the principle is exemplified in our experience. 
Presumably it might be generalized in the forms that: (i) minds 
are always the essentiae objectivae of bodies or X-ian modes; (2) 
bodies are always animated or em-X-ed; (3) X’s are always em­
bodied, animated, or em-Y-ed. In the case of Thought this is 
obvious because it is essentially knowledge (and must be o f some-
form ally, and speculatively. T o  parody a distinction o f F ra n c is  Bacon (Advance­
ment of Learning, I I ,  Nat. ReL, 2 ) : sufficient to convince, b u t not to inform .
T h u s  from  the sim ple irrefragable fact that knowledge im plies, as I  have said, 
an existentially, bu t no t cognitively, independent object, the argum ent leads us 
on to the doctrine o f the infin ite  A ttrib utes o f the Real. B y  the too rapid  m ove­
m ent from  the m any to the One (the characteristic vice o f the ‘w ise ’) in  the case 
o f the A ttributes, w h ich  is  the essence o f both epistem ological and m etaphysical 
idealism , m etaphysics has in  the past been stultified as m u ch  as it  is  now 
disabled b y the too slow  m ovem ent o f the epistem ological (and m etaphysical) 
realists towards u n ity. T h e  idealists m ake knowledge an illu s io n ; the realists 
make it  a brute fact; neither can be said to make it  intelligible. N o r  do they 
explain w h y  and how  far it  is  unintellig ible. E ve n  those idealists who have 
censured B ra d le y ’s resolution o f the ultim ate duality o f experience have looked 
for a com pleter view , not beyond the confines o f E xperience w ith  its inescapable 
anthropom orphic lim itations, bu t to aspects other than intellectual w ithin 
Experience. T h e se  aspects are undoubtedly im portant, especially w hen ‘in ­
tellectual’ is  taken in  too narrow  a sense; but the general restriction o f interest 
w h ich  is im p lied b y  the attitude I  am critic iz in g  means that the m ain problem  is 
only  shirked and obscured, bu t not rendered the less urgent. N o r  does it  follow  
that because the R ea l is  only  grasped b y  us in  (o r even as) the u n ity  o f Experience, 
that therefore we cannot recognize that in  itse lf it  transcends that u nity. T h e  
p hilosopher m ust, in  H egelian phrase, ‘ bathe in  the aether o f the O ne’ (Werke, 
B e rlin , 1836, X V ,  p. 376), b u t he w ill not, unless the drought is  very severe, 
attempt, as too m any have done, to swallow the bath!
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thing). But solitary Extension too is impossible, and whatever 
may be the other Attribute to which it is conceived as related, and 
whatever the relation involved (and in no case can it be causation1 
of the kind which connects finite modes), the ultimate result will 
be the implication of infinite Attributes. And this must be the 
case even if it is taken as related to itself as Thought is related 
to itself in reflection.
The nerve of the argument must be that any limitation of 
Attributes within Substance would curtail its absolute perfection 
and dissipate its unity: its perfection would be limited in that it 
would then no longer include every possible type of being (for a 
finite number implies an external cause, and hence some being 
outside of the nature of Substance); its unity would be dissipated, 
because the expression of the independent reality which each 
Attribute possesses as expressing, in its own way, the whole nature 
of Substance (which alone is independently real) demands re­
flection in infinitely many Attributes. For not the whole essence 
of Extension (e.g.) is expressed in Thought, but only its essentia 
objectiva. But the unity of Substance demands adequate expression, 
in each Attribute, of the nature of all Attributes, and complete 
expression by each, of its nature, in all.
Thus what is true of Thought in its relation to Extension must 
mutatis mutandis be true of Extension in relation to Thought, and 
of all the Attributes in relation to each other. Indeed, as may be 
gathered from the doctrine of idea ideae, it is true of Thought in 
relation to itself, and hence will be true, in an appropriate form, 
of each Attribute in relation to itself. As Thought is alsoThought
1 T h is  point is of the utm ost im portance. T h e  only relation o f the sort know n 
to us is, of course, the u niqu e cognitive relation, w h ich  has often been m istaken 
for a causal one (w ith  the m ost disastrous epistem ological and m etaphysical 
results). T h e  reaction away from  this error, however, to the view  that there is 
no relation, bu t v irtu al identity, has had equally disastrous results, both m eta­
physical and epistem ological. T h e  relation is fo r us unique, bu t it  is a relation. 
A n d  all the relations between the A ttributes m ust be u nique in  analogous senses, 
w hile the relation o f T h o u g h t to a ll the other A ttributes w ill be always, in  some 
sense (though always, we m ust suppose, w ith  a difference), cognitive. F o r  these 
among other reasons I  m ust strenuously and ab ruptly deny that the A ttrib utes 
are systematically or organically connected in  Substance, as has sometimes been 
asserted (cf. A . W o lf, The Correspondence of Spinoza, pp. 392, 460). T h e  
mode of connexion is  sui generis. E ve n  the single exam ple o f w h ich  w e have 
em pirical acquaintance (i.e. knowledge) is  a source o f endless p erp lexity to the 
acutest intellects (in  proportion to th eir acuity and superficiality). I t  is  at once 
too sim ple and too profound for us.
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about (i.e. enjoyment of) Thought, that is, in addition to being 
Thought about (i.e. contemplation of) Extension, and infinite other 
Attributes, so Extension extends over (i.e. ‘lives through’ the 
being of) Extension in the hierarchy of worlds.1
Further, Thought is the essentia objectiva not only of Extension 
but of every other Attribute of the eternal Real; not in the sense 
that it is infinitely and extensively reduplicated, but, since Ex­
tension includes Thought (in the sense I have indicated), and hence 
also in analogous manners every other Attribute, Thought in so 
including Extension does also, in like manner, include all the others. 
And it is surely in this sense, and in this sense alone, that each 
Attribute is the adequate expression of Substance, viz. because it 
includes (in the sense defined) every other Attribute, and, indeed, 
in the same sense, includes itself. But this is true only of the 
infinite and eternal Attributes of Substance, and not of this or that 
finite mode as it is known to us. Each mode in itself is expressed in 
all the Attributes; but the expression of any mode in the Attribute 
of Thought will again be infinitely reduplicated as a mode of Thought 
about itself, about a mode of Extension, about a mode of X, and 
so on to infinity. Now man is not all of these infinite expressions : 
he is a mode of Thought (about itself and about a mode of Ex­
tension) and that mode of Extension itself. But he is not a mode 
of X, nor of thought about X; for these are not implied by his 
nature as a finite, animated body. True, Thought implies Extension 
and all the other Attributes; Extension implies Thought and all 
the other Attributes; but a mode of Thought, or of Extension, does 
not imply a mode of any other Attribute: it implies nothing beyond
1 Some such m eaning m ay underlie  the suggestion o f Cam erer and Professor 
Joachim  already m entioned (p. 53, note 5), that S pinoza’s doctrine o f idea ideae 
was perhaps p u t forw ard to p rovide a basis for the restoration o f ‘that u n ity  and 
co ntinuity  in  all o u r th inking, w h ich  h is conception o f the m in d  as a com plex of 
‘ ideae’ seems to have destroyed’ (A  Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 140). 
Professor Joachim , o f course, adm its that the attempt, i f  made, was doomed to 
failure. B u t surely it  was never made, and d id  no t need to be m a d e ; for, as I  
have sufficiently em phasized, S pinoza’s ‘ideae' are not conceived by h im  as 
H u m ian , and they therefore do not need to be extraneously conjoined. T h e y  are 
essentially constellated in  scientia intuitiva, and even in  R eason; they are 
fragm entary o n ly  in  Im aginatio n (and then only  in  a lim ited degree). B u t the 
doctrine o f the self-reflection o f the A ttrib utes certainly emphasizes the systematic 
character o f N atura naturata as a self-reflecting u n ity , and its subordinate 
constellations, organic, chem ical, p hysical, atom ic, & c., w h ich , as we know, are 
not its sections, bu t ru n  through it  w ith  va ry in g  proportions o f self-maintenance 
and dependence (or, u nde r T h o u g h t, o f intellectus and Im agination).
296 A E T E R N I T A S
its own A ttribute (nor that, indeed, completely). Ideas give rise 
to ideas, movements to movements; but ideas do not cause move­
ments, nor movements ideas; nor do ideas and movements cause 
X-ian modes. Hence for us, two only of the Attributes are known. 
‘Although each thing is expressed in an infinity of ways in the 
infinite Intellect of God, yet those infinite ideas whereby it is 
expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular 
thing, but infinite minds; seeing that each of these infinite ideas 
has no connexion with the rest.’1 But though infinite minds are 
thus required, it does not follow that infinite Thought-Attributes 
are required; the argument implies the contrary, and it is thus 
that our minds and the Thought of God differ from one another: 
there is ‘about as much correspondence between the two as there 
is between the Dog Star and the animal that barks’.2 For Thought 
implies every other Attribute, and is thus a draught of the ineffable 
essence of N atura as creative eternity; but our thought is creative 
only within its own circuit, and even there only with patience and 
derivatively: it waits for the data upon which it works. And the 
mind receives no data with respect to modes other than the 
extended body, nor could it; for it receives no data at all from 
things external to itself (not even from the body); its data are its 
own, and can, therefore, refer only to the body of which it is the 
essentia objectiva. Thus we are doubly finite: both as parts of 
psycho-physical nature, and also as lacking the infinite diversity of 
expressiveness and expression that belongs to infinite Natura.
Let me now very rapidly marshal the main heads of my argu­
ment in formal order: my general view of N atura naturata is of an 
infinite whole of infinitely many parts each of which in its measure 
reflects the whole. Their measures are infinite, not merely because 
there is an infinite series in which neither repetition nor lacuna 
occurs, but also because each part and each part of each part ad in­
finitum is a whole of subordinate parts.3 Thus in the diversification
1 Ep. Ixvi. C f. p. 287, note 1.
2 ‘ S i ad aeternam D e i essentiam, intellectus scilicet, et voluntas pertinent, 
aliud sane per utrum que hoc attributum  intelligendum  est, quam  quod vulgo 
solent hom ines. N am  intellectus, et voluntas, q u i D e i essentiam constituerunt, 
a nostro intellectu, et volúntate, toto coelo differre deberent, nec in  u lla  re, 
praeterquam in  nom ine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam  inter se 
conveniunt canis, signum  coeleste, et canis, anim al latrans.’ (E th . I ,  xvii, Sch.)
3 A n d  also in  the further sense that the parts o f various grades constitute 
relative w holes through w h ich  the m ain diversification receives in fin ite ly  varied 
cross-connexion.
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of Natura naturata1 there arises the necessary distinction between 
eternity and duration: for each finite thing in part reflects the whole 
adequately, and in part inadequately; adequately in so far as it is 
self-contained and active; inadequately in so far as it is acted upon 
by the infinitely many other parts, and is thus passive.2 As active 
individuals, finite things are eternal; as passive things they are 
temporal, and endure only so long as it is possible for them to do 
so under the being of N atura naturata. Using the terms ‘whole’ 
and ‘part’ very strictly, it may be said that every whole is for itself 
and in itself eternal; every whole is for its parts sempiternal; every 
part is for other parts external to it an enduring existence. Thus 
pure time which characterizes the dust of non-being becomes real 
time by the ‘densification’ or integration which belongs to the union 
of events within increasingly concrete individualities. Timeless­
ness is thus, as Bosanquet says in the passage already quoted, an 
essential constituent of time.
I need not repeat the argument by which I was led to the further 
movement of thought from N atura naturata to N atura naturans, 
not as a separate existence, but as the same thing viewed first as 
created nature, and again as creative essence. The eternity which 
is enjoyed by N atura naturata is enjoyed necessarily as flowing from 
Natura naturans, and is thus the creative eternity of N atura.
I have thus re-emphasized the main steps in my argument in 
preparation for a further flight of rational speculation for which 
the reader must now gird himself, and towards which we are urged 
by the conclusions reached in the course of this chapter. It is 
impossible to rest in the nominal creative unity so far explained, 
because, empirically, N atura naturata is already twofold in expres­
sion, as both extended and thinking. Creation must explain not 
merely the emergence of finite extended and conscious modes 
from the unity of the Attributes of Extension and Thought, but 
also the unity of these and all other Attributes in unica Substantia. 
That ultimate unity must, so far as possible, cease to be ineffable. 
Creation, in other words, is only a legitimate principle of explana-
1 I n  the constitution o f N atura naturata, I  m ust rem ind the reader, we have 
transcended m ere ‘org anic’ u nity, w h ich  has too often been regarded as the 
high-w ater m ark o f intim ate system, and thus has been applied indiscrim inately 
w herever a u n ity  w h ich  is  m ore than m ere sim p lic ity, aggregation, or m echanical 
system, has been im puted. O rganic beings are finite things bearing a certain 
relation to an environm ent; hence infin ite  nature cannot be an organism .
2 ‘ N o s eatenus patim ur, quatenus N aturae sum us pars, quae per se absque 
aliis non potest co n cip i’ (Eth. I V ,  ii) .
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tion, if it really explains: not when it is a mere term to cover some 
final inexplicability by thrusting it into an ‘asylum of ignorance’. 
The ineffability of the unity of Substance, so far as it remains at 
the end of our analysis, must be due not to intellectual impotence 
as such, but only to that intellectual impotence which arises solely 
from an existential limitation in the thinker. Thus only may the 
divine unity be accepted as ineffable with philosophical propriety. 
So far as it relates to the Attributes of Thought and Extension the 
human mind has grounds for adequate knowledge of the divine 
unity; for in our finite way we are at least familiar with it, since 
it is the unity of knowledge.
I need not repeat the arguments in favour of an infinitude of 
Attributes, but I must consider the state of human knowledge with 
respect to these, and their relations to Thought and Extension, to 
one another, and of all to Substance. In the nature of things, these 
can be dealt with only in the most formal manner; in the absence 
of actual experience of their natures we are precluded from under­
standing them and their relations to each other as they are under­
stood in the infinite Intellect of God.
We know, then, that the unity of Substantial Thought, i.e. of 
Thought of Extension together with Thought of Thought, Thought 
of X, Thought of Y, &c., is the same as the unity of the Attributes 
themselves of Extension, Thought, X, Y, &c.; i.e. it is the Thought- 
transcriptof the creative unity of Substance; i.e. Thought as creative 
eternity. Similarly the unity of Substantial Extension is the extensive 
transcript of the creative unity of Substance; i.e. Extension as creative 
eternity. And so on. Further, the unity of Substantial Thought, 
Substantial Extension, Substantial X, Substantial Y, &c., is the unity 
of the infinite transcripts of Substance. Hence once more the neces­
sary postulation of infinite Attributes: for it is only because there 
are infinite transcripts of Substance that Substance can adequately 
be regarded as the unity of its transcripts without remainder. It is 
pure expressiveness with infinite expression. There is no part or 
element in Substance which is opaque either to Thought, or to 
Extension, or to any other type of expression; it utters all itself.
But to us, by reason of our relative inexpressiveness and unre­
sponsiveness it remains ineffable; and this inexpressiveness infects 
even our legitimate expressiveness, since for us knowledge is a 
miracle even when, as knowledge, it is effective, and its object thus 
transparent to thought. The object of knowledge may be clearly
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and distinctly apprehended, but nevertheless knowledge itself re­
mains opaque, and this opaqueness of the cognitive relation is but 
the reverse of the reality of the infinitude of Attributes which we 
do not know. Our ignorance of them is reflected in the givenness 
of the fact of knowledge. But, it may be said: on the contrary, the 
cognitive relation is transparently clear; we have only to accept it 
as a unique relation! True, I reply, but that is not to understand 
it, not to explain how it is essential in the Real.1 Nor is the explana­
tion for us. All we can know is that in the infinite Intellect of God 
Thought and its object are not exclusive as they are for us even 
when our knowledge is adequate; for there Thought reciprocates 
with every range of expressiveness (including its own), and its 
object, therefore, retains no ground of otherness. So long as the 
types of expressiveness remain finite, infinite Substance possesses 
some core of unexpressed essence, so that Thought remains 
other and less than its object. Make them infinite and Thought 
melts into its other in the eternal unity of the Real. The argument, 
however, has no idealistic implications; for precisely the same thing 
is true mutatis mutandis of Extension, and of every Attribute of 
the Real. There is no pre-eminence.
N atura, therefore, is doubly ineffable to us; it is ineffable with 
respect to the Attributes which we know, because to us they fail to 
present a unified appearance; it is ineffable, further, because infi­
nitely many Attributes are hidden from us; and the two sources 
of mystery are ultimately one. The eternal ‘uniquity’ of infinite 
Substance is for itself not ineffable, for it is its nature to utter itself 
completely, not merely by way of Thought, but by every possible 
way of expression. Such is eternity as it constitutes the essence of 
the Real in its ultimate uniqueness as creative expressiveness at one 
with its infinitely diverse created expressions. It is thus that from 
the infinite essence of God there flow ‘infinite things in infinite ways’.
1 I t  w ill be profitable ab ru p tly  to re-em phasize these p rin c ip le s: I  recognize 
the difficu lty  experienced by idealists in  accepting the ‘ p ro jicience’ involved in  
knowledge (th rough  w h ich  they tend to incorporate the object into the ‘ ex­
perience’, and thus, in  effect, to deny ‘p rojicience’, and therefore to deny the 
ostensible m eaning o f ‘know ledge’ also). I  recognize e qually the necessity urged 
by realists for accepting the fact o f know ledge as a u n iq u e  relation invo lving  
‘ p rojicience’, o r its equivalent. I  conclude that since both are unansw erable, the 
‘m ira cle ’ o f knowledge is part o f an infin itely  w id e r set o f relations w h ich  alone 
can make knowledge itself intellig ib le. W here the idealists refuse to face the facts, 
and the realists are content m erely to take them as ‘ brute’ facts, m y  choice is  of 
a w ay at once m ore rational, m ore difficu lt and, perhaps, m ore modest.
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E X C U R S U S  V i l i
MORAL PROGRESS AND THE CHANGELESS REAL
T h o u g h  the scope of my present inquiry does not include the meta­physics of ethics, it will be well for me to indicate shortly what I take to be the attitude of Spinozism to the question of the coherent relation of the moral progress of finite individuals with the changeless perfection of the Real, on the one hand; and with the ultimate reality of the finite individuals themselves, on the other. I am the more ready to do so because this difficulty has commonly been regarded as the ground of a fundamental objection to the philosophy of Spinoza.It is, of course, perfectly obvious that if ultimately the Real is change- lessly perfect, then moral progress in its parts can be no more than an appearance or perspective within it or under it. But once admitted as such it seems to demand an infinite scope: only continuous moral pro­gress in an immortal existence could be a genuine, well-founded, appearance of the infinite perfection of the Real. Thus the finite in­dividual progressing in time must either be illusory, or immortal and infinitely perfectible. But, if the latter, then in the end each finite individual would cease to be finite and become identical with the whole. Such a view only illustrates the truth of my contention that an immortal existence is not proper to the finite individual: the actual enjoyment of complete immortality and the loss of finitude are but the reverse and obverse of the same quality of individuality. Such a ‘king­dom of ends’ as that thus adumbrated is conceivable only in so far as it ceases to be the end of a process and is lifted altogether out of time. But even so (my argument runs) the conception is invalid because it implies a plurality of indistinguishable, because equally perfect, in­dividuals. We can choose, therefore, which we will regard as illusory: either the moral progress of the finite individual; or the changeless perfection of the Real; or the ultimate reality of the finite individual: we cannot have all three at once. Moral progress of an unreal individual may cohere with the changeless perfection of the whole; the changeless perfection of the whole may cohere with the ultimate reality of un­changing finite parts; the ultimate reality of the finite parts may cohere with their progress within a changing Real; but how can moral progress in ultimately real finite individuals cohere with a changeless perfect whole? Any two, but not all three.The problem is resolved by the application of the principles already expounded: ethical judgements have reference to our existence as 
enduring individuals, and they are valid as applied to the ineluctable
imaginative representations of our finite individuality. This is a point upon which there has been among philosophers in general (and even among experts) very persistent misunderstanding of Spinoza’s philo­sophical position. In Chapters V and VI, where I have indicated the relations and distinctions of the eternal and the enduring existences of the finite individual, and the roots and implications of his finitude and of his individuality, I have already laid down the principles which must govern the interpretation of this part of Spinoza’s theory. It is of the essence of the duration of the finite individual that it cannot compre­hend his being as a whole (i.e. as eternal): he is wholly present at no instant or epoch, however extended, of his temporal life; for he is eternal. In 
time he runs through the perspectives of his eternal nature under the partial heteronomy of his context and complement. Eternally he occupies his concrete but finite individuality, as a real part of the ' eternal whole. Now as both finite and individual he is both temporal and eternal; or rather, he is essentially eternal yet dissipated by time and transiency. Thus if we consider the abstract individual as he exists at this or that moment or epoch of his duration, we find him not merely incomplete and partial (for as I have shown in the text, he is partial 
eternally), but in time he is even incompletely himself. Hence arises the sense of imperfection or of sin: not that we fall short of absolute per­fection, for it is proper that we should do so; but that we fall short of our own eternal stature. And that we do so, and are aware that we do so, is the deliverance of our eternity; for the eternal being of the finite individual lies perdu in his duration, revealing itself more especially in movements towards higher values and deeper insight, but constituting all that is positive in its temporal perspectives.Thus Spinoza’s assertions to the effect that each thing is as perfect as it is its nature to be, since it is what it is, and lacks nothing that it ought to have,1 and that it only appears imperfect when compared with something other than itself (and, in general, with the highest perfection possible to its genus) in no way conflict with the ethical parts of his philosophy, or the ethical atmosphere of the whole. For though we may not compare this or that man with outstanding historical examples of human perfection, or expect him to achieve the ideal goodness of an imagined perfect man; yet he may, and must, be judged by his own 
eternal standard, the criterion which he eternally is for himself, and to which in time (i.e. as temporal) he never attains. This judgement of the temporal man by his eternal self is the very root of ethics in the philosophy of Spinoza; and it is thus that insight is freedom and salvation. For from every point of time there is a way out into the eternal: with mind it is the way of knowledge, which is the way of blessedness. Morality,
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1 Cf. Epp. xix  et xxiii.
therefore, issues from the relations of eternity and duration, and moral improvement means increasing individuality in the sense of an in­creasing approximation of the temporal actuality of the finite individual to his eternal reality. Not that this reality is ever submerged by time: it is the root of all that is real or positive in the waste of our years; 
this is it, falsely seen as transient and piecemeal; but moral strength means its synthesis and completion, the substitution of ‘the order of the Intellect’ for ‘the common order of nature’. So long as the finite individual rests in ‘the order of nature’ his eternity is fo r  his knowledge (i.e. for Imagination) dissipated; but it is not destroyed. The disorder of the premisses darkens the conclusion. But ‘the common order of nature’ itself is not wholly unmeaning, or even unreal: it is a temporal perspective which in part fails to indicate the proper degree of perfection which characterizes the finite individual as an eternal reality.The same essential relations become clear also when we think of individuality as determined primarily by responsiveness to the In­dividual Real, and only remotely (and as an imaginative result) by division or section of the seamless whole. In time we discover ourselves as responding to this or that abstracted external situation rather than to the whole in our measure; and moral progress is achieved by a pro­gressive correction of this failing. As we respond more and more fully to a wider context we gain power and freedom in the moral life, and more nearly approximate our temporal individuality to the eternal that we are.At this point I may add that the reader can conveniently test his grasp of the main principles of this essay by his ability to resist the objection that my analysis necessarily leads in practice to pococuranteism, in that it saves morality from illusoriness only to render it wholly fatuous, since we already (note the term!) eternally are all, and more than all, we can ever become as the result of moral endeavour.Thus as against those who regard the reality of moral development in time as conflicting with the unchanging character of the eternal Real, I shall assert that it is because even the finite individual suffers, sub specie 
aeternitatis, no temporal transition, but sums up as quality all real (i.e. logical) transition, that the same, viewed imaginatively (and so far as he is finite, not falsely) sub specie durationis, can be aware of imperfection (or a falling below himself) and of the imperative to live in accordance with the eternal constitutive principles of his own nature. The temporal progress is real, and involves real achievement, only in so far as it is the imaginative transcript of eternal immanent causation.Further, as against those who would make use of the interpretation of moral progress as towards more and more complete community of purpose within social wholes, to imply that finite individuals have no ultimate reality within or under the Absolute, I contend that in moral
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progress there is not less but more, not merely of individuality defined as responsiveness to a world, but even of individuality indicated imaginatively by distinction, exclusion, and division. For each sub­ordinate individual is ultimately finite, and his moral progress is towards his own proper fullness of being, and not towards the goal of infinite perfection; though the road to the one is the same as the road to the other, viz. organization and wholeness (in mind, insight or adequate ideas).Finally, as against those who would interpret the ultimate reality of the finite individual as implying an immortal progress towards an infinite perfection, I must hold that such a destiny can belong, even sub 
specie durationis or imaginatively (for intellectually it is incoherent), to no individual but the Absolute Whole, which is eternally perfect, and thus possesses all achievings and achievements, not as involving tem­poral transition, but as quality or integrated ‘transformation without succession’. Thus though the finite individual is unlimited in moral scope (for time and eternity are incommensurable, so that his eternal reality can never reach complete or adequate expression in time, not though he should endure indefinitely), he is none the less limited by his eternal place in the Real as a subordinate part: in time he cannot surpass the bounds of his eternal finite nature; nor, however his life might be prolonged, could he reach them:
All I could never be,All, men ignored in me,This, I was worth to God . . .
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IF I have reasoned correctly from the data of experience to the ultimate character of the Real, it should now be possible to judge 
of the value and ultimate satisfactoriness not only of the extreme 
theories of deistic transcendence and identity or equivalence which 
have been held with respect to the relations of the temporal and 
the eternal, but also of the via media which has sometimes been 
supposed to resolve their opposition: the doctrine of immanence.
On the one hand, extreme transcendentists, exclusively im­
pressed by the opposition of the actual and the ideal, of facts and 
values, have held that the relation of these two worlds is wholly 
asymmetrical, not only from the standpoint of both production 
and interaction, but also from that of human knowledge: for all 
action, they say, is from the noiimenal to the phenomenal, and the 
latter should, or rather must,1 remain passive clay in the hands of 
the potter. Thus though the actual world may be led or inspired 
by ideals, these ideals themselves cannot be determined by refer­
ence to their remote effects in the world of actual facts, nor can 
they develop from the facts; the eternal world of values may, in­
deed, by a miraculous condescension, or creative parturition, even 
be the source of the factual world, and therefore also of the values 
embodied in it, but no return is possible from the side of pheno­
mena, not even in the epistemological form of a satisfactory recon­
struction of the divine nature by reference to the ordered hierarchy 
of temporal existences. It would be far easier to suppose that a man 
could ‘enter the second time into his mother’s womb, and be born’; 
for it is to suppose that the child could conceive its own mother, 
and the creature recreate its creator.
On the other hand, extreme opponents of transcendence have 
held that it is to the temporal that we must look for genuine reality, 
and therefore for the true significance of the eternal; that the Real
1 T he distinction here between ‘should’ and ‘must’ indicates the weakness of 
the theory. I f  all realized ideals are placed on the side of phenomena (as they 
must be if  these are to have content at all) then ‘must’ is the word. I f  they are 
retained on the side of noiimena, then ‘cannot’ would appear to be analytically 
necessary (for phenomena would be either non-existent, or wholly alien to 
values). As they are left indeterminate, ‘should’ becomes convenient.
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is essentially of a developing, progressive nature, and is thus the 
source of ever new values; reality is constituted by time. This 
tendency of thought is, perhaps, distinctively modern in its un­
qualified form, though it is descended from a respectable ancestry ; 
in our own time it is immediately traceable to developments of the 
speculations of M. Bergson. Thus when we are told that ‘ l’éternité 
même est dans le temporel ’, the meaning is not that which we 
have found in the writings of Bosanquet, viz. that ‘timelessness is 
an essential constituent of time’,1 still less that eternity, so far as 
real existence is concerned, is pure negation, belonging only to 
logical essences for which time is neutral ; but rather that though 
we may intellectualize reality as a passage of temporal things and 
events, reality itself which is time is not in the same sense 
‘temporal’.2 Time is not in time, and it is therefore eternal; and 
it is thus, presumably, that ‘l’éternel s’amorce sur le temporel’.3 
Eternity, then, is not outside of time, nor are values : they are its 
very offspring, and thus only are they real.
At the present moment extreme deistic transcendentism is being 
preached in France, by way of reaction from the Bergsonian doctrine 
of identity or equivalence ; but historically the latter was elaborated 
in opposition to the abstract and empty conception of eternity that 
had for long occupied the field. That older tradition might easily 
be traced back to the famous dictum of Plato in the Timaeus, 
which certainly governed much mediaeval and early modern specu­
lation about the nature of eternity. Its influence on Augustine is 
clear enough, and it has been seen at work in the doctrine of 
Boethius which I discussed in an earlier chapter. Plato’s state­
ment is to the effect that ‘when the father who begat it perceived 
the created image of the incorruptible gods moving and living, 
he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more 
like the pattern-, and as this is a living being incorruptibly existent
1 The Principle o f  Individuality and Value, p. 339. Cf. p. 59, note 1, for the 
context which is important.
2 So also, as I have already noticed, Professor Taylor reminds us that ‘passage’, 
which M r. Whitehead finds to be the fundamental character of Nature, does 
not itself ‘pass’ . (A  Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, p. 691.)
3 For a criticism o f this type of thought, though mainly in its ethical, social, 
and political aspects and implications, see M . Julien Benda’s volume, La Fin de 
V Éternel (the continuation of his well-known La Trahison des Clercs which has 
been translated into English under the title, The Great Betrayal). T h e vivid 
dictum to which this note is attached is taken from Sertillanges, and is quoted 
from La Fin de l’Étemel, p. 184.
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he sought to make the sum of things also such, as far as might be. 
Now the nature of that living archetype was eternal, and to bestow 
this attribute in its fullness upon the creature was impossible. 
Therefore he resolved to make a moving image o f  eternity ; so while 
he was marshalling the heavens he made of the eternity that abides 
in unity an eternal image that passes in accordance with number, 
even that which we call time’.1 The account of time by contrast and 
relation with eternity very naturally becomes for us an account of 
eternity in contrast and relation with time, eternity being notius 
natura, but time (or so it is supposed) notius nobis. But from which­
ever end we view the relation it is clear that Plato means that time 
(xpóvos) and eternity (alwv) are at once to be assimilated to,and dis­
tinguished from, each other. The immediate problem is to discover 
how. Plato conceives the universe in the first instance as without 
time, not in the sense that it does not move, that it is not a process : 
it is ‘moving and quick’, it is active ; but how it is active he does not 
explain. No suitable image or appropriate description of such a 
condition is possible, because, as Plato clearly means, the con­
dition itself is impossible, because incomplete. What is lacking 
to it is determinate form, either in the sense of self-sufficiency and 
wholeness, or in the sense of measure, transforming mere vital 
urgency and disturbance into ordered succession without limits. 
Now the former attributes belong only to ‘the everlasting gods’, or 
whatever is rightly styled the archetype of the universe (a point 
which is not altogether clear); for these there is no process or 
becoming, for they are eternally complete. Thus the universe could 
only be approximated to its paradeigma, and this is accomplished 
by the introduction of that ordered succession which is the result of 
the comparison of the inchoate durations of passing but overlapping 
processes within the total process of nature. This measurement of
1 *Qs Se KLvqQkv avrò kcll £¿ov evórjoev rtiv ¿lSlcüv detiv yeyovòs ayaXpa ó yevvr¡aas 
TT(LTr¡p, rjyáadr) r e  /caí evĉ pavdeis e rt 8rj paXXov opoiov 7rpos t o  TrapdSeiypa ¿7revorjaev 
direpyaaaoQaL. Ka.9a.Trep ovv avrò Tvyyávei £a/ov alSiov ov, /cat róSe r ¿  ttolv ovtcüs els 
8vvap.iv ¿7TexeípT]oe tolovtov à/iroreXeiv, rj pev ovv tov £cpov (f>voLS irvyxavev ovata altivios, 
/cat rovTO pèv 8rj rip yevvrjrti 7ravreXtis TrpoadTTreiv ovk ¿¡v Svvaróv* et/ccò S* ¿TrevóeL 
Kivqróv riva aleüvos 7ToirjoaL, /cat SiaKoapcov apa ovpavòv ttolcl pévovros altivos iv evi 
Kar àpiOpòv lovoav altiviov elKÓva, rovrov ov S17 ^póvov tivopaKapev (Timaeus 37 C , D .) 
Though the point has not, I think, been noticed by scholars, Plato here appears 
to assume a distinction between an eternal {altivios) and an everlasting (audios) 
existence. ‘Everlasting’, however, in addition to its prima facie suggestion of 
‘sempiternal duration’ may also mean simply ‘ incorruptible’. It is in this sense 
that the eternal ‘gods’ are also everlasting.
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process is time, and it is by its agency that mere process (thought 
of as indefinite, unmeasured extent of duration, or, perhaps con­
ceivably, as indeterminate Bergsonian duree) comes to be ordered 
and determinate as an enduring process of successive elements, 
having neither beginning nor end. By this means the processes of 
the universe are made ‘still more like’ their archetype in that they 
are now conceived as ‘everlasting’ (aiSios), at least in the extensive 
sense which alone is possible with a created thing (full of beginnings 
and endings, yet having neither beginning nor end). The ‘ever­
lasting gods’, on the other hand, are truly everlasting or eternal 
(atamos), since they are without process or becoming: they are in­
corruptible because they are uncreated. Time, therefore, the source 
of the ordered successiveness of the universe, is at best an approxi­
mation to eternity; for eternity ‘that abides in unity’ is the para- 
deigma of time the everlastingness of unending ordered process 
‘that passes in accordance with number’.1 Endlessly long succes­
sion without a beginning, when it is thought of (or ‘imagined’, as 
Spinoza would say) as a whole, is a nearer approach to eternity 
than the formless duration of a restless seething mass of timeless 
events: for time introduces form and law and measure, and there­
with the inchoate completeness of unlimited extent.
Thus the problem was set: nature, containing in itself all dura­
tion, all temporal process, is conceived as a whole which, as such, 
does not endure; for it contains all time within itself. Thus the 
whole of duration does not endure, though every part of it does 
endure. In the eternal, on the contrary, no process and no dura­
tion is even contained. What is the precise relation of the eternal 
and the temporal?
I have already examined the answer put forward by Boethius, 
which attempted to read the eternal as a kind of infinite specious 
present devoid of reference to the moving ‘tempunctum’ of a finite 
existence: as being all duration viewed in a single intuition; ‘inter- 
minabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio’. But this account, 
which with Augustinianism2 underlies the doctrine of Aquinas and
1 Timaeus 3 7  D.
2 T h e doctrine of Augustine about eternity is, in the main, identical with that 
of Boethius, though his amazing discussions of the problems of time are much 
more detailed and psychologically acute than the rapid review o f Boethius, and 
certainly than anything that had so far been attempted. On the doctrine of 
eternity cf. Confessiones, X I :  ‘Anni tui omnes simul stant, quoniam stant, nec 
cuntes a venientibus excluduntur, quia non transeunt . .  . Hodiernus [dies] tuus
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of the Middle Ages generally, is clearly not the view which Plato 
himself entertained, but only the appearance which the duration of 
the universe would present if viewed, impossibly,1 by the universe 
itself conceived as a total single self-conscious individual including 
all durations but not itself as a whole enduring. To the finite 
conscious parts of N atura the sempiternity of the whole seems 
piecemeal, a perpetual coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; to the 
supposed universe it would appear as an ‘eternal now’ including 
all passage, but not as a whole passing. This is the nearest approach 
which a creature can make to eternity, but eternity itself must, on 
Plato’s view, transcend even this ‘intuitive sempiternity’. It must 
do so, of course, because the conception of the possession ‘all at 
once’ of what is ‘unending’ involves a patent contradiction.
Thus human acuity was forced on to the view of eternity as 
excluding all temporal extension, and defined solely as ‘tota simul 
etperfectapossessio’: it becomes a timeless moment which, passing 
the contradiction, is precisely nothing. In some such way, it may 
be supposed, there arose the empty conception of a logical eternity, 
against which the Bergsonians have waged unequal warfare. To 
engender this monster it was only necessary to let loose the one 
‘eternity’ (=successionless whole or timeless moment) upon the 
other (=a whole of interminable succession or tuneful moment): 
for if eternity is really without transiency, or again, can be complete
aeternitas’ (x iii); ‘Praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum 
transiret, non jam esset tempus, sed aeternitas’ (xiv); ‘ Certe si est tam grandi 
scientia et praescientia pollens animus, cui cuncta praeterita et futura ita nota 
sint, sicut mihi unum canticum notissimum, nimium mirabilis est animus iste 
atque ad horrorem stupendus, quippe quem ita non lateat quidquid peractum et 
quidquid relicum saeculorum est, quemadmodum me non latet cantantem illud 
canticum. . . . Sed absit, ut tu, conditor universitatis, conditor animarum et 
corporum, absit, ut ita noveris omnia futura et praeterita. Longe tu, longe 
mirabilius longeque secretius.’ (xxxi.)
1 ‘ Impossibly’ because a total individual cannot endure. An individual to 
which all time is ‘present’, which ‘interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter 
comprehendit, ac possidet; cui neque futuri quicquam absit, nec praeteriti 
fluxerit’ (De Consol. Phil. V, Pr. vi) could not regard itself as enduring from eternity 
to eternity. Its mode of existence would be non-temporal, because, as Boethius 
emphasizes, tota simul. Thus past and future would not merely be ‘present’, they 
would cease to be past and future. These distinctions only remain in the finite 
specious present because it is finite, and as a whole passing. Thus such a com­
plete individual would be essentially eternal in form. Our own eternity is imaged 
by us as duration because we are finite beings, and hence only partly  eternal. 
Thus our eternal essence, as actual, i.e. as we have it (and not as it is constellated 
in Natura) is imagined as a conatus which claims indefinite duration, but which 
cannot make good the claim within the sempiternity of nature.
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while succession is incomplete, then succession and transiency do 
nothing, and must be taken as neutral or null. Time may then be 
regarded as an infinite congeries of timeless moments among which 
succession is wholly inoperative. Thus, as I have said, time 
becomes a neutral order of externality; no longer even an ‘un­
passing passage’, but a mere dimension added to those of space. 
And eternity, craving the content denied to it as a timeless moment, 
becomes identical with this neutral time, supersedes it, so that time 
becomes its measured ordinates.
Against some such ‘spatialized’ conception of time and eternity, 
as is well known, M. Bergson put forward his theory of real time 
or durée, which is not neutral but operative, and is, in fact, the 
very stuff of reality. In so doing he took a step towards a more 
adequate conception both of time and of eternity. For if time is 
the mere empty form of the succession of timeless instants with an 
extraneous content, it matters little whether we regard eternity as 
a single moment in which all time-contents are confusedly con­
tained, or as the total of all moments without their successiveness, 
and thus with their contents lacking even the order and connexion 
which in time they appear to have ; for in either case the content of 
the eternal being must be less coherent than that of time itself. 
Now such a result can only be avoided by showing that the content 
of time is not extraneous to it but is essentially temporal, and is, 
indeed, the very source of extended successive time; for thus the 
continuity of extended duration becomes real, or at least bene 
fundatum, and eternity, as the form of the existence of the whole, 
will be neither a single confused moment of all contents, nor these 
spread out without genuine connexion, but the ultimate source of 
all contents, and of their temporal forms and buccessions. Its 
nature will become clear to us as the ultimate integration of all 
existence. M. Bergson did not, as is well known, carry the argu­
ment to the point I have thus indicated, but his doctrine of durée 
as the reality which is wrongly grasped under the form of spatialized 
time was in essence the sound beginning of my thesis. What 
remained to be done was to indicate the proper place in the whole 
of both the real durée of things, and also of their apparent successive­
ness in spatialized time, for both have an essential meaning in our 
experience.
The principles underlying the integration of all existence in 
eternity, which also explain the durée of the individual finite being,
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and his successiveness within N atura, have been expounded in 
the foregoing chapters. It is not for me to attempt to determine 
whether beneath the doctrine of Plato that time is ‘a moving image 
of eternity’ there is to be read a more profound significance. The 
fact that both nature and its paradeigma are said to be ‘everlasting’ 
must not impress us too much: for the incorruptibility of the 
creature, which is derived from its total possession of time, is only 
an approximation to that of the ‘everlasting gods’, which is derived 
from their uncreated perfection; nor can we suppose that Plato 
was not alive to the impossibility of regarding mere length of life 
as universally commensurate with perfection of being: such a view 
may be possible with the universe as a whole, but never with the 
finite individuals within the universe. Thus the good man may die 
young while the wicked enjoy a green old age; and even if we 
question the validity, or the ultimacy, of human judgements of 
worth, it is clear that some of the most highly organized of living 
beings are comparatively ephemeral, while a lowly organism may 
be wellnigh immortal.
It is thus necessary to distinguish between the reality which a 
thing possesses in virtue of its own completeness and perfection, and 
the extent of duration which it actually enjoys under a given set of 
circumstances; or, to speak in terms of time, between the duration 
after which a thing endeavours and the duration which it actually 
enjoys in the sempiternity of nature. This distinction arises only 
with the finite parts of nature, for these alone act in opposition to 
the obstruction of external causes; and hence the indefinite dura­
tion which would be enjoyed by even the finite mode if it met no 
opposition1 (i.e. if it were not finite) is curtailed in accordance 
with what for it must appear as chanceful, contingent, accidental.
It is essential to the theory which I have advanced that these 
facts arise from the ambiguous status of the finite individual within 
the system of N a tu ra : he is but a part of Natura, and, in his own 
way, recognizes his partialitas. Because all the things that act 
upon him belong to N atura, the existence of the universe as a whole 
comes to be imagined as everlasting; while his own existence 
begins and ends within the sempiternity of the whole. His finite 
duration is thus a ‘chunk’ of the duration of the universe. But he
1 ‘Nulla res, nisi a causa externa, potest destrui.’ (Eth. I l l ,  iv.) ‘ Conatus, quo 
unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed 
indefinitum involvit.’ (Eth. I l l ,  viii.)
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knows that ‘in short measures life may perfect be’, and dimly feels 
that he is something more than a mere section of the universe; 
that though he is finite, he is yet an individual with a nature and 
value of his own— a value and individuality which are not adequately 
accounted for, nor adequately respected, by external natural causes. 
Small wonder then that in his ignorance he falsely imagines him­
self to be immortal. The value or perfection which belongs to his 
individuality is, of course, its very content and nature, and it is in 
virtue of this that he actively operates within N atura, and is no 
mere ‘particle’ driven about by external forces. This is his 
conatus1 through which for a few short years he marshals the aid 
of N atura and repels its destructive forces. But for the ultimately 
insuperable power of the universe2 he might, so far as his own nature 
and conatus is concerned, be imperishable.3 But though he thus 
dimly feels his value and his claim to reality he does not always 
recognize that this is not rightly conceived sub specie temporis, and 
that he is here in the very act (if he rightly understood it) of 
‘feeling’ that he is eternal. For the immortality or indefinitely 
extended duration which he claims in N atura, and which Natura 
must refuse him (because he is but a part),4 is really the image of 
the eternity which he enjoys as an individual within the eternal 
Real. He images it as duration, because N atura as a whole is 
imaged as enduring, or, rather, the two facts reciprocate with each 
other; but in the Real both N atura and man are eternal, and man 
is a part of N atura.5
Thus man’s extended duration, unlike that which he attributes 
to N atura, is not commensurate with his value, for this belongs to 
his eternity. That eternity appears in time under the form of 
conatus, which may be called his real duration, his durée; but his 
actual duration, which is the extended or ‘spatialized’ image of his 
conatus cut short and maimed, that corresponds rather to the
1 ‘ Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est 
praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.’ (Eth. I l l ,  vii.)
2 ‘Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est, et a potentia causarum 
externarum infinite superatur.’ (Eth. IV , iii.)
3 Though if  we were thus alone we should not image our existence as an 
extended duration at all.
+ ‘Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit Naturae pars, et ut nullas possit pati 
mutationes, nisi, quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque 
adaequata sit causa.’ (Eth. IV , iv.)
5 T hus we ‘feel’ our eternity as conatus ; we ‘prove’ it in our intellectual life. 
(Cf. Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.)
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mutilation suffered by a part of Natura cut adrift from the whole 
in which alone it is real.
It is, therefore, not the extent of man’s occupation of the imagined 
sempiternity of Natura that determines his value and reality, but 
the quality of his conatus. From a more purely ‘extensive’ view of 
existence as spread out in time, the mind is thus led to an ‘intensive’ 
one in terms of individuality. Hence arises the distinction between 
the limited duration of a man and that effort after more content 
which is the representation sub specie temporis of his real duration, 
which is ‘intensive’ rather than ‘extensive’, which is quality rather 
than quantity, and which, viewed sub specie aeternitatis in its 
ultimate integration in the Real, is his eternity.
In this way I have attempted to explain how it is that the 
fundamental structure of the Real not only makes the quantitative 
or durational view of existence legitimate, but renders both this 
and the ‘intensive’ or qualitative view essential for its full compre­
hension; so that the two are, therefore, essentially connected. 
Further, not only does their proper connexion lead to the solution 
of the problems which I have just been considering, but, as I shall 
indicate, it offers also a way of escape from some unwelcome con­
clusions towards which certain monistic theories of immanence 
seem to be impelled.
The general theory of the nature of the Real which has been 
outlined in the course of this study, and especially in its later stages 
as culminating in the last chapter, provides a platform from which 
to judge the validity of the opposing views of extreme deistic 
transcendentists, who in their eagerness for the unity of the whole 
have omitted to consider its content; and of their direct opponents 
who, paying exclusive attention to the temporal content of the 
whole, have omitted to consider its ultimate form. The theory of 
the former, in so far as it implies that universals are real without 
individual expression, and that values can have meaning out of 
all relation to actual existences,1 must certainly be rejected. For 
the Spinozistic theory which I have followed and emphasized, the 
only existing universals are universal singulars or ‘concrete uni­
versals’, while abstract universals are mere entia Imaginationis. All 
values too are embodied in the eternal Real, which expresses itself,
1 ‘Truth, beauty, love— all the great values— what meaning have they apart 
from their conscious realization in a living individual, finite or infinite?’ (A. S. 
Pringle-Pattison, Life and Finite Individuality, p. 108.) I should omit, but not 
exclude, the term ‘conscious’.
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and them, in infinite things, in infinite ways, in unending times. 
For as Plato saw (and, indeed, it is of the very essence of the 
Platonic philosophy) reality and value are one and the same.
But the opposing theory of equivalence or identity, in so far as 
it involves the restriction of the Real to what has already been won 
and assimilated, or is being fought out in the ‘military’ present,1 
must also be rejected. For values actualize themselves though they 
may be hidden from us, or seen only per speculum in aenigmate, 
and they are thus in some sense real independently of their appear­
ance in the time-series; they are real celsitudine semper praesentis 
aeternitatis: how else could a purpose determine our action or 
an acorn become an oak-tree? As in sense-perception the finite 
individual reveals at once his relative integrity as well as his 
fragmentariness (in that he perceives enduring things, which 
survive in time but do not achieve eternity), so in purposive action 
the finite individual exhibits both his relative wholeness and his 
partialitas; for as he is a part, his ends follow upon their means in 
time, but as he is a whole his ends inform and guide the means 
towards themselves. And the ‘miracle’ thus becomes actual because 
real duration is an efflux of eternity. In eternity the purposive 
process is realized as quality, and our love for an ideal which we 
pursue is itself an abstraction of the eternal love which underlies 
all temporal process, and all that is positive in our achieving and 
our achievement. Thus as sense-perception means integration and 
the weaving of duration from time, so purposive action means the 
expression of eternal essence, not as time, but as that triumph 
over time that we call duration.2 And for a sympathetic reader, it is
1 ‘ L e  tem porel est essentiellem ent m ilita ire ’ (Péguy, quoted b y  M . Julien 
Benda, L a  F in  de l ’Étem el, p. 141).
2 A s  w ill be seen im m ediately, I  do not confine m y  dissent to the contemporary 
doctrine o f equivalence (w h ich  is  only  an extreme form  o f im m anentism ), for 
in  a ve ry  real sense a ll anthropom orphistic theories belong to the same general 
category, even w hen the values that are expressed in  h um an nature at its best are 
taken as part o f that nature. F o r  so they belong to it  underivatively. A nd 
how ever sophisticated the anthropom orphism  m ay be, and w hether it  traces its 
descent from  the heights o f H egelian idealism , o r per contra subsists by 
p reying  upon A b solutism , it  is  at bottom the Protagorean doctrine that ‘ M an 
is  the m easure o f all things, o f things that are that they are, and o f things that 
are not that they are not’. I t  needs no re fu ta tio n : b irth  and life  and death cry 
aloud that it  is  m an h im self that is  m easured; nay m ore, he is  spun, and at last 
cu t off, b y N a tu ra :
N on e shall triu m p h  a w hole life  through,
F o r  death is  one, and the fates are three.
A n d  m an’s fin itude rem ains even w hen he is  conceived sub specie aeternitatis.
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surely in this sense that Spinoza asserts that ‘final causes are 
human figments’:1 they spread out in time what in duration becomes 
a realized miracle,2 and in eternity the qualitative Real.
On the other hand, the insistence of the transcendentists upon 
the inadequacy of any mere doctrine of immanence or equiva­
lence is undoubtedly valid, not merely for the reason already 
stated, viz., that the real existence of the eternal values must 
transcend the actualities of any world still developing in time, but 
for the further reason that the Real includes elements which 
transcend the eternal world of Thought-Extension (whence this 
also transcends our knowledge, both in content and in relational 
form). The Real, as I have indicated, essentially transcends not 
merely its finite but also its infinite expressions taken singly or in 
any finite number; and thus, both in range of expression and in its 
degree of expressiveness, creative eternity transcends all finite 
limits.3
Lastly, the opponents of deistic transcendentism must surely be 
right in their belief that even under the categories of finite 
existence there is something which belongs to the Real; for 
not only does duration yield us the clue to the eternal fulfilment 
of the Real, but there is no enduring existence which does not, in 
itself or in its immediate or remote determinants, find a place 
within the Real.
It may, perhaps, be thought that the view which I have put 
forward (neglecting the reference to the transcendence of the 
unknown Attributes— a doctrine which may be condemned as 
necessarily either empty or self-contradictory) is essentially a 
doctrine of immanence, i.e. of equivalence purified from the 
implications of a mistaken view of the ultimacy of time; and the 
critic, using a trite figure, may say that while the Bergsonians, in
1 ‘ U t  ja m  autem ostendam, naturam  finem n u llu m  sib i praefixum  habere, et 
omnes causas finales n ih il, n is i hum ana esse figmenta, non opus est m u ltis ’. 
(Eth. I ,  Appendix.)
2 F ro m  this p o int o f view  it  becomes a matter fo r astonishment that in  spite 
of the inexplicab le  character o f consciously purposive action (on the supposition 
of the reality o f tim e), it  has been thought w orth w hile to invent an ‘unconscious 
m in d ’ to rationalize unconsciously purposive action.
3 In  this connexion it  is  clear w hat m ust be the solution o f the problem  to 
w hich ‘ negative theology’ was p ut forw ard as the answ er: we m ust distinguish 
among ‘attributes’ those w h ich  lim it a perfection (and hence cannot be affirmed 
of the R eal), and those w h ich  perfect a limitation (and hence m ust not be denied 
of it). C f. also above, Preface to P art I I I ,  especially p. 234.
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searching for the eternal values in the actual, are milking the 
he-goat; and the deistic transcendentists, in placing the values 
beyond the range of the actual, are running their milk into a sieve; 
the solution which I have offered only milks the he-goat into the 
sieve; for it finds the eternal values, first detected in their operation 
among finite individuals in time, really existent only in the Absolute 
which expresses itself in these ‘finite centres’; and thus the many 
are merged in the one, and their individual content is lost in its 
identity. By such a critic my theory would thus mistakenly be 
identified with the via media of immanence which falls between the 
extremes of equivalence and separatist transcendentism.
It is of some importance that such a misunderstanding should 
be corrected, and especially in view of the too facile common 
description of Spinoza as a ‘pantheist’. This can, perhaps, most 
effectively be accomplished by showing how the principles I have 
laid down constitute a way of escape from a recognized difficulty 
which has shadowed monistic idealism in the recent past with 
reference to the ultimate status of the finite individual. This was 
the subject of an instructive Symposium written in 1918 and 
published with other matter in that year for the Aristotelian 
Society under the general title: L ife and Finite Individuality. The 
discussion arose as the result of some statements by Bosanquet1 
which had just been vigorously combated by Professor Pringle- 
Pattison2 and these writers were the chief symposiasts. I need not 
follow their arguments in detail, but only notice the main point of 
the dispute which is so clearly expressed in their papers, and show 
the effect of the Spinozistic principles which I have emphasized 
in resolving the opposition. The main point at issue was the 
suggested possibility of the blending or coalescence of finite selves 
in the Absolute. According to Bosanquet, what separates any two 
selves is nothing of the essential nature of mind, but some more or 
less accidental limitation or hindrance or quality arising, e.g. from 
the possession of different bodies (body thus being, in this con­
nexion, conceived as but an outlying suburb of mind). On the 
other hand, selves are assimilated to each other in the social, 
theoretical, and aesthetic interests of various kinds which con­
stitute the real metropolis of human individuality; so that in the
1 In  his G iffo rd  L ectures on The Principle of Individuality and Value and The 
Value and Destiny o f the Individual.
2 I n  h is G iffo rd  Lectures on The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy.
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end, i.e. in the eternal Absolute, such finite individuals may be 
supposed to be merged in the single existence of the Real. The 
separate individual is finite, impotent, and precarious; the con­
fluent social individual is wider, stronger, and more solid; the 
Absolute individual is infinitely inclusive, powerful, and self- 
sufficient.
As against this tendency to read the finite individual as ‘adjectival ’ 
to the Real, Professor Pringle-Pattison emphasized the ultimate 
character of each individual as a ‘focalization’ of the universe, 
which is nowhere exactly repeated.1 In a word, the opposition was 
between the theory which regards differences of individuals as 
purely a matter of content, and that which regards them as primarily 
a matter of form . ‘Form is not like an empty case into which a 
certain content may be put: it is the structure and organization of 
the content itself.’2
Now, in spite of the fact that Professor Pringle-Pattison speaks 
of the theory of Bosanquet as reflecting ‘precisely the confusion 
which leads Spinoza to resolve all things and persons into modes 
of the attributes of God’,3 it is, on the contrary, his own theory, in 
my opinion, which more truly reflects the sense of Spinoza. That 
follows, as I have indicated, from the Lemmata of Part I I of the 
Ethics, together with the doctrine of Part V that ‘haec et ilia’ 
human mind is, in part, eternal; and, I may add, the important 
suggestions in Ep. Ixxxiii about Extension; the whole being 
read in the light of the system as a whole, not forgetting that the 
Ethics itself in the main necessarily falls under Reason and not 
scientia intuitiva. Certainly the contention of Professor Pringle- 
Pattison in the Symposium is nearer to the theory I have advanced 
in the name of Spinoza than is that of Bosanquet. For to Spinoza 
a human mind is precisely not ‘simply a complex of ideas, as it were 
an objective ideal content, continuous with the rest of the system 
of ideas which together constitute the infinite intellect of God’.4 
He does not say, nor, I think, does he imply that ‘persons are 
merged in the ideal continuum of the infinite intellect’.5 That has 
doubtless been the common view of Spinoza’s theory since James 
Martineau published his masterly misunderstanding of that philo­
sophy in 1882, but a careful and acute scrutiny of the pertinent 
sections of Spinoza’s own writings, with an open and prepared
1 The Idea of God in  the Light of Recent Philosophy, p. 267. 2 Loc. cit.
3 Life and Finite Individuality, p. 103. 4 Loc. cit. 5 Loc. cit.
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mind (for an unprepared mind cannot be ‘open’ in any but an 
ironic sense), will be sufficient to show its falsity. For the human 
mind in adequate thought is no mere ‘complex of ideas’, it has 
‘form’, i.e. structure and organization, and if there is in some 
degree complexity without system in the ideas of Imagination, that 
is due to its partial inadequacy and confusedness, i.e. its impotence. 
On the side of Extension the teaching is equally unmistakable. 
Nothing, indeed, could have led serious readers to miss his point 
but failure to understand the meaning and place of N atura naturata, 
both extensa and cogitans, in the Real, and a tendency to ignore or 
discount Spinoza’s idea of creation.
Although, however, there is general agreement between the 
doctrine of individuation which I have put forward in the name of 
Spinoza, and that which is defended by Professor Pringle-Pattison, 
there is a good deal in the seemingly opposed teaching of Bosanquet 
that is worthy of remark. There is a real and important meaning 
to be attached to the description of finite individuals as ‘adjectival’ 
to the constellations within which they fall, though the actual term 
is naturally more suitable at some stages of individuation than at 
others. The problem is not merely that of relating finite individuals 
to the Absolute, but of relating any constellation to that within 
which it falls; and the same problem recurs at every stage in the 
hierarchy of individuals. When colours, sounds, tastes, &c., are 
integrated into a perceptual thing, they become, at any rate from 
our point of view, its ‘adjectives’. But the integrated adjectives are 
the substantive. So below this level, when vibrations are integrated 
into a colour or a sound, the vibrations, call them ‘adjectival’ or 
not as you will, bear an analogous relation to the quality, though 
now, as a result of our preoccupation with ‘things’, we are more 
inclined to speak of the constellation as the adjective of the contour 
of its elements. An analogous relation is discovered at every stage 
in the increasingly concrete individual, right up to N atura naturata. 
There is no loss of individuality among the elements integrated as 
the result of the integration, for such loss would render the 
integration void. It is because the vibrations remain (in their 
appropriate perspective) that the colour remains (in its perspec­
tive). But the perspectives are different, and hence normally 
it is one or other, and not both that we apprehend in any given 
single act of perception; though the apprehension is increasingly 
adequate as the perspective involves increasing integration. In
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N atura naturata we have adequate modal integration at last, but 
no less of subordinate individuation right down to the dust of 
non-being.
Thus at each stage, viewed in relation to that stage, the subordi­
nate individuals appear as ‘adjectival’ in the sense that their diverse 
content yields its essence to the higher individual while losing 
what, from the point of view of integration, is its unresolved and 
untransmuted incoherence. Thus the vibratory motion to and fro 
gives place to the steady content of colour; it is transmuted into 
quality. The many notes are phrased into the melody. The 
fleeting sense-qualities give place to the relatively permanent per­
ceptual object. The ever-changing parts give place to the identical 
organism. And so on. In N atura naturata what remains of the 
subordinate individuals is their quintessence, so to say, with all 
their incoherence and opposition, not lost, but resolved and 
transmuted into quality. It is not lost, but transformed from ‘ex­
tensity’ to ‘intensity’, or, in accordance with my formula, it is real 
as ‘transformation without succession’.
Although, therefore, the use of the term ‘adjectival’ is hardly to 
be advocated, there is undoubtedly a sense in which its emphasis 
is just. The higher constellation is more real than the lower, 
because it at once possesses more reality, and also possesses the 
reality of the lower in a more integral form. It does not absorb 
or negate it. And our feeling of the impossibility of calling our­
selves ‘adjectives’ of the Real may in part be due to our failure to 
think of the Real as our constellation, or constellation of constella­
tions. We think of it as that which somehow includes us without 
‘qualitative’ transcendence. Doubtless it is difficult to do otherwise 
and still retain distinct ideas; but should we not, I ask, be ready 
always to remind ourselves that it is no degradation to be an 
‘adjective’ of N atura, as it certainly would be to be an adjective of 
even a perfect human being ?
There can, however, be little doubt that Professor Pringle- 
Pattison is right in his judgement that it is because Bosanquet 
allowed himself to slip away from his better mind, and to think of 
ideas as ‘objective ideal contents’ and not as activities of mind (and 
hence in their due order eternal) that he accepts the image of the 
Absolute as the single continuum which is composed of the contents 
which are finite individuals purged of their incoherences and im­
perfections. But such a view was as impossible for Spinoza as for
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Professor Pringle-Pattison: for Spinoza each idea is an active 
essence flowing from adequate grounds and giving rise to its 
proper consequents.1 It is already a conatus with its appropriate 
expression, framed remotely on the analogy of cogitatio naturans 
expressed in the infinite idea of God. ‘The human mind is part2 of 
the infinite Intellect of God; thus when we say that the human 
mind perceives this or that we make the assertion that God has 
this or that idea, not in so fa r  as he is infinite, but in so far as he is 
expressed through the nature of the human mind.’3 The situation 
could hardly have been expressed more accurately and succinctly. 
It is difficult to understand what other significance could be read 
into a statement which is otherwise only a gross circumlocution. 
In so far as God is infinite the true ideas which pass in this or that 
human mind yield their non-successive quintessence for his eternal 
intuition. They are not lost but ‘phrased’ and made whole. As 
such they are the ideas of God, but they do not thereby cease to be 
the ideas of this or that man. He finds his place in the eternal 
Thought as a ‘filament’ of creation, but he remains for himself 
the finite individual in which that ‘filament’4 is eternally expressed. 
From that point of view memory and Imagination as such are gone 
(though their positive content remains in its proper order in the 
Real), and the soul becomes for itself what it essentially is for God 
— a finite eternal integral part of the Real.
It is thus that the eternal Real genuinely transcends because it 
includes the finite individuals in which it expresses itself: what 
for them is change, loss, contradiction, achievement, is also the 
very content and expression of the Real which integrates them. 
Nor need we wonder how in the Absolute our experiences of ex­
pectation and disappointment, of hope deferred and the sickness 
of the heart, of joy or misery founded upon illusion, are integrated. 
It is sufficient for us that they can be integrated without cancella-
1 A n  idea is  not ‘m u tu m  instar picturae in  tabula’ but ‘ [m odus] cogitandi . .  . 
nempe ip su m  intellig ere’. (Eth. I I ,  x liii, Sch.)
2 N o t a section, fo r the infin ite  In te lle ct is  in d iv is ib le .
3 ‘ S eq u itu r M entem  hum anam  partem  esse in fin it i intellectus D e i;  ac proinde 
cum  dicim us, M entem  hum anam  hoc, vel il lu d  percipere, n ih il a liu d  dicim us, 
quam  quod D eus, non quatenus in fin itu s est, sed quatenus p er naturam  humanae 
M e n tis  exp licatu r’. {Eth. I I ,  x i, Cor.) T h e y  are a little  u n ju st to Spinoza 
w ho both deny that he finds room  fo r the finite in d iv id u a l and also sneer at 
the often-repeated quatenus. B u t the association o f ideas is  not altogether 
inexplicable.
* I  need hardly  add that the ‘filam ent’ is  an ens rationis.
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tion. ‘So may a glory from defect arise.’ Even the endless doing 
and undoing of ether-vibrations are transformed (and conserved 
because transformed) in the colour which is their ‘phrasing’, and 
the qualitative content of our time is the image of the eternity of 
subordinate constellations. To suppose that in the Absolute our 
blunders and our recoveries, our love and its rejection, our fear and 
its dispelling, our problems and their resolving, do not yield their 
concrete quintessence (and not their arithmetical sum or differ­
ence) is really to suppose, as Bosanquet says, that ‘a Dante or a 
Shakespeare [is] far better off than the Absolute’.1 If the Intellect 
of God were but the one-dimensional system of all ‘ideal contents’, 
then these concrete experiences could not be conserved; for 
opposites would cancel or neutralize each other, and the whole 
would be distorted and impoverished.
Thus, as I contended in the course of the general discussion, the 
attempt to exclude its real parts cannot but result in the denial 
of all content to the Absolute. And the same principle demands 
that these real parts shall be real in the sense of being relative 
wholes of wholes to infinity. It is thus that they constitute the 
Absolute; because each in his measure is constituted by the 
Absolute. But there is no part which in the whole is not trans­
cended and fulfilled. Nor need we wait for the fulfilment of the 
Absolute whole; here and now we can and do perform the miracle; 
for we too are partial wholes, and it is thus that we are able to 
detect ‘touches of bliss in anguish that superhumanize bliss, 
touches of mystery in simplicity, of the eternal in the variable’.2
1 The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 389.
2 George M eredith , Beauchamp’s Career, xxxiv.
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CONCLUSION
MY inquisitio veri is at an end. I have sought to enforce conviction by a serious endeavour to avoid the extremes by 
which philosophical investigations are always endangered, and 
have often been devitalized and perverted: that, on the one hand, 
of endeavouring to entice assent by consecrating the actual—  
either making it the ultimate arbiter of truth (and thereby exclud­
ing the eternal values), or p er contra justifying its deficiencies by 
‘drawing up a memorandum in favour of the Almighty’ in his 
supposed special dealings with men (a rock on which many a 
philosophy has been split); and on the other hand, that of becoming 
involved in a whirlpool of mere illusions and of idle values, bearing 
no essential relation to the empirical data of experience:
Vainest of all, the student’s theme Ends in some metaphysic dream.
But all speculation worthy of the significant name, though it 
must rise above the actual (viewing it tamquam ex  aliqua specula) 
does so only that a clearer and more extensive view may be taken. 
It does not feed itself upon dreams and illusions; it is the sole road 
by which we can hope to escape the illusions which arise from a too 
entire immersion in the unfinished actual.
In that spirit I have looked to the world of duration for guidance 
in the search for the nature of eternity; and, following the clue 
thus obtained, have found that the real source of the progressive 
embodiment of values which is the enduring actual must be the 
eternal values themselves, wholly realized and hypostasized as the 
creative unity of N atura. Thus the main result of the inquiry has 
been to reject all current conceptions of eternity which make it 
either a direct or (if the term may be permitted) an inverse function 
of time; and to identify it with the ultimate stuff of reality. In 
this I have but followed the lead of Spinoza himself, for whom 
eternity is the very essence of God, which reveals itself in each 
and all of the infinite Attributes and affectiones of Substance: ‘as 
if eternity could be understood apart from the contemplation of 
the divine nature, or as if it were anything other than that nature’.1
1 ‘ Q uasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae contem platione in te llig i posset, 
vel q u id  esset praeter divinam  essentiam.’ (Cog. M et. I I ,  i. )
I am willing to admit, nay rather I assert, that Spinoza passed too 
rapidly from the clue to the completion, and thereby short- 
circuited the current of intellectual criticism, and thus concealed 
an important part of the infinite content of eternity which falls 
within the experience and nature of finite individuals, yet in the 
main principle he is both clear and resolute: duration is the limited 
conception, eternity the infinite; ‘an infinite existence belongs to 
God . . . which I call eternity’.1 It follows, as I have shown, from 
the clue provided by perceptual experience, that the existence 
which is eternity is not an empty form of being but concrete 
reality. For it is duration that constitutes the content of per­
ceived existences, and it is eternity itself that exists in the eternal. 
For M. Bergson duration itself is the ultimate reality: for Spinoza 
eternity is the reality of duration, and is therefore the very stuff 
of the Real.2
Further, I have shown how the eternity of the whole implies and 
includes that of every part which in its measure reproduces the 
whole. To deny the reality and eternity of such parts3 is to 
evacuate the whole. Our eternity is thus one with our relative 
wholeness as real parts of the infinite whole. It does not lie in the 
past or in the present or in the future, but our past, present, and 
future lie within it, transformed and ‘livelier than life’; integrated, 
expounded, redeemed, stabbed broad awake. Thus though from 
the point of view of time the past is given and cannot be cancelled, 
‘the Moving Finger writes’, yet the full significance of the writing 
does not at once appear, may never appear sub specie temporis (for 
reflection and evolution do not always, with eternity, affirm the 
conception of an hour). In the haze of time large things are 
obscured, and small things loom over-large. The past as past lies 
already in the maw of ‘cormorant devouring Time’; the future as 
future remains in ‘the wide womb of uncreated Night’; and the 
content and significance of the past as little as that of the future 
can be read in the present. We must mount, therefore, into the 
watch-tower of eternity. Where evolutionists have looked to the
1 ‘ D eo infinita actu existentia competit . . . atque hanc infinitam  existentiam  
Aeternitatem  voco.’ (Cog. M et. I I ,  i.)
2 I n  this sense it  is  that I  assert that eternity is not the sum o f all durations, 
no r th eir identity, bu t their constellation.
3 T h e  argum ent depends entirely upon the nature assigned to these parts 
w h ich  (since the w hole is in d ivis ib le ) are sections or ‘ ch unks’ o f reality only for 
Im agination.
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first syllable of time, and eschatologists to the last, it is for the 
metaphysician to weigh the discourse as a whole, not cursorily as 
he that running reads, but wholly, profoundly, quintessentially.
Nor must we think of the discourse as already pronounced and 
laid up in heaven; to think of the work as already done, or as still 
to be done, is equally to place the eternal in time. Still less can 
we say that the work is now being $one, as if the garments of God 
were covered with the dust of time. It has been said that ‘what is 
negated in “timelessness” is not the reality of the present, but the 
unreality of the past and future’ ;* on the contrary, the present is 
no more and no less real than the past and the future. We must 
not thus confuse real being with temporal doing. Temporal being 
is undoubtedly, as such, one with temporal doing, for time itself 
is the urgency of the part to manifest the whole. But eternity is the 
creative urgency of the whole to manifest itself in infinite parts, 
and thus to constitute itself; nor can it fail, save in so far as failure 
in the part is a means of completeness in the whole. Here failure 
is itself success.
Further, the eternity which constitutes the essence of the Real 
must not be conceived as the summed contents of all durations, 
either with or without their successiveness; for taken as successive 
they can never be whole, and taken together they cannot but merge, 
either confusedly as mere feeling, or transparently into non-being. 
But not such is the never wearied love that wields the world. 
Duration can have no place in eternity, though it has a place under 
eternity, for the finite being cannot but perceive his environment 
sub specie durationis. ‘Our weakness shapes the shadow, Time’; 
for duration arises from the finitude of the part recognizing its 
partialitas and imaging its complement under the categories of its 
impotence. And thus what is opaque to thought falsely becomes 
the very type of the Real, and what is real in the part only the 
symbol of illusion. Nevertheless it is thence that the eternal values 
filter through in our moral, intellectual, and aesthetic experience; 
we show the cinders of our spirits through the ashes of our chance; 
we discover the impress of the signet of eternity on many a passing 
moment. But God, as we say, sees into the hearts o f  m en; and their 
very outsides, truly seen, are, for him, the hearts of subordinate 
beings. From the point of vantage which he occupies, from the 
specula of eternity, all things are eternal— not merged in a general 
1 W . R . Inge, Outspoken Essays, p. 275.
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totum without distinction ; not as a congeries of separate units ; but 
as N atura naturata, a constellation of constellations to infinity, 
flowing undividedly from the pure creative urgency which is 
N atura naturans. Thus from the very focus and centre of all being 
N atura dominates the infinite worlds with the utter simplicity of 
creative, and therefore commensurate, love.
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Ens inanissimum et deficientissimum, 
225._
Ens perfectissimum et realissimum, 141, 
225, 247, 259.
Ens rationis, 6, 66, 137, 139,292, 294. 
Ens reale, 103, 292.
Entelechy, 139.
Entropy, 198, 216-18.
‘Entropy, organic’, 202-3. 
Environment, 147, 204.
Ephemeral, 311.
Epigenetic emergence, 278. 
Epiphenomenon, 250.
Epistemology, 150, 261, 292. 
Epistolae, see Index I.





actual and real, 53, 113. 
and existence, 43-5, 108 et seqq. 
Essences, 221, 241.
Essentia objectiva, 16, 18, 88, 100, 169,
259, 282, 287, 288, 289, 290, 
291, 295, 296.





Eternal modes, finite and infinite, 
83-4, 101, 145.
Eternal moments, 133.
Eternal ‘now’, 23 et seqq.
Eternal objects, 240-3, 246.
Eternal truths, 15 et seq.
Eternal values, efficiency of, 133. 
Eternity, vii, 14-17, 22-6, 43-63, 72- 
136, 233-5, 305- 13. 322-5. 
concrete existence, 323. 
constellation of all durations, 134, 
256, 275, 323. 
infinite existence, 43 et seqq. 
integration of all existence, 310. 
intransient, 309.
source of the contents of time, 310. 
stuff of the Real, 322-3. 
not timelessness, 16, 256.
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Eternity, and conatus, 238, 255, 309. 
and creation, 208, 324. 
and duration, 4, 43, 112-14, 117, 
158, 164, 211, 222, 228, 238, 
255, 256, 270, 275, 298, 302, 
307, 310, 312, 322. 
and Imagination, 128. 
and Intellect, 46. 
and knowledge, 49, 224. 
and logical necessity, 15, 76, 306, 
3° 9 -
and ranges of individuality, 120 
et seqq. 
and reality, 229. 
and sempiternity, 254. 
and time, see Eternity and duration.
incommensurable, 304. 
and totalitas, 112-14.
Eternity, a conceptual and an intui­
tive, 233. 
as a dimension of space, 27, 310. 
God’s and man’s, 120, 132. 
of human body, 72-g8 passim, 135-6. 
of human mind, 45, 46, 72-98 
passim, 144. 
its four main characters, 73-7. 
as an ideal limit, 234-5. 
individual, 194. 
a living, 234. 
as a neutral time, 310. 
of scientific truth, 16.
See Aeternitas.
Ethica, see Index I.
Ethics, 228.
metaphysics of, 133, 301.
Event, 168, 239.
Events, ambiguity of, 241, 245, 246. 
character of, 241. 
fictitious, 244. 
nothing else in nature, 241. 
their organic character, 245, 246-7. 
Events and objects, 241-2, 244-6. 





Existence, only one kind, 119.
three kinds of, 117.
Existence, human, is mixed, 117-18. 
Existence, and essence, 43-5, 108 et 
seqq.
and persistence, 45.
Experience, the Absolute, 291-2.
duality of, 292-3.
Exposition and echo, 170.
Expression and expressiveness, 299, 
300, 315.
Extension, 7-13, 78-88, 281-300 pas­
sim.
Extension, analysis of, 294.
Leibniz and Spinoza on, 108. 
Extension, and body, 8, 84. 
and duration, 9-13, 80. 
and Imagination, 8. 
and locomotion, 84. 
and the Real, 8, 9, 12, 13, 78 et seqq., 
256.
and Thought, 253, 281-300passim. 
Extension, the Attribute and concep­
tion of, 78-83, 252, 253-4. 
‘imagined’ and ‘objective’, 79. 
‘imagined’ and real, 80. 
instantaneous and recurrent, 81-3, 
138, 155, 252. 
intelligible, 291-3.
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, 78 et seqq. 
Substantial, 299.
Extensive and intensive, 59, 236-7, 
3 3̂ , 319-
Externality, a neutral order of, 27, 31, 
97. 306, 310. 
and the nisus to unity, 85, 151, 154, 
158, 159, 166.
External things, 170.
Facies totius Universi, 52, 85-7, 89-90, 
101, 114, 120 et seqq., 124, 
139-40, 142, 156, 158.
Fact and value, 232, 305, 313, 315. 
Facts, prejudice in favour of, 180, 229. 
Failure and success, 324.
Figments, 315.
‘Filament’, 203, 205, 320.
Final causes, 315.
Finite and infinite, 145, 152.
‘Finite centres’, 226, 316.
Finite eternal modes, 145.
Finite individual, 91, 115, 119, 301-4 
passim, 311. 
his duration and his eternity, 302. 
reality of, 91-3, 114-1?, 144-5, 301- 
in time incompletely himself, 302. 
ambiguous status, 311. 
ultimate status, 316-19.
Finite individual and Absolute, 316- 
2i passim.
Finite perfection, 302, 304.
Finite selves, coalescence of, 316-17. 
Finite thought, 259.
Finitude and responsiveness, 92, 259, 
269, 303.
Finximus, 57-8.
Fixed and eternal singulars, 90. 
Floating ideas, 17.
Flock of sheep, 147.
Fluency of time, 276.
‘Flying Scotchman’, 128. 
‘Focalization’, 317.
‘Force, lines of’, 148.
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Form, and content, 317. 
and matter, 149, 162.
Four-dimensional continuum, 248-9.
Freedom, 62, i n ,  207-8, 230, 232,
302-3-
Friction, 198.
Future, anticipated and perceived, 
19 et seqq.
Future, past and present, 13, 18, 25 et 
seqq., 30, 60.





Ghost, 30, 116, 126, 204, 229.
‘ G lad  surprise’, 273.
Gloss, upon Alexander, 251. 
upon Spinoza, 251, 290.
Goat, 315-16.
God, his existence ambiguous, 275. 
knowledge of, 91, 151-5, 299.
God and man, 48-9, 54, 88 et seqq., 
320-
G rade and part, n o ,  158, 297.
Grades of soul and of body, 266-7.
Head, colour in, 186.
Hearing, non-cochlear, 179.
H e-goat, 3 15 -16 .
Hetero'nomy, 230, 302.
Hiatus in Spinoza’s thought, 82, 101, 
182.
Hierarchy, of individuals, 36, 42, 86 
et seqq., 120 et seqq., 157,247, 
256, 269, 272, 296, 305. 
of propria communia, 94, 103, 152. 
temporal, in the Real, 251, 263.
Higher synthesis, 197.
Historical time, 13, 27.
Homologous wholes, 213.
Human body, 89, 91-2, 128 et seqq., 
137, 141, 170, 250, 258, 261, 
265, 267-8. 
complete view of, 268. 
individual, 89.
See Corpus humanum, and Body, 
human.
Human eternity, 45, 46, 72-98 passim, 
144.
its fou r m ain characters, 73 -7 .
Human knowledge, double limitations 
of, 287-9.
Human mind, 135, 250, 257-8, 261. 
the essentia objectiva of the body, 288.
Idea corporis and idea Petri, 257, 260, 
268.
Idea ideae, 53, 56, 161, 258, 260, 288, 
295, 296.
Idea simplex, 269, 286.
‘Idea’, Spinoza’s use of, 257, 260. 
Ideas not pictures, 257, 260, 319. 
Ideal and actual, 305.
Ideal contents, 17, 317, 319, 321. 
Idealism, 107, 162, 169, 271-2, 276, 
283, 290-4, 300, 316. 
epistemological, 91, 169, 179, 272, 
294. 
monistic, 316.
Idealism and Spinoza, 271.
Idealists, absolute, 258.
Ideally good man, 302.
Ideatimi, 282, 288, 291.
Identity doctrine, 261.
Identity, doctrine of, 305-6, 314-15. 
Identity of Indiscernables, Principle 
of, 110, 142, 143, 301.
Idola fori, 5.
Ignorance of infinite Attributes, 289, 
293- 4 , 296-7.
Imagination, 6, 16, 31, 45, 52, 63, 77, 
82, 96, 115, 122, 127, 132, 165, 
236, 266, 286, 296, 318, 320. 
ineluctability of, 96, 118, 127-8, 
130-1, 168, 301-2. 
source of its power, 127-S. 
its double valuation, 164-6. 
Imagination, and death, 131. 
and duration, 135, 165, 236. 
and eternity, 128. 
and Extension, 8. 
and Intellect, 93, 112, 130, 155. 
Imagination, aid to, 6, 06 , 167, 168. 
‘ Imaginative’, 122.
‘ Imaginative’ content stubborn, 96, 
118, 127-8, 130-1, 168, 301-2. 
‘ Imaginative’ singulars, 89. 
Immanence, monistic, 313. 
Immanency and transiency, 210-11. 
Immanent and transient causation, 
58-9, 209, 303.
Immanentism, 305, 313, 314, 315 et 
seqq.
Immenso et Innumerabilibus, De, II, 
xiii, (Bruno), 155.
Immortality, v-vi, 72, 74-5, 97, 132-6, 
143, 192-3, 301-4, 307, 311-12. 
Imperishability, 143, 193, 307-8.
‘Imperium in imperio', 141.
Implicates, 50, 62.
Impossibility, 246.
Impotence, categories of, 120,134,324.
intellectual, 299.
Impotence and power, man’s, 127. 
Inclination, determination by, 230. 
Inclusion and transcendence, 320-1. 
Incoherence and integration, 318-21. 
Incorruptibility, 143, 193, 307-8. 
Indefinite, 42, 160 et seqq., 199, 292.
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Independence, 204.
Indicator, 26-7.
Indiscernables, Principle of the Iden­
tity of, n o , 142, 143,301.
Individual duration, 237, 255.
Individuality, 53 et seqq., 107-59 
passim, 312, 316 et seqq. 
grades of, 85-7.
ranges of, and distinctions of dura­
tion, sempiternity, and eternity, 
120 et seqq. 
torn edge of, 127.
Individuality, and morality, 303. 
and partialitas, 87-91.
Individuality, human, its nature and 
ambiguity, 142-3.
Individuals, 142-59 passim. 
durational, 255. 
essence of, and duration, 237. 
finite, 91, 115, 119, 301-2, 311. 
hierarchy of, 36, 42, 86 et seqq., 
120 et seqq., 157, 247, 256, 269, 
272, 296, 305. 
overlapping of, 157. 
reality of, 91-3, 114-19, 301. 
relations of, 267.
Individuation, 36, 107-215 passim.
‘ Induction’, 114.
Ineluctable Imagination, 96, 118,
127-8, 130-1, 168, 301-2.
Infants, 113.
‘ Infected by time’, 114.
Inference, timelessly asymmetrical, 
32. 48, 55. 59. 60-1.
Infinita idea Dei, 74, 90, io i, 143, 152, 
155, 320.
Infinite, the actual, 39, 41, 144, 151, 
160-3, 224, 292.
Infinite Attributes, 271, 281-300 pas­
sim, 315. 
man’s knowledge of, 299.
Infinite Intellect of God, 101, 208, 
284-5, 287, 289, 297, 300, 317, 
320-
Infinite mechanism, 203.
Infinite minds, 288-9, 296-7.
Infinite and eternal modes, 83-4, 101, 
145-
Infinite organism, 203.
Infinite regress, 54, 57, 260. 
in nature, 200.
Infinite series, 54, 57, 260.
Infinite, and complete, 291. 
and finite, 145, 152.
‘ Infinitesimal’, 123, 126, 140.
Infinity, and indefinity, 160 et seqq., 
199, 292. 
and perfection, 36 et seqq.
Influx, alien, into nature, 277.
Ingression, 190, 242, 244, 245, 246.
Inquisìtio veri, 322.
Instantaneous and recurrent exten­
sion, 81-3, 138, 155, 252.
Integration, 173 et seqq., 191, 256. 
of primary qualities, 179-80. 
of ‘qualified’ thing, 173-5. 
of secondary qualities, 175-9, 234, 
318.
Integration, and aggregation, 137, 139, 
141, 296, 318. 
and constitution, 172. 
and incoherence, 318-21. 
and loss, 318, 320. 
and occupation, 275. 
and perception, 173 et seqq. 
and summation, 238, 324.
Intellect, 31, 125, 267. 
in man and in God, 287, 297.
Intellect, and eternity, 46. 
and Imagination, 93, 112, 130, 155. 
and Real, 167.
Intellectual criticism, 131, 168-70, 
182, 212, 213, 224, 233, 294, 
323.
Intellectual love, 62, 95, 145, 208, 314.
Intellectual order, see Order of the 
Intellect.
Intellectus absolute infinitus, 101, 208, 
284, 285, 287, 289, 297, 300, 
317, 320.
Intellectus Emendatione, Tractatus de, 
see Index I.
Intelligibility, 144, 149-51, 294, 300.
Intelligible extension, 291-3.
Intelligible world, 231.






‘ Iron necessity’, 111.
Irritability, 201.
Jackal, 276.
John, Hi, 4, 305.
Joy, 51 et seqq.
Katabolic and anabolic processes, 201.
Kevwais, 211, 223.
Kette, 162-3.
Keystone of Spinozistic philosophy, 
144-
Kingdom of ends, 230-2, 301.
‘Kink’, 290.
Knowing and being, 169, 170, 291.
Knowledge, 169.
double interest in, 171. 
form of, 150, 293.
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Knowledge, its givenness, 300. 
intelligible, 300. 
a miracle, 299-300. 
its reality, 300. 
no interpositum, 291—2, 294.
Knowledge, the absolute relation, 293. 
as brute fact and as illusion, 294.
Knowledge, and eternity, 49, 224. 
and its object, 258. 
and wholeness, 45.
Knowledge, human, double limitations 
of, 287-9. 
of Natura, 91, 151-5, 299. 
selective, 287. 
kinds of, 99. 
of other minds, 267. 
reflective, 55, 295. See Idea ideae.
Korte Verhandeling van God de 
Mensch en des zelfs Welstand, 
see Index I.
Lacuna in Spinoza’s thought, 82, 101, 
182.
Laetitia, 51 et seqq.
Lapis philosophicus, 33.
Life and cellular structure, 201.
Life and Finite Individuality, 316-17.
‘Life-force’, 148.
Life, the highest quality, 264.
Light, how it is coloured, 185, 187.
Limitation and perfection, 102, 224-5, 
229, 315.
Lines of force, 148.
Lion, 276.
Living eternity, 234.
Living matter cellular, 201.
Living process and organic form, 200 
et seqq.
‘Living-through’ and enjoyment, 262, 
296.
Locomotion, 31, 84 et seqq.
Locoquiescence, 84 et seqq.
Logical content, 272.
Logical necessity and eternity, 15, 76, 
306, 309.
‘Loins, o’erteemed’, 180.
Loss and integration, 318, 320.
Love, intellectual, 62, 95, 145, 208,
314-
Machine, 147, 148, 196 et seqq. 
self-governing, 197. 
not self-maintaining, 198.
Macrocosm and microcosm, 90, 107 
et seqq.
Man, a finite-infinite, 194. 
doubly finite, 297. 
a mode of Thought and Extension 
only, 296.
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Man, the nature of, 132.
‘ortal’ and mortal, 123 et seqq.,
135-6, 142.






Materia prima and materia secunda, 
138-9.
Matter and form, 149, 162.
Matt, vi, 23, 97.
Means and ends, 314.
Measurement, 12, 13, 79. 
of duration not absolute, 7. 
of space and time, 248.
Mechanical unity, 196-9, 214. 
formula for, 196. 
its defects, 197-9, 217.
Mechanical universe, 218. 
‘Mechanism’ of perception, 172. 
Mechanism, infinite, 203.
simple and complex, 196-7. 
Mechanistic philosophy, 197, 223. 
Mediate parts of Natura naturata, 212- 
14, 259.




Memory, 58, 77, 131.
and immortality, 132.
Mental and neural process, 261.
Mera experientia, 4, 18, 180, 268. 
Mergence of finite selves, 316-17. 
Metabolism, 201, 263.
Metaphysica, data, apparatus et cogi- 
tata, 278.
Metaphysical philosophy, 224. 
Metaphysics, v, x, 221-78 passim. 
empirical, 229. 
of ethics, 133, 301.
Metempsychosis, 108, 132.
Method, analytical and synthetical, 58. 
Metric sciences, 233, 248.
Microcosm and macrocosm, 90, 107 
et seqq.
‘Military present’, 314.
Mind, as a form of time, 250.
enjoyment of, 262.
Mind and body, relation of, 250, 258, 
261.
Mind, human, 135, 250, 257-8, 261.
knows only its own body, 257. 
Minimum sensibile of duration, 20. 
Miracle, 60, 232, 299, 300, 314, 315, 
331- 
Modes, 43. 
not illusory, 146, 207.
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Modes and Substance, 145, 146, 148.
Modes, finite and eternal, 145.
infinite and eternal, 83-4, 101, 145. 
perishing, durational, 214, 259. 
of one Attribute only, none, 294.
Modus cogitandi, 66.
Moment, timeless and ‘timeful’, 309.
Monad, dominant, 108.
Monadologie, La, 91.
Monads, go, 108 et seqq.





Moral agent, double nature of, 230, 
232.
Moral progress, 301-4 passim.
Moral struggle, 233.
Morality, 230.
and bifurcation of the Real, 230-3. 
and duration, 301. 
and individuality, 303.
Mortality and ‘ortality’, 123 et seqq., 
142, 213.
Motion, and partialitas, 84, 87. 
and position, relativity of, 253. 
and rest, absolute, 88. 
and Space-Time, 250, 255.
Motus et quies, 31, 83 et seqq., 87-8, 
101, 126, 138-41 passim, 156, 
159, 208.
M ouse and angel, 88.
‘Moving Finger’, 323.
Multicellular organism, 200-1, 207. 
specialization in, 202.
‘ Multifurcation’ of nature, 240.




Mysticism, vi, 235, 278.
M yth ology, 277.
Natura, a constellatio constellationum, 
269, 325. 
its changeless perfection, 301. 
its ineffability, 297-300. 
has parts but is not divided, 269. 
its power insuperable, 312. 
not an organism, 295, 298. 
not for itself sempiternal, 112.
Natura naturans, 123, 146, 147, 149, 
154, 206, 298, 325. 
and Natura naturata, 95, 146-9, 
206-7, 298, 300, 325.
Natura naturata, 115, 119, 129, 130,
134. 145, 146, 147. 149, 154,
205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 212,
254, 265, 267, 269, 275, 285,
338
286, 287, 288, 296, 297, 298, 
3 l 8 , 319 . 325- 
Natura naturata generalis, 70.
Natura tota, 36 et seqq., 121, 125. 
‘Natural piety’, x, 61, 253, 273, 274. 
Natural and spiritual, 277-8. 
Naturalism, v.
Nature, bifurcation of, 240. 
diversification of, 239-40. 
‘multifurcation’ of, 240. 
nothing but events in, 241. 
Necessity, iron, i n .
logical, and eternity, 15, 76, 306, 
.309-
Negatio est determinatio, 224.
Negative theology, 224, 315.
Nervous system, colour in, 185, 187. 
Neural process, consciousness a quality 
of, 257, 259, 262-3, 270. 
enjoyment of, 262.
Neutral order of externality, 27, 31, 
97, 306, 310.
Nisus to externality and unity, 85, 151, 
154, 158, 159, 166. 
Nominalism, 115.
Non-being, 205, 254, 324. 
Non-numerability, 144, 282, 292. 
Notiones communes, 101, 152. 
Noiimena, 221, 230, 305.
our knowledge of, 231.
Novum Organum, I, Aph. lix, 5.
I, Aph. Ixxxv, 33.
II, Aph. iii, 32.
‘Now’, an eternal, 23 et seqq.
Number, 44, 97, 281, 307, 308.
Oak-tree, 314.
Object, spatio-temporally indivisible, 
244.
Object, and event, 241, 242, 244, 245, 
246.
and ‘passage’, 245. 
and subject, 291, 293.
Object, eternal, 240-3, 246.
‘qualitied’, and sense-organism, 174. 
scientific, 239.
of thought, its otherness, 300. 
‘Objective content’, 291-2, 293. 
‘Objective ideal contents’, 317, 319. 
‘Objective’ duration, 12, 18, 27. 
‘Objective’ times are hybrids, 29. 
‘ Objective’ and ‘subjective’, 18, 222. 
Observer, 26-7.
Occupation and integration, 275. 
Oculi mentis, 46, 97.
Omnia animata, 257, 269, 291, 294. 
Omniscience, 23. 
ovra, t¿, 221.
Ontological proof, 209, 224, 283.
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‘Opaque’, 166, 211, 228, 229, 299, 300, 
324 -
Open mind, 317-18.
Opera Posthuma, see Index I.
Orchestra, 92.
Order, geometrical, 5.
Order of the Intellect and the com­
mon order of nature, viii, 31 et 
seqq., 42, 45, 54, 55, 62, 72, 77, 
78, 88, 100, 103, 130, 171, 303.
Organ, pedal notes of, 179.
Organic adaptation, 201, 263.
Organic ‘entropy’, 202-3.
Organic form and living process, 200 
et seqq.
Organic independence, 200.
Organic unity, 199-203, 212, 217, 264. 
a vague conception, 199. 
insufficiency of, 202. 
not applicable to Substance, 295,
298.
Organism, 10?, 147, 171, 212, 213. 
adaptation in, 201, 263. 
self-maintaining, self-developing, 
and self-reproducing, 200. 
not conscious but vigilant, 264.
Organism, and passage, 246-7.
Organism, an infinite, 203.
unicellular and multicellular, 200-2, 
207.
‘ O riginal perception’, 173-4.
‘Ortality’ and mortality, 123 et seqq., 
142, 213.
Otherness of object of thought, 300.








Part, and grade, n o , 158, 297.
and section, 76, 87, 89, 91, 92, 
112,142, 148, 151, 205, 213-14, 
269, 296, 320, 323. 
and whole, 92-3, n o , 112-14, 124, 
145,150,206,222,230-1,236-7.
Parts, primary and mediate, 205, 209- 
15. 259.
Partialitas, 142, 143, 151-7 passim, 
175,210-11, 222, 311, 314, 324. 
and compulsion, i n .  
and division, 153, 155. 
and individuality, 88-91. 
and motion, 84, 87. 
and time, 42, 112. 
totalitas, and possibility, 246.
Particle, 312.
Parturition, and partition, 250. 
creative, 305.
Passage, 55, 229, 239, 243, 306, 310. 
and objects, 245. 
and organism, 246-7. 




and activity, 121 et seqq., 233, 298.
Past, present, and future, 13, 18, 25 et 
seqq., 30, 60.





Perception, 91, 94, 108, 182.
intellectual criticism of, 168-70, 182. 
‘mechanism’ of, 172.
Perception, and integration, 173 et 
seqq.
and sense-organism, 169, 170-1.
Perception, original and acquired,





degrees of, 145. 
measure of, 311, 313.
Perfection, and duration, 117-18, 136, 
311-12. 
and infinity, 36 et seqq. 
and limitation, 102, 224-5, 229, 315. 
value, and reality, 232, 295, 314.
Perfection, finite, 302, 304. 
changeless, of Natura, 301.
Perishing durational modes, 214, 255, 
259 -
Permeation of duration, 59-61, 236-7, 
256.
Persistence and existence, 45.
‘Perspectives’, 128, 222. 
colour in, 188. 
place of, 189. 
reality of, 189.
Per speculum in aenigmate, 213, 314.
paivofxevov, to, 221.
Phenomena, 221, 222, 292, 305. 
parricidal, 233. 
temporal, 229-30.
Phenomenalism, v, x, 183.
Phenomenality, quintessence of, 223.
Phenomenology, x, 122, 128, 221-7, 
228-78 passim. 
peculiar defect of Bergson’s, 238-9.
Phenomenology and time, 228-47 pas­
sim.
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Phenomenon bene fundatum, 166, 175, 
213, 310.
Phenomenon of the Whole, 230. 
Philebus, 16 D,E, 46, 181, 294. 
Philosophy, biological, 223. 
empirical, 272. 
mechanistic, 197, 223. 
metaphysical, 224. 






‘Place’, of colour, 172, 177, 183-91. 
of perspectives, 189. 
of ‘qualitied’ thing, 191. 
of sense-qualities, 172, 177, 183-91. 
Plants, 93, 263.





Point of view, 108.
Politics, 228.
Polyadic and dyadic relations, 190. 
Position and motion, relativity of, 253. 
Possibilities, unrealized, 176. 
Possibility, and actuality, 108, i n ,  
242 et seqq. 
and partialitas, 246.
Possible and real, 243.
Posterior and prior, 48, 55, 59, 147, 
148, 158.
Posthuma, Opera, see Index I. 
Praevidentia, 24, 25.
Pre-eminence of Attributes, 300. 
Pre-established harmony, 108. 
Prejudice in favour of ‘facts’, 180, 229. 
Present, 19 et seqq.
its reality, 19-20.
Present, the ‘military’, 314.




Primary parts of Natura naturata, 
205, 209-15 passim, 259. 
Primary qualities, reality of, 179-80. 
Primary and secondary qualities, 176, 
I77> I79> t8o, 256, 274. 
Principia Cartesii, see Index I. 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscern- 
ables, n o , 142, 143, 301. 
‘Principle-riding’, 281.
Prior and posterior, 31-2, 48, 55, 59, 
60-1, 147, 148, 158.
Process, 55, 59.
Process, duration, and quality, 59.
Process, mental and neural, 261.
Procession, 55.
Productivity, 61.
Progress, moral, 301-4 passim.
‘Projects’, 222.
‘Projicience’, 166, 186, 300.
Propria communia, 52, 90, 94, 100 et 
seqq., 151, 176. 
hierarchy of, 94, 103, 151. 
relation to Reason and scientia 
intuitiva, 94-8.
Propria propria, 100-1, 102.





Puncta, 107-8, 114, 122 et seqq., 138, 
139, 142, 158, 269.




Quadam, 99, 103, 104.
Qualitative transcendence, 319.
‘Qualitied’ thing, integration of, 173-5. 
place of, 191.
‘Qualified’ thing and sense-organism,
174-
Qualities, emergent, 61. 
integration of, 175 et seqq., 234, 318. 
primary and secondary, 176, 177, 
179, 180-2, 256, 274.
Quality, 55-6, 59, 60, 61, 119, 120, 
164-82 passim. 
not emergent, 256.
Quality, and constellation, 274, 303. 
duration, and process, 59. 
and passage, 245. 
and quantity, 313. 
and sense-content duplicated, 177-9. 
and Space-Time, 274. 
and summation, 155. 
and synthesis, 120, 164-82 passim. 
and time, 255.
Quantity, 12, 13, 313.
Quatenus, 85, 146, 320.
‘Quiescent mass’, 79, 81, 83, 155.
Quintessence, non-successive, 320. 
of phenomenality, 223.
Ranges, of individuality and distinc­
tions of duration, sempiternity, 
and eternity, 120 et seqq. 
of quality and constellation, 274.
Rational and spiritual apprehension, 
278.
Real, the transcendent, 305-21 passim. 
unchanging, 57, 301-4.
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Real, the, and duration, 7, 8, 13, 19, 
229, 315. 
and Extension, 8, 9, 12, 13, 78 et 
seqq., 256. 
and system, 52. 
and time, 6.








Reality, bifurcation of, 232.
constituted by time, 306.
Reality, and activity, 53, 207, 233. 
and eternity, 229. 
and passage, 243.
perfection, and value, 232, 295, 314. 
and sense-perception, 168, 266. 
and truth, 293.
Reality, of colour, 187.
of duration, 118-20, 128, 167, 305,315-
of finite individual, 91-3, H4-19, 
144- 5 , 3°i- 
of perspectives, 189.
Reason, 16, 17, 47-8, 63, 94-6, 100 et 
seq., 317- 
passage from, to scientia intuitiva, 
49-50, 95, 102.
Reason, and conduct, 231.
and scientia intuitiva, 49, 50, 95, 99, 
101-3, 296.
Reciprocity, 83.
Reference and apposition, genitive of, 
268.
Reflection and reproduction, 210, 269. 
Reflective knowledge, 55, 295. See 
Idea ideae.
Relation, the absolute, 293.
Relations, dyadic and polyadic, igo. 
Relativity, 28, 35, 84.
Relativity, of position and motion, 253. 
of spatio-temporal motus et quies, 
87-8.
‘Relativity, absolute’, 59.
Religion and Science, conflict of, 278. 
‘Remanet’, 77.
Repetition in nature, 142.
Repose, inward mental, 53 et seqq., 
176.
Reproduction, 135, 170, 210, 269. 
and constitution, 171, 172. 
and reflection, 210, 269.
Res extensa naturans and res extensa 
naturata, 85, 88. 
Responsiveness and finitude, 92, 140, 
147. 259, 269, 303.
Retina, colour in, 185-6, 187.








Science and Religion, conflict of, 278. 
Sciences, 47, 233.
Scientia intuitiva, 17, 47-8, 55, 63, 95, 
96, 152, 176, 296. 
passage to, from Reason, 49-50, 95, 
102.
Scientia intuitiva and Reason, 49, 50, 
.95 , 9?, 101-3, 296.
Scientific objects, 239.
Scientific philosophy, defects of, 
228-9.
Scientific time, 29.
Scientific truth, eternity of, 16. 
‘Screens’, 181.
Secondary and primary qualities,
176-9, 180, 256, 274. 
reality of, 180-1, 182.
Sections and parts, 76, 87, 89, 91, 92, 
112, 142, 148, 151, 205, 213-14, 
269, 296, 320, 323.
Selective, correlation of Thought and 
Extension is not, 284-5, 289. 
human knowledge is, 287. 
Self-diremption, 283. 
Self-maintenance, 88, 140, 147, 200. 
Self-permeation of duration, 59-61, 
236, 237, 256.
Self-reflecting unity, 203-6, 296. 
Self-representative process, 41. 
Sempiternity, vii, 14, 74, 112, 120, 
124-5, IZ6, 127, 130, 131, 254, 
298, 307-8, 309, 311, 313. 




Sense-objects, 190, 241. 
Sense-organism, and perception, 169,
170-1.
and ‘qualitied’ thing, 174. 
Sense-perception, 164-91 passim, 314, 
318.
its defect, 171-2.
Sense-perception and the Real, 168,
266.
See Perception.
Sense-quality, not made by conscious­
ness, 188, 266. 
place of, 172, 177, 183-91.
Sensum, 190.
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Sentience, 293.
Sentient experience, 293.
Sheep, flock of, 147.
Short circuit, 323.
Short Treatise on God, Man, and His 
Well-being, see Index I (Korte 
Verhandeling).
Sieve, 316.
Sin, sense of, 302.
Singulars, fixed and eternal, 90. 
of Imagination, 89. 
mutable, go.
universal, 16, 47, 94, 313.
Site, building, 79, 81.






Solus Deus, 43, 70, 104. 
Somnambulists, 265.
‘Sons of God’, 208.
Sorites, 49.
Sorrow, 51 et seqq.
Sotto voce, 92, 170.
Souls, 108.
Space, essentially temporal, 249. 
without time nothing, 250, 253. 
dimensions of, and characters of 
time, 249.
Space, and its modes, 180. 
and time, compared, 9 et seqq. 
measurements of, 248. 
their relation, 248 et seqq.
Space, empty, 271-2. 
finite, 35.
Space-Time, 30, 61, 83, 166, 168, 181, 
214, 248-78 passim, 283. 
distortion of, by objects, 24s, 275. 
its filling, 275.
essentially incomplete, 252, 253. 
not ultimately real, 253. 
Space-Time, and motion, 250, 255.
and quality, 274.
Space-Time, as four-dimensional con­
tinuum, 248-9. 
pure and evolved, 254. 
real, is eternal Extension, 245, 253, 
275-
Space-Time, framework, 242, 287. 
Spanish poet, 113.
‘Spark of being’, 166.
Spatial distinctions relative but re­
versible, 9 et seqq., 28. 
Spatialized time, 310.
Specialization and multiplication in 
organisms, 202.
Specious present, 20 et seqq., 26, 39 
et seqq., 309.
Specious present, an infinite, 22 et seq., 
25, 308. 
not temporal, 22-3.
Spectre at feast, 239.
Specula, 322, 324.
Specula aeternitatis, ex, 99, 323, 324. 
‘Speculation’, 127, 322.
Spirits, i n .
Spiritual and natural, 277-8.
Spiritual and rational apprehension, 
278.
State, a makeshift, 203.
Stocks and plants, 93.
Stone and body, 284, 288.
Struggle, and achievement, 56, 58, 59, 
304, 314- 
Struggle, moral, 233.
Stubborn ‘imaginative’ content, 96, 
118, 127-8, 130-1, 168, 301-2. 
Stuff and Substance, 274.
Subject and object, 291, 293. 
‘Subjective’ and ‘objective’, 18, 222. 
Subjective content, 292-3.
‘Subjective’ duration, 12, 18, 26. 
Subjectivism, 9, 10, 179, 183.
Sub quadam specie aeternitatis, 17, 47, 
49-50, 80, 99-104, 176, 182. 
Subsistence, 15, 125.
Substance, 7,43, 144, 150, 153-4, 156. 
206-7, 282, 300. 
neither an aggregate nor an empty 
form, 89. 
not an organic unity, 295, 298. 
not a summum genus, 115, 153, 156. 
Substance, and Attribute, 270, 276, 
290, 291, 296, 298-300. 
and mode, 145, 146, 148. 
and stuff, 274.
Substantial Extension, 299. 
Substantial Thought, 299.
Substantive and adjective, 318. 
Suburbs, 266, 268, 316.
Success and failure, 324.
Succession, 12, 13, 26 et seqq., 60, 119, 
176, 310.
Summa Theologica, I, x, 5, (Aquinas), 
73-
Summation, and constellation, 179,323. 
and integration, 238, 324. 
and quality, 155.






Symbolic deduction of the modes of 
unity, 209-13.
Synthesis, and analysis, 107. 
and quality, 120, 164-82 passim.
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Synthetical and analytical methods, 
58 .
System and the Real, 52.
Table, 286, 288-9.
Temporal distinctions relative but 
irreversible, 9 et seqq., 28.
Temporal extension without transi­
ency, 23, 39, 308-9.
‘Tempunctum’, 139, 308.
Tendency, 216.
Test for reader, 303.
Theologico - Politicus, Tractatus, see 
Index I.
Theology, v, 277.
Thermodynamics, Second Law of, 
198, 216-18.
Thing, ‘ qualified’, and sense-organ- 
ism, 174. 
integration of, 173-5.
‘This or that’ man, 75, 194, 317.
Thought, an actual infinite, 161. 
analysis of, 293-4. 
its duality, 293-5. 
essentially individual, 272. 
as logical content, 272. 
a quality of empirical things, 257, 
259, 260-1, 262, 290.
Thought, Substantial, 299.
finite, less than its object, 300.
Thought and Extension, 253, 281-300 
passim.
not selectively correlated, 284-5, 
289.
Throb, kinaesthetic, 179.
Timaeus, 37 C, D, 25, 214, 306-8.




direction absolute, 9 et seqq., 28,
32- 3.
empirical character of, 255, 274. 
fluency of, 276. 
importance for Kant, 229-30. 
reality of, 118-20, 128, 167, 305, 315.
relativity and irreversibility of, 9 et 
seqq., 28. 
constitutes space, 270. 
successive, 12-13, 26 et seq., 60, 
119, 310. 
transiency of, 58-9, 256, 303, 310. 
not a dimension of space, 12,13, 248, 
249.
not temporal, 252, 306.
Time, as an Attribute, 251-6. 
beginning and end of, 34-9. 
characters of, and dimensions of 
space, 249.
Time, deduction of, x, 158, 237, 238. 
mind as a form of, 250. 
mind of space, 249, 270. 
origin, 5, 66, 307-8. 
problem of, .3-4.
Time, and the Absolute, 41. 
and cause, 82-3. 
and duration, 4, 5, 42, 167, 314. 
and eternity, 4, 43, 112-14, 117, 
158, 164, 2 ii ,  222, 228, 238, 
255, 256, 270, 275, 298, 302, 
307,310,312,322. 
incommensurable, 304. 
and measure, 7, 59. 
and partialitas, 42, 112. 
and phenomenology, 228-47 passim. 
and quality, 255. 
and the Real, 6. 
and space, compared, 9 et seqq. 
measurements of, 248. 
their relation, 248 et seqq. 
will, and purpose, 40 et seq.
Time, absolute, 27.
abstract and concrete, 34-6. 
clock-, 74, 248. 
empty, 36, 271-2. 
a finite, 34 et seqq. 
historical, 13, 27.





Times, ‘objective’, are hybrids, 29. 
Timeless and ‘timeful’ moments, 309. 
Timelessness, 16, 49, 59, 97, 125, 256, 
298, 306, 309, 324. 
an essential constituent of time, 59, 
298, 306.
Time-series, 131 et seqq.
Time-span, 39.
To Himself, xii, 36, (Marcus Aurelius), I3S-
Torn edge of finite individuality, 127. 
Tota Natura, 36 et seqq., 121, 125. 
Totum simul, 22, 24, 73-4, 118, 308. 
Tracks, spatio-temporal, 255-6. 
‘ Trahison’, 226-7, 306. 
Transcendence, 281-321 passim.
qualitative, 319.
Transcendence, and inclusion, 320-1. 
Transcendentales termini, 115. 
Transcendentism, deistic, 305, 306, 
313 ,. 315- 
Transcreation, n o , 232, 233. 
Transcript, 299.
Transformation and conservation, 321. 
‘Transformation without succession’, 
62, 158, 165, 176, 234, 304, 319-
343
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Transiency, 59, 87, 169-70, 210 -n , 
256, 3° 3 . 310- 
without integration, 259.
Transiency of time, 58-9, 256, 303, 
310-
Transient and immanent causation, 
58-9, 82, 209.
Transition, 51, 55, 57, 303.
Transmuted into quality, 119-20, 319.
Tremor, 179.
Triginta Sigilli, (Bruno), 33.
Tristitia, 51 et seqq.
Truth and reality, 293.
‘Twenty men’, 281-2.





‘Unconscious mind’, 265, 284.
Unica Substantia, 282, 300.
Unicellular organism, 200-2. 
specialization in, 202.
Union with the body and with God, 
143, 192-3.
Unit of duration, 6-7.
Unity, collective, 195. 
creative, 206-9. 
divine and cognitive, 299-300. 
mechanical, 196-9, 214, 217. 
modes of, 193-215 passim.
symbolic deduction of, 209-13. 
organic, 199-203, 212, 217, 264. 
self-reflecting, 203-6, 296.
Unity, nisus to externality, 85, 151, 
154» 158, 159» 166.
Universal, abstract, 15 et seq., 47, 94, 
96, 97, 115, 313- 
concrete, 163, 168, 313. 
singulars, 16, 47, 94, 313.
Universe, 83. 
descent to, 83-4.
Universe, and man, 101-2.
and Natura, 166.
Universe, a mechanical, 218.
Validity, 125.
Value, and duration incommensurable, 
117-18, 136, 311, 312. 
and fact, 232, 305, 313, 315. 
perfection, and reality, 232, 295, 314. 
Values, 231, 232, 302, 305, 306, 312, 
313 , 314» 315» 3 i 6 , 322, 324. 
eternal, efficiency of, 133, 314. 
supervenient, 235.
‘Vanishing’, 214.
‘Vapour’ of instants, 255.
Variety of the universe, 78, 83-4, 254, 
272.
Vibration and colour, 177-8. 
Vigilance, 179, 263-6, 269.
Vis activa, 138.
Vitalism, 223.
White is black, 185.
Whole, the, duration of, 237. 
the spirit of, 123, 124, 211, 214. 
no phenomenon of, 230.
Whole and part, 92-3, n o , 112-14, 
124, 145, 150, 206, 222, 230-1, 
236-7.
Whole, collective and mechanical, 196. 
Wholeness and knowledge, 45. 
Wicked, 311.
Will, 40 et seq.
of God, 253.
Windows, 108.
Worlds of understanding and of sense, 
231-2.
Worm in blood, 121 et seqq.
X-Attribute, 284-9 passim, 294, 296-7,
299.
X-ian modes, 284, 286, 288, 294, 296.
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